합동주간정보분석 제58호

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE RADIO AND CABLE CENTER EMS MRS **INCOMING MESSAGE** SECRET PRIORITY JLA 6 Feb 49 FROM : CG USAFIK TO : DA (FOR INTELLIGENCE DIV, GEN STAFF, USA) INFO : CINCFE (G-2) NR : ZGS1 138 (WEEKLY NER 58, PERIOD 29 JAN TO 5 FEB 49) Current. 1. The Korean Foreign Office announced the appointment of Pyon Yun Tai as special representative to the Philippine Govt. Pyon, a close friend of President Rhee, was a professor of English Literature at Korea University at the time of the appointment. He has never been engaged in native politics. 2. 3 more members of the UN Commission on Korea, Yassin Majid, Syria; Aroup Sing, India, and Rufina Luna, Philippines, and several members of the Secretariat arrived in Seoul. Comment: Representatives from El Salvador and Australia, who complete the 7-man committee, are expected to arrive in the near future. 3. President Rhee announced that Col Ben Limb (Lim Byung Jik), the chief executives travelling handyman who returned to Korea on 25 Jan, had been appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, filling a vacancy that had existed since 24 Dec. Limb, who had been in the US for many yrs, filled a position vacated by Chang Taik Sang, now ambassador to Great Britain, who fell into disfavor when he publicly announced a get-tough policy against North Korea. 4. Kim Koo, strong man on the Korean political scene, now is said to be playing a devious role of cooperation with both right and left wing politics in a move calculated to place him at the head of a unified Korean Govt. (over) PRIORITY SECRET 36396 [DECLASSIFIED stamp] Authority EO [illegible] NND 795020 [GHQ FEC stamp dated 7 Feb 1949 G-2] 29 Paraphrase not required. Handle as correspondence of classification carried hereon per paragraphs 517 and 60a, AR 380-5. 1540- F Secret PRIORITY FROM: CG USAFIK NR: ZGBX 138 6 FEB '49 CONTID: His latest step is reported to have been the sending of a representative of his Korean Independence Party as a delegate to Mao Tse Tung, Chinese Communist leader, extending cooperation in exchange for Chinese Communist assistance in uniting Korea under Kim Koo's leadership. Comment: Whether Kim Koo is planning the ambitious program ascribed to him cannot definitely be proved at this time, but certain factors, confirmed by other sources, lend credence to the report. Since the north-south Pyongyang conference, he has lost favor with the Chinese Nationalist Govt; he is not too friendly toward Americans and is desirous of seeing them depart from Asia. He is bitterly opposed to President Rhee, and he is a classic example of the too common brand of oriental politician whose loyalties are dedicated largely to personal aggrandizement. 5. Subsequently it was reported that the unification guard forces, reportedly a secret group of Kim Koo's Korean Independence Party, was preparing handbills for distribution when the UN Committee on Korea goes into official session. Translation of the handbill follows: "The UN Commission on Korea is 1 of the places of the international div of our fatherland. "It is none but the deceitful or ignorant who are welcoming the UN Commission on Korea as if it was a ray of light or hope for the welfare of the fatherland. "The only way to help or save the fatherland is to eliminate of purge those rightist factions, together with the Communist traitors, that the peaceful and unified fatherland, founded on Socialism where there is no despotism or exploitation can be realized. "Do believe and trust, fellow countrymen, the unification National Guard Forces as a guiding symbol of our rising fatherland." In conjunction with this info, it was reported in Jan that the Korean Independence Party and Kim Kyu Siks National Independence Federation had held meetings to elect representatives for another joint north-south conclave. Comment: These reports are not in conflict with Kim Koos item above. Further, it is significant that the KIP was the only major political party which did not participate in a general meeting in Seoul on 27 Jan to elect members for a joint consultation body which will cooperate with the UN Committee in the matter of effecting a unified Korea. (2) 36396 PRIORITY Secret **DECLASSIFIED** Authority EO 12958 Sec 3.4(b) NND 795020 GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE RADIO AND CABLE CENTER FROM : CG USAFIK NR : ZC[illegible] 138 6 FEB 49 CONT'D **INCOMING MESSAGE** 6. Office holding members of the Haekjoo (Korean) Democratic Party, which recently merged with the Taehan Nationalist party to form the Democratic Nationalist Party, were said by a reliable political informant to be planning a program of economic patronage for the benefit of party members and the financial betterment of their organizations. The plan envisages the surrender by the govt of certain vested former Japanese enterprises now under the operation of the govt to the pvt ownership of influential party members. Military. 