

II MISCELLANEOUS POLITICAL INFORMATION

It has been reported that during the month of August 1948, approximately three hundred (300) leftists arrived on Cheju Do from the mainland. Some of this group were reportedly North Koreans. These 300 people formed the nucleus of all raider activity. As near as can be ascertained at the present time, there are about thirty (30) of the original group still active. It is reported that the weapons still in the raiders' possession are carried by these 30 men, who are the active leaders. The balance of the original group have been killed or escaped from the island.

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• 1948년 4월 이후의 내란과 관련한 이범석의 보고(1949. 1. 10)

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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Subject: Report of Minister of National Defense, Lee Bom Suk,
on Internal Insurrections after April 1948

NEAR EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Sir:

I have the honor to submit a translation of a report entitled "Internal Insurrections after April, 1948," which was given to the National Assembly in a speech made by LEE Bom Suk, Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense, on December 7, 1948.

The report was requested during a period when the National Assembly became increasingly concerned over instances of direct, oppressive and possibly illegal interference by the Army and the Police with the lives of the people. The particular target of the Assembly was the Home Minister, Mr. YUN Chi Yung. But the continued imposition of martial law in North and South Cholla long after the quelling of the Yesu-Sunchon revolt resulted in numerous arbitrary acts by Police and Army which were regarded by local Assembly members as responsible for much local hardship. The threat to civil liberties, the hardships observed among constituents, and

the fact that the local populace tended to blame the Assembly for their sufferings under martial law, caused the Assembly to feel that it was losing face and that the successful progress of the important Grain Purchasing and National Traitors Acts was being endangered. Further Assembly concern was related to national defense in general and to the problem of Youth Group amalgamation in particular (see Mission Report No. 140, dated December 30, 1945) which the Assembly had initially recommended and the progress of which it continued to watch with interest as a future bulwark of Korean defense.

The report describes the protracted struggle on Chaju Island, the "No Nam incident" (i.e., the Yesu-Suncheon rebellion of October), the Taegu incident of November 2nd and the more recent fighting in the vicinity of Mt. Odai in central Kangwon province. The history of each incident is given in some detail, the causes of the incident and analysis of future plans and enemy potential is given more briefly.

The obscurity and doubtfulness of the details of much that happens in Korea, taken in conjunction with the extensive intelligence gathering resources of the United States Army in Korea, make some comment on the accuracy of this report possible and desirable.

In general, the report seems to be an honest attempt to present what the Korean Ministry of National Defense considered to be the facts of these uprisings. Its principal weakness seems to lie in the analysis of the causes of these incidents and in the exaggeration of Korean Army successes.

That part of the report dealing with the Chaju Island incident elicited particular comment from G-2, United States Army Forces in Korea. G-2, for example, feels that "Reasons" behind the Chaju Island incident are too generalized to be a useful guide to action, and that they are also, not unexpectedly, one-sided. The graft and inefficiency of Korean Government officials played a part in causing friction between officials and islanders; parochial-mindedness among the latter was only part of the explanation. Lack of control and coordination among personnel who were responsible for keeping peace on the island resulted in popular dissatisfaction and failure to curb disturbances. Extreme acts of violence by Police resulted in further hostility and panic. All this created fertile soil for Communist organization and propaganda, whether directly from the north or through the agency of the South Korean Labor Party. Moreover, G-2 considers it doubtful whether there are 100,000 Chaju Island laborers in Japan. However, it considers that some aid from the Korean League in Japan to the rebels is not improbable. Statements that "the number of armed rioters has decreased to 50 or 60," and that there are "premises of an early subjection," are also considered improbable by G-2 which believes the number of rioters was probably greater, that no estimates relative to Chaju Island are reliable due to the extremely fluid way in which forces can be dismissed, recalled, hidden or released weapons, and that early pacification of the island is doubtful. In Table I, First Operations of the Army, reported as being from April to middle June, actually took place from April 3rd

1. Cheju Island Incident;
2. Ho Nam Incident;
3. Taegu Incident;
4. Yang Mon Province Incident.

PART II. The Cheju Island Incident:

1. History

a. Reasons

- (a) Because it is an isolated island, the propaganda and plots of the so-called Peoples' Republic which sprang up right after liberation are still in existence.
- (b) More than 100,000 Cheju laborers in Japan are persistent followers of Communistic ideas.
- (c) The feelings of the islanders toward the administrative organizations - the Cheju islanders are extremely parochial-minded and they hate policemen from other provinces.

