

this time would be followed at once by North Korean invasion. He considered Korean Army not yet completely cleansed of subversives and maintained he needed few extra months for this purpose and for completion re-organization Korean Army which recently initiated. He also appeared to doubt whether Korean Army, as now constituted, trained, and supplied, is adequate to meet all-out invasion from north. In event concerted invasion, from north, he stated categorically, Korean Army would need continuously replenished supply munitions from US sources. Both Ministers maintained people throughout South Korea uneasy over prospect completion US troop withdrawal and desired retention US forces now here.

4. I informed Ministers troop withdrawal program now too far advanced to be halted and must go forward. I stressed fact troop withdrawal implied no lessening of US support of or interest in Korea. I reviewed existing and projected aid programs and reminded Minister KMAC being greatly strengthened streamlined. I expressed belief, which I said shared by several eminent ex-military officials, Korean Army well able handle security Korea. I expressed belief North Koreans could not risk all-out invasion South Korea, it would no doubt pursue current infiltration activities. I pointed to splendid record achieved by Korean Task Forces recently in Cheju and Chiri Mountains operations against guerrillas and said I confident security forces now well capable of coping with any such activity.

5. I went on to say I deplored publicity put out locally during past two weeks on subject troop withdrawal. I said it my view such publicity harmful in that it undermined Korean people's confidence in Government and security forces and tended prejudice advancement Korean-US relations. I expressed opinion Korean publicity rather should stress recent achievements government and security forces and inculcate confidence among people.

6. It is my hope substance foregoing conversation will be passed on to Rhee by his Ministers. I propose to see Rhee during next day or two and convey similar views to him.

MUCCIO

• 제주도지사 김용하와의 대화 비망록(1949. 5. 27)

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

SECTION 11
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

No. 303

American Embassy,

RESTRICTED

Seoul, Korea, May 31, 1949.

Subject: Transmittal of Memorandum of Conversation Covering
Discussion with Mr. Kim Yong Ha, Governor of Cheju-do

The American Embassy has the honor to transmit for the
Department's information copies of a memorandum of conversation
which is self-explanatory.

Enclosure: 

Memorandum of Conversation
No. 54, dated May 27, 1949

<첨부문서> 김용하와의 토론(1949. 5. 27)

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 303 dated May 31, 1949 from the
American Embassy, Seoul, Korea

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
No. 54

May 27, 1949

SUBJECT: Discussion with Mr. Kim Yong Ha, Governor of
Cheju-do

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Kim Yong Ha, Governor of Cheju-do
Mr. L. H. Kim, Interpreter
Mr. [unclear]
Mr. [unclear]

TIME: 11:00 a.m.
DATE: May 27, 1949
PLACE: American Embassy

(XX) MR. KIM called to ask whether we could secure air
transportation to Cheju-do soon.

The GOVERNOR (talking through his interpreter at all times)
asked if it would be possible for him to secure air transportation
back to Cheju-do. He said he was newly appointed to the job, that
he had been in Cheju-do only for a very short time to date, namely,
from May 7 to May 19, and that he wished to return as soon as
possible by air. Both MR. GERRIAT and MR. GARDNER asked him
questions concerning conditions in Cheju-do, and the following re-
presents the general tenor of his remarks.

The GOVERNOR said that conditions were improving very much in Cheju-do—that they were immeasurably better than they had been a year ago so far as he could determine. He, of course, was very new at the job—this being the first official position that he had held. In civilian life he was a professor. He had graduated from Seoul National University, and after that had taught at the Normal School in Taegu for about 11 years. After that, he had taught at the Middle School in Yongsan, a suburb of Seoul. He had been associated with Military Government for a period where he had worked in the Office of Consumers Goods.

When asked how many guerrillas had come down from the hills to surrender as a result of the Government's amnesty program, he said he estimated the number to be about 6,000—2,000 of these were in 3 guarded camps located in the cities, while some 4,000 were in the villages under a high degree of police surveillance. He said he hoped he would be able to reindoctrinate all these people. He intended to establish reindoctrination centers and to divide these people into four classes—(a) those who had been tools of the Communists, (b) those who had leftist leanings, (c) those who had stronger leftist leanings, and (d) those who were incorrigible party liners. He intended to release all those in category (a) as soon as the authorities determined the identity of these persons. Categories (b) and (c) would be worked on by the Government and subsequently released, while those in category (d) would probably continue to be held in custody of the authorities.

He said that the crops were doing quite well and that he believed within seven or eight months the Island would be able to support itself insofar as food was concerned. He said he did not know the number of persons at present unemployed in Cheju-do as he new to the job, but he intended to make a survey to determine this fact as soon as possible.

MR. DRUMRIGHT asked the GOVERNOR whether sufficient funds for relief purposes had been sent to the Island. The GOVERNOR said these had been promised, but as yet had not been received. MR. DRUMRIGHT suggested that the GOVERNOR contact both the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Social Affairs in order to speed up their delivery. He went on to say that he thought that the Minister of Defense could be of great assistance to the GOVERNOR in this connection. MR. DRUMRIGHT asked the GOVERNOR whether sufficient seeds, particularly potato seeds, had been received in Cheju-do. When the GOVERNOR replied in the negative, saying that he intended to contact the Minister of Agriculture about this matter, MR. DRUMRIGHT urged him to see the Minister of Defense on this problem as well. This, the GOVERNOR said, he intended to do. MR. DRUMRIGHT then suggested to the GOVERNOR THAT it was of the utmost importance to get the refugees out of the cities and back to their fields for, unless this was done, the indigenous food supply of the Island was bound to suffer. The GOVERNOR said he intended to do something about this problem, but that first he would have to make a careful survey of the situation. MR. DRUMRIGHT then asked the GOVERNOR whether the elections of May 10 had passed without incident, and the

GOVERNOR had indicated that such had indeed been the case.

The meeting closed with MR. DRUMRIGHT telling the GOVERNOR that he would seek to make arrangements for the latter's flight to Cheju-do next week, suggesting that the GOVERNOR return to this office on Tuesday at which time MR. DRUMRIGHT said he expected he would be able to inform him concerning the projected flight.

John P. Gardiner

• 1949년 5월의 정치상황 요약(1949. 6. 13)

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Despatch No. 346

American Embassy

CONFIDENTIAL

Seoul, Korea, June 13, 1949

Subject: Political Summary for May, 1949

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

In continuation of Despatch No. 273, May 17, 1949, reporting on political developments in Korea for the month of April, 1949, I have the honor to submit a review of political developments in May, 1949.

I. SUMMARY

May was a difficult month for the Republic of Korea. The strain of impending United States troop withdrawal and of Communist successes in China led to anxious and inept attempts to secure guarantees of assistance against the Communist menace. Despite the efforts of the Philippine Delegate, the United Nations Commission on Korea resolved that it had no responsibilities in the timing or facilitation of troop withdrawal, and aside from that resolution accomplished little else. The