

Following UNCOK developments have taken place since our telegram 295, March 26:

1. Radio Pyongyang intercept March 24 stresses futility of UNCOK except to support ROK and keep American troops in Korea.
2. I suggested to Wertheimer might be timely for UNCOK consider problem troop withdrawal. Details follow by despatch.
3. Principal Secretary UNCOK received Kim Yak Soo informally, listened views regarding petition (paragraph 2 OURTEL 295, March 26)
4. UNCOK to discuss interpretation terms of reference next week. Jamieson expected return Seoul April 9.
5. Committee Two again heard Yuen Chi Yua member National Assembly and ex-Home Minister, Kim Sung Soo member Supreme Committee Democratic Nationalist Party, Cho Se Ang, Chairman Socialist Party. Scheduled hear Foreign Minister April 11.
6. President Rhee reviewing logistical support problem UNCOK.
7. UNCOK planning trips Cheju Yeosu areas middle April

MUCOIO

APR 11

• 군사원조에 관한 이승만과 무췌의 대화 비망록(1949. 4. 5)


THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

American Mission in Korea,

No. 200

Seoul, April 5, 1949.

SECRET



Subject: Transmitting a Memorandum of Conversation on Military Aid to Korea and Withdrawal of United States Troops

The American Mission in Korea transmits for the information of the Department a copy of a memorandum of a conversation held between the President of the Republic of Korea and the Special Representative on the above-cited subjects on April 4, 1949.

Enclosure: *AM*

✓ Copy of Memorandum of
Conversation, as stated.

<첨부문서> 대한 군사원조 / 주한미군 철수(1949. 4. 4)

SECRET

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 200 dated April 5, 1949, from
American Mission in Korea, Seoul.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

April 4, 1949

Subject: Military Aid for Korea; Withdrawal of U. S. Troops

Participants: President Rhee
Mr. Muccio
Mr. Drumright

Mr. Muccio and Mr. Drumright called on President Rhee this morning at his residence.

Mr. Muccio said that he had come to tell the President in a general way about the reformulation of American policy with regard to the problem of Korea. Mr. Muccio then proceeded to read to President Rhee the substantive text of the Department's circular airgram of March 18, 1949, 3:15 a.m. President Rhee listened intently as Mr. Muccio read off the six numbered paragraphs of the reference airgram. As Mr. Muccio concluded reading the statement, President Rhee asked for a copy, saying he needed it for purposes of clarification. Mr. Muccio replied that he could not very well present the paper to President Rhee since it was the only copy in his possession. However, he would see whether it would be feasible to make a copy and have it sent to the President.

Mr. Muccio then explained that decision had been taken while he was in Washington to provide Korea with certain military supplies and equipment. He went on to say that the details of the program were now being worked out. In this connection, he said, General Roberts was proceeding to Tokyo today to take up the subject with General MacArthur.

President Rhee broke in to say that he had been giving the question of military equipment and supplies a great deal of thought, that he had discussed it with General Roberts, and that he had asked Dr. Chough Pyung Ok to take up the question in Washington. Chough had also wanted to make a public appeal for arms to the American people, but the President had asked him to withhold it pending the return of Mr. Muccio.

The President went on to say he sometimes wondered whether the State Department and other officials in Washington really understood the problems of Korea. He then said that the Koreans in North Korea were willing to do their part toward the unification of Korea. He went on to say most of the North Koreans were fighting against the Communists and that the large majority of the North Korean military forces were looking for an opportunity to rise up against their Communist masters. They were seeking the opportune moment to join up with their comrades in South Korea. The President added that the North Koreans were merely waiting a signal from South Korea to rise up. Many were getting impatient, he said, and were asking for a signal from South Korea was not forthcoming. The difficulty, the President said, is what is the next step? If word should be sent up from South Korea, the North Koreans would at once overthrow Kim Il Sung, but then the Chinese Communists in Manchuria might intervene. The Chinese Communists, the President went on, are a more serious problem than the Korean Communists. That is why, the President explained, the Republic of Korea really needs more arms and military equipment. If the North Korean regime is overthrown, the President said, the South Korean forces would find it necessary to go to North Korea to help remove the iron curtain up to the Tumen and Yalu rivers and bar the entry of Chinese Communist forces into North Korea. The President went on to say that the Communists are attempting to take over Cheju and other islands. To frustrate this attempt, it is necessary to maintain a tight blockage. Therefore, the President said, the Republic of Korea needs patrol boats.

