공산주의 지하전투 부대

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE RADIO AND CABLE CENTER LRS # INCOMING MESSAGE LRS PRIORITY FROM : CG USAFIK TO : CINCFE (G-2) (ATTN COL DODDS) 43 > ZQBT 1944 21 Nov 48 DECLASSIFIED PER CS LTR OF 20 AUG 73 Reference WX 92068. Communists Underground Combat Forces are known variously as "People's Liberation Army," "Action Vanguard Corps" and guerrillas. Term Guerrillas is used in this message. Part A. 1. Organization: Apparently in each province there is a Mil Bureau Parallel with Provincial Central Committee of South Korea Labor Party. Head of Mil Bureau is fully responsible for organization and activities of various forces. In at least some of provinces each town and village is in turn directly subordinate to bureau and all directives emanating from bureau are rapidly disseminated through those channels. It is not determined that there is a centralized authority higher than Provincial Mil Bureau to coordinate activities of guerrillas. However it is assumed that guerrilla forces-like all Communists-cooperate with each other. According to info received, principly in Cheju Do, guerrilla forces are organized on basis of battalions of 60 to 80 men each composed of 2 companies of 2 platoons of 2 squads each. Where organization has been very thorough and detailed, such as on Cheju Do, there is evidence that battalion commanders had ord, Intelligence, Supply and Medical Sections. Also on Cheju Do company commanders are assisted by deputy commanders for political affairs, typical of organizations patterned after the Soviet. It is not known to what degree such detail and thorough organization has been accomplished in other provinces. 2. Present Morale : It was estimated last spring that there were on Cheju Do between 1400 and 2000 organized guerrillas. In the other provinces the estimates are from 150 to 500. Guerrilla strength is considered to fluctuate widely, depending on activities. When combat forces initiate an operation it is likely they gain recruits on the spot, particularly if they find the civs sympathetic because of recent police brutality or traditional rice collection. It is considered certain that during periods of inactivity, many of guerrillas return to their homes and take up at least an outward resumption of normal life. 3. Unit locations: D. Cholla Pukto, Kyongsang Namdo, Cholla Namdo: Traditional Guerrilla Area in these 3 Provincey is Chiri coordinates (1 KNOYO 60-1370) mountain area. Local guerrillas have been reinforced by remnants of Yosu coordinates (1070-1300) mutineers who escaped Loyal Constabulary Forces. Total of bands operating in general area is estimated by Constabulary to be 800. In addition there are estimated to be approximately 150 trained active guerrillas around Posong coordinated (1000-1300) and approximately 100 near Yongan coordinates (960-1300). Conventionally province of Cholla Namdo is strongly Communistic, particularly during rice collections. E. Cheju Do: Estimates of present strength on Cheju Do vary between 300 and 1500. Losses recently inflicted by Constabulary are reportedly approximately 300; it is very doubtful that all of these were bonafide guerrillas. 4. Arms and equipment: In general, guerrillas are considered to have about 50% of their strength armed with bamboo spears and other 50% with Japanese 99 rifles, carbines and M-1's captured from Security Forces or brought in by mutineers. Occasionally homemade and Japanese grenades are reported. Some weapons are probably received from North Korea. There is no info as to vehicles or heavy weapons. 6. Targets and Operational Plans: Targets are conventionally to attack police boxes and kill police, to assassinate govt officials and other prominent Rightists, to arouse homtility toward Republic of Korea through propaganda, and occasionally to sabotage communications. It is noteworthy that, except during election period and Yosu mutiny, numerous plans and threats to assassinate Rightists have not materialized. Plans call for raids on towns and villages incident to attack of targets. 8. Communications and control by North Korea: For Communist activities in general, orders originate in Pyongyang. They are sent to SKLP Hq in Haeju Coordinates (870-1700) North Korea, and from that point are transmitted to South Korea through agents or smugglers who are crossing 38th Parallel daily. Unconfirmed reports have been received that communication is also effected by rad. Several C sources report that liaison is maintained from both National and Provincial SKLP central committees directly with head of each guerrilla force. (As noted in Par 1, other reports state that head of mil bureau is parallel to head of provincial central committee). Communications in South Korea (generally carried by courier, both male and female. Most of messages are oral rather than written. As another means of control North Korean ∠ ⊘ auth are rptd to be sending trained organizers to ea province in South Korea to aid in preperation of plans and in tng guerrilla tactics. Part C. 2. Constabulary: The Yosu-Sunchon mutiny disclosed for certainty what has long been reported, that is that Constabulary has been infiltrated by Communists. However it also demonstrated that vast majority of Constabulary are loyal. Elements of at least 6 Regts were in contact with mutineers yet only unit to desert to mutineers was 1st Co sent (alone) against them. Not only were there no other reported disaffections during period os mutiny but units which subdued mutineers fought to best of their ability against rebellious elements. On 2 Nov an uprising at Taegu indicated that Bn of 6th Regt was not entirely loyal. A disturbance took place on rifle range when Sgt being arrested for Communist activities killed arresting off. p[illegible] civ sympathizers. Most Constabularymen quickly surrendered to an. American; 80 or 90 fled with their weapons and were rounded up next day. Extent of Communist influence has not yet been determined. Constabulary officials report that, as result of screening, 60 Communists have been found in Bn. It is probable that these characteristically exploited an incident which is easy to do with volatile Koreans. Significant is report that one method riot leaders used to get EM out of barracks when outbreak started was to appeal to throw loyalty to govt by pretending that they were to fight mutineers from Yosu who were approaching Taegu. Since Sep, Constabulary Intelligence pers have arrested about 1,600 suspected Communists in Constabulary; the searching out is continuing.