

can extend his dictatorship over remaining two-thirds living in American zone. Since he cannot bluff UN Commissioner or US Army there he is trying to wreck coming democratic election by murder and terror UNQUOTE.

DALLAS NEWS third states QUOTE Korea deserve better luck than it is having but its only hope is in UN action which in turn requires that mythical UN fighting force to effectuate it. Korea has population of close to twenty-four million. Only fifty thousand of these were estimated as Communists in nineteen forty. Korea wants above all things freedom and independence. What Korea needs is UN trusteeship until completed free elections can be guaranteed. Korea isn't likely to get either UNQUOTE.

• 북한 선거와 5·10선거 반대 일지(1948년 10월 22일)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DC/R

DATE: October 22, 1948

FROM : UNP - Mr. Wells

SUBJECT: Enclosures to Despatch No. 51 from Seoul, Korea

The following enclosures have been withdrawn from the subject despatch and forwarded to the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly in Paris:

1. One carbon copy of Enclosure 1.
2. Sole copy of Enclosure 2.
3. One carbon copy of Enclosure 3.
4. One carbon copy of Enclosure 4.
5. Sole copy of Enclosure 5 (a carbon copy).
6. Original copy of Enclosure 6.
7. Sole copy of Enclosure 7.

The following remaining enclosures, with original despatch No. 51, are returned herewith for your files:

1. Original copy of Enclosure 1.
2. Original copy of Enclosure 3.
3. Original copy of Enclosure 4, and one carbon copy.
4. Three photostats of Enclosure 6.

Attachments:

As stated in paragraph two above.



## OPPOSITION TO SEPARATE KOREAN GOVERNMENTS

### AND THE

### NORTH KOREAN ELECTION

#### U.S.S.R. and U.S. Claims

It is probable that the USSR will include a number of the following claims in its stand on the Korean issue before the U.N. General Assembly in Paris:

1. The 25 August election is the only election which can be considered a national election since it was held in both zones. Suppression of U.S. and Korean authorities in South Korea forced the election underground in that area.
2. All geographic, economic, social and political segments of the population participated in the election.
3. The 25 August election was not accompanied by the coercion and bloodshed which occurred during 10 May. Two seats are still vacant in the so-called National Assembly because of the objection of the people of CHEJU DO to the 10 May election.
4. The majority of the people in South Korea did not support the 10 May election. All patriots opposed it. Only the capitalistic, traitorous pro-Japanese elements favored this scheme for dividing the nation because it meant the perpetuation of their authority in the American zone.
5. Election statistics: In North Korea, 4,529,938 or 97.97 per cent of the registered voters cast ballots; in South Korea, 6,735,407 or 77.48 per cent of the eligible electorate cast ballots.
6. The Supreme People's Council contains representation of the Korean people at the ratio of 50,000 to 1 -- twice



the representation allowed in the so-called National Assembly. The South Koreans with 360 representatives have a greater voice in the Government than the North Koreans with 212.

7. All essential positions in both North and South Korea have been filled. The central government is ready to function.

The following arguments might be advanced by U.S. spokesmen at the United Nations General Assembly in their efforts to prove that the 25 August election was a fraud, that it had no legal basis and that its outcome was pre-arranged by the Communists:

1. North Korean claims that more than 77 per cent of the eligible voters in South Korea participated in the North Korean election are absurd. (A rough estimate of those South Koreans willfully participating in the election would not exceed 5 per cent; an additional 20 per cent may have voted for "something," i.e., voted for an election, a land distribution program or against rice collection.)

In the UNTCOK-supervised election more than 50,000 election officials were necessary to insure a fair election for over 90 per cent of South Korea's eligible voters. Presumably it would take a comparable number of election officials to assure legal election practices if more than 77 per cent, as the Soviets claim, participated in the 25 August election. Such a force operating in the open could not have escaped detection by Korean law enforcement agencies. That only about 2,000 were arrested by South Korean police during the election period for all types of subversive activities indicates the degree of exaggeration



of Soviet claims for South Korean participation. Police confiscated approximately 100,000 ballots during the election, each ballot, on the average, containing about ten signatures, seals or finger prints.

