

some clarity to the picture as it existed there. One thing is absolutely certain - that the Island was organized as a Communist base. The evidence was irrefutable once we really began to dig into the matter. Police brutality and inefficient government were but incidental to the Communist designs on this Island.

Lieutenant Loose is doing a very fine job with the 20th Infantry Detachment on the Island. He is a very capable young officer and has conditions well in hand. I agreed with you entirely that the Military Government Company was in very poor shape. However, I think that Major Noel and myself have put them somewhat on the right track.

Again may I express my sincere appreciation for all that you have done for me. I have learned more under you than any other officer I have ever served under.

Mrs. Brown joins me in very best regards to you, Mrs. Ward and your charming daughter.

Sincerely,

ROTHWELL H. BROWN
Colonel, Cavalry

1 Incl.
Rpt of Activities on Cheju-Do
dtd 1 July 1948

<첨부문서> 1948년 7월 1일 제주도 활동 보고서

• 브라운 대령의 제주도 활동 보고서(1948. 7. 17)

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
APO 235 UNIT 2

17 July 1948

Major Edgar A. Noel,
Chief Civil Affairs Officer,
59th Military Government Company,
APO 712

Dear Major Noel:

Herewith is copy of Colonel Brown's "Report of Activities on Cheju-Do Island from 22 May 1948 to 30 June 1948." It is desired that Colonel Brown's recommendations contained in paragraph 6 of his report be fully implemented.

However, to restore Cheju-Do to normalcy we must show people of Cheju-Do that Military Government has something definite and constructive to offer. All the Government Departments here in Seoul have been instructed to give Cheju-Do high priority in their considerations. I want you to feel that you can call on me at any time for assistance and advice. We do not possess all the material needs of Cheju-Do, but every effort will be made to secure for Cheju-Do its share of available means.

I feel certain that you are well on your way to establishing a more efficient provincial government than we had previously. It is going to take constant effort to keep any provincial government free from graft and inefficiency. Likewise, it is going to be a constant problem to maintain a graft-free, humane and efficient Police organization. However, I expect you to delegate this job to Mr. Chorpenning, Police Adviser, and insist on his obtaining results for you. It is mandatory that friction between Police and Constabulary be held to a minimum. The ideal would be to eliminate it entirely.

Please be certain and give assistance and guidance to the re-orientation program as it is one of the most important weapons. You may keep this report.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

W. F. DEAN

Major General, United States Army
Commanding

1 Incl.
Col Brown's Rpt
dtd 1 Jul 48.

<첨부분서> 브라운 대령 보고서(1948. 7. 1)

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
APO 235 Unit 2

1 July 1948

SUBJECT: Report of Activities on Cheju-Do Island from 22 May 1948,
to 30 June 1948

TO: ~~Commanding General~~
United States Army Military Government in Korea
APO 235 Unit 2

1. As a result of screening operations in which approximately 5,000 inhabitants of Cheju-Do Island were interrogated, the following information has been obtained:

Organization of Cheju-Do Island by the South Korean Labor Party

began in 1946. Organization proceeded slowly during the early part of 1947. When it became apparent that there was going to be a separate election for South Korea, organization activities were intensified and special organizers were sent in from the mainland. As far as can be determined, these organizers were all Koreans. The principal leaders had received intensive training in Communist infiltration tactics. No evidence was uncovered of the physical presence of Nationals of any other country. During the pre-election period Communist cells were established in every village and town throughout the Island. These cells consisted of a cell leader, propaganda agent and supply agent and, in the larger towns, personnel to assume civil government functions upon the breakdown of the established government. In addition to Communist cells, which were organized in the villages, the People's Democratic Army for the Island of Cheju-Do was established. This consisted of two regiments and the usual complement of battalions. Officer personnel were assigned and recruiting was vigorous. At the height of the rioting, it is estimated that the People's Democratic Army had a strength of approximately 4,000 officers and men. Less than 10% of this force was equipped with rifles, the balance being armed with Japanese swords and native made spears. The Women's Auxiliary of the South Korean Labor Party was also established and very complete lists of membership have been uncovered.

