

a continuing purge of the Korean Security forces to ensure the dismissal of disloyal elements. Although the Army is, as a result of its cleansing, now probably a reliable body, the other consequences of the early defections of some personnel have ramified much beyond the Army itself.

In late October 1948, a mutiny involving a regiment of soldiers, in the city of Yosu, South Chulla Province, immediately attracted civilian Communist sympathizers. The combined bands captured the city and five or six neighboring counties which they held against counterattacks of loyal forces for a week in some areas. Although the chief communities and accessible areas have now been restored to Government control, remnants of the rebels have remained active throughout the province as guerrilla bands.

Similar troubles prevailed on Cheju Island where for almost two years armed Communist-civilian bands terrorized the countryside. Two or three mutinies in North Kyungsang Province, while not gathering civilian adherents, added fuel to widespread Communist-inspired disorders which have kept the province upset. Spasmodic troubles from scattered guerrillas have also occasionally disturbed parts of Kangwon, South Kyungsang, and North Ch'ongch'ung Provinces. A national reserve army (militia), a police auxiliary ("Min Po Tan") and students' military training have been started to increase the law and order potential of the Government.

• 주한미군 철수에 관한 토론(1949. 5. 26)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

SECRET

Action Assigned to *NA* Control 11081

Action Taken *Noted* Rec'd May 26, 1949

2:16 P.M. DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

MAY 26 1949

FROM : Seoul Date of Action *June 8 1949*

TO : Secretary of State Action Office *File*

NO : 607, May 26 Name of Officer *W. L. Sullivan*

Direction to DC/R *File*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1. Defense Minister Sihm and Transportation Minister Huh called this morning and engaged me in conversation re US troop withdrawal. While they did not say so, I am convinced they came at bidding of President Rhee.

2. After considerable discussion they revealed purpose of call: Namely, inquiry whether it possible delay departure RCT for additional six months.

3. Defense Minister expressed belief withdrawal RCT at

this time would be followed at once by North Korean invasion. He considered Korean Army not yet completely cleansed of subversives and maintained he needed few extra months for this purpose and for completion re-organization Korean Army which recently initiated. He also appeared to doubt whether Korean Army, as now constituted, trained, and supplied, is adequate to meet all-out invasion from north. In event concerted invasion, from north, he stated categorically, Korean Army would need continuously replenished supply munitions from US sources. Both Ministers maintained people throughout South Korea uneasy over prospect completion US troop withdrawal and desired retention US forces now here.

4. I informed Ministers troop withdrawal program now too far advanced to be halted and must go forward. I stressed fact troop withdrawal implied no lessening of US support of or interest in Korea. I reviewed existing and projected aid programs and reminded Minister KMAC being greatly strengthened streamlined. I expressed belief, which I said shared by several eminent ex-military officials, Korean Army well able handle security Korea. I expressed belief North Koreans could not risk all-out invasion South Korea, it would no doubt pursue current infiltration activities. I pointed to splendid record achieved by Korean Task Forces recently in Cheju and Chiri Mountains operations against guerrillas and said I confident security forces now well capable of coping with any such activity.

5. I went on to say I deplored publicity put out locally during past two weeks on subject troop withdrawal. I said it my view such publicity harmful in that it undermined Korean people's confidence in Government and security forces and tended prejudice advancement Korean-US relations. I expressed opinion Korean publicity rather should stress recent achievements government and security forces and inculcate confidence among people.

6. It is my hope substance foregoing conversation will be passed on to Rhee by his Ministers. I propose to see Rhee during next day or two and convey similar views to him.

MUCCIO

• 제주도지사 김용하와의 대화 비망록(1949. 5. 27)

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

SECTION 11
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS