

Prime Minister and Gen LEE, a Cabinet member, while LEE Yun Yong, elected in Seoul, a North Korean and acting head of the Chosun Democratic Party probably will receive a Cabinet post in view of his large Christian following, his personality, and the fact that he represents many North Koreans. (a)

Comment: The rumored coalition group being formed against Dr. RHEE (Intell. Summary 2111) apparently is beginning to take shape. Dr. RHEE has had many political ups and downs, but usually has managed to better himself each time. If Dr. RHEE is elected President of South Korea it will be interesting to note whether he abides by his recent statements and requests U.S. troops to remain in Korea until adequate military forces are trained to defend South Korea from attack by North Korean forces (Intell. Summary 2107).

#### MISCELLANEOUS

#### 2. Civil Disturbances: (Refer to Map No. 1)

(a) Violence Increases: Civil disturbances in South Korea increased sharply during the latter part of April as Communists sought to intimidate and bewilder Koreans in an attempt to jeopardize the 10 May elections.

(b) Additional Deaths Reported: Several deaths occurring prior to 22 Apr have not been included in previous reports (Intell. Summary 2103). They include:

Chuhan (26) 15 Apr: One person was burned to death. (a)

Sinam (22) 11 Apr: Three Rightists were shot to death. (b)

Ho Young (28) 19 Apr: Four rioters were killed when a mob of 200 persons attacked the police. (c)

Sam Dong (29) 21 Apr: One raider was killed and one wounded when raiders attacked the village.

(c) Civil Disturbances 22-30 Apr:

Cheju (24) 23 Apr: Police killed two raiders.

Sam Yang (25) 26 Apr: One raider was killed by the police.

Chochun (27) 24 Apr: A Communist was shot to death while attempting to escape from the police. (d)

Singeng (30) 30 Apr: An election committoeman was killed.

Ora (23) 30 Apr: A woman and a 10-year-old girl were killed.

• 남한의 5·10선거(1948. 5. 30)

|                                                                                                  |                                                                                        |             |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| <b>GENERAL HEADQUARTERS<br/>FAR EAST COMMAND</b><br>MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF |                                                                                        |             |
| TABLE OF CONTENTS                                                                                |                                                                                        |             |
| NO.                                                                                              | Selected Items for the Information of Commanders<br>and Staffs of the Far East Command | DATE        |
| Special Edition                                                                                  |                                                                                        | 30 May 1948 |

### KOREA

**Military, Political, Economic, Social Situation,  
Press Review, Civil Intelligence, Miscellaneous**

Selected Items for the Information of Commanders  
and Staffs of the Far East Command

#### POLITICAL REPORT

#### 1. General Election in South Korea:

(a) Organization of Elections: The first general election in the history of Korea was held in the U.S. Occupation Zone on 10 May 48 under supervision of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea. A National Election Committee composed of Koreans was appointed by the U.S. Military Governor and was charged with the responsibility of setting up machinery for conducting the elections. Based on the last official census which was taken in 1946, the Election Committee estimated that approximately 8,216,851 South Koreans were eligible to vote in the election. An electoral headquarters was established in each South Korean provincial capital and a separate headquarters was set up in the metropolitan area of Seoul. The U.S. zone was divided into 200 electoral districts, each having a population of approximately 150,000 people, and 13,407 polling places were established. Approximately 7,884,095 people, or 95.9 per cent of those eligible, registered for the election and 938 South Koreans announced their candidacy for 200 seats in the National Assembly. However, several candidates withdrew or were disqualified shortly before the election. In approximately 12 districts, candidates had no opposition. Throughout South Korea Rightist and nonpartisan candidates were the most numerous. No candidate ran on a Communist ticket although it was suspected that some Leftists masked their political affiliations by campaigning as nonpartisans. Some Rightists and Moderates also apparently announced as nonpartisans in areas where their parties did not enjoy dominant popularity.

(b) Activities at Polls: The polls opened at 0700 hours on 10 May and many eligible voters already were in line outside the polling places. The South Korean National Police were charged with responsibility of maintaining order and were assisted by Constabulary and Coast Guard personnel.

The organization of Community Protective Units was authorized by the U.S. Military Governor upon the recommendation of CHOUGH Byung Ok, Chief of the National Police. These protective units were composed of members of Rightist Youth Groups who volunteered to assist in maintaining order. The protection of voting places by protective units was considered as a voluntary, patriotic action and the Youth Group members did not function in an official capacity.

Available buildings scattered throughout the provinces were used as polling places and the names and pictures of candidates were posted above the entrances. An area of approximately 20 square yards was roped off at the entrance to each polling place in order to regulate the flow of traffic. Voters formed in lines outside the blocked off areas and only two or three were allowed inside the polling places at any given time. This action apparently was taken to insure that voting officials constantly outnumbered the voters inside the polls. Occasionally a voter was searched before being allowed to enter the polling places, and in one instance, a female voter was observed while being searched by a Korean woman. The processing of voters in and out of polling places was controlled by members of the Community Protective Units who were dressed in civilian clothes and wore brassards of various types. These men were armed with clubs, and upon casual inspection, it appeared that only three or four were on duty at each polling place. However, a more thorough examination revealed that additional guards were posted at near-by street intersections, in entrances to buildings, and at various obscure places near the polls. At one polling place which was observed at length, the commander of the protective unit assembled his guards for orders and 28 men were counted. When the polls closed he assembled them again and approximately 50 men fell into formation.

One or two policemen and about the same number of Constabularymen normally were stationed near each polling booth. Police were armed with carbines or rifles and Constabularymen carried rifles with fixed bayonets. However, the Constabularymen were not allowed to approach closer than 30 yards to the entrance to the polls.

Additional Constabulary or Coast Guard personnel, who appeared to form small reserve groups of from 10 to 20 men, were observed in obscure alleys near several polling places. It appeared that the same guards remained on duty throughout the day and most of them were fairly alert. No congregation of people who had voted was observed in the vicinity of any poll, and the general appearance of the Seoul area was one of preparedness. Police mounted on horses and in trucks patrolled the streets. Auxiliary police, who were deputized for the election, conducted bicycle patrols. The latter were dressed in Japanese

military uniforms. United Nations personnel toured South Korea to inspect election procedures and U.S. Military Police conducted normal patrols. U.S. troops were alerted, but few were on the streets, and U.S. personnel were prohibited from entering polling places.

The polls closed at 1900 hours and ballots were boxed immediately and transported to district headquarters for counting. Successful candidates are being notified unofficially of their election by the district headquarters and voting results were processed through provincial headquarters to the National Election Committee Headquarters in Seoul.

(c) Atmosphere of Election: The atmosphere at polling places observed in the Seoul area appeared free to the extent that eligible voters apparently were able to go to the polls unmolested and cast their ballots for candidates of their choice. However, Communist efforts to block election plans by sabotage, murder, and attacks upon registration places had convinced those favoring the election that protection of polling places and ballots was necessary. This protection appeared to have been carried out in an orderly manner at the polls observed, and although some voters were searched, none was denied entrance to the polls.

(d) Results of Election: An announcement by the South Korean office of Civil Administration indicates that approximately 90 per cent of the registrants voted. The percentage of registrants who voted in the various provinces and in the Seoul area follows:

|                   |    |
|-------------------|----|
| Seoul             | 92 |
| Kyonggi Do        | 90 |
| Chungchong Pukto  | 94 |
| Chungchong Nando  | 93 |
| Kyongsang - Pukto | 90 |
| Kyongsang Namdo   | 96 |
| Kangwon - Do      | 95 |
| Cholla Pukto      | 93 |
| Cholla Namdo      | 92 |
| Cheju Do          | 70 |