2. It is estimated that not over six trained agitators and organizers were sent in from the outside to establish the South Korean Labor Party on the Island of Cheju-Do. It is estimated that an additional five to seven hundred sympathizers, with some real understanding of Communism and its purposes, joined these six specialized organizers in the movement. It is estimated that between sixty and seventy thousand people on the Island actually joined the South Korean Labor Party. However, it has been quite apparent that a large majority of these people had no real understanding of the background or purposes of the South Korean Labor Party, nor any real understanding of, or desire to join the Communist movement. They were, for the main part, ignorant, uneducated farmers and fishermen whose livelihood had been profoundly disturbed by the war and the post-war difficulties, and they were easily persuaded that the South Korean Labor Party offered them increased economic security.

3. There were several factors which influenced the success of the pre-election organization of the Island of Cheju-Do by the Communist Party acting through the South Korean Labor Party. These were:

- a. The marked lack of initiative and understanding of the aims of the Communist Party and their tactics by the various Chief Civil Affairs Officers commanding the 59th Military Government Company on the Island of Cheju-Do.
- b. The thorough and long-range plan set up by the South Korean Labor Party in 1946, which was carried through with skill and determination by highly trained organizers and agitators until May 1948.
- c. Skillful and sustained use of all organs of Communist propaganda.
- d. A complete lack of effective American counter-propaganda.
- e. Graft and inefficiency on the part of Korean Government officials.

f. A disturbed and disrupted economic life for the people on the Island.

g. Ineffective organization of Island police units, especially with respect to the establishment of efficient police intelligence units.

h. A lack of coordination between CIC and Military Government personnel on the Island.

4. There were several factors which influenced the success of the election riots and which led to negation of the election and the development of a major revolt on the Island. These were:

a. Failure on the part of the Chief Civil Affairs Officer of the 59th Military Government Company to take prompt and determined action:

(1) To break up initial riots with forces immediately available to him.

(2) To control the Island police.

(3) To effectively employ police reserves as they arrived on the Island.

(4) To issue positive orders to Korean Constabulary units as they arrived on the Island and to take positive steps to assure the execution of such orders.

b. Excessive brutality and terrorism practiced by police reserves sent to the Island (this was a direct result of comments made in (2) and (3) above).

c. Infiltration of Communist sympathizers into the Korean Constabulary which resulted in two successive regimental commanders of the 11th Regiment conducting negotiations with the Communist agitators and adopting stalling tactics where vigorous action was required. (The Korean Constabulary could have been immediately effective, if the Chief Civil Affairs Officer had been forceful and positive in his actions).

d. The spread of panic among all inhabitants of the Island and the complete breakdown of all civil government functions resulting from:

(1) The complete and widespread organization of Communist cells in each and every town and in each and every government department.

(2) The immediate death and destruction imposed by the Communist leaders on all individuals who opposed the revolt.

(3) Inability on the part of the police, the Constabulary and Military Government to afford protection to loyal citizens.

e. The natural tendency among the people of Cheju-Do Island to resent government control and a background and history of Island lawlessness.

f. Blood ties which link most of the families on the Island and make it extremely difficult to obtain information.

5. Procedure adopted on 22 May 1948, to break up the revolt:

a. Police were assigned the definite mission to protect all coastal villages; to arrest rioters carrying arms, and to stop the killing and terrorizing of innocent citizens.

b. The Constabulary was assigned the definite mission of breaking up all elements of the People's Democratic Army formed within the interior of the Island.

c. An interrogation center was established for the interrogation of all prisoners taken either by the police or by the Constabulary. Information obtained in the interrogation center was used either in preparation of trials of proved offenders, or in arresting individuals implicated in the rioting.

d. Civil government officials were given police and Constabulary protection and civil government functions were re-established as rapidly as could be done.