1. Strenght of security forces at the end of the period follows: Army-64490, Coast Guard-3962 and Police-45000. 2. A commando battalion, trained for 2 months in the art of guerrilla fighting in the KA 1st Brigade area, departed Suwon (1000-1610) for the Chiri-San (1070-1370) area where it will operate against the concentration of rebels in that region. At the same time the 5th battalion of the 8th regt, left Wonfu (1100-1610) for duty on Cheju-Do. Comment: Cheju-Do and the Chiri-San area continue to be the primary areas of guerrilla activity. The dispatching of 2 more battalions for operations against dissidents is indicative of the seriousness with which KA Hq views the activities of the islanders on Cheju-Do and the Brigands in the Chiri-San area. 3. 5 leftist deserters from a separate company of the 6th regt, KA, stationed at the port city of Pohang-Dong (1230-1460), returned, killed an officer and a guard and then persuaded the 38 troops in the area to join forces with them. An ordnance storehouse was raided, and the defending soldiers were joined by a small group of civilians. Kyongsang-Pukto police, KA troops and a small attachment of the Coast Guard from Pohan-Dong are attempting to intercept the rebels. One truckload of KA troops enroute to the scene of the rebellion was involved in an accident, and 8 Korean soldiers were killed and 18 injured. 4. There was a continuance of almost daily clashes along the 38th parallel between North Korean Troops and South Korea Security Forces. Police reported that OP 7 (890-1690) had been attacked and surrounded by 400 NKC Troops at 271400. Reinforcements by police and the KA from Yonan (91-C-1580) repelled the invaders, killing 15, wounding 45 and capturing 15. 1 policeman was reported killed and 1 wounded. A US Army patrol visited the scene of the attack on 28 Jan and reported that there had been some evidence that firing had taken place and that 1 SK policeman had been killed and 1 wounded. 36396 (3) PRIORITY [illegible] Paraphrase not required. Handle as correspondence of classification carried hereon per paragraphs 51i and 60a, AR 380-5. 1540-F DECLASSIFIED Authority [illegible] NND 745026 Secret PRIORITY FROM : CG USAFIK NR : ZGB1 138 6 FEB 49 CONT'D Comment: This is another example of the exaggeration usually encountered in police reports. Initially, police reports would lead 1 to believe a major engagement was taking place, however with the more objective observations by US Army personnel, the "engagement" usually amounts to the exchange of rifle fire across the parallel. A detachment of NKC, estimated at 30, on 29 Jan deployed a few yards south of the 38th parallel near Wondai-Ri (1110-1690) and from that point opened fire on a police patrol. The police withdrew without damage. Comment: This incident involves a new point of disturbance along the 38th parallel. Police reported that on 31 Jan a small force of NKC crossed the 38th parallel in the vicinity of Sungchu-Dong (1015-1695). The NKC were engaged by police in the area and retreated north. An American Army patrol visited the scene of action later on the same day and found all was quiet. Near Kaesong a group of 20 NKC troops on 31 Jan crossed the 38th parallel at (957-1697). Police attacked the invaders, driving them back into North Korea and killing 1 NKC soldier. In the skirmish police moved several hundred yards inside North Korea before machine gun fire forced them to withdraw. A detachment of NKC attacked a police box north of Chumunjin (1175-1685) at 021550 Feb. One policeman was killed and 1 NKC was wounded. A NKC force attacked the police station at Paekchon (930- 1695) at 022300 Feb. In the ensuing engagement the police sta was burned to the ground and 4 policemen, 2 KA troops and 1 civ were killed. A few members of the attacking force were said to have been disguised in South Korean police uniforms. 