An examination of the attached (Attachment 2.) random samples of the ballots cast in the communist election did not disclose a single acceptable fingerprint. All fingerprints appearing on the ballots were "smudges" or merely a few ridges from the tips of the fingers, indicating either (1) that the fingerprint takers knew nothing about fingerprinting or (2) that the fingerprints were deliberately defective. It will be noted that the size of the ballot does not permit ten bonafide "roll" fingerprints.

2. In the South Korean phase of the 25 August election the names of the candidates do not appear on the ballot.

3. Primary support of the 25 August election in South Korea came from the components of the Democratic People's Front, which South Korean authorities still permit to exist despite the Front's record of crimes against the people and government of South Korea. Members of the moderate parties who had reportedly made every effort to arrive at some compromise solution with the communists individually and for their parties denounced the election and refused to participate.

4. The 25 August election certainly cannot be called "popular" election. Many of the 1,080 so-called representatives departed from South Korea for HAEJU prior to the completion of the so-called election in South Korea. Further it is certain that the election did not represent the will of



approximately four and a half million North Koreans in the American zone who had come South of the 38th parallel rather than continue living under Communist subjugation. The foremost leader of these refugees, CHO Man Sik, has been under house arrest in North Korea for nearly three years. Neither he nor any of his followers were elected to the Supreme People's Council or to posts in their new Cabinet.

CHRONOLOGY OF ACTIVITIES OF OPPOSITION TO THE  
UN-SPONSORED ELECTION

NOTE: To furnish an indication of public thinking at a given time during the JAN-AUG 1948 period, extraneous concurrent activities are also included, in dotted lines.

|            |                                                                                                                                                      |
|------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 26 Jan     | KIM Koo, in consultation with UNTCOK, opposes separate election; advocates withdrawal of troops and North-South (N-S) consultations.                 |
| 27 Jan     | KIM Kyu Sik deplores division of Korea before UNTCOK; urges bizonal conferences, preferably in South Korea (SK).                                     |
| . . . . .  |                                                                                                                                                      |
| 08 Feb     | RHEE reiterates demands for immediate general election before estimated 10,000 persons in Seoul Stadium.                                             |
| . . . . .  |                                                                                                                                                      |
| 17 Feb     | KIM Kyu Sik publicly denies wishful reports which allege that he is in complete accord with RHEE on the question of government.                      |
| . . . . .  |                                                                                                                                                      |
| 18 (?) Feb | KIM Koo appeals to "30 million Koreans" to strive for "unification and complete independence"; to avert ruinous civil war being advocated by vicious |



profiteers.

19 Feb Two SK KIMs receive death threats for their all-Korea election efforts.

23-27 Feb KIM Kyu Sik leads opposition to Korean Interim Legislative Assembly (KILA) action supporting Little Assembly resolution to hold election in the area accessible to UNTCOK -- i.e., SK; KIM Kyu Sik and followers walk out of KILA.

01 Mar Gen. Hodge issues proclamation setting 09 May as election date (later changed to 10 May because of eclipse on previously chosen date).

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01 Mar KIM Koo and KIM Kyu Sik noticeably absent from SAM IL Day (March 1st) celebrations held in Seoul Stadium; KIM Koo publicly asserts Little Assembly recommendation "means the bankruptcy of the principle of Democracy."

05 Mar KIM Kyu Sik tells USAFIK official that there is no possibility that NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE FEDERATION (NIF) will change its attitude and support separate election.

15 Mar 100 representatives of KIM Koo's KOREAN INDEPENDENCE PARTY (KIP) convene in Seoul and reaffirm KIM Koo's "non-participation" stand on coming election.

10-17 Mar PYONGYANG and MOSCOW Radios show increased concern over approaching election (10 May).

