

Following UNCOK developments have taken place since our telegram 295, March 26:

1. Radio Pyongyang intercept March 24 stresses futility of UNCOK except to support ROK and keep American troops in Korea.
2. I suggested to Wertheimer might be timely for UNCOK consider problem troop withdrawal. Details follow by despatch.
3. Principal Secretary UNCOK received Kim Yak Soo informally, listened views regarding petition (paragraph 2 OURTEL 295, March 26)
4. UNCOK to discuss interpretation terms of reference next week. Jamieson expected return Seoul April 9.
5. Committee Two again heard Yuen Chi Yua member National Assembly and ex-Home Minister, Kim Sung Soo member Supreme Committee Democratic Nationalist Party, Cho Se Ang, Chairman Socialist Party. Scheduled hear Foreign Minister April 11.
6. President Rhee reviewing logistical support problem UNCOK.
7. UNCOK planning trips Cheju Yeosu areas middle April

MUCCHO

APR 11

• 군사원조에 관한 이승만과 무췌의 대화 비망록(1949. 4. 5)


THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

American Mission in Korea,

No. 200

Seoul, April 5, 1949.

SECRET



Subject: Transmitting a Memorandum of Conversation on Military Aid to Korea and Withdrawal of United States Troops

The American Mission in Korea transmits for the information of the Department a copy of a memorandum of a conversation held between the President of the Republic of Korea and the Special Representative on the above-cited subjects on April 4, 1949.

Enclosure: *AM*

✓ Copy of Memorandum of
Conversation, as stated.

<첨부문서> 대한 군사원조 / 주한미군 철수(1949. 4. 4)

SECRET

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 200 dated April 5, 1949, from
American Mission in Korea, Seoul.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

April 4, 1949

Subject: Military Aid for Korea; Withdrawal of U. S. Troops

Participants: President Rhee
Mr. Muccio
Mr. Drumright

Mr. Muccio and Mr. Drumright called on President Rhee this morning at his residence.

Mr. Muccio said that he had come to tell the President in a general way about the reformulation of American policy with regard to the problem of Korea. Mr. Muccio then proceeded to read to President Rhee the substantive text of the Department's circular airgram of March 18, 1949, 3:15 a.m. President Rhee listened intently as Mr. Muccio read off the six numbered paragraphs of the reference airgram. As Mr. Muccio concluded reading the statement, President Rhee asked for a copy, saying he needed it for purposes of clarification. Mr. Muccio replied that he could not very well present the paper to President Rhee since it was the only copy in his possession. However, he would see whether it would be feasible to make a copy and have it sent to the President.

Mr. Muccio then explained that decision had been taken while he was in Washington to provide Korea with certain military supplies and equipment. He went on to say that the details of the program were now being worked out. In this connection, he said, General Roberts was proceeding to Tokyo today to take up the subject with General MacArthur.

President Rhee broke in to say that he had been giving the question of military equipment and supplies a great deal of thought, that he had discussed it with General Roberts, and that he had asked Dr. Chough Pyung Ok to take up the question in Washington. Chough had also wanted to make a public appeal for arms to the American people, but the President had asked him to withhold it pending the return of Mr. Muccio.

The President went on to say he sometimes wondered whether the State Department and other officials in Washington really understood the problems of Korea. He then said that the Koreans in North Korea were willing to do their part toward the unification of Korea. He went on to say most of the North Koreans were fighting against the Communists and that the large majority of the North Korean military forces were looking for an opportunity to rise up against their Communist masters. They were seeking the opportune moment to join up with their comrades in South Korea. The President added that the North Koreans were merely waiting a signal from South Korea to rise up. Many were getting impatient, he said, and were asking for a signal from South Korea was not forthcoming. The difficulty, the President said, is what is the next step? If word should be sent up from South Korea, the North Koreans would at once overthrow Kim Il Sung, but then the Chinese Communists in Manchuria might intervene. The Chinese Communists, the President went on, are a more serious problem than the Korean Communists. That is why, the President explained, the Republic of Korea really needs more arms and military equipment. If the North Korean regime is overthrown, the President said, the South Korean forces would find it necessary to go to North Korea to help remove the iron curtain up to the Tumen and Yalu rivers and bar the entry of Chinese Communist forces into North Korea. The President went on to say that the Communists are attempting to take over Cheju and other islands. To frustrate this attempt, it is necessary to maintain a tight blockage. Therefore, the President said, the Republic of Korea needs patrol boats.

The President then touched on the necessity of organizing the people of South Korea, including Korean youth, against the inroads of Communism. He stressed the necessity for the elimination of the Communist underground, asserting that this was another reason why more arms are needed. If a force of 200,000 could be developed, the President remarked, the Republic would be in a very strong position. Such an Army would be a heavy burden on the Korean economy and might cost too much money. If the burden proved too heavy, Korea's needs might be met by a smaller standing Army augmented by a reserve force.

The President then said that Korea needs an air force, pointing out in this connection that Korea now possesses ten pilots of outstanding caliber.

The President then returned to the subject of the absorption of North Korea into the Republic, remarking that the North Koreans were ready to come over to the Republic at any time. He then said that the Republic must wait and choose the opportune time to accomplish this objective.

