제주도 주민 1만 5,000명 살육

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE RADIO AND CABLE CENTER CORRECTED COPY INCOMING MESSAGE PRIORITY DECLASSIFIED PER XCS UR CE 20 AUG 75 EMS U: 3 Apr 49 FROM : CG USAFIK TO : D4 (INTELLIGENCE DIV, GEN STAFF, USA) INFO : CINCFE (G-2) NR : ZOSRI 225 [illegible] WER 66, PERIOD 26 MAR TO 2 APR 49) Current. 11. Cheju Island, historic Korean seat of unrest and for the past year a bloody battle ground of warring ideologies which has seen the slaying of 15,000 people and the razing of 1/3 its homes, gradually is returning to normalcy, and the last 3 weeks of Mar were the quietest days the island has known since 1 Mar 47. Current: Lull in rebel activities can be attributed largely to Col Yu Jai Hung, capable former off in the Japanese Army and executive of the Korean Mil Academy, who was sent to Cheju on 2 Mar as an overall task force commander of Security Forces. Col Yu shifted troops from their billets in sea coast towns and sent them into the mountains against the Guerrillas, adopted an amnesty program and called a halt to indiscriminate slaying of residents of hill-country villages. Since his arrival 300 rebels or rebel sympathizers have been killed 1,500 prisoners have been taken, and 22 rifles and 1 pistol have been recovered. Armed rebels, who are estimated to nbr 250, backed by 1,000 to 1,500 non-combatant sympathizers, have been harrassed from one hiding place to another, and, aside from the ambushing of one KA platoon in a mountain pass on 9 Mar, the rebels have been unable either to counterattack or mount raids on villages. Most pressing problem of the Guerrillas at the present time is lack of ammo. Captured and foraged food stocks are ample, and caves left behind by Japanese divisions make security and housing no great problem, but there is no ready source of ammo. The rebels are believed to have less then 1,500 rounds, and only source of supply for captured American-type weapons are stocks seized from security forces, although Guerrillas are thought to have reloading supplies for 2,000 rounds of Japanese 99 rifle ammo. There have been rumors that rebel forces have received logistic support by water from the mainland and from North Korea, but there is no evidence to substantiate these reports. Constant patrolling by ships of the Korean Navy, aerial reconnaissance flights and the tight ring of police in villages on the coastal plain reduce the possibility of outside support. As a result of cumulative rebel actions and countermeasures of security forces there is a tragic amount of hardship and privation among the civ populace of the island. An estimated 1/4 of the 300,000 islanders have been dislocated from their razed villages and have been moved to coastal areas; food, clothing and medicinal stocks are low, and only in the past 2 weeks have needed relief supplies from the mainland began to arrive in noticeable quantities. Housing for the dislocated people offers no great problem. Primary building materials, stone and mud, are in abundance all over the island, and new villages spring up overnight, but food is and will continue to be a pressing problem. Farmers at the present time have been allowed to move 6 kilometers inland to resume farming, but they are handicapped by the distances to their present dwellings and wanton destruction of draft animals by both rebels and security troops. (B-2). Comment: While the overall picture looks bright at the present time, any certation of activities on the part of Korean Army units likely will result in fresh outbreaks of terrorism unless in the meantime the some 250 odd armed rebels are either killed or captured or their arms confiscated. One captured rebel leader has admitted that present policy of his cohorts was to keep under cover until army troops are withdrawn, at which time raiding would be resumed. Utilizing intelligence reports, the Korean commander is attempting to ferret rebels from their hiding places by direct opns, but, while the guerrillas are kept on the move and have suspended their activities, no real dent has been made in the armed units. **Present plans of cleaning out the rebels entirely before mid Apr appear somewhat optimistic. It may be necessary to utilize an alternate plan, which is under consideration, to form a line of army troops and Min Bo Dan (spear armed civ defense agency members) completely across the island and comb the mountains thoroughly, driving rebel troops toward a police holding force on the other end of the island. An operation of that nature in view of the distance involved and the rugged nature of the terrain could be expected to last a month, but it should be effective.** Subversive: 1. Pak Il Won, ex-Communist and former member of the south Korea Labor Party, was assassinated on 29 Mar, while on his way to the election campaign office of Chang Talk Sang. (A-1). Pak Chu San, the confessed assassir and a member of the South Korea Labor Party was arrested by the police. Pak Chu San had been given the definite assignment, by the South Korea Labor Party, of assassinating Pak Il Won. (B-2) Comment: It has been reported that Chang Talk Sang, deposed Minister of Foreign Affairs who is running for an assembly seat, had utilized south Korea Labor Party supporters in his campaign. That fact being true, South Korea Labor Party members were in a good position to keep Pak Il Won, a C.ung supporter under surveillance. 