

order that the by-election in these two electoral districts is postponed for
 該兩地區之再選舉無期延期할것을
 an indefinite period.

命함.

SECTION II. This Executive Order shall be effective on the date appear-

第二條 本令之公布日로부터 効力이 發

ing hereon.

生함.

대통령에게서

朝鮮軍政長官

美軍陸軍少將

W. F. Dean

W. F. DEAN

Major General, United States Army

Military Governor in Korea

1948년 7월 정치요약(1948. 8. 16)

No. 264

CONFIDENTIAL

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
 OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DIVISION OF
 EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS
 SEP - 1948

ACTION
 is assigned to

FB

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 U.S. Political Adviser
 Seoul, Korea, Hqs. XXIV Corps, APO 235
 S/O PM, San Francisco, Calif.
 August 16, 1948

SUBJECT: Political Summary for July 1948

RECEIVED
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 SEP 1 1948

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HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SEP 1 1948

WASHINGTON

SIR:

I have the honor to report herewith the outstanding political develop-
 ments in Korea during the month of July 1948.

In summary, it may be noted that July was a period of positive events
 which, nevertheless, by their nature, indicated that they were only a pre-
 lude to more conclusive happenings in the near future. Thus, the National
 Assembly completed the (South) Korean Constitution, organized the all-

important executive branch, and elected a president and vice-president. But the government structure and staff were still only partially built and not ready to accept the reins of control from U.S. military authorities. Similarly, South Korean rightist and moderate groups seemed in a state of flux. Rightist parties were realigning under the stress of imminent actual responsibility in the search for patronage. Moderates were reflecting the wisdom of their recent honeymoon with the North Korean Soviet puppets and vaguely indicating that they might participate in the (South) Korean regime if asked, or, if not, become an active instead of a boycotting opposition. The United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea added to this picture by completing a report on its work and observations through May 10th and preparing for the two big tasks of consultation with the new administration, and reporting to its parent body, the UN General Assembly, in Paris in September.

Even the pattern of North Korean activity fitted this mold. The Democratic People's Constitution was proclaimed to be operative, but the big event was to be the election of August 25th which would "freely, secretly, and democratically" elect the first Supreme People's Council. North Korean troops seemed to be moving to positions closer to the 38th parallel, as if in preparation to take over (although this was not indicated). On instructions from, and with the help of aid, supplies, and agents from the North, South Korean Communists appeared to be building up guerrilla bands in relatively inaccessible mountains and to be reorganizing urban party organizations. Signs pointed to a major Communist effort, perhaps on the August 15th planned formal inauguration of the new government in Seoul, but more likely on August 25th, which North Korea has proclaimed to be election day for the whole nation.

VII. NORTH KOREAN AGENTS AND SOUTH KOREAN COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES

Everywhere in South Korea, the South Korea Labor Party and its fellow travelers showed lively activity throughout South Korea. South Korean officialdom and police openly considered the Communists as rebels and traitors who must be seized and imprisoned whenever found and whatever doing. In view of the Communists' violence, riots, ambushes, lies, and plots, this attitude was quite understandable and reasonable. The Communists were putting themselves "beyond the pale".

In every province, South Korea Labor Party men organized mobs, attacked police boxes, coerced farmers, and planned infiltrations of constabulary, police, and civil government offices. Several hundred who had already infiltrated were uncovered and arrested. More and more reports filtered in of growing bands in hard-to-police mountains which adopted names such as "People's Liberation Army", reminiscent of Communist guerrillas in China, Greece, and other lands.

Groups of up to 300 men each were 40 miles east of Seoul, 30 miles north of Kunsan, 25 miles east of Chongju, 20 miles northwest of Taegu, and 40 miles southeast of Chonju, in addition to rebels in Cheju.

Urban groups were also revitalizing their basic cells and liaison organization. Work was begun to "get out the vote" for the August 25th election (See part VI above) in South Korean towns and villages. Apparently, however, most important instructions and organization no longer go from Pyongyang to Seoul headquarters, and thence to provincial and lower units throughout South Korea. Party channels of command are no longer adequate enough in the U.S. zone. Instead, it seems more and more that North Korean agents bring many

orders directly from the Soviet zone to cohorts scattered all over South Korea. This seems to have somewhat angered the South Korean Labor Party.

Reports from all parts of the South indicate the presence of these agents. At least 5 were arrested near the 38th parallel itself. Two separate reports told of 450 (actually in North Korean Army) sent south to contact guerrilla units and spread instructions. Twenty-five North Korean police allegedly were sent south to lure South Korean police to training schools and better jobs in the North. Agents were also alleged to be entering the South as "refugees". In addition, ships were coming to points along the South Korean coast to supply guerrillas and Communist organizations with supplies, weapons, and propaganda. 100,000,000 Won worth of opium was reported to have been given to the South Korean Labor Party to sell for expense money.

Amid these preparations, other reports told of plans to use the forces built up for violence. Many place "D-Day" as August 15th. This seems unlikely in view of priority instructions from Pyongyang to carry through in the South the August 25th election. This itself will require much effort in a non-violent atmosphere. More likely are reports which set the beginning of a major effort after August 25th. Whether these will result in sizeable troubles to a greater extent than similar past alarms is a matter of speculation. However, a year has passed since the Communists were raided and disorganized in August 1947. Not only has there been time to reorganize, but this is an occasion worthy of a major effort. It is the beginning of "cold war" between North and South with dangerous "hot" interludes.

VIII. MISCELLANEOUS


At least 19 clashes involving North Korean and Russian troops against American soldiers or South Korean police occurred during July along the 38th parallel. One of these resulted in the death of a U.S. soldier, with another wounded. Very few other casualties were recorded although many shots were exchanged. In almost every case the South Korean side of the parallel was violated. Most incidents were in the Kaesong area north of Seoul. This might indicate that large new Korean troop units had moved near the parallel in this area (based on Haaju) and were showing their inculcated contempt of the South.

The South Korean constabulary continued its expansion and training. Clashes occurred in widely scattered areas with police, civilians and youth groups. This indicated more rivalry than Communist infiltration of the constabulary. Units also completed clean-up operations on Cheju Do, which quieted down considerably.

The Korean press continued to devote attention to events in Japan. Non-rightists deplored the U.S. "building-up" policy, but all parties attacked the conviction of the Korean rioters at Kobe, day after day. A report that smugglers of Japanese goods into Korea had been caught brought approval. The press felt that continuation of such imports would lead to renewed dominance of Japanese industry in Korea. An anti-Japanese Rearmament Society was established. Reference to the protests over the status of vested Japanese property in Korea has already been made in Part I above.

Sporadic attention in the press was also given to the Korean Olympic team en route to and in London, the high price of rice (up to 1800 Won per 26-2/3 pounds in late July in Seoul), and the floods in many parts of southern South Korea, which, in part, contributed to rising rice prices.

Respectfully yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Joseph B. Jacobs', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Joseph B. Jacobs
United States Political Adviser