주한미육군 군정청, 일반문서

브라운 대령이 워드 장군에게 보낸 서한

Letter from Colonel Brown to General Ward
1948-07-02 · 보고일 1948-07-02 주한미육군 군정청 United States Army Military Government in Korea, USAFIK
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수신: 미육군 제6사단장 올랜도 워드(Orlando Ward) 소장 친애하는 워드(Ward) 장군님: 저는 부산으로 가서 장군님과 사모님을 직접 뵙고 작별인사를 드릴 생각으로 5월 19일의 장군님의 편지에 답장을 하지 않았습니다. 그러나 제가 여유있게 제주도를 출발하여 부산을 여행할 시간이 없었습니다. 저는 유감스럽게도 제6사단과 제20연대를 떠나게 되었습니다. 저는 장군님께서 관심을 가질 것이라는 희망으로 저의 제주도에서의 활동에 대한 보고서 사본을 동봉합니다. 저는 제주도 폭동의 원인에 관하여 많은 다른 의견들이 있음을 깨닫게 되었습니다. 저는 저의 보고서가 현재의 제주도의 명확한 전체 모습을 나타내기를 희망합니다. 제주도가 공산주의자들의 거점으로 조직되었다는 한 가지 사실은 너무도 명확합니다. 그 증거는 일단 우리가 실제로 그 문제를 파고들어 갔을 때 부정할 수 없었습니다. 경찰의 잔악성과 비효율적인 정부도 원인이었지만 본도에 대한 공산주의자들의 계획에 비하면 지엽적인 원인들입니다. 루스(Loose) 중위는 제20연대의 제주도 파견관으로서 훌륭히 임무를 수행하고 있습니다. 그는 유능한 청년 장교이며 상황을 잘 파악하고 있습니다. 저는 군정중대가 매우 약한 모습이라는 점에서 장군님과 전적으로 동감입니다. 그러나 저는 노엘(Noel) 소령과 제가 노력하여 군정중대를 다소 정상으로 되돌려 놓았다고 생각합니다. 그동안 저에게 베풀어 주신 모든 일에 감사드립니다. 로스웰 브라운(Rothwell Brown) 대령 <첨부문서> 1948년 7월 1일 제주도 활동 보고서 (역주: 48년 7월 17일 딘 소장이 노엘 소령에게 보낸 공문의 첨부문서 참조)
THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA No. 149 United States Political Advisor Office, Hq. XXIV Corps, APO 235, c/o PM, San Francisco, California. SECRET FOR STATE DEPT USE ONLY Seoul, Korea, July 2, 1948 SUBJECT: Disturbances on Cheju Island NORTH EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT OF STATE THE HONORABLE THE SECRETARY OF STATE, WASHINGTON. SIR: In connection with the disturbances on Cheju Island, which we attribute in a general way to Communist activities, I have the honor to enclose a copy of a secret memorandum dated June 16, 1948, prepared for the Commanding General by his Deputy who visited the Island. Perusal of this memorandum will give a more accurate view of the situation there and the various disturbing factors which enable the Communist elements to take advantage of the situation for furtherance of their aims. This despatch should not be distributed outside of a limited circle within the Department itself because it is a copy of an Army document which should be treated strictly as its classification —secret—indicates. Respectfully yours, Joseph E. Jacobs United States Political Adviser Enclosure: Copy of report on Cheju Island disturbances. <첨부문서> 제주도 소요관련 보고서 사본(1948. 6. 16) Enclosure to despatch no. 199 July 2, 1948 Seoul, Korea, "Disturbances on Cheju Island" [illegible] [illegible] S[illegible] [illegible] SECRET [illegible] CG: COPY [illegible] PH[illegible] [illegible] p [illegible] 24 [illegible] 248 MEMORANDL FOR: The Commanding General SUBJECT: Visit to Cheju Do, 13 June, 1948 a1. Operations. [illegible] the forward [illegible] is conducting [illegible] operations [illegible] [illegible] a. Four Constabulary battalions and move been stationed to the north, east, west and south sides of the Island respectively, with about two companies in each battalion on substations in the battalion area. The police are charged with the responsibility of security in the coastal area and the Constabulary all areas exclusive of the coastal area. b. Searching of Constabulary areas simultaneously by all battalions working inland toward the high point of the mountain as the common objective is scheduled to be completed and troops back at their base camps today (16 June). c. About three thousand persons have been apprehended and screened during this operation. At present there are 575 persons, including two women, in the stockade at Cheju now being screened again by four interrogation teams. In this search, several subleaders were apprehended and through them, caches in caves in the mountains have been located. 500,000 yen, arms, food and equipment have been captured. At the time of my visit, headquarters in Cheju was out of communication with battalions other than by runner, so results of the operations on the 15th had not been received d. The operation has scattered the raiders into small bands who are on the run and in hiding. A second operation is contemplated in a few days to search the island from north and south in reverse order by adjoining battalions to surprise the raiders and with the hope of apprehending more 2. Conditions. a. The conditions are much improved but will be lost unless a well organized information and reorientation program