The President then touched on the necessity of organizing the people of South Korea, including Korean youth, against the inroads of Communism. He stressed the necessity for the elimination of the Communist underground, asserting that this was another reason why more arms are needed. If a force of 200,000 could be developed, the President remarked, the Republic would be in a very strong position. Such an Army would be a heavy burden on the Korean economy and might cost too much money. If the burden proved too heavy, Korea's needs might be met by a smaller standing Army augmented by a reserve force.

The President then said that Korea needs an air force, pointing out in this connection that Korea now possesses ten pilots of outstanding caliber.

The President then returned to the subject of the absorption of North Korea into the Republic, remarking that the North Koreans were ready to come over to the Republic at any time. He then said that the Republic must wait and choose the opportune time to accomplish this objective.

At this point Mr. Muccio broke in to remark that the President did not seem to appreciate that he was, in the eyes of the Korean people, a symbol of Korean independence and freedom. In Mr. Muccio's opinion, the President should appeal to the Korean people in the North, gradually preparing them. Mr. Muccio went on to say he thought that the major struggle was in the field of ideas. To this the President responded that military aid was needed and he repeated the thesis that the North Koreans were growing impatient of waiting and they might soon become disappointed in the Republic.

President Rhee then launched into a discussion of the parts played by Generals MacArthur, Hodge, and Roberts in Korea. He suggested that General MacArthur had consistently been wholeheartedly in favor of Korea's aspirations, but that this was less true of

Generals Hodge and Roberts. In this connection, Mr. Muccio commented that American policy toward Korea had always been made in Washington and that Generals MacArthur, Hodge, and Roberts were but the implementers of that policy. Mr. Muccio then stressed the point that he had been busy for six weeks on Korean policy in Washington; that he had seen the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Army, General Wedemeyer, and the National Security Council on the subject. The lines of U. S. policy toward Korea had been redefined while he was in Washington. He could assure the President that the decision had been taken to grant continued U. S. economic and military aid to Korea.

Mr. Muccio then reiterated the view that the President, as the symbol of Korea's freedom and independence, should appeal periodically over the radio to the people of North Korea. In the meantime, it was his view that the Republic should solidify its position in the South, carrying on the training of its security forces and eliminating the guerrilla bands infesting Cheju Island and South Cholla.

The President stated that he realized the importance of cleaning up the Communist elements in the Republic, that action toward this end was steadily going forward, and that he had also formulated plans for the reorganization of the Korean Army. He said he had instructed the new Minister of Defense to proceed to Cheju Island in company with the Minister of Social Welfare. He said that the latter would stay in Cheju to take over overall control of the island, while the Minister of Defense would return to Seoul within a short time to accomplish reorganization of the Korean Army. The purpose of this reorganization would be to unify and render more efficient the Korean security forces. In this connection, the President said that in the future much more time would be put to the building up of the Korean Navy.

The President then said that some thought had been given to the despatch of the Korean Prime Minister, a military figure, to Washington to plead Korea's case for additional arms and equipment. To this, Mr. Muccio rejoined that a decision had just been taken in Washington with respect to the supplying of additional arms and equipment to Korea and that it seemed to him that the Prime Minister's trip would serve no useful purpose. In reply, the President commented that the Prime Minister hoped to see Mr. Muccio during the course of the afternoon and would discuss the subject with him.

After a discussion of several unrelated subjects, Mr. Muccio suggested that U. S. troops could not be expected to remain in Korea indefinitely, that he understood some Koreans were agitating for the withdrawal of U. S. troops, and that there was a natural desire on the part of the United States to withdraw its forces as soon as this could be done without imperiling Korean security. Mr. Muccio went on to say he felt that the training of the Korean security forces had made a good deal of progress in recent months and that he felt that the withdrawal of American troops might be accomplished in the very near future. In this connection, Mr. Muccio pointed out that such withdrawal would be accomplished by the furnishing of further supplies of arms and ammunition to the Republic and by augmentation of the Korean Military Advisory Group. Mr. Muccio added he felt that withdrawal of U. S. forces was important from the psychological point of view. It would give the Korean people and Army a new sense of responsibility and self-reliance. He felt certain the Korean people would grasp this new sense of responsibility. It would, moreover, enhance the prestige of Korea in the

eyes of the world. Mr. Muccio then suggested that at an appropriate time the President might want to issue a statement expressing appreciation of the service rendered by the U. S. forces in Korea and suggesting that they might now withdraw.

President Rhee took Mr. Muccio's comment with respect to the projected withdrawal of American troops calmly. He said he realized they could not be kept in Korea indefinitely. He merely hoped that they could be maintained in Korea until the Republic had an adequate force to protect its interests and sufficient arms and munitions to supply its forces.

