

a menace of Communism not of its own making and that Communists were strengthened by American efforts at compromise during the early years of the occupation when Korea was forbidden to develop an Army and combat the spread of Communism.

He further pointed out that he did not agree with the defense policies outlined by the American Ambassador and the Commanding General USAFK with regard the 38th Parallel, indicating that outposts were manned by police with short-range carbines and both police and Army troops were ordered to avoid combat. It was his belief that the parallel line should be manned by Army troops and that Korea should be given more weapons including combat aircraft.

Comment: The complaint against carbines may appear justifiable to combatants who are pinned down by small arms fire at several thousand yards and who can expend huge quantities of ammunition and only occasion co-incidental casualties. It is doubtful if the contribution of more armament would in the long run be beneficial to either the US or Korea unless the Korean Government is willing to sacrifice some of its sovereignty to a foreign power and allow advisory personnel more sway in the training and control of its Army. In some instances it is apparent to American authorities in Seoul that Rhee accepts the gratuitous advice of several Americans who surround the President but have no official status. One such individual is an American professor who has written several articles on Korea and has assumed the role of an expert on Korea. His advice has not always been to the best interests of either the US or Korea.

3. Hong Son Nyung and Kim To Hyun, both native sons and conservative Rhee NSAKI members, were elected to Assembly seat on Cheju-Do on 10 May in an election which was marked by its quietness.

Comment: Both assembly seats have been vacant for a year, since the 48 elections in 2 of the island districts were invalidated because of Communist-inspired disturbances.

• 6개월간의 제주도 작전 전과보고(1949. 6. 24)

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MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

SECRET

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED

From: MILATTACHE Seoul Korea

To: Dept of Army for Intelligence Division; CINCPAC
Tokyo Japan for G-2

BTQ: 240715Z

JOINT WEEKA 2

24 Jun 49

2. During this period, seven parallel incidents were reported.

B. A Korean Army report of operations for Cheju Do (950-1130) for period 28th December 48- 13th June 49, lists casualties as follows: Korean Army; wounded 55 killed in

action 100 weapons lost 51. Rebels; surrendered 2,680 prisoner of war 4,630 killed in action 3,421 weapons lost 255.

Comment:

Rebel losses probably exaggerated. Situation in Cheju Do very quiet at present.

• 제1독립대대 제주도 주둔(1949. 7. 15)

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STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE
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From: MILATTACHE, Seoul Korea

To: Dept of Army for Intelligence Division

Info: CINCPAC; COMNAVFE

DTG: 150900Z

JOINT WEEKA 5

15 Jul 49

Military:

7. Forces to be retained on Cheju Do, first separate Battalion, Korean Army.

Comment:

Guerrilla activity on Cheju Do has been reduced to minimum. Police and 1 Battalion Army believed adequate to maintain law and order. Islanders are interested in reducing sizes of present Korean Army force.

3. On Cheju Island trials of 2,000 unregenerate Communists have been completed. 350 received death penalty; balance between 20 years and life imprisonment. President Rhee has not approved sentences to date.

• 제주도 공산주의자 재판 결과(1949. 8. 12)

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From: MILATTACHE Seoul Korea

To: Dept of Army for Intelligence Division USA

Info: G-2 CINCPAC pass to COMNAVFE