브라운 대령: 1948년 5월 22일부터 1948년 6월 30일

CONFIDENTIAL HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA APO 235 Unit 2 1 July 1948 SUBJECT: Report of Activities on Cheju-Do Island from 22 May 1948, to 30 June 1948 TO: Commanding General United States Army Military Government in Korea APO 235 Unit 2 1. As a result of screening operations in which approximately 5,000 inhabitants of Cheju-Do Island were interrogated, the following information has been obtained: Organization of Cheju-Do Island by the South Korean Labor Party began in 1946. Organization proceeded slowly during the early part of 1947. When it became apparent that there was going to be a separate election for South Korea, organization activities were intensified and special organizers were sent in from the mainland. As far as can be determined, these organizers were all Koreans. The principal leaders had received intensive training in Communist infiltration tactics. No evidence was uncovered of the physical presence of Nationals of any other country. During the pre-election period Communist cells were established in every village and town throughout the Island. These cells consisted of a cell leader, propaganda agent and supply agent and, in the larger towns, personnel to assume civil government functions upon the breakdown of the established government. In addition to Communist cells, which were organized in the villages, the People's Democratic Army for the Island of Cheju-Do was established. This consisted of two regiments and the usual complement of battalions. Officer personnel were assigned and recruiting was vigorous. At the height of the rioting, it is estimated that the People's Democratic Army had a strength of approximately 4,000 officers and men. Less than 10% of this force was equipped with rifles, the balance being armed with Japanese swords and native made spears. The Women's Auxiliary of the South Korean Labor Party was also established and very complete lists of membership have been uncovered. 2. It is estimated that not over six trained agitators and organizers were sent in from the outside to establish the South Korean Labor Party on the Island of Cheju-Do. It is estimated that an additional five to seven hundred sympathizers, with some real understanding of Communism and its purposes, joined these six specialized organizers in the movement. It is estimated that between sixty and seventy thousand people on the Island actually joined the South Korean Labor Party. However, it has been quite apparent that a large majority of these people had no real understanding of the background or purposes of the South Korean Labor Party, nor any real understanding of, or desire to join the Communistic CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL Report of Activities on Cheju-Do Island from 22 May 1948, to 30 June 1948 movement. They were, for the main part, ignorant, uneducated farmers and fishermen whose livelihood had been profoundly disturbed by the war and the post-war difficulties, and they were easily persuaded that the South Korean Labor Party offered them increased economic security. 3. There were several factors which influenced the success of the pre-election organization of the Island of Cheju-Do by the Communist Party acting through the South Korean Labor Party. These were: a. The marked lack of initiative and understanding of the aims of the Communist Party and their tactics by the various Chief Civil Affairs Officers commanding the 59th Military Government Company on the Island of Cheju-Do. b. The thorough and long-range plan set up by the South Korean Labor Party in 1946, which was carried through with skill and determination by highly trained organizers and agitators until May 1948. c. Skillful and sustained use of all organs of Communistic propaganda. d. A complete lack of effective American counter-propaganda. e. Graft and inefficiency on the part of Korean Government officials. f. A disturbed and disrupted economic life for the people on the Island. g. Ineffective organization of Island police units, especially with respect to the establishment of efficient police intelligence units. h. A lack of coordination between CIC and Military Government personnel on the Island. 4. There were several factors which influenced the success of the election riots and which led to negation of the election and the development of a major revolt on the Island. These were: a. Failure on the part of the Chief Civil Affairs Officer of the 59th Military Government Company to take prompt and determined action: (1) To break up initial riots with forces immediately available to him. (2) To control the Island police. (3) To effectively employ police reserves as they arrived on the Island. DECLASSIFIED Authority NND [illegible] 2 CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL Report of Activities on Cheju-Do Island from 22 May 1948, to 30 June 1948 (4) To issue positive orders to Korean Constabulary units as they arrived on the Island and to take positive steps to assure the execution of such orders. b. Excessive brutality and terrorism practiced by police reserves sent to the Island (this was a direct result of comments made in (2) and (3) above). c. Infiltration of Communist sympathizers into the Korean Constabulary which resulted in two successive regimental commanders of the 11th Regiment conducting negotiations with the Communist agitators and adopting stalling tactics where vigorous action was required. (The Korean Constabulary could have been immediately effective, if the Chief Civil Affairs Officer had been forceful and positive in his actions). d. The spread of panic among all inhabitants of the Island and the complete breakdown of all civil government functions resulting from: (1) The complete and widespread organization of Communist cells in each and every town and in each and every government department. (2) The immediate death and destruction imposed by the Communist leaders on all individuals who opposed the revolt. (3) Inability on the part of the police, the Constabulary and Military Government to afford protection to loyal citizens. e. The natural tendency among the people of Cheju-Do Island to resent government control and a background and history of Island lawlessness. f. Blood ties which link most of the families on the Island and make it extremely difficult to obtain information. 5. Procedure adopted on 22 May 1948, to break up the revolt: a. Police were assigned the definite mission to protect all coastal villages; to arrest rioters carrying arms, and to stop the killing and terrorizing of innocent citizens. b. The Constabulary was assigned the definite mission of breaking up all elements of the People's Democratic Army formed within the interior of the Island. c. An interrogation center was established for the interrogation of all prisoners taken either by the police or by the Constabulary. Information obtained in the interrogation center was used either in preparation of trials of proved offenders, or in arresting individuals implicated in the rioting. CONFIDENTIAL DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 947500 CONFIDENTIAL Report of Activities on Cheju- Do Island from 22 May 1948, to 30 June 1948 d. Civil government officials were given police and Constabulary protection and civil government functions were re-established as rapidly as could be done. 6. Recommended procedure to prevent reorganization of rioters on Cheju-Do Island. a. Maintain one regiment of Korean Constabulary on the Island for at least one year. b. Reorganize the Island police into an effective and trained unit. c. Establish a long-range, sustained American educational program which will: (1) Offer positive proof of the evils of Communism. (2) Show that the American way offers positive hope for the future and for sound economic development of the Island. (3) Provide effective counter propaganda to Communist propaganda claims. d. Provide the Island with a civil government which is as nearly free from graft and inefficiency as can be developed. Rothwell H. Brown ROTHWELL H. BROWN Colonel Cav 1 Incl 1st Partial Report of Information obtained through screening members of the South Korean Labor Party on Cheju-Do Island (Additional annexations to this report will be furnished approximately on 10 July 1948) 4 CONFIDENTIAL DECLASSIFIED Authority[illegible]