

A projected trip to Chaju Island got only as far as the fog over the island's airfield; weather conditions prevented landing³.

2. Kyung Hyang Simoon, April 18, 1949.
3. Embassy airgram A-162, May 2, 1949.

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• 드림라이트의 제주도 방문과 폭동 진압(1949. 5. 18)

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Visit to the Island of CHEJU (33°20'N; 126°30'E)

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Sea Ports and Harbor Facilities, Air Installation.

On 4 May 1949 Lt. Paul Garbler, the Assistant Naval Attaché, accompanied Mr. E. F. Drumright, Counselor to the Embassy, on a visit to the island of CHEJU (33°20'N; 126°30'E). The purpose of Mr. Drumright's visit was to assess at first hand the current situation existing between rebel and Korean army forces and to further estimate some of the possibilities for future employment of the island. Mr. Drumright and Lt. Garbler spent three days here, speaking with the Korean Advisory Group, the Commanding Officer of the Korean Army troops on CHEJU and with many of the native islanders. A description of the airfield at CHEJU (designated in reference as SAISHU field) is herein included.

1. On 4 May 1949 Lt. Garbler and Mr. E. F. Drumright, Counselor to the American Embassy, flew to CHEJU in the Naval Attaché plane. The trip was without incident and required one hour and forty minutes from takeoff to landing. The landing was made at the airfield presently known as "CHEJU North" and described in reference as SAISHU field (33°30'N - 126°29'E). The field has two runways, one 4000 feet x 350 feet, direction 310° x 130°; the second runway is 6000 feet in length and approximately 300 feet wide, direction 130° x 310°. The sod covering, which is based on lava rock, has become quite irregular and is badly pitted and rolling in many places. Approximately 100 feet of the 300 foot width on each runway is still usable. The approaches are steep; however, extendability of either runway would require the leveling of many small hills and considerable effort would be involved. The prevailing wind is from the NW and rather regularly reaches a velocity of 40 - 50 MPH. The field is usually covered with cattle and native island ponies and must be cleared by jeep and reported low passes before a landing can be made. The Korean Airforce has constructed a single wood frame hangar near the center of the field, suitable for housing two Army Liaison Type aircraft.

2. Up until a few weeks ago, two Korean Airforce P-51s operated from this field for the purpose of spotting rebel positions and directing fire. An attempt was made during the employment of these planes to outfit them with a bazooka-type weapon attached to each wing for the purpose of firing rockets.

and the pilot and observer would occasionally carry "ldp bombs." This bomb was described by members of the Korean Military Advisory Group based on CHEJU as a crude, drawstring-type affair, weighing approximately twenty pounds, loaded with TNT which was activated by a detonating cap. The weapon was armed by tripping a lever and then hurled from the plane at such time as the pilot considered that he had reached an advantageous position. The effect of these innovations on the rebels' morale proved to be of more value than any destructive results obtained.

CHEJU South is not employable at the present time; however, during World War II it was used as a base and training field for Japanese Naval aircraft, and was considered to be a better field than CHEJU North. Korean Army troops have prevented the natives from encroaching on this field and it is believed that it could be rendered usable with a minimum amount of work. This is the field described in reference as HOSHIPO (33°13'N - 126°17'E).

3. Mr. Drumright was welcomed by Captain A. M. Haskell, officer-in-charge of the KMAC detachment, Lt. E. L. Horton of KMAC, Colonel YU Le Kwong, officer-in-charge Korean Army troops on CHEJU and Miss Sara Park, correspondent for Reuters and INS, who had spent a week on the island in search of local color.

The stay on the island was taken up with a visit to the village of CHEJU, a tour of some of the smaller villages which had been burnt out by the rebels and were being restored, a flight over rebel and Korean Army positions, and in speaking with Colonel YU and some of his officers.