The conversation then passed on to other subjects.

EFBramright/jcg

주한미군 철수와 주한미군사고문단의 증강(1949. 4. 9)

DIVISION OF OPERATIONS AND RECORDS TELEGRAPH BRANCH		DEPARTMENT OF STATE	
OFFICE INCOMING TELEGRAM FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS		289	
APR 11 1949		TOP SECRET	
DIRECTOR DEPARTMENT OF STATE		CORRECTED COPY 4/11/49, 12:30 p.m. CORRECTIONS UNDERSCORED	
		Control 3362	
		Rec'd April 9, 1949 4:38 a.m.	
FROM: Seoul		DIVISION OF NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS	
TO: Secretary of State		Noted APR 11 1949 H. T. Hughes DEPARTMENT OF STATE	
NO: 362, April 9, 2 p.m.			
Creation best possible atmosphere for announcing withdrawal USAFK and augmentation Korean military advisory group progressing favorably.			
Immediately upon my return March 29 I assured Rhee decision had been reached by Government of US to furnish Korean security forces adequate arms, equipment and munitions prior to withdrawal of task force and that legislative authority would be sought to continue such support for immediate future. (See despatch 189, April 1). I conveyed similar assurances to Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Minister Defense.			
On April 4 I again raised question of withdrawal with Rhee. In course of lengthy discussion I told him			

to the direct interest of the puppet People's Republic in the fighting on Cheju. Textually, the following was stated:

"Furthermore, they (the island guerrillas) are encouraged in their struggle by the fact that, under Premier Kim Il Sung, a sound democratic base has been built in the northern half of the Republic, and there is the strong Soviet Union behind us (*sic*). Also, the Cheju Islanders have a powerful people's coalition front.

"The activities of the armed guerrillas on Cheju Island became intensified following the formation of the Central Government of the Republic (of North Korea)."

Muccio

• 군사원조에 대한 이승만과 무쵸의 대화 비망록(1949. 4. 12)

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

American Mission in Korea,

April 12, 1949

DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS
Noted - file
MAY 5 1949
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

No. 211

TOP SECRET

SUBJECT: President Rhee's Visit to Cheju and Military Aid
for Korea

The American Mission in Korea has the honor to transmit for the Department's information a copy of a self-explanatory memorandum of conversation dated April 11, 1949.

Enclosure: *att*

1. Memorandum of Conversation
dated April 11, 1949.

<첨부분서> 이승만의 제주도 방문과 대한군사원조(1949. 4. 11)

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

April 11, 1949

Subject: President Rhee's visit to Cheju and military aid
for Korea

Participants: President Rhee
Mr. Muccio

President Rhee was very enthusiastic in informing me of the results of his visit to Cheju Saturday, April 9. He is confident steps taken by the military will result in the complete elimination of the Communists. He is already taking steps to help the civilian population rehabilitate itself. Steps have been taken to send seeds, food, building material, etc. and his Minister of Social Affairs is staying there to supervise the rehabilitation. A copy of his statement regarding Cheju is attached.

I then carefully explained in detail the conclusions of NSC 8-2 approved by President Truman on March 23rd. In doing this I used the first part of DA WARI 86359 dated March 31. I did not disclose the date given in paragraph "c" thereof nor the figures in "f" 1, 2 or 3.

We then discussed the proposal to augment and formalize KMAC. President Rhee mentioned his concern about General Roberts and recalled that he had requested an outstanding military figure from Secretary Royall and General Wedemeyer. I pointed out that although the General is a bit gruff, he is an outstanding soldier and was especially selected by General MacArthur and General Coulter for his unique ability in training and inspiring junior officers, qualities especially called for in KMAC.

President Rhee reiterated his eagerness for a larger Korean army of about 200,000. He has mentioned this figure several times and had presented a similar one direct to Secretary Royall and General Wedemeyer. I countered that the question of the adequate size of the Korean army and security forces had been given a great deal of consideration by General Roberts, by General MacArthur and by General Wedemeyer. I emphasized that the best military talent available to the United States of America were unanimous that a small, well-equipped, well trained army thoroughly loyal to the Government and to President Rhee with a somewhat larger reserve or civilian national guard - an army of say between 50,000 and 65,000 would be the most suitable.