DECLASSIFIED PER JCSTIR ON  
20 AUG 75



The National Election Committee announced that, according to declared party affiliations of candidates when filing their petitions, the number of representatives elected by the various political organizations was as follows:

|                                                                     |    |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence (Rightist) | 54 |
| Hankook Democratic Party (Rightist)                                 | 29 |
| Dai Dong Youth Corps (Rightist)                                     | 13 |
| Korean National Youth Corps (Rightist)                              | 5  |
| Small independent parties                                           | 11 |
| Nonpartisans                                                        | 88 |

(e) Government to be Established: The purpose of the general election was to elect a representative to the National Assembly from each of the 200 electoral districts in South Korea. Since approximately one-third of the Korean population is located in the Soviet zone, 100 seats in the Assembly theoretically will be held open for North Korean representatives.

A new government will be established by the National Assembly, which will be assisted by the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea. All important officials in the new Government will be elected from the ranks of the Assembly. One major problem confronting the South Korean Government is to find a place large enough for a body of this type to meet, since no suitable legislative chamber exists in South Korea.

(f) Visit to Residence of Dr. RHEE Syngman: On the morning of 10 May, a visit was made to the residence of Dr. RHEE Syngman, prominent Rightist leader. Dr. RHEE, who lives in the East Gate District of Seoul, one of the poorer sections of the city, was a candidate for the National Assembly as a representative of the district. He initially was opposed by TCHEI Nung Jin, whose English name is Daniel CHOI, but CHOI was disqualified for allegedly forging fingerprints on registration forms.

Dr. RHEE's residence, on the side of a large hill, is surrounded by a brick wall approximately seven feet high. A guard house is near the gate, and

rifles, believed of Japanese manufacture, were stacked in racks in the guard house. The walled area was guarded and additional guards reportedly outposted the hill in rear of the residence.

The U.S. personnel were met at the gate by a policeman who asked for their names and requested that they wait while he obtained clearance from Dr. RHEE. He returned a few minutes later and escorted the visitors toward the house where Dr. RHEE, Mrs. RHEE, and Dr. PYONG, a political adviser, were sitting in a garden.

Mrs. RHEE, who is of Austrian birth, appeared much younger than her husband, but did not seem to be dressed for visitors and retired into the house after introductions had been made. Dr. RHEE was very cordial and both he and Dr. PYONG discussed events of the day. Dr. RHEE stated that he regretted that he had no opposition in the election and would have preferred to have one or two opponents. Dr. PYONG stated that he did not vote in the election since Dr. RHEE had no opposition and did not need his ballot. Dr. RHEE said that he had been mistaken for a while and had opposed the South Korean election and had criticized U.S. policy, but had seen his error and was with the U.S. on the election issue. He appeared to be of the opinion that election day disturbances would not be widespread in South Korea, since Police Director CHOUGH had announced over the radio that police had been instructed to shoot those who resisted them and instigated disorders. Dr. RHEE appeared confident that election results would be favorable to his Rightist party and said that Koreans were an analytical and thinking people who had a right to settle their own problems.

Dr. RHEE claimed that the Communists could not be dealt with by normal legal means and charged that a lawful country would not permit the murders committed by Communists in South Korea. He pointed out that all foreign Communists have a country of their own and stated that they should stay at home "to stir up trouble." He advocated dealing with Communists in a forceful manner and stated that a few examples of forceful treatment would stop all trouble in South Korea. He cited the fates of Napoleon, Hitler, and Mussolini as illustrations that dictators of the past have failed, and predicted that Stalin also would fail to accomplish his ambitions.

Dr. RHEE commented on the recent conference between North and South Korean political leaders which was attended by KIM Koo, a South Korean Rightist leader, and Dr. KIMM Kiu Sik, prominent Moderate leader. Dr. RHEE said that he attempted to dissuade KIM Koo from attending the conference and told him that nothing could be accomplished by a discussion with the North Korean Communists. However, KIM Koo was opposed to a separate election in South Korea and could not believe that an attempt to unite the country would prove futile. Dr. RHEE pointed out that both KIM Koo and Dr. KIMM Kiu Sik had a golden opportunity to demonstrate their patriotism when they returned from the conference by denouncing the Communists and supporting the South Korean election, but both declined to take this action. In spite of this unfortunate development, Dr. RHEE expressed the belief that KIM Koo could be salvaged but that Dr. KIMM Kiu Sik was lost. Dr. PYONG added that KIM Koo "couldn't see the trees for the woods."