At this point Mr. Muccio broke in to remark that the President did not seem to appreciate that he was, in the eyes of the Korean people, a symbol of Korean independence and freedom. In Mr. Muccio's opinion, the President should appeal to the Korean people in the North, gradually preparing them. Mr. Muccio went on to say he thought that the major struggle was in the field of ideas. To this the President responded that military aid was needed and he repeated the thesis that the North Koreans were growing impatient of waiting and they might soon become disappointed in the Republic.

President Rhee then launched into a discussion of the parts played by Generals MacArthur, Hodge, and Roberts in Korea. He suggested that General MacArthur had consistently been wholeheartedly in favor of Korea's aspirations, but that this was less true of

Generals Hodge and Roberts. In this connection, Mr. Muccio commented that American policy toward Korea had always been made in Washington and that Generals MacArthur, Hodge, and Roberts were but the implementers of that policy. Mr. Muccio then stressed the point that he had been busy for six weeks on Korean policy in Washington; that he had seen the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Army, General Wedemeyer, and the National Security Council on the subject. The lines of U. S. policy toward Korea had been redefined while he was in Washington. He could assure the President that the decision had been taken to grant continued U. S. economic and military aid to Korea.

Mr. Muccio then reiterated the view that the President, as the symbol of Korea's freedom and independence, should appeal periodically over the radio to the people of North Korea. In the meantime, it was his view that the Republic should solidify its position in the South, carrying on the training of its security forces and eliminating the guerrilla bands infesting Cheju Island and South Cholla.

The President stated that he realized the importance of cleaning up the Communist elements in the Republic, that action toward this end was steadily going forward, and that he had also formulated plans for the reorganization of the Korean Army. He said he had instructed the new Minister of Defense to proceed to Cheju Island in company with the Minister of Social Welfare. He said that the latter would stay in Cheju to take over overall control of the island, while the Minister of Defense would return to Seoul within a short time to accomplish reorganization of the Korean Army. The purpose of this reorganization would be to unify and render more efficient the Korean security forces. In this connection, the President said that in the future much more time would be put to the building up of the Korean Navy.

The President then said that some thought had been given to the despatch of the Korean Prime Minister, a military figure, to Washington to plead Korea's case for additional arms and equipment. To this, Mr. Muccio rejoined that a decision had just been taken in Washington with respect to the supplying of additional arms and equipment to Korea and that it seemed to him that the Prime Minister's trip would serve no useful purpose. In reply, the President commented that the Prime Minister hoped to see Mr. Muccio during the course of the afternoon and would discuss the subject with him.

After a discussion of several unrelated subjects, Mr. Muccio suggested that U. S. troops could not be expected to remain in Korea indefinitely, that he understood some Koreans were agitating for the withdrawal of U. S. troops, and that there was a natural desire on the part of the United States to withdraw its forces as soon as this could be done without imperiling Korean security. Mr. Muccio went on to say he felt that the training of the Korean security forces had made a good deal of progress in recent months and that he felt that the withdrawal of American troops might be accomplished in the very near future. In this connection, Mr. Muccio pointed out that such withdrawal would be accomplished by the furnishing of further supplies of arms and ammunition to the Republic and by augmentation of the Korean Military Advisory Group. Mr. Muccio added he felt that withdrawal of U. S. forces was important from the psychological point of view. It would give the Korean people and Army a new sense of responsibility and self-reliance. He felt certain the Korean people would grasp this new sense of responsibility. It would, moreover, enhance the prestige of Korea in the

eyes of the world. Mr. Muccio then suggested that at an appropriate time the President might want to issue a statement expressing appreciation of the service rendered by the U. S. forces in Korea and suggesting that they might now withdraw.

President Rhee took Mr. Muccio's comment with respect to the projected withdrawal of American troops calmly. He said he realized they could not be kept in Korea indefinitely. He merely hoped that they could be maintained in Korea until the Republic had an adequate force to protect its interests and sufficient arms and munitions to supply its forces.

The conversation then passed on to other subjects.

EFBramright/jcg

주한미군 철수와 주한미군사고문단의 증강(1949. 4. 9)

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS TELEGRAPH BRANCH		DEPARTMENT OF STATE	
OFFICE OF INCOMING TELEGRAM FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS		289	
APR 11 1949		TOP SECRET	
DIRECTOR DEPARTMENT OF STATE		CORRECTED COPY 4/11/49, 12:30 p.m. CORRECTIONS UNDERSCORED	
		Control 3362	
		Rec'd April 9, 1949 4:38 a.m.	
FROM: Seoul		DIVISION OF NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS	
TO: Secretary of State		Noted APR 11 1949 Holt T. Hughes DEPARTMENT OF STATE	
NO: 362, April 9, 2 p.m.			
Creation best possible atmosphere for announcing withdrawal USAFK and augmentation Korean military advisory group progressing favorably.			
Immediately upon my return March 29 I assured Rhee decision had been reached by Government of US to furnish Korean security forces adequate arms, equipment and munitions prior to withdrawal of task force and that legislative authority would be sought to continue such support for immediate future. (See despatch 189, April 1). I conveyed similar assurances to Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Minister Defense.			
On April 4 I again raised question of withdrawal with Rhee. In course of lengthy discussion I told him			