is rigorously executed. b. Communist trained agents are highly organized on the Island and Colonel Brown estimates that about 80% of the population are connected or adhere to the Communist set up through fear. Each village has a Communist cell and unless the inhabitants do as directed, they are shot, or beaten. or their homes are burned. Colonel Brown is of the opinion that the organization of the Island has been effected by the South Korean Labor Party. Except for few agents sent in from China, or Manchuria, or North Korea, most of the raiders were trained natives. Few arms and a very little equipment have been found that could not have been obtained on the Island from old Japanese, American sources, or locally made. [illegible] the [illegible] fire in constant fear and cooperat. ith the Com[illegible] [illegible] be[illegible] of that [illegible] grade[illegible] [illegible] in [illegible] [illegible] been reopened but idle school students are on strike and so far have re- ised to return. leftist tendencies have found fertile rowth in these students and they are acting in accordance ith instructions. d. The police brutality, and economic conditions the Island have contributed immeasurably to the work f the Communists and will require long and thorough treat- ent. The police activities are well known in this headquarters. e. The economic situation is intolerable and corrective tion must be taken on a little headway can be made. f. The Island, unlike the mainland, does not derive s major income from rice. Other grains are produced. The ajor crop of the Island has been the sweet potato for con- ersion into alcohol. The Japanese operated a large alcohol lant at Cheju, buying the potatoes from the farmers. The 946 and 1947 crops were purchased and alcohol made. g. Colonel Brown states that the operations of the lant sold the last year's production of alcohol and, through heft or other disposition, have no funds to purchase present risting crop on the Island the plant is closed. The value f the crop is about 40,000,000 yen. The farmers are approach- ng planting season now and with their last crop on their hands re confused and do not know what to plant. h. Unless this situation is corrected without de- ay, serious trouble there can be expected both economically nd politically. 3. Miscellaneous Items. a. There are three Japanese fishing boats tied up a Cheju basin that were seized for being in local waters, nd have been there for six months without action taken as o their disposition. The Japanese crews live in the boats nd are fed from provincial sources. These boats should be eleased, or employed in local fishing to assist local economy. b. An FS boat, aground in the harbor, is beyond urther use. There is machinery aboard, such as lathes, tc., that could be used locally if salvage would be permitted. c. The retaining wall on the quay at Cheju is badly undermined from high seas of past seasons. It can be saved ow by chucking stone into washed cut areas. If this work s not done soon the entire port will be subject to destruction and the only suitable port on the Island made inoperable. 4. Recommendations: The above information is based upon statements of Colonel Brown and by personal observation. No doubt Military Government is cognizant of the above conditions, but I feel that conditions—there are of such nature that prompt— action should be taken. Therefore, the following recommendations are made: a. A comprehensive reorientation of the inhabitants of Cheju be made by OCI, mainly through Korean personnel, be effected without delay. Communist hold on the Island must be eliminated or serious effect on the island will result. b. An efficient and reliable police force be stationed on the Island. c. A mobile, efficient Constabulary force should be stationed on the Island until the police can take over security responsibility. d. Action be taken to remedy the present intolerable situation relative to the potato crop and operation of alcohol plant. e. Action taken to dispose of the three Japanese fishing boats in the harbor. f. Salvage of the FS boat be effected. g. Repair of retaining wall on quay be accomplished at earliest practicable time.
출처: 제주4·3사건진상규명및희생자명예회복위원회 편, 『제주4·3사건자료집 9』 [미국자료편], 번역문 p.37 / 원문 p.456–459.