5. Elements of the Korean Coast Guard, stationed at Mukhojin-Ni (1200-1690) at 030940 Feb raided North Korean Naval Base at Kizuma-Ni (1160-1690). Several installations, including 1 port gun, were destroyed. Comment: It can be expected that retaliatory measures may be taken by the North Koreans especially against South Korean villages on the East Coast in vicinity of Kangnung. Mobilization potential. Monetary exchange rates on 3 Feb were 1000 won for 1 US silver certificate, a loss of 80 won from last week, and US Military payment certificates remained stable at 580 won for 1. The price of rice in Seoul averaged 750 won per small mal (16.5 lbs) on the same date. This represents an increase of 10 won over last week. Korean sources report that 3178574 suk of rice had been purchased by the govt as of 2 Feb. This represents 42.4% of 36396 [illegible] CONT'D PRIORITY Secret DECLASSIFIED Authority EO 12058 Sec 3 402 NND 795020 GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE RADIO AND CABLE CENTER INCOMING MESSAGE FROM : CG USAFIK NR : ZGB 138 6 FEB 49 CONTINUED the quota. Subversive. 1. Latest instruction from South Korea Labor Party hq to regional agencies indicate a possible on-the-surface change of tactics in dealing with the problem of the UN committee on Korea. Translation of a portion of the directive fols: "With the coming domination of China by Chinese Communists, the fate of Asia is subj to great change, but far from being the problem of World War III. We will apparently challgenge the UN Commission on Korea, but in reality we will make use of it for the time being in realizing the unification of thoughts in North and South. But at the last turn which will come with a definite decision of Chinese fate we will reveal ourselves and plunge into open fight. "As a result of a mil agreement with the Chinese Communists the maj portion of North Korean Mil Force is sent to the reinforcement of the Chinese Communist Army. The mil strength of North Korea is very poor, therefore we must develop the propaganda campaign to the highest possibility. By close combination of laboring people we can exploit a critical situation. Externally we will play with UN commission on Korea but internally we will strive to prepare ourselves." Comment: While the double talk of the program does not lend itself to ready analysis, it appears that the Communists who hitherto have roundly flayed the UN as a tool of American imperialism, may conveniently switch to insincere semblance of cooperation. Later an attempt to bring another convert into the Soviet orbit will be resumed with new vigor. 2. 5 of the 6 members of an assassination squad were arrested in Taejon (1040-1490) by police. The group, which had 3 rifles and 2 grenades in its possession, had instructions to kill prominent local leaders and sabotage important facilities. One of the group arrested was a woman. 3. Coal miners at a large mine at Samchok (1200-1630) drew up a petition protesting the presence of a guard unit of 1 platoon of NK troops. Comment: Troops were placed on guard duty at the mine, where on 25 Jan a railroad building was destroyed by a fire of incendiary origin. Info that there was a large Communist element among miners led Korean authorities to take preventative measures versus possible future sabotage. 4. During the period there was a comparitively [illegible] incidents of civil unrest. 36396 (over) PRIORITY Paraphrase not required. Handle as correspondence of classification carried hereon per paragraphs 51i and 60a, AR 380-5. 1540-F DECLASSIFIED Authority [illegible] NND 795020 SECRET PRIORITY FROM : CG USAFIK NA : ZGB7 138 6 FEB 49 CONTINUED In Cholla-Namdo province rebels attacked a village and a police box. Police casualties were 3 killed, 1 wounded and 1 missing. Three villagers were kidnapped. Rebels burned a schoolhouse in Kyongsang-Namdo which was being used as a Korean Army billet. Two soldiers were killed and 3 were wounded. In Kangwon-Do rebels attacked and burned a police box. No casualties were reported. Delayed reports from Cheju-Do covering the period 19-25 Jan indicate that activities of rebels are on a decreasing scale. 15 rebels, 6 policemen and 12 civs ere killed in 3 attacks by rebels. American advisors to the KA 2d Reg saw 97 bodies of civ men, women and children who had been shot, but they were unable to ascertain who was responsible-rebels, police or Korean Army. Psychology. 