Dr. RHEE appeared confident that South Koreans could take care of themselves but mentioned no plans for solving the future problems of Korea.

#### CIVIL DISTURBANCES

##### 2. General: (Refer to Map No. 4)

(a) Communists Active: As 10 May approached, South Korean Communists increased their efforts to interfere with election plans and to convince the outside world that a large segment of the Korean population opposed the UN-supervised elections. Handbills were distributed condemning the election and urging South Koreans to "fight to the death against imperialist efforts" to divide their country. Civil disturbances were instigated by the Communists throughout the U.S. zone although no large-scale disorders were reported. These disturbances consisted mainly of sabotage of communications facilities, attacks on voting places, and clashes between Communist and Rightist groups or police (See Chart No. 1). The majority of disorders occurred in South Cholla Province, Cheju

Island, and the Taegu area, but sporadic outbursts of violence occurred throughout the U.S. zone.

(b) Disorders on 8 May 48: (Refer to Map No. 1)

1. Seoul - (1) 8 May: Election official murdered by unknown persons near his home. Explosion at West Gate Police Station caused damage to walls of building.
2. Suwon - (2) 8 May: Group of Leftists stopped train just south of station and wrecked instruments in cab.
3. Hoengsang - (3) 8 May: Telephone lines between Hoengsang and Hongchon cut twice.
4. Chonju - (4) 8 May: Two locomotives collided head-on.
5. Taejon - (5) 8 May: Two locomotives collided head-on.
6. Taeju - (6) 8 May: Electric power in city cut off. Railroad, telephone, and telegraph lines cut between Taeju and Chongju. Power lines between Taeju and Kyongju cut. Leftist newspaper destroyed by explosion. Pistons and engine brakes of 14 locomotives stolen. Telephone lines cut by rioters; one rioter killed by police. Employees of power company dismantled power station and were arrested.
7. Kyongju - (7) 8 May: Group of men entered engine shed and took locomotive at point of gun; crashed locomotive into two other locomotives.
8. Mokpo - (8) 8 May: Train wrecked in tunnel four stations south of Mokpo, where plates had been removed from tracks.
9. Myongsan - (9) 8 May: Train, with military coach attacked, derailed near the town.
10. Naju - (10) 8 May: Train en route from Mokpo to Seoul derailed south of Naju.
11. Mayu-Up (11) 8 May: Unknown person shot and killed a Rightist leader.
12. Kwangju - (12) 8 May: Telephone poles and eight wires cut; power lines cut. Police telephone lines running out of city cut.
13. Hwasun - (13) 8 May: Electric power lines cut.
14. Sunchon - (14) 8 May: Rail removed from roadbed five miles from city and six telephone poles cut at same location. Attempt made to burn telegraph station; fire extinguished before it did any damage.
15. Pusan - (15) 8 May: Telephone lines cut near city. Forty Communists attacked railroad engine house. Police lieutenant killed in mountains near city. Approximately 50 members of South Korean Labor Party arrested near city.
16. Tongnae - (16) 8 May: Railroad station attacked.
17. Ponsong - (17) 8 May: Power lines cut near town. Fifteen men attacked electric power station, destroyed equipment and stole vital parts. Water supply system damaged.