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18 Mar KILA "expels" and "accepts resignations" of 30 members who submitted resignations during preceding week.

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19 Mar PYONGYANG admits monetary support to SK Communists hampering progress toward 10 May election.

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20 Mar UNTCOK decides to observe elections in SK.

21 and 23 Mar Meetings of NIF Standing Committee adopt resolution to "cooperate with international efforts which aim at achieving Korean unification and independence."

25 Mar PYONGYANG Radio invites representatives of SK opposition to 10 May election to participate in an "all-Korea" conference in PYONGYANG beginning 13 April (later changed to 14 April); a preliminary list of 15 SKs invited contained only one rightist - KIM Koo; North Koreans (NKs) originally designated 10 conferees, all of them North or South Korean Communists; correspondence between KIM Il Sung and KIM Doo Bong and two SK KIMs revealed: on 15 Mar two NK KIMs replied to 16 Feb letter from two SK KIMs; foundation for joint conference laid.

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03 Apr Large-scale guerilla activity begins on CHEJU DO.

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07 Apr SK KIMs dispatch representatives to PYONGYANG to prepare for N-S meetings and attempt to postpone first meeting from 14 to 20 April.



09 Apr

SK KIMs representatives return with no significant positive information except that arrangements for the N-S conference are near completion.

• 계속된 경비대 반란사건(1948년 11월 10일)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

10 NOV 1948

SUBJECT: Intelligence Division Special Briefing.

FURTHER OUTBREAKS AMONG SOUTH KOREAN CONSTABULARY

Further mutinous incidents among the South Korean Constabulary since the suppression of the Yosu rebellion raise two important questions:

- (1) What is the extent of serious disaffection among the Constabulary?
- (2) Are these outbreaks the initial phases of a Communist plan for the gradual development of a Communist guerrilla rebellion in Korea patterned after the one in Greece?

The latest outbreaks have been on a much smaller scale than the Yosu incident last month. The principal one was at Taegu where on 3 November a large number of the Sixth Constabulary Regiment revolted when Korean Military Police attempted to arrest a member of the Constabulary for Communist activities. Early reports of the fighting which ensued gave the Police casualties as 4 killed and 15 wounded, and mutineer casualties as 21 killed and 8 wounded. The mutiny was under control on 4 November, by which time some 400 Constabulary had been rounded up. Over 300 of them are reported to have surrendered to the Commanding Officer of the First U.S. Infantry at Camp Stimpert on the outskirts of Taegu. Interrogated prisoners said the mutineers had intended to attack police boxes on 3 November, and that the uprising had been precipitated by the Police attempt to arrest one of the Constabulary, as mentioned above. While reports do not indicate that the Communists were directly responsible for the outbreak at Taegu, it is fairly safe to conclude that Communist elements in the Sixth Regiment did their best to expand the mutiny into a rebellion.

Two other minor mutinies in the Constabulary have occurred recently in South Korea. On 29 October 20 members of the Fourth Regiment in Posing are reported to have mutinied. They were subdued by local units of the regiment. The other minor incident was on 3 November near Naju where the commander of the second battalion of the Fourteenth Regiment was shot by a company commander who then fled to the hills with about 80 Constabulary.

On Cheju-do, 145 guerrillas, including their deputy commander, are reported to have been killed recently by the Constabulary in a concentrated effort to smash Communism on the island. Whether any mutineers are among the guerrillas on Cheju-do is not known.

The above incidents so soon after Yosu would suggest that disaffection among the Constabulary is more widespread than was at first suspected. It is still believed, however, that dissident elements in the Constabulary are in the minority.

Thus far there is insufficient evidence to warrant the conclusion that the recent incidents in Korea, beginning with Yosu, are part of a Communist plan to apply the techniques of Greek guerrilla warfare to Korea for the purpose of overthrowing the Government, but the number and violence of the outbreaks, with the Communists being rapidly involved, would indicate the definite possibility of Communist inspiration.