- (d) Plots and underground activities of the South and North Korea Labor Parties.

b. Developments

Since the outbreak of the insurrection on Cheju Island on the 3rd of April, armed insurgents have, under the control of the Leftists, perpetrated all kinds of cruelties all over the island, such as murder, incendiarism, assaults on Government and public organizations, and robbery. The National Army appealed to the patriotic conscience of the rioters and patiently advised them several times to reflect on themselves and to submit, but not only did they pay no attention to the advice, but on the contrary, they increased their atrocities. Considering the spreading influence of the serious conditions all over South Korea, we had to take up arms to reprimand them on the 17th of the same month. They are using the natural advantages of Halla Mountain for their guerrilla tactics and avoid head-on collisions. Most of the islanders are relatives of the insurgents and are cooperating with them, but due to appropriate measures taken by the able Commander of the Ninth Regiment we have promises of an early subjugation.

2. Disposition

a. Plan

We will appeal to their patriotic feelings first but in case they refuse to listen we are determined to exterminate them.

b. Disposition of troops

The Ninth Regiment of the National Army in Cheju Island has been suppressing the insurgents for the past nine months, since the middle of April, with 116 officers and 2,968 soldiers. The Eleventh Regiment was organized there, but a part of this was replaced by others sometime in July of this year. The main force of the Regiment was transferred to Suwon, Kyonggi Province. The total result of the battles is listed in Table 1, attached. On the other hand, the Navy assigned ships for the transportation of soldiers and, since the 18th of October they have blockaded all sides of the island with seven ships and 203 sailors; they are contributing a great deal to the operations of the Army.

3. The Future

a. The Movement of the Enemy

What with the infliction of a crushing defeat on the enemy by the National Army and what with the lack of food, weapons, munitions, and collaborators on their part, the number of the armed rioters has decreased to 50 or 60, but it is a greatly regrettable matter that most of the islanders are spiritual supporters of the insurgents.

- b. The forces of the Ninth Regiment have occupied all important points on the island and have removed all the people in the mountain villages to the seaside town for the enforcement of the "Bokap" (Joint responsibility of community) system. They have cut all the trees and bushes along both sides of the roads on the island for the prevention of sudden attacks by the insurgents and have also cut off all the enemy's supply routes. The army is proceeding resolutely to rehabilitate Cheju Island by taking

decisive measures against the collaborators of the rioters.

c. The Future

There has been a tendency for the insurgents, whose fate hangs by a single hair, to being setting fires as their last resort, but because of the continuance of persistent military operations and martial law proclaimed on the 15th of November, conditions have rapidly begun to take a turn for the better. The Army and the Police have been united as one body.

We deem it highly necessary to lead the islanders morally.

Table 1 - Summary Result of the Cheju Incident

	No. of battles	No. of Combatants	No. of Enemy troops		Period of Operations	Casualties	
			Max	Present		Own	Enemy
P I. R S T	12	3,045 (Both garrison and combatants)	1,000 armed and 2,000 others	50	From April to middle of June	3 killed 3 wounded	80 dead 2,015 captives Weapons Many
S H C O	60	2,112 (Garrison and combatants)			From middle of June to December	3 killed 3 wounded	362 dead 3,704 captives
		7 ships and 203 sailors			7 months from April to December		5 ships captured