1. North Korean agents have been reported attempting to recruit college professors for service in North Korea. The agents were said to be proselyting in Seoul, Taegu (1150-1430), Kwangju (990-1300) and Chongju (1040-1530) where they were offering advance bonuses of 100,000 won. 2. Vice-Chairman Kom Sang Ton of the National Traitor Act Investigating Committee was reported in a Seoul newspaper to have taken the stand that pro-Japanese in both the Army and police force would not be exempt from indictment. He was quoted as having said: "We, the 30,000,000 people of Korea, have no need of such mil pers and police officials who offered their loyalty to the Japanese emperor, no matter how excellent ability they actually may possess. We will thoroughly purge away such treacherous elements wherever they may escape." Comment: It is not known what standards the committee is utilizing in assessing pro-Jap sentiments, but, if their purge is pursued too vigorously, they could well eliminate a large percentage of the best KA and police offs, including the CG of the Army and several important police officials. Part 2. North Korea. Current: 1. A meeting between representatives of the North Korean Govt and the Chinese Communist Govt was reported held in Pyongyang on 11 Dec 48. At the meeting a pact was signed that insured Chinese Communist aid to North Korean forces in the event of necessity. An identification of the people actually signing the pact was not effected. Informant understood that every possible aid that the Chinese 8th route Army could afford would be given to North Korea. (B-3). 36396 PRIORITY [illegible] [illegible] DECLASSIFIED Authority EO 12056 sec 3.402 NND 795020 GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE RADIO AND CABLE CENTER INCOMING MESSAGE PRIORITY FROM : CG USAFIK NR : ZGBI 1386 FEB 49 CONTINUED Comment: The existence of such a treaty is entirely possible, as it would be well within the capabilities of communist behaviour by peoples of related races. The spread of communism has long been aided by the "loaning" of troops, particularly Guerrilla Troops, to the new adherent who has not yet established complete communistic control of its entire area. Further, the existence of such a pact would effect a measure of recognition of the assistance given to the Chinese 8th route Army by Koreans. inasmuch as this Army numbered thousands of North Koreans in its ranks during its campaigns. 2. Since 21 Dec 48, about 6,000 Korean nationals have been detained at the former Hamhung Girls High School where they receive mil training and political indoctrination. This group of Koreans served in the Japanese Kwang Tung Army during the war; were taken prisoner, shipped to the USSR with Japanese prisoners of war in 45 and returned to Hamhung early in Dec 48. Prisoners were not permitted to leave camp nor to receive civ visitors. (F-4) On 25 Dec 48, some 2,000 Korean nationals who had served in the Japanese Army and were incarcerated with the Japanese prisoners of war in USSR in late 45, arrived in Pyongyans. Those prisoners who had been residents of North Korea before the war were released and permitted to return to their homes. Approx 400 PW's who had resided in South Korea prior to incarceration, are still detained at Hamhung. (F-6) Comment: These reports tend to confirm earlier re- ports of the return of Korean PW's to North Korea. (WEEKA 57) in view of the present tension obtaining between North and South Korea, and the shortage of labor in the North the fate of the South Korean PWs can be guessed, though earlier reports indicated that these prisoners would be returned after negotiations with the South Korean officials. 3. Communists in North Korea are divided into 3 maj groups. The 1st 1 is composed of Kim Il Sung and his followers. Practically all members of this group are from the Kazakhstan Soviet Socialist Republic and from Yashkino in the USSR and follow the dictates of Moscow loyally and unquestioningly. A 2d group, led by Pak Hun Yong, formerly of South Korea, is (over) PRIORITY 36395 -7- Secret Paraphrase not required. Handle as correspondence of classification carried hereon per paragraphs 51i and 60a, AR 380-5. DECLASSIFIED Authority [illegible] NND 745040 1540-F Secret PRIORITY FROM : CG USAFIK NR : ZHEI 138 6 FEB 49 CONT'D ma e up of native Koreans who turned to Communist support for only 1 reason, to achieve Korean independence. The nucleus of this gp, then organized as an underground unit, fought the Japanese by the employment of sabotage and propaganda during the Japanese rule in Korea. The 3d gp consists of former members of the Chinese 8th route Army and Korean volunteer gr (Yonan CCF) led by Kim Moo Jong, present artillery Commander of the Peoples Army and deputy Commanding Gen of the Peoples Army. Friction between these 3 gps is increasing as each faction has a different answer to the question "what measure must be taken to accomplish a United Korea?" Kim Il Sungs position in this all important Korean matter is extreme and unconciliatory. He is a loyal and ardent follower of the Moscow line, and has stated flatly that he will follow all orders which reach him from his