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북한 공산폭도들의 남한침투(1948년 12월 6일)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

DEC 6 1948

SUBJECT: Intelligence Division Special Briefing.

COMMUNIST RAIDERS FROM NORTH INFILTRATE SOUTH KOREA
(See attached map)

South Korean Constabulary forces are continuing operations against Communist raiders in Kangwon Province. Reports indicate that four groups of Communist guerrillas, trained in North Korea, may have succeeded in infiltrating across the 38th parallel. The first three groups were companies of 80 men each, allegedly comprising a battalion, and entered South Korea early in November. The fourth group, whose presence has not yet been confirmed, was reported to be a second battalion which crossed the parallel on 3 December. The first battalion has now been reduced to the status of three small detachments totalling approximately 90 men. No further information is available on the strength or location of the reported second battalion.

Interrogation of prisoners indicates that 80% of the raiders were members of the South Korean Labor Party who had been given training in North Korea, and that the remaining 20% were North Koreans. The raider force was dressed in civilian clothes and armed with Japanese weapons. Rations and money were furnished to the group before it left North Korea. The mission of this force was to contact local members of the South Korean Labor Party and promote the spread of Communism by recruiting new members, by carrying out sabotage, and by creating disturbances.

These Communist guerrilla forces apparently are being brought under control by South Korean Police and Constabulary shortly after they make their appearance in South Korea. It will probably be impossible, however, to prevent infiltration of this type because of the mountainous terrain along the 38th parallel in Kangwon Province. Prisoners state that a total of 800 to 1000 personnel were being trained for this duty in North Korea, and it is considered probable that many of these personnel will eventually find their way into South Korea. This infiltration will provide a continuing problem for South Korean security forces, although it is not probable that action on the present scale could result in the overthrow of the South Korean Government. However, it is believed that the recent infiltrations are only a beginning and that it must be anticipated that their scale can be increased in the future.

Elsewhere in South Korea the situation remained relatively quiet as Constabulary units continued mopping up rebel forces in South Cholla Province and on Chajin Island. A total of 217 Communists were reported killed by security forces on Chajin Island during the period 18 Nov - 4 Dec.

No major changes were reported from North Korea. Soviet units apparently are continuing their withdrawal. North Korean People's Army troops have been moving into areas relinquished by the Soviets. Although no firm identifications of units in their new stations have been made, reports indicate that People's Army troops have been deployed on a garrison basis rather than for tactical purposes. A recent fall in reports of troop movements into the 38th parallel area may indicate that units have closed in new locations. The immediate vicinity of the 38th parallel is manned by North Korean Constabulary personnel and no People's Army troops have been identified on border guard duty.

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• 남한의 게릴라 상황(1949년 1월 10일)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
General Staff, United States Army
Washington 25, D. C.

7259/7261 M.C. Keen
J.V.

10 January 1949

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION DAILY BRIEFING

GUERRILLA SITUATION IN SOUTH KOREA

A Communist invasion of South Korea from North Korea does not appear likely in the near future. Rumors of such an invasion persist, but according to a fairly reliable report the invasion is contingent upon the outbreak of a Communist revolution in South Korea. The North Korean People's Army would then, it is reported, enter South Korea ostensibly to restore law and order. It is not believed that the Communists in South Korea are at present capable of fomenting a general revolt in the area.

Relative quiet prevailed throughout South Korea during the closing weeks of 1948 and the first week of 1949. Activity was confined to skirmishing between South Korean security forces and Communist raiders. Reports indicate that police and Constabulary activities against the Communist guerrillas in Kangwon Province have reduced the Communist groups to small scattered bands whose morale is deteriorating. In other provinces of South Korea, mopping up operations against Communist raiders were also continued with success by the police and Constabulary. The campaign against Communists on Cheju Island resulted, according to Constabulary reports, in many Communist casualties. The decline in violence does not, however, indicate its early end or the termination of Communist capabilities to provoke disorders.

The South Korean Constabulary has stepped up recruiting, with an eventual goal of 65,000 men. Where the equipment for force of that size will be obtained is unknown, since the U.S. has agreed to furnish arms and equipment for only 50,000. There are no arms available locally, with the possible exception of some Japanese weapons.

The collection of grains for rationing in South Korea is progressing very slowly, largely because the Korean National Assembly has failed to provide sufficiently stringent enforcement provisions in the law. Only 34 percent of the quota had been collected by the end of the past year, whereas in 1947, under American supervision, 90 percent had been collected by the end of the year. A breakdown in the rationing system as the result of the failure of the grain collection would breed discontent and make the populace more susceptible to Communist propaganda and leadership.

Recent rumors of disaffection in North Korea have been supplemented by a report of certain concrete details of an alleged plan by dissidents in the North