1948년 활동보고서

971ST CIC DETACHMENT ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT 1948 Re DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 911069 By &UT NARA, Date 1/6/[illegible] SANITIZED COPY SENSITIVE INFORMATION DELETED ACS 59-3733 RECEIVED IN 5 DEC 1942 No. 04738 SECTION I INTRODUCTION: 2. Organization of the 971st C.C Detachment The 971st CIC Detachment has its headquarters in Seoul, the capitol city of Korea. During the year of 1948, there were thirteen district offices and seven sub-offices in operation. From the beginning of September 1948 to the end of December 1948, because of the decrease in the number of Counter Intelligence personnel in Korea, the sub-offices were gradually closed. The following is a list of district and sub-offices: a. Seoul district Office h. Kwangju District Office Uijongbu Sub-office Lokpo Sub-office b. Kaesong District Office i. Pusan District Office Masan Sub-office c. Inchon District Office j. Chonju District Office d. Ongjin District Office Kunsan Sub-office e. Kanguung District Office k. Chongju District Office Camchok Sub-office l. Taejon District Office f. Chunchon District Office Honggsong Sub-office m. Cheju-do District Office g. Taegu District Office Pohang Sub-office 3. Associate Espionage Investigations KANG Mun Buk, chairman of the Propaganda Section of SKLP is in charge of one of the liaison points to effect liaison between the JOP and the Asiatic Cominform. KIM Chun Hae, aka KIM Ten Kai, member of the Central Executive Committee of the Japanese Communist Party(JCP) and KOSAKA Sabume, aka KOIDA Sabome, of the JCP makes contact with the Cominform through KANG Mun Buk and SONG Sung Chul for the SKLP and CHOI Yong Dal and LEE Kang Kook for the NKLP. Smuggling ships based in Pusan and Cheju Do, coded international mail, and courier services are the means of effecting liaison. Another source indicated that communication is maintained by wireless stations established in the Japanese towns of Nigate, Tauruga, and Akitaall towns on the coast of the Sea of Japan. In addition to the wireless transmittal, contact with the Cominform is made through numerous smuggling ships operating between the ports of Chongjin and Ha Nam, Hamyong Pukto, North Korea and unknown Japanese ports on the Sea of Japan. PAK Heun Young maintains contact with the Cominform through the Soviet Army Headquarters in Pyongyang, North Korea. Communications and liaison are also maintained through the underground Central League of Korean Cooperatives liaison connection with the Democratic League of Koreans Residing in Japan. 5. Subversive Activity The historical dominance of the oriental police has proved in some instances to be detrimental to the advancement of Korean independence. Police suppression probably was responsible for the success of the Communist agitation on Cheju Do Island. In other instances, catering to the whims of pplice officials was responsible for decrease of production in certain industries. Although a large and powerful police force has been necessary to control the subversive elements in South Korea, undue repression has caused wide criticism of the American policy, destroying to some extent the good-will desired by the American Command. In some cases of suspected subversive activity, CIC has found the cause to be dissension between individuals in vital positions. The leftist uprising and guerrilla warfare that raged on Cheju Do Island in April, May and June was a leftist success in terms of herve wrought. Efforts of the left wing to disrupt the May general elections by attacking registration and election booths were negligible considering that they made attempts at only 126 out of 13,455 booths. trained leftist propagandists, capitalizing on the psychological frustration of a liberated people, dissemated Communist propaganda against the American occupation and played up the Soviet regime in North Korea in the same manner as the distorted verbosity which emanated da daily from Radio Pyongyang. Korea's Memorial Day, 01 March, was continually referred to as a focal date by Communists in South Korea who reportedly planned an up-rising on that day to match last years performance which resulted in twenty deaths when left and right clashed. The SKLP issued orders to its members to set fire to any building belonging to the U. S. Army & to assassinate right wing politicians and important Korean employees. It is believed that failure to disseminate these orders together with police vigilance was responsible for the lack of any special violence on.01 March. Communists initiated wide-scale rioting and guerilla war-fare on Chejudo Island at the beginning of April. Sixty people were killed on the Island during the month of April. Sixty people of which about thirty were associated with the gu willa bands. Climax to the riots came during the first half of May when even more were killed during a two week period. It was during this period that the largest percentage of attacks on towns, as shown in Chart II, occurred. Communist guerilla forces, hiding in the mountains by day, attacked town after town by night, leaving behind, them devistated areas and old men, women and children brutally murderd. In July, the Korean Constabulary Commander was assassinated by leftist members of the Constabulary, who acted under orders of the leader of the People's Guerilla Forces. Constabulary reinforcements finally brought the uprising under control. Cheju Do Island was the only place in South Korea where Communist Anti-election violence met with