superiors in the Kremlin, even though is should involve open warfare with South Korea. In contrast to this severe and uncompromising attitude, the gp of native communists led by Pak Hun Yong believe that a settlement is possible, either through the help of the UN commission on Korea or through the good offices of the 2 South Korean politicians, Kim Koo and Kim Kyu Sik. They believe that Rhee is amenable to their plan that agreement between the north and the south can be reached without civil war. The opinions of Kim Moo Jong on the question of settlement of the north-south dispute are not known. However, his position may be likened to that of Tito of Yugoslavia, in that Kim Moo Jo Jong is a Korean National Communist and opposes domination of his country by Moscow. Friction and difference of opinion exist between Kim Moo Jong and Kim Il Sung on the food question also. Kim Moo Jong maintains that all North Korean citizens should be furnished food rations on an equal basis and decries the present preferential treatment given for politican considerations in the issuance of rations. In addition, he opposes shipment of Korean food to the USSR. Reliable confidential sources claim that Kim Moo Jong is open to arguments which will lead to a peaceful settlement of the north-south conflict and that he may throw the weight of his following on the side of less extreme Pak Hun Yong. (G-6) Comment: From the info available it appears that the difference between Pak Hun Yong and Kim Moo Jong are not irreconcilable, as they are both in favor of effecting the unification of the north and the south by peaceful means. Rumors have been received recently which indicate that some sentiment is being 36396 PRIORITY -8- Secret DECLASSIFIED Authority EO 12058 Sec 3.402 NND 795020 미국자료 V 429 GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE RADIO AND CABLE CENTER PRIORITY FROM : CG INCOMING MESSAGE CONT'D expressed in North Korea for unification through the UN Commission on Korea, and it is inconsistent with human reason to deny that a great many people in North Korea would prefer to see the north and south united without recourse to civil war. It is entirely logical to suppose that some leaders in North Korea would like to see their own interpretation of communism in operation as opposed to the exploting type of the Moscow brand. Kim Moo Jong was formerly head of the artillery branch of the Chinese Communist forces and was chief liaison officer between the Chinese Communists and the Koreans in China. While in China he married a Chinese Communist woman whom he later divorced in order to marry a Korean woman. By divorcing this strongly Communist Chinese woman, he incurred the displeasure of the party. When Kim Moo Jong returned to Korea, he had visions of becoming either head of the peoples committee or CG of the Peoples Army. He was greatly disappointed with the soviet choice of Kim Il Sung, and the 2 are at odds much of the time now. Kim Moo Jong wanted to bring the Korean volunteer Army from China to Korea as the backbone of the Peoples Army, but Kim Il Sung strongly objected. Military. 1. With the redesignation of the old independent mixed brigade, Peoples Army at Hamhung (1040-1920) to the 3d div (WEEKA 57) a new independent mixed brigade is reported to have been activated at Chinnampo (840-1780). An F-3 reports that during the latter part of Oct 48 the former independent brigade of the Dept of Internal Affairs stationed at Chinnampo was carefully screened and 1,800 men were sent to replace the Peoples Army troops guarding the Korean-Manchurian border between Sinuiju (750-1950) and Hyesanjin (1100-2100). Those whose records proved their loyalty to the present regime in power were retained. This small force was then augmented with new recruits and men from other units and a new independent mixed brigade, Peoples Army, was formed. Source further states that this new independent mixed brigade is composed of 3 independent battalions. He knew of no arty battalion in this brigade. A 2d source reports an independent mixed brigade, Peoples Army, together with an unidentified battalion of this brigade at Chinnampo. Source states he observed 6 field guns, caliber unknown, with the unidentified battalion. (F-2) (over) 36396 PRIORITY -9- Paraphrase not required. Handle as correspondence of classification carried hereon per paragraphs 51i and 60a, AR 380-5. 