2. An organization called the Chinese Associate Op has been reported to be formed with Hq in Seoul and is presently attempting to organize branches in all main S outh Korean Ports. Allegedly the chief purposes of this organization are to act as a liaison agency between the Chinese Communists and the S uth Korea Labor Party and to overthrow the South Korean Govt by aid- ing, in every manner possible, subversive organizations in s uth Korea. (C-3) Comment: Support of leftist organizations in South Korea seems to be high on the agenda of the Chinese Communists. A previous unsubstantiated report indicated that Chinese Communists were supporting Rebel forces in the Chire-San area (1070-1370) by active participation. 3. The South Korea Labor Party plans to take advantage of the spring time grain shortage to incite the populace of South Korea to riots and demonstrations during the mo of Apr. Comment: The possibilities of riots and demonstrations as a result of the new rationing program, which goes into effect 1 Apr, can not be discounted. The Communist inspired South Korea Labor Party can be expected to exploit the situation to the fullest exten. 4. A N rth Korean flag was raised over the Kumdan Myon (970-1640) public primary school on 31 Mar. (C-3) 5. A N rth Korean intelligence agent was arrested by the National police on his 2d mission to South Korea. He admitted to being a member of a 6 man espionage gp of the Nor h Korea People's Army. This agent was sentenced to 29 days in the Uijongbu (1009-1690) police station and fined 10,000 won. Comment: The lightness of the sentence imposed on this self confessed espionage agent is felt to be inadequate and in no way sufficient to discourage espionage. 6. During this period the main scene of Rebel attacks shifted from Cholla Namdo Province across the border into Kyongsang Namdo but still remained in the Chiri-San area. The shift was probably brought about by aggressive action by security forces in Cholla Namdo. Security forces made 3 attacks upon Rebels in which 30 Rebels were killed and 1 policeman killed, in Cholla Namdo Province. (C-2) In Kyongsong Namdo Province a police attack of a Rebel hideout and operations of the Chiri San Task Fprce resulted in 28 Rebels and 7 soldiers being killed and 14 soldiers wounded. Security forces recovered 1 M-1 rifle, 1 Jap rifle, 1 pistol, and 2 automobiles. (C-2) Rebels ambushed a police patrol in Cholla Namdo Province. 4 Rebels and 2 policemen were killed and 1 policeman was wounded. The Rebels captured 2 Japanese rifles. In Kyongyson Namdo rebels attacked police sub stations on five occasions. 3 police stations were burned; 5 Rebels, 2 policemen, and 4 civilians were killed, and 8 Rebels were captured. The Rebels seized 1 truck, 9 Japanese rifles, 1 carbine, 1 shot gun, 9 police uniforms while the police recovered 1 M-1 rifle. (C-2) Delayed reports from Cholla Namdo Province indicate that the National police attacked Rebel hideouts on 4 occassions on 23 Mar, killing 22 Rebels and capturing 11. 2 carbines were recovered by the police. (C-2) Further delayed reports from the same province on the same day indicate that Rebels attacked a village and 2 police boxes. 7 Rebels and 2 police men were killed and the Rebels seized 2 Japanese rifles. (C-2) Two bridges were sabotaged in Cholla Namdo Province when small sections of the structures were removed. (C-2) . 영홍만 잡수함 기지(1949. 5. 7) GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE RADIO AND CABLE CENTER INCOMING MESSAGE SECRET ROUTINE SM jag EPF 7 May 49 FROM : CG USAFIK TO : DA (INTELLIGENCE DIVISION) INFO : CINCFE (G-2) NR : ZGBI ?9) (WEEKA NUMBER 71, PERIOD 30 APRIL TO 7 MAY 49) DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF 20 AUG. 75 Current: 3. . UNCOK committee plans go to Cheju-Do on 8 May and observe the 10 May elections on the island for two assembly seats. 2. North Korea. Current. 2. The North Korean government has established a submarine base in the Yonghung Bay area (1040-1860) for the purpose of supplying guerrilla organizations in South Korea. There are reportedly 3 submarines assigned to this base, described as "German F type"submarines. The commandant of the base is Kang Pa, a native of Cheju Do, who purportedly received submarine training in Vladivostok. By March of 1949, three successful cargo transport missions had been made to Cheju Do. (F-6) Comment: Rumors of submarine sighting off Cheju Do have not been confirmed but the use of submarines in supplying isolated guerrilla units has been proven feasible and it is possible that North Korea is using or planning to use submarines for this purpose. ALSULO comment: It is not believed that the North Korean Navy can or could support a submarine or a submarine base at this time. The water depths in Yonghung Bay do not lend themselves to the establishment of a submarine base in the usual meaning of such a base. It seems more probable that a base may have been established in this area for use as a lay-over point for Soviet operated submarines where North Korean guerrilla units and supplies may be picked up for transportation to South Korea and where fresh water and supplies may be replenished.