any degree of success. Failure to receive more than half of the ballot boxes in the two districts made a second election necessary. A contributing factor in minimizing Communist violence in July and August was undoubtedly the many arrests the Communists suffered in connection with their efforts to acquire signatures on secret ballots to be sent to North Korea for the 25 August North Korean election. Approximately 120 persons were arrested in July and August, being apprehended while obtaining signatures or while on their way to North Korea. Three factors were perhaps responsible for August and September being the quietest months since the first of the year. On 12 August, CIC and police raids were conducted throughout South Korea in an attempt to apprehend known leftists, in order to allow a peaceful inauguration of the South Korean Government on 15 August. Active leftists had concentrated their effort toward securing signatures to be used in the North Korea election. 25 August found in North Korea, a large communist delegation from South Korea. Most of these delegates remained in North Korea for some time to participate in the early sessions of the Supreme Council, and to receive further directives. Another group from South Korea were enrolled in a school which prepared and organized them for the express purpose of operating in South Korea as a guerrilla force. Upon their graduation from this school, they were dispatched to South Korea as anticipated. All levels were ordered to prepare for active opposition to the autumn grain collection and to adhere to strict party lines. Guerilla forces were reportedly organizing on Cheju Do, where attacks were resumed with renewed vigor in the September. In late October, approximately forty enlisted men of a Constabulary regiment stationed on the southern coast of Korea, mutinied under the leadership of a non-commissioned officer, prior to, or while being transferred for duty on Cheju Do. It should be well to keep in mind that Oh Dong Ki held the position of regimental commander of another constabulary unit in this same area prior to his arrest come two weeks before the outbreak. The mutineers, implemented by an unknown number of civilians, attacked police, constabulary military police, railroad police, and coast guardsmen. The rebel strength increased to some 500 strong as they commandeered a train toward a small town some 25 miles inland. Other loyal constabulary units located in the vicinity engaged in a pitched battle with the rebel forces, who within a few days, increased to a strength of some two thousand. During the course of the uprising, the rebels reportedly marched through the streets flaunting Red Flags, and singing Red Songs. After a weeks time of severe fighting between rebel and loyal forces, the latter augmented by other units from the east and north, the fighting subsided and the Constabulary turned its attention to mopping up operations dedicated to eliminating all remaining dissidents that had taken refuge in the mountains adjacent to the battle area. A late press release furnished by President Rhee at the results of the uprising gave the following figures: 2,533 killed; 1,028 wounded; and 833 missing--making a total of 4,874 casualties. In the early stages of the revolt, towns were set on fire, and Police killed after trial by a typically communist "People's Court". Although six constabulary regiments had been committed against the rebels, the only case of loyal constabulary deserting to the rebels was that of one company which was attacked by a greatly superior force. The outbreak and suppression of the mutiny clearly indicated that although there are communists in the constabulary, these elements have not gained a sufficient following to constitute a menace to the Republic of Korea or to cause the constabulary to be regarded with too great suspicion. If anything, the Yosu incident has served not merely to bolster morale within the Police and Constabulary, but has caused the communist cause in South Korea to loose much "face" and disfavor with the people because of its barbaric consequences. The government likewise, has become significantly aware of the dangers and dire results attendant to the communist menace in South Korea, and has girded itself against its onslaughts if for nothing else but self-preservation. That the person in the age old proverb of "united we stand, divided we fall" has been realized by all concerned in South Korea, is clearly indicated. Again during the last week of October, guerrilla activity in Cheju Do, flared up. The Korean Constabulary suffered attacks along with the Police. About fifty agitators and demonstrators were apprehended as the Constabulary attempted to disrupt guerrilla activities. Gasoline and Japanese grenades were used during the attacks by the raiders. In October, the SKLP issued instructions to collect signatures on petitions calling for the withdrawal of the United States Troops, supposedly to be sent to the United Nations upon its completion. A sounder technique was manifested than during the underground North Korea elections in South Korea, for canvassing was placed in the hands of old men, women and children At the year's end, both Cheju Do and Yosu uprisings have been reduced to sporadic guerrilla engagements between rebels and the communists on one hand, and the forces of the government on the other. Recent indications have been that the raiders in both places have a hard winter to look forward to. Food is reportedly low, and morale equally **is** low.