I then mentioned that American military experts now felt that the present Korean army was rapidly reaching an advance degree of efficiency, that with equipment, supplies and munitions we propose transferring to the Government of the Republic of Korea and with legislative authorizations for continuing military assistance that the Korean Army has now reached a grade of competence where the retention of the U.S. task force is no longer warranted and politically is starting to become a disadvantage. President Rhee assented. I then suggested he might make a public announcement expressing confidence in his own security forces, in the rapid strides they had made and that he considered them now capable of taking care of Korea and that he was therefore suggesting to the American authorities that we discuss the timing of withdrawal. I added that such a pronouncement coming from him at this time would have an excellent effect on the world at large and be a real inspiration to his own people.

President Rhee concluded that he would make a statement to this effect "in a day or two".

<첨부분서> 이승만 제주도 방문 결과 보도문(1949. 4. 11)

Press Release

April 11, 1949

Office of the President

As a tribute to the bravery and devotion of the 3,100 men of the Korean Army, led by Colonel Yu Jai Hung, who have captured more than 2,800 Communist rebels and have ended guerrilla attacks on Cheju Island, President and Madame Syngman Rhee made a day-long visit with the people of Cheju Saturday.

In a speech to 2,500 of the captured "mountain people" in a refugee camp on the outskirts of Cheju City, President Rhee told them, "Forget the past. What is done is done. Your task now is to become loyal citizens of the Republic".

President Rhee emphasized this same note of conciliation and unity when he told an assemblage of 75,000 gathered in Cheju's city square, "Welcome the mountain people back among you and help them to learn the ways of peaceful and constructive citizenship."

Kim, Yung Whan and Lee, Dock Koo, principal Communist leaders on the island, are still at large. With a small band of followers, most of them unarmed, they are hiding among the rocks in the mountains. The Army, however, has them surrounded and expects to end the active stage of mopping up operations very soon.

The long-delayed election to choose two members of the National Assembly from Cheju will be held on May 10.

Following an intensive propaganda campaign featuring leaflets dropped from planes, hundreds of the guerrilla fighters have voluntarily surrendered.

All who give themselves up are placed in a refugee camp for a brief period of re-education. Plans call for their return to their farms in time to plant this season's rice crop.

President and Mrs. Rhee inspected a warehouse full of captured arms and ammunition, and President Rhee praised Col. Yu and the police and civic authorities for their vigorous and successful suppression of the guerrilla bands.

Some 150,000 of the 300,000 total population of Cheju Island turned out to welcome President and Madame Rhee.

Lt. Col. Walter J. Haberer, Jr., Senior American Advisor on Cheju, and Defense Minister Shin Sungmo accompanied President and Mrs. Rhee on their tour of the island.

In his principal address of the day, President Rhee praised the United States, and expressed appreciation of Ambassador John Muccio for the ECA aid, which, he said, will mean much more prosperous living for the people of Cheju Do, as well as for the rest of Korea.

The presidential party flew down to Cheju, leaving Saturday morning and returning in the evening of the same day.

Governor Yim Kwanho of Cheju City expressed the gratitude of the people for President Rhee's visit, and said it was more than sufficient recompense for the sufferings they have had to endure.

• 제주도 작전 소탕단계(1949. 4. 14)

INCOMING AIRGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS TELEGRAPH BRANCH
From American Mission in Korea
Seoul

DIVISION OF Date of Mailing: April 16, 1949

CONFIDENTIAL

NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

Re: April 27, 1949 11:14 a.m.


Department of State

APR 27 1949

Washington

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

A-131, April 14, 1949



The return of spring has seen an increase in both Communist rebel activity and opposing efforts of the Korean Army and police force. While it is apparent that the situation differs considerably from district to district, present indications are that the increased training of the Korean troops and a more aggressive and well-organized effort on the part of both army and police seem to be making headway in combating communist-inspired activities in South Korea.

The month of March saw a mushrooming of raids by both communists and Government forces in South Cholla and South Kyungsang Provinces. Some eighteen of such incidents were sufficiently confirmed to be recorded. The Tongbang News of South Ch'ongch'ung listed six in six different locales in one morning's news alone. The attacks were mostly on or from rural police centers; sometimes reports, perhaps somewhat exaggeratedly told of 50 to 100 men involved. They are generally officially recorded as involving more rebel than Government losses, though missionary sources stress the rebel advantages of raids which fire a building, pick off one or two policemen in an isolated station, take a gun or two and ammunition and disappear without much possibility of immediate reprisal. Such raids show the real, though small-scale striking power which the rebels continue to have in the Southern provinces and which continue to put small villages temporarily at their mercy. Missionaries resident in these provinces remark on the disruptive effect such activity has had on cultivation and repair work; they are extremely worried about what will happen to the already serious food situation if disruption should prove to have seriously affected the planting, cultivation or harvesting of summer grains.