(c) Disorders on 9 May: (Refer to Map No. 2)

1. Ongjin - (1) 9 May: Police substation attacked by 20 unknown raiders; two policemen and one raider wounded.
2. Inchon - (2) 9 May: Telephone exchange set on fire by a girl member of South Korean Labor Party. Fire started with oil-soaked rags.
3. Seoul - (3) 9 May: Homemade bomb dropped on roof of warehouse of Rightist-owned department store. Bomb thrown into Dai Dong Youth Headquarters; no damages.
4. Kangnung - (4) 9 May: Grenade thrown into home of election candidate near the town.
5. Koemongki - (5) 9 May: Twenty persons, armed with clubs, attacked home of village leader; police guarding house were beaten but village leader escaped.
6. Naesong - (6) 9 May: One Rightist killed, one Leftist wounded in fight between the two political factions.
7. Chunyang - (7) 9 May: Four Rightists killed and five injured by mob of 40 persons.
8. Kwangju - (8) 9 May: Head of election committee murdered.
9. Chinju - (9) 9 May: Homemade bombs thrown into election headquarters building; extent of damage unknown.
10. Chonju - (10) 9 May: Bottles of gasoline ignited and thrown into polling places; only damage was a broken window.

11. Kochang - (11) 9 May: Five ballot boxes and 6,000 blank ballots burned.
12. Taegu - (12) 9 May: Mob of 20 Communists attacked police station; police killed two and arrested eight. Two Rightists killed in fight between Right and Left; police intervened and killed two Leftists; 52 persons arrested. Village clerk in suburb of city killed by four men with knives. Parts stolen from 18 locomotives. Man killed when glass bottle was thrown into his home and exploded.
13. Pusan - (13) 9 May: Attempt made to destroy polling place with dynamite; no casualties.
14. Ulsan - (14) 9 May: Election candidates killed and one member of his family injured by group who attacked house.
15. Topyang-Ni - (15) 9 May: Police killed four rioters.
16. Cheju Province - (16) 9 May: Ten South Korean Constabulary members and 20 Coast Guard personnel attacked police substation; kidnaped seven policemen and several villagers; four policemen were wounded.
- (d) Disorders on 10 May: (Refer to Map No. 3)
1. Kaesong - (1) 10 May: Three police boxes attacked with hand grenades; one attacker killed and one policeman wounded.
2. Inchon - (2) 10 May: Voting booth attacked; ballots saved.
3. Seoul - (3) 10 May: Two charges of dynamite thrown into polling booth killing two Koreans. Four men attempted to burn polling place; police killed two and arrested two. Two men working in polling place killed by unknown person. Polling place bombed; no casualties, little damage. Two persons attacked poll and wounded a Korean who was protecting the place; one attacker killed by police. Five polling places attacked. Three Communists arrested.
4. Sansu-ri - (4) 10 May: One Rightist killed in disturbance in village.
5. Wolchong - (5) 10 May: Police station attacked; one attacker killed.
6. Chunchon - (6) 10 May: Polling place attacked by 20 Leftists who set fire to ballot boxes and beat a guard; undetermined number of ballots destroyed but duplicates used.
7. Chumunjin - (7) 10 May: Hand grenade thrown into voting district headquarters; one person slightly injured and building damaged.
8. Wanchang-Ni - (8) 10 May: Twenty demonstrators attacked police box; one attacker killed.
9. Chunchon-Ni - (9) 10 May: Polling place attacked and registration records destroyed; one Rightist wounded; duplicate registration records used and voting continued. One Communist killed and one policeman wounded in disturbances in the village.
10. Changsong-Ni - (10) 10 May: Fifteen members of a group which had been assigned to protect election booth killed two policemen with spears.
11. Oktung-Ni - (11) 10 May: Voting place attacked and ballot boxes destroyed; one Communist killed and one Rightist wounded.
12. Namjon-Ni - (12) 10 May: Voting place attacked and ballot boxes destroyed.
13. Chujong-Ni - (13) 10 May: One ballot box burned.
14. Taegu - (14) 10 May: Police killed two demonstrators in dispersing mob; transformer sabotaged causing lights to go off. Members of a mob fired into group of North West Young Men's Association members (Rightist) and wounded two men. Town head's home in outlying district burned. Rail removed along railroad to Chaichon. Polling place blown up; five men injured. Dynamite thrown near election place and one man injured; building not damaged. One child of Rightist family killed and two Rightists wounded. Two polling places attacked and windows broken; 15 Communists arrested.
15. Mokpo - (15) 10 May: Molotov cocktail thrown into home of election official; house burned and official injured.
16. Sochang Myan - (16) 10 May: One polling place destroyed with all ballots; two Rightists killed.
17. Kwangju - (17) 10 May: Mob of 50 persons attacked office of National Congress (Rightist); one member of mob and one man assisting police was killed. One Rightist killed.
18. Whanang Gun - (18) 10 May: Home of election committee chief attacked and election official beaten to death.
19. Chosu Myun - (19) 10 May: Twenty Leftists attacked voting booth with spears; ballot boxes and registration records destroyed.