6. Recommended procedure to prevent reorganization of rioters on Cheju-Do Island.

a. Maintain one regiment of Korean Constabulary on the Island for at least one year.

b. Reorganize the Island police into an effective and trained unit.

c. Establish a long-range, sustained American educational program which will:

(1) Offer positive proof of the evils of Communism.

(2) Show that the American way offers positive hope for the future and for sound economic development of the Island.

(3) Provide effective counter propaganda to Communist propaganda claims.

d. Provide the Island with a civil government which is as nearly free from graft and inefficiency as can be developed.



ROTHWELL H. BROWN
Colonel Cav

1 Incl

1st Partial Report of Information obtained through screening members of the South Korean Labor Party on Cheju-Do Island (Additional annexations to this report will be furnished approximately on 10 July 1948)

<첨부분서> 제주도 남로당원들을 조사해 얻은 제1차 부분 보고서(1948. 6. 20)

REPORT
on
SOUTH KOREAN LAECR PARTY, CHEJU DO

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I. INTRODUCTION

20 June 1948

This report has been prepared based upon the verbal orders of Colonel R. H. BROWN, Commanding, Cheju Do. The bulk of the information presented in this summary has been the extracted from Interrogation Reports of various evaluation compiled by the Cheju Do Interrogation Team. Other sources included Cheju District CIC, Korean National Police, the Office of the S-2, 11th Korean Constabulary Regiment, and documents and leaflets found in possession of prisoners now detained at the civilian prisoner camp, Cheju Do.

II. SCOPE OF REPORT

This report is a summary of information on the present status of the SOUTH KOREAN LABOR PARTY (SKLP) on Cheju Do, its

organization and chain of command, both within the party proper and its military organizations.

As the largest part of the information in this report has been obtained from prisoners who had come in contact with members of the Peoples Liberation Army, i.e. the Mountain Raiders and its supporting group, the Cha Wi Dai (Self-protection Society) the paragraphs dealing with this phase of SKLP actions are presented in some detail.

III. SOUTH KOREAN LABOR PARTY

1. Organization (see chart, page 10)

a. CHOLLA NAMDO COMMITTEE

As of this date, the activities of the SKLP on Cheju Do are directed by the CHOLLA NAMDO Provincial Party Headquarters. The CHEJU DO Committee of the SKLP receives all its directives from that Hq.

b. CHEJU DO COMMITTEE

From this top committee on this Island emanate all directives which are then forwarded to subordinate committees in Myons and villages, to the Military Bureau of the Peoples Liberation Army and to affiliated leftist organizations. The Cheju Do Committee of the SKLP is organized as follows:

Chairman: Kim, Hu Han

Vicechairman: Cho, Mong Goo

and the following chief of sections, whose work is coordinated and controlled by Chief of Staff HYONG, Doo Kil (Literal translation of title: Chief of Staff members)

Chief of Organization section	: KIM, Tal San
Chief of Propaganda	: KIM, Hyong Kwan
Chief of Farmers Section	: I, Jong U
Chief of Labor Section	: I, Jong U
Chief of Young men's Section	: KIM, Kwang Jin
Chief of Women's Section	: KIM, Kum Soon
Chief of Finance Section	: KIM, Kwang Jin

c. CHEJU UP MYON COMMITTEES

According to information collected from various sources the key myon on CHEJU DO Island, called CHEJU UP, does not follow the organizational pattern of the eleven other myons on this island. In this, one of the largest and certainly the most populous myon on CHEJU DO, two separate Committees have been set up and are functioning, a General and a Special Committee. Both, however, receive all party directives through the CHEJU DO Committee, and their functions may be defined as follows:

(1) GENERAL COMMITTEE, CHEJU UP MYON

This committee, organized along the same lines as the CHEJU DO committee has jurisdiction over the "legitimate" activities of the party in the myon. It operates on the

same basis and is identical in setup with the eleven other myon committees of the SKLP on the island. Its members