4. Colonel YU is considered to be an outstanding Korean Army officer. He attended the Japanese Military Academy in Tokyo, graduating in 1937. During the last war he was--according to his own description--"captain in the Tokyo Guard" and engaged in no active warfare. His father attained the rank of Colonel in the Japanese Army and as a child Colonel YU was inculcated in the Japanese manner, so much so that he suffers a disadvantage at the present time in that his manner, speech and military habit are too Japanese to suit the Korean taste. He is 29 years of age, small in stature even for an Oriental, and speaks and understands much more English than does the average Korean officer of equal rank.

Colonel YU was detailed to CHEJU early in March, arriving to assume command during the last week in March, following a series of conferences with highly-placed officials, including Lt. Gen. Suh and General Chai Sung Tuk, Supreme Chief of Staff of the Korean Army. Apparently the situation on CHEJU had been somewhat mishandled and Colonel YU was chosen from his post at the Military Academy to attempt a solution to the problem.

5. He has under his command on CHEJU at the present time one (1) Regiment, consisting of four (4) Battalions; i.e. three (3) regular Battalions and one (1) special Battalion trained in guerrilla warfare. This group comprises 2300 officers and men. Upon assuming command Colonel YU reversed the policy of his predecessor, Colonel HAHN (these were said to include killing everyone taken within a rebel area, regardless of identity or amount of arms) and immediately embarked upon a program of amnesty. Prisoners are taken if possible and are personally interviewed by the Colonel, having demonstrated their remorse and provided they are not one of a small group of guerrilla fighters, they are given food, cigarettes, etc., and released. The results of such a procedure to date have been most satisfactory, since the released prisoner will often lead YU's men to caches of arms or pass the word back to his compatriots that they will be kindly treated and not summarily killed, should they surrender. YU estimates that every rebel released under his amnesty program has brought in at least six more.

He further believes that he is aware of the location of every leader of the guerrillas and the amount of arms and ammunition he has at his disposal, down to the last grenade. Rebel armament has proved meager and has grown steadily more meager. Captured arms and ammunition have been ex-Japanese or American in manufacture. Many of the guerrillas are armed

with nothing more than a bamboo pole with a razor-sharp, broad-headed knife tied to the tip. Colonel IV has so placed the four battalions scattered in the CHEJU operation that they are grouped in a circular arrangement around the HALLI-SUN peak, which is located at the approximate center of the island. Thus he has restricted the area of present operations to a small vertical cone extending from some 3-4000 feet of the HALLI-SUN to its peak, 6398 feet up, and the lower reaches of the island had seen no rebel attacks for two weeks prior to Mr. Dewright's visit.

6. It is estimated that the Korean Army has suffered 140 officers and men killed since 1 March; the number of wounded was not available. The number of rebels killed since that time is officially estimated at 1200, but it is reported by IDAG on CHEJU to be much greater. IDAG estimates 15,000 civilians killed since 3 April 1948. This number would include both rebels and non-participants, as both combatants were equally guilty at various times during the campaign, of indiscriminately killing non-combatants.

7. CHEJU is an elliptically shaped island approximately 40 miles in an east-west direction and 10 miles in a north-south direction. There is a "main road" describing a complete circle around the island, which in many places becomes practically impassable even for a jeep in rougher areas. The population of the island is estimated at 300,000. Pillage and fires are much more evident than on the mainland and the island itself is somewhat reminiscent of Guam. HALLI-SUN is a landmark visible for many miles and the entire island appears to be the base for this now extinct volcano. A lake has formed in the crater and many smaller lakes can be seen in the minor peaks surrounding HALLI-SUN.

The island is volcanic in origin and nature. Many of the dried up stream beds show evidence of considerable lava deposits. The barley and rice crop was far ahead of that on the mainland and appeared to be well tended. There is a severe shortage of water throughout the island, compounded by a scarcity of wells and the fact that almost all of the streams have run dry. In traveling over the area, only one active stream was observed; this one passes through the center of CHEJU village and is considered to answer every imaginable requirement. During the last war, the garrison maintained 80,000 troops as garrison for the island and it was necessary to transport water from the southern side.