1540-F DECLASSIFIED Authority [illegible] NND 775226 Secret PRIORITY FROM : CG USAFIK, NR : ZEBI, 6 FEB 49 CONT'D Comment: An earlier report which was discounted at the time, stated that in Sep 48 the independent brigade, Dept of Internal Affairs, was incorporated into the Peoples Army and redesignated the Peoples Army independent Brigade, composed of 2 Inf battalions and 1 Arty battalion. (WEEKA 55) however, the above info reveals that only a small portion of this brigade (see also 3 below) was transferred to the Peoples Army and utilized in the formation of a new independent mixed brigade. New recruits and Peoples Army personnel were observed in the area formerly occupied by the independent brigade, Dept of Internal Affairs at Chinnampo during the latter part of Sep and early Oct. At the time it was assumed that a training center had been established in this locality. (WEEKA 47) in fight of the latest reports it is believed that these were the men gathered in Chinnampo for training and activation of the new independent mixed brigade. Based on all info available to date this office accepts a new Peoples Army independent mixed brigade, size and org unknown, at Chinnampo. 2. Although a considerable nbn of reports on the 2d div of the Peoples Army have been received by this office the only maj change noted in the disposition of this unit is a move if the 2d battalion of the 4th Reg. This battalion is reported as departing from Hyesanjin (1100-2100) sometime during the latter part of Sep 48 and is presumed to have returned to its parent org in Hoeryong. (F-2) The following accepted disposition of the 2d div of the Peoples Army is present: Hq of the 2d div with service and support elements at Nanam(1240-2150) (F-1); hq 4th reg with service and support elements at Hoeryong (1250-2230) (F-1) 1st battalion at Kyongwo (1260-2280) (F-1), 2d battalion at Hoeryong (F-2) and 3d battalion at Hoeryong (F-1); hq 5th Reg with service and support elements together with all 3 battalions at Nanam (F-1); hq 6th Reg with service and support elements together with all 3 battalions at Nanam (F-1) and the arty Reg of this div at Kangduk (1250-2150) (F-1). Comment: The above accepted disposition of the 2d div together with unidentified Peoples Army Tank Unit (WEEKA 55); redisposition of the 2st div (WEEKA 57) and activation of new independent mixed brigade (see 1 this WEEKA) constitutes the entire order of battle of Peoples Army tactical ground units carried by this office in North Korea. 36396 PRIORITY -10Secret **DECLASSIFIED** Authority E.O.12058 Sec3.402 NND 745020 GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE RADIO AND CABLE CENTER PRIORITY FROM : CO US **INCOMING MESSAGE** D 3. An analysis of reports received by this office indicates that 3 Bns of the independent brigade, Dept of Internal Affair, have been redeployed to the North KoreanManchurian border to take over patrolling previously assigned to Peoples Army units. The remainder of the pers are reported transferred to the Peoples Army, which took over installations in Chinnampo previously occupied by this brigade. Unit designations of these 3 border constabulary Bns are unknown and there is no indication of a brigade hq functioning over them. Locations of these border constabulary Bns along the Korean-Manchurian border are accepted by this office as follows: Unidentified Bns at Sinuiju (750-1950) (C 0) Manpojin (930-2080) (C-1) and Namyang (1220-2090) (C-3). Comment: This office accepted the departure of the independent brigade in view of the fact that 3 Bns, formerly a part of this brigade are now accepted along the KoreanManchurian border, this office is tentatively dropping the independent brigade, Dept of Internal Affairs, from Its order of battle. Although a brigade hq has not been identified controlling 3 Bns in view of the structure of border constabulary units along the 38th parallel such a hq is a definite possibility. 4. The border constabulary brigade, security forces, located at Chorwan (1010-1720) has been firmly identified as the 1st Brigade. Companies of the 1st Battalion of this brigade have been identified as follows: 1st Co in Yonchon (1000-1700), the 2d Co (formerly carried as the 211th Co) in Chongong-Ni (1000-1690) and the 3d Co (formerly carried as the 211th Co) in Hwachon (1060-1700). (P-1) Comment: That above identifications are accepted by this office and supplement info on disposition of this brigade as carried in WEEKA 53, Pages 28 and 29 in W/S 158 and Pages 27-28 W/S 166. 