Korean armed forces to begin an uprising on 18 January. While this report cannot be confirmed as yet, it appears more credible than previous rumors because it contains specific details and because it was revealed to South Korean officials in a bid for assistance. The leader of the plot stated it would be executed regardless of whether or not South Korean assistance was forthcoming.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE:

GEORGE S. SMITH
Colonel, GSC
Chief, Intelligence Group

▪ 남한에서 공산주의자들의 역량(1949년 2월 21일)

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COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES IN SOUTH KOREA

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COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES IN SOUTH KOREA

SUMMARY

Communist capabilities in South Korea are now at a low level and probably will be further reduced if the Republic continues its present trend toward increased stability.

The network of Communist organizations in South Korea is designed to provide control mechanisms for every segment of society and is sufficiently broad to draw new members from all classes should a severe economic crisis cause popular discontent and a swing to the left. The number of South Koreans who have consistently braved various degrees of police action to assist the Communist program may exceed 600,000, while the total number of Koreans enrolled in Communist front organizations may exceed 10 percent of the 20 million population. Underground combat organizations under Communist control and leadership are scattered throughout the mountain areas of South Korea and present a continuing threat to internal security.

The Communists in South Korea are under the direct control of Soviet agents in North Korea. Their adherence to the Moscow line has incurred the hostility and distrust of Korean nationalists, and periodic mass arrests of Communist leaders have forced them to concentrate organizational efforts on rebuilding party channels and strengthening the underground forces. The anti-Communist program undertaken by the Republic of Korea, since its inauguration in August 1948, has forced many Communist leaders to flee to the North.

The Communists have failed to control labor and have lost the ability they possessed in September 1946 to call a general strike. They have, however, improved their technique of coordinated sabotage as demonstrated in the anti-election campaign of February 1948. They have devoted considerable effort, with some success, to infiltrating youth groups, political parties, the security forces, and the government on all levels.

Current Communist propaganda is aimed at creating confusion, fear, and defeatism in the South. The constant threat of invasion from the North and the susceptibility of the isolated villagers to propaganda can be exploited by the Communists to produce these results in local areas. But the Communists have lost the advantage they possessed in the fall of 1948 when it appeared to the Koreans that the US was about to withdraw all troops, leaving the infant Republic to face alone the combined forces of Communism in the Far East. Favorable UN action on Korea, the expectancy of continued US aid under ECA, and the moderate success of security forces in suppressing the guerrillas have restored confidence in their future among the people and officials of South Korea.

The mission of the Communist forces in South Korea is to assist in carrying out the Soviet plan for the eventual absorption of South Korea into the Korean Democratic Peoples Republic by undermining popular government support through the creation of political and economic chaos, dissipating the military strength of the Republic, and developing the conviction that Communist domination is inevitable, thereby achieving a favorable psychological climate for opportunist "coalition" with the north.

The present Communist strength in South Korea does not appear great enough to support a sustained, country-wide campaign that would accomplish this mission. The limitation of their future potential, however, depends primarily on the ability of gov-

Note: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force have concurred in this report. The information herein is as of 10 February 1949.

ernment officials and the people to resolve their personal or party differences in presenting a united front to the Communists, and on the ability of the government to insure a minimum standard of living for both the farmer and the urban worker.

COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES IN SOUTH KOREA

1. SIZE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE SOUTH KOREAN COMMUNIST PARTY.

(3) *Militant Groups.*

Underground militant organizations under Communist control and leadership, the most important tools for the USSR's long-range program, are combat groups known collectively as the People's Liberation Army or the Action Vanguard Corps, consisting of separate guerrilla units. A Military Bureau, parallel with the Provincial Central Committee of the SKLP, is responsible for the organization and activities of the various forces within each province. In some provinces, at least, each town and village is in turn directly subordinate to the Provincial Bureau, and all directives emanating from the Bureau are rapidly disseminated to the local units. The existence of a centralized coordinating authority higher than the Provincial Bureaus has not been confirmed, nor is it known to what extent the SKLP issues specific directives to the guerrillas. However, as in South Korean Communist activities in general, it is known that important orders originate in Pyongyang and are transmitted to South Korea through agents who cross the 38th parallel daily. Trained organizers are dispatched from the North to assist in planning activities and in teaching guerrilla tactics.

Guerrilla strength fluctuates widely, depending on activities. South Korean groups are being steadily reinforced by special units infiltrating from the North. Casualties during periodic police actions serve to reduce their numbers, and, during periods of inactivity, many non-party guerrillas return to their homes and resume an outward appearance of normal life. During active periods, the guerrillas are likely to gain spot recruits among non-Communists who may be aroused by police brutality or unpopular government measures such as forced rice collections.

The island of Cheju-Do has long been a center of guerrilla strength and activity. Police brutality, the venality of public officials, and the historic clannishness of the islanders contribute to the discontent which trained Communists have fanned into chronic revolt. Recently, indiscriminate guerrilla activity against villages has caused many formerly sympathetic civilians to assist security forces in combing the hills, and the first mass surrenders of guerrillas on Cheju-Do have since been reported.

▪ 조병옥 유엔 연설 요지(1949년 5월 18일)

Republic of Korea Determined Not To Surrender to Communistic Totalitarianism

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. JOSEPH R. FARRINGTON
DELEGATE FROM HAWAII
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, May 18, 1949