A number of caves were also observed, particularly when a trip was made on foot into the areas which have been rendered uninhabitable by the fighting. The caves have been used as dwellings and hideouts by the rebels and evidence of recent habitation was apparent. Many mass burials had taken place in this area and a few fresh graves were seen. At one of the graves a "propaganda stake" was found. This was a wood stake driven into the ground alongside the grave mound, inscribed on all four sides. Freshly translated, the inscription warned the islanders that their participation in the May elections would result in the rebels burning their homes, pillaging their villages and slaughtering their cattle and the islanders themselves.

8. CHEJU harbor has two piers, only one of which is suitable for use by the Korean Navy minesweepers. The islanders have no rehabilitation of large ships in the harbor and the largest vessel to enter since the end of the war has been an LST. Controlling depth at high tide is reported to be between 17 and 20 feet, at low tide 10 and 13 feet. It is a poorly protected anchorage, particularly if the winds are strong from the south, a frequent occurrence. The second pier is presently being used as headquarters by the women divers of CHEJU, who go down in twelve to fourteen feet of water in the harbor for edible seaweed and abalone. The matter of the women divers is interesting in that it follows the pattern of married life on CHEJU. The only manual labor the men are obligated to perform is agricultural--and only enough to insure that the crops are being properly tended. The women perform all of the remaining work, including that of a beast of burden since oxen and carts are in short supply.

A flight was made over the island with Colonel YU pointing out his own and rebel positions. From the air the Colonel's strategy of forcing the guerrillas constantly further up the HALLI-SUN became clearer. Because the area behind the Korean Army lines for many miles is still wooded land and is practically deserted. An occasional woman may be seen working in a wheat field or barley field, but she rarely does so without a small Korean national flag tied to the end of a long pole which is intended to identify her as friendly to the troops. The islanders as a group are more friendly to Americans than are the Seoul inhabitants since it is reported that they consider the Americans at least partly responsible for bringing about an end to the disorder, burning and killing on both sides.

9. There are approximately 4,000 people still remaining in the refugee camps established by the Army. Since the cost of feeding these people falls on the Government, the Army encourages the refugees to seek immediate reconstruction of the burnt-out villages. They usually remain within the camp until the customary wall has been constructed around the village and then move into the compound and start construction of their dwellings. KMAC reports that there is still enough food available and no starvation is imminent; however it is felt that the food stock will eventually have to be replenished and maintained from the mainland until such time as the natives can be convinced it is safe to work the fields lying out some distance from the villages.

10. Approximately 200 guerrillas who have been captured since the inauguration of Colonel YU's amnesty program are still held in local jails and will probably receive long term jail sentences. This is the group which Colonel YU feels has been too strongly imbued with the Communist doctrine to let go free. In this respect, while he has not succeeded, up to this time, in capturing Soviet equipment of any sort, the Colonel feels that the guerrilla leaders of the CHEJU uprising were Soviet trained either in North Korea, Manchuria or in Soviet Russia.

Out of an original group of twelve organizers and guerrilla leaders who came to CHEJU for the purpose of "fomenting revolt and spreading the Communist doctrine," the Colonel believes only one to be still at large. *The quote is Colonel YU's.

on HALLI-SUN. He is "KIM Suk-ho", former school teacher, one of the most prominent of the group, his long absence from school master at HALLI on the western side of the island, and the fighting on the west slope of HALLI-SUN on 20 April 1949.

11. Police forces on CHEJU number 1,000 regular island police and the Seoul police, imported for the purpose of suppressing the revolt of the island. The SEOU detachment had the one name of "KIM" indicated that he expected to return to Seoul when the revolt was over, future or at such time as the CHEJU trouble had completely subsided.

ANALYSIS COMMENT: This report confirms information from other sources relative to the suppression of the CHEJU uprising and the manner of mopping up operations.

It is significant to this office that such an uprising could be sponsored and even partially successful on CHEJU where conditions are relatively good by comparison with those of the mainland peninsula. The conclusion to be drawn (and one with which I believe in full agreement) is that the success of the revolt cannot be attributed to what the guerrillas had to sell but to mismanagement of local affairs by government officials.

*Reported by G-2 USAFIK PR #1126 to be killed in action on 2 April 1949.

- 유엔한국위원단 공보 제16호(1949. 5. 19)