5. An unconfirmed report states that special police constabulary units were activated after recognition of the South Korean Govt by the United Nations. Locations and designations of these units are as follows:- 1st unit at Pyongyang (880-1820), 2d unit at Haeju (370-1700), 3d unit at Wonsan (1040-1830), 4th unit at Chongjin (1250-2150). Strengths of the units are unknown. The mission of these units is the prevention and suppression of revolts and uprisings which might occur as a result of recognition of the South Ko[illegible] Govt by (over) 36396 PRIORITY 0-11[signature] Paraphrase not required. Handle as correspondence of classification carried hereon per paragraphs 51i and 60a, AR 380-5. 1540-F DECLASSIFIED Authority [illegible] NND 745026 7 RECEIVED GHQ FEB 19[illegible] 432 제주4·3사건 추가진상조사자료집 7 [illegible] PRIORITY FROM : CG USAFIK NR : ZGBI 138 6 FEB 49 CONT'D the United Nations. These units consist of especially picked loyal and trusted personnel who enjoy unlimited purchasing priveleges at govt controlled stores as an added boost to their morale. (C-6) Comment: The only special police constabulary unit previously reported is the Pyongyang special city police constabulary bn at Pyongyang carried in the order of battle summary on Page 25 W/S 158. This Bn, however, was reported utilized for traffic, guard, and normal police duties only. There have been indications of a change in organization of the police constabulary in previous reports by this office. Ref Page 23 W/S 161 and Page 22 W/S 165. However, until more definite info is received, this office will continue to carry the organization of the police constabulary as given on Pages 25, 26 and 27 W/S 158. 6. The fol oath of fealty is reportedly taken by all soldier of the Peoples Army: (F-3) "As a citizen of the democratic Peoples Republic I solemnly swear that I will discharge my holy duty toward my fatherland, and will fight to the last drop of my blood. As a soldier of my fatherland I pledge that I will overcome whatever difficulties confront me and that I will be a faithful citizen of the Korean Peoples Republic. As a soldier of my fatherland, should I fail to discharge my duties according to the written oath I shall be punished severely by the citizens of the North Korean Peoples Republic." Comment: The extraction of an oath from members whose sole objective is the protection of a police state and those in power is not new. An Army whose every member had the stamina and ability to fight to its last drop of blood would be well nigh invincible indeed. 7. Known desertions from the North Korean Armed Forces for the period 23 through 29 Jan were 2 Pvts in the mounted police constabulary, security forces. Their reason for desertion was given as disaffection (B-2). Mobilization potential: 1. The Peoples Army is constructing a billeting area reputed to house some 60,000 soldiers in the locality bounded by Puong-Gang Upp (1028-1747), Pokkye Ri (1025-1749), and Ha Bok Ri (not shown on map-approximately 2 miles northwest of 36396 PRIORITY [illegible] DECLASSIFIED Authority EO 12056 Sec 3-402 NND 795020 GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE RADIO AND CABLE CENTER [illegible] PRIORITY INCOMING MESSAGE FROM : CG [illegible] TO [illegible] [illegible] Pokrye Ri). A 2 lane road bisects the settlement, leading from Ha Kok to Pyonggang. The construction was started in Nov 48 and was expected to be completed by 1 Feb 49. (B-3) Comment: Previous reports have indicated construction of barracks in this area but have not tied the construction to any definite boundary. It is believed that the estimate of the nbr of troops to be housed is ambitious as countries with 10 times the population of North Korea seldom concentrate 60,000 troops in such a small area. 2. The latest info available on the population of North Korea gives the breakdown by province as follows: Pyong An Namdo 2,500,000, Pyong an Bukto 2,000,000 Hwanghae Do 1,700,000, Kangwondo 700,000, Hamgong Namdo 2,000,000, Hamgyong Bukto 600,000; total 9,500,000 (F-3) all figures are approximate. 3. Reportedly a close liaison existed between the Gen Director Fomenko of "Mortrans" (Soviet-Korean Transport Co) and the Soviet Navy. During the period 1 through 7 Dec 48 former Soviet Naval Personnel were assigned to the Wonsan (1040-1830) Br of "Mortrans" which also took over a nbr of warehouses formerly utilized by the Soviet Navy. (C-6) The Chongjin (1250-2150) Br of "Mortrans" is reported as having 80 trucks (ZIS and GMC) which may be hired on a pay by the mile basis. 