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• 남한의 게릴라 상황(1949년 1월 10일)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
General Staff, United States Army
Washington 25, D. C.

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10 January 1949

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION DAILY BRIEFING

GUERRILLA SITUATION IN SOUTH KOREA

A Communist invasion of South Korea from North Korea does not appear likely in the near future. Rumors of such an invasion persist, but according to a fairly reliable report the invasion is contingent upon the outbreak of a Communist revolution in South Korea. The North Korean People's Army would then, it is reported, enter South Korea ostensibly to restore law and order. It is not believed that the Communists in South Korea are at present capable of fomenting a general revolt in the area.

Relative quiet prevailed throughout South Korea during the closing weeks of 1948 and the first week of 1949. Activity was confined to skirmishing between South Korean security forces and Communist raiders. Reports indicate that police and Constabulary activities against the Communist guerrillas in Kangwon Province have reduced the Communist groups to small scattered bands whose morale is deteriorating. In other provinces of South Korea, mopping up operations against Communist raiders were also continued with success by the police and Constabulary. The campaign against Communists on Cheju Island resulted, according to Constabulary reports, in many Communist casualties. The decline in violence does not, however, indicate its early end or the termination of Communist capabilities to provoke disorders.

The South Korean Constabulary has stepped up recruiting, with an eventual goal of 65,000 men. Where the equipment for force of that size will be obtained is unknown, since the U.S. has agreed to furnish arms and equipment for only 50,000. There are no arms available locally, with the possible exception of some Japanese weapons.

The collection of grains for rationing in South Korea is progressing very slowly, largely because the Korean National Assembly has failed to provide sufficiently stringent enforcement provisions in the law. Only 34 percent of the quota had been collected by the end of the past year, whereas in 1947, under American supervision, 90 percent had been collected by the end of the year. A breakdown in the rationing system as the result of the failure of the grain collection would breed discontent and make the populace more susceptible to Communist propaganda and leadership.

Recent rumors of disaffection in North Korea have been supplemented by a report of certain concrete details of an alleged plan by dissidents in the North

Korean armed forces to begin an uprising on 18 January. While this report cannot be confirmed as yet, it appears more credible than previous rumors because it contains specific details and because it was revealed to South Korean officials in a bid for assistance. The leader of the plot stated it would be executed regardless of whether or not South Korean assistance was forthcoming.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE:

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Colonel, GSC
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• 남한에서 공산주의자들의 역량(1949년 2월 21일)

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FOR THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE
GENERAL STAFF, U.S. ARMY

532191
COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES
IN SOUTH KOREA



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