20. Sandong Myon - (20) 10 May: Voting place attacked by crown; one ballot box, one copy of registration records, and 700 blank ballots taken.
21. Chilgok - (21) 10 May: Four voting places attacked by Leftists; one policeman killed.
22. Togan-Ni - (22) 10 May: Seven Communists killed and one Rightist wounded in disturbances in the village.
23. Cheju Province - (23) 10 May: Seven homes burned; wave of minor disturbances throughout the province resulted in a request by a Military Government official for assistance in restoring order.

(e) Conclusions: The following conclusions are based upon personal observations and upon information obtained from U.S. Occupation personnel in South Korea.

(1) That some Communists and Moderates were elected as representatives to the National Assembly on a nonpartisan ticket.

(2) That election procedures permitted free exercise of suffrage.

(3) That protection of the polls was necessary, and that law enforcement agencies generally functioned in a satisfactory manner.

(4) That U.S. personnel did not interfere with the casting of ballots.

(5) That the atmosphere of the election was free to the extent that eligible voters were permitted to cast their ballots for the candidates of their choice without interference from election officials, law enforcement agencies, or U.S. Occupation forces.

(6) That Communist-instigated disorders failed to prevent the success of elections or to convince the outside world that the majority of South Koreans opposed the UN-supervised elections.

(7) That a large segment of the South Korean population is willing to support a Government in South Korea even though a united Korea is impossible at present.

(8) That the basis has been laid for the establishment of a Government in South Korea which will be composed of elected representatives of the Korean people.

#### SECURITY AGENCIES

#### 3. Law Enforcement:

(a) Control: The military and law enforcement agencies of South Korea have played a significant role in maintaining order in the past and will be charged with important responsibilities in the future Government which is to be established by members of the National Assembly, which will convene the first week in June. At present the militarized forces are controlled by the Department of Internal Security, and the National police form the principal law enforcement agency.

The Department of Internal Security is controlled by the U.S. Military Government and is charged with the mission of providing a police and marine force to assist the Government in maintaining internal security. The department is directed by Brig Gen RIU Tong Yul and is divided into a Constabulary Bureau and a Coast Guard Bureau.

(b) Constabulary Bureau: (Refer to Map No. 5)

As of 7 May 48 the South Korean Constabulary Bureau had a strength of 28,324 troops. It is commanded by Col CHUNG Il Kwon, with headquarters in Seoul, and consists of three brigades of three regiments each. Constabulary troops previously have been armed with rifles and carbines of Japanese manufacture but considerable U.S. equipment is now being issued to the bureau. Allocations of U.S. weapons include the rifle .30 cal M-1, rifle cal .30 BAR M-1, carbine cal .30 M-1, submachine gun cal .45 M-3 and pistol cal .45.

Constabularymen generally are recruited from the provinces in which units are stationed. The troops are in excellent physical condition and are slightly above average in educational qualifications. U.S. advisers with the Department of Internal Security state that as a whole the status of training is

good but only small-unit training has been conducted. Approximately 140 U.S. officers are now assigned as advisers to the Constabulary and current training includes familiarization with weapons, drill, and field exercises involving units up to and including the battalion level. No command post exercises nor maneuvers have been conducted. U.S. advisers estimate that the Constabulary, when fully equipped, will be capable of maintaining internal security but could offer only a token resistance if the borders of South Korea were threatened.