70% of these vehicles are equipped with charcoal generators. An unknown nbr of warehouses in the Chongjin Dock area are being utilized by the "Mortrans" br located in this city. (C-3) Comment: The liaison between "Mortran" and the Soviet Navy is understandable. By the very nature of its work "Mortrans" needs warehouses and the relinquishing of warehouses by the Soviet Navy would necessitate a certain amount of liaison between the 2 agencies to the affect transfer. This is the 1st report, however, that former Soviet Naval personnel were assigned to "Mortrans". In view of the fragmentary nature of the info it is difficult to deduce whether these people are former members of the Soviet Navy who were discharged and elected to remain in North Korea or a covert incorporation of Soviet Naval personnel into this organization. For agreement for formation of "Mortrans" (Soviet-Korean Transport Co) and additional info on this organization see Page (over) 36396 PRIORITY [illegible] -13- Paraphrase not required. Handle as correspondence of classification carried hereon per paragraphs 51i and 60a, AR 380-5. DECLASSIFIED Authority [illegible] NND 795026 1540-F Secret PRIORITY FROM : CG USAFIK NR : ZGBI 138 6 FEB 49 CONT'D 6 of Inclosure 4 in ISMK 37 and Page 10 in ISMK 48. Psychological: 1. North Korea received a great deal of attn during this period and included reports of loans to farmers to complete irrigation projects and of the purchase of oxen and fertilizer; meetings to celebrate the successes of the Hungram fertilizer factory; the progress of the Pyongyang Central Machine Works in perfecting new production processes and in the expansion of facilities; the progress of the compulsory education program for which the farmers are excitedly contributing many suk of "Patriotic Rice", the proceeds from which will be used for the construction of new school buildings (according to rad Pyongyang); and the forthcoming celebration of the 1st anniversary (8 Feb 49) of official activation of the Peoples Army, for which celebration the workers in factories and the farmers in the fields are preparing gifts and favors for the off and soldiers. The rebels in South Korea continued to receive the plaudits of rad Pyongyang for their activities in the various provinces in the south, and open encouragement to continue their terroristic activities as true "Patriots". Equipment used by the Communists in the uprising was said to be superior. Rad Pyongyang bemoaned the fact that "Patriots" in South Korea were being punished for raising the North Korean flag. Comment: An accepted tenet of Communism is to achieve revolution if Korea by rebellion, hence the constant spurring of guerrilla elements in non-Communistic areas, aided by Moscow trained leaders or advisors guerilla warfare is economical to the perpetuator, costly to the defender, and deadly in its long range possibilities. 2. Rad Moscow contributed to the entertainment of Koreans with tales of America and the terrible conditions obtaining there. Cried rad Moscow: " Although no homes were destroyed in America by the War, 1/3 of the Americans have to live in slums. Pres Truman had to admit this fact in his state of the union msg. Every city has its own character. Detroit citizens called their city on with a "Mad population". Detroit is a slum city. Baltimore newspapers recently said Baltimore is the worst slum city in the US. New York is the worlds worst slum city. 36396 PRIORITY [illegible] CONT'D DECLASSIFIED Authority EO 12058 Sec 3.402 NND 795020 GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE RADIO AND CABLE CENTER PRIORITY INCOMING MESSAGE FROM : CG USAFIK NR : ZGBI 138 6 FEB 49 CONT'D "The reasoning is not clear in these statements, but the object is clear; to make the Koreans believe that the USSR is very much more progressive and humane than the USA. Moscow is still worrying about the US constructing Military Bases in Korea. "According to a pact concluded between America and Syngman Rhae, South Korea is being turned into an American base against the Soviet Union. War preparations against the Soviet Union are being made with the organization of the National Defense Army which conscripted men between 16 and 60. Even students are given military training." Comment: Allusions to our own published report about inadequate housing in the US illustrate vividly the difference between a free press and a "Kept" press. The ref to the US planning to use Korean soldiers for their own war is one example of the Soviet line of reasoning; They castigate others without reason for the very thing they themselves perpetuate constantly. NO SIG INFORMATION : COMMANDER IN CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, G-3, AG, DIPLOMATIC, JSPOG 36396 PRIORITY TOO : 050200[illegible] MON : 92836 RECEIVED 7 FEB 1949 GHQ FEC G-3 DECLASSIFIED Authority EA 1052 82-3492 NND 745026 Paraphrase not required. Handle as correspondence of classification carried hereon per paragraphs 51i and 60a, AR 380-5.