PART III. The Ho Nam Incident

1. History

a. Reasons

- (a) The cells of the South Korea Labor Party had been organized in Army units;
- (b) When they were ordered to Cheju Island, the Leftist cells in the Fourteenth Regiment received directives from the Party;
- (c) The Local Leftist Cells, Leftist Young People's Organizations and the Cells in schools had been joined to the Cells in the Regiment;
- (d) The arrest of Major Oh Dong Ki exposed the joint-plot of the extreme Rightists and Leftists.

b. Developments

The Fourteenth Regiment, in Yosu, which had been ordered to leave the subjugation of the Cheju rioters on the 19th of October received directives from the South Korea Labor Party, and three officers and about 40 privates rose in revolt despite the desperate attempts of their Battalion Commander to prevent them. They captured Yosu City completely at 8:00 A.M. on the 20th and organized the People's Army, composed of the local Leftist organizations and students. enemy are exterminating them. The details are found in Table IV attached.

The Navy blockaded the coast-line south of the 38° parallel with the ships of the Second Special Service and has won great gains.

1. The Future-

a. The Movement of the Enemy

About 20 Communist bandits (the so-called First Battalion) have been almost annihilated and there is a rumor that about the same number of bandits are coming from

b. The Future

We are prepared in every way to meet them and 200 of the so-called Second Battalion will inevitably meet the same fate as their predecessors. The National Army, in cooperation with the police and people is taking an active part in the battles with the Communist bandits. If the North Korea Puppet Government should continue such atrocious activities by guerrilla warfare, we want to add a remark that we will surely work retribution on them with more than they bargain for.

PART VI. Conclusions

All the incidents that have occurred in South Korea are due to the vicious destructive moves of the Communists fanned by the plots and propaganda of the North Korea Puppet Government and the lack of unified ideology and practical ability on the part of the Government of the Republic of Korea. A part of the National Army was under their evil influence, and this is certainly an indelible stain on the history of the Army, but we think this is a good chance to purge all the rebellious elements and to establish a strong National Army with a unified ideology. We have already achieved rather good success. We will soon establish a National Army that can justify the Nation's

trust and stop all the destructive activities, however strong their perpetrators may be. We are making preparations against all cases of emergencies to the satisfaction of the people.

We hope that the high and low of this country will unite together with an iron will and strong cooperative spirit in order to tide over the extremely difficult situation we are facing at present and to ensure the happiness of our posterity of thousands of generations to come.

Table 2 - Summary of Results in the de Nam Incident

Number of villages and settlements	Total number of participants from units in any one area	Number of Enemy Troops		Period of operations	Casualties Enemy
		Max	Present		
1 (Ayokoo)	1,000	60		From Oct. 1-20	10 dead 10 captured 4000 lbs and ammunition
2 (Bunphon)	1,000	1,200		From Oct. 1-20	10 dead
3 (Khang- seng)	470	200		Oct. 1-20	Many trophies
4 (Khang- seng)	617	240		From Oct. 21-26	9 dead 3 captured Many trophies
5 (Khang- seng)	800	300		From Oct. 22-24	6 dead 12 captured Many trophies
6 (Khang- seng)	700	1,000		From Oct. 25-28	248 dead 1,483 captured Many trophies
7 (Khang- seng)	300	300		From Oct. 28 to Nov. 1	Many trophies
8 (Khang- seng)	400	500		From Oct. 26-28	Many trophies
9 (Khang- seng)	600	150		From Nov. 1-4	12 dead 40 captured Many trophies
10 (Khang- seng)	3,000	900		From Nov. 8-30	262 dead 160 captured Many trophies
11 (Khang- seng)	2,615	900		From Nov. 15-25	27 killed 12 wounded 9 missing 228 dead 618 captured Many trophies
12 (Khang- seng)	110 officers 4,732 soldiers	3,700	200	About 2 months longer for full clean-up	161 killed 183 wounded 16 missing 821 dead 2,680 captured Many trophies
13 (Khang- seng)	2,941	1,568	7	About 2 months longer for full clean-up	1 killed 5 wounded 5 dead 176 captured