(c) Coast Guard Bureau: (Refer to Map No. 6)

The headquarters of the South Korean Coast Guard is in Seoul and the organization is commanded by Commodore SOHN Won Yil. Present Coast Guard strength is approximately 3,000 men and bases are located at the major South Korean ports. The Coast Guard Academy and the Service Force Headquarters are located at Chinnhae.

Since its inauguration, the Coast Guard has made steady progress along sea-going lines, especially in deck training. Part of this training has been accomplished by placing Korean personnel aboard U.S. destroyers while patrolling off South Korea. Koreans are inept mechanically and engineering training has lagged behind, but U.S. advisers believe that the majority of Coast Guard officers are capable of handling their craft. The Coast Guard Bureau has been handicapped by a shortage of both enlisted and officer personnel and by the infiltration of undesirables into the ranks, but a campaign is now underway to rid the service of undesirables and increase the efficiency of the bureau.

The Coast Guard organization was established as a floating agency for enforcement of customs laws and has been developed for use as the military forces afloat, in event of an emergency. However, its limitations in technically trained personnel, armament, and equipment render it impotent for other than minor naval operations.

(d) National Police Department: (Refer to Map No. 7)

The National Police organization was established as the Bureau of Police in Sep 45 and was reorganized as the National Police Department in Jan 46. It functions under joint control of the U.S. Military Government and the South Korean Interim Government, and administrative authority is vested in Dr. CHOUGH Byung Ok, director of the National Police. Dr. CHOUGH has authority to appoint and discipline personnel and is responsible for the general policy of the Police Department.

The primary mission of the department is the preservation of law and order south of the 38th Parallel, but at present the police are considered as the first line of defense against an invasion from the North and against subversive activities in South Korea.

The police organization is divided into 10 divisions and one inspection command. The current strength is approximately 34,330 personnel, including 447 policewomen. Locations and strength of police units are shown on Map No. 7.

Police personnel is recruited from Koreans who are thoroughly screened for previous criminal activities and contacts with subversive elements. Aside from normal police training, all policemen receive military training in care and maintenance and of weapons, familiarization firing, and some close order drill. When possible, this training is conducted or supervised by U.S. military personnel. Equipment of the National Police Department includes the following:

| Quantity | Type of Equipment                 |
|----------|-----------------------------------|
| 18,984   | U.S. carbines cal .30             |
| 500      | U.S. pistols cal .45              |
| 4,594    | Japanese rifles 7.7mm             |
| 7,973    | Japanese rifles 6.5mm             |
| 50       | Japanese machine guns cal 7.7mm   |
| 70       | U.S. machine guns cal .30         |
| 1,575    | Japanese pistols of various types |
| 108      | 1/4-ton trucks                    |
| 170      | 3/4-ton trucks                    |

35  
27  
29  
1  
3  
6  
23  
1  
24  
10  
10

1 1/2-ton trucks  
2 1/2-ton trucks  
Ambulances  
Radio SCR 188  
Radios, SCR 195  
Radios, SCR 608  
Radios, SCR 610  
Radio BC - 610  
Radios, BC - 342  
Power units PE 75  
Power units PE 95

The capabilities of the National Police are those normally found in a police force. The police are capable of using the weapons with which they are equipped and are a potent force for action such as riot control, strikes, civil disorders, and strife involving the civil population. (a)

CHART NO. 1, SPECIAL EDITION

VIOLENCE IN SOUTH KOREA DURING 8, 9, and 10 MAY (REPORTS NOT ALL CONFIRMED)

| VIOLENCE IN SOUTH KOREA DURING 8, 9, and 10 MAY (REPORTS NOT ALL COMPILED) |                   |   |    |               |   |    |                   |    |    |                  |   |    |                      |   |    |           |   |    |             |   |    |              |   |    |               |   |    |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|---|----|---------------|---|----|-------------------|----|----|------------------|---|----|----------------------|---|----|-----------|---|----|-------------|---|----|--------------|---|----|---------------|---|----|
|                                                                            | Attacks on Police |   |    | Police Killed |   |    | Communists Killed |    |    | Rightists Killed |   |    | Voting Booths Raided |   |    | Strikes * |   |    | Sabotage ** |   |    | Sabotage *** |   |    | Sabotage **** |   |    |
|                                                                            | MAY               |   |    | MAY           |   |    | MAY               |    |    | MAY              |   |    | MAY                  |   |    | MAY       |   |    | MAY         |   |    | MAY          |   |    | MAY           |   |    |
|                                                                            | 8                 | 9 | 10 | 8             | 9 | 10 | 8                 | 9  | 10 | 8                | 9 | 10 | 8                    | 9 | 10 | 8         | 9 | 10 | 8           | 9 | 10 | 8            | 9 | 10 | 8             | 9 | 10 |
| SEOUL                                                                      |                   | 1 | 6  | 1             |   |    |                   |    | 1  | 1                |   | 2  |                      | 1 | 10 |           |   |    |             |   |    |              |   |    |               |   |    |
| KYONGGI DO                                                                 |                   | 1 | 7  |               |   | 1  |                   |    | 1  |                  |   | 2  |                      | 1 | 5  |           |   |    | 3           | 1 |    |              |   |    |               |   |    |
| KANGWON DO                                                                 |                   |   | 1  |               |   |    |                   |    | 1  |                  |   | 2  |                      | 1 | 4  |           |   |    | 2           |   | 1  |              |   |    |               |   |    |
| CHUNGCHONG NAMDO                                                           |                   |   | 1  |               |   |    |                   |    | 1  |                  |   |    |                      |   |    | 1         |   |    | 1           |   |    | 2            |   |    |               |   |    |
| CHUNGCHONG PUKTO                                                           |                   |   |    |               |   |    |                   |    |    |                  |   |    |                      |   |    |           |   |    |             |   |    |              |   |    |               |   |    |
| KYONGSANG PUKTO                                                            | 2                 |   | 2  |               |   |    | 10                | 3  | 3  | 3                | 5 | 2  |                      |   | 12 | 10        |   |    | 3           |   | 3  | 3            |   |    | 2             | 2 |    |
| KYONGSANG NAMDO                                                            | 3                 | 1 |    | 2             |   | 1  |                   |    |    | 2                |   |    |                      | 5 | 2  | 2         |   |    | 1           |   |    |              |   |    |               |   |    |
| CHOLLA PUKTO                                                               |                   |   | 1  |               |   |    |                   |    | 1  |                  |   |    |                      | 1 | 2  |           |   |    | 3           |   |    | 2            |   |    |               |   |    |
| CHOLLA NAMDO                                                               |                   |   |    |               |   | 2  |                   | 2  | 2  | 2                | 1 | 2  | 1                    |   |    |           |   | 4  |             | 1 |    |              |   | 1  |               |   |    |
| CHEJU DO                                                                   | 1                 | 2 |    |               |   | 1  | 3                 | 6  | 6  | 7                | 3 | 4  |                      |   | 5  |           |   |    |             |   |    |              |   |    |               |   |    |
| Daily TOTAL                                                                | 6                 | 5 | 18 | 3             | 0 | 5  | 13                | 11 | 16 | 15               | 9 | 14 | 1                    | 9 | 40 | 13        | 0 | 0  | 17          | 1 | 5  | 7            | 0 | 0  | 1             | 2 | 2  |
| 3 DAY TOTAL                                                                |                   |   | 29 |               |   | 8  |                   |    | 40 |                  |   | 38 |                      |   | 50 |           |   | 13 |             |   | 23 |              |   | 7  |               |   | 5  |

\* Labor and schools  
\*\* Communications and power  
\*\*\* Locomotives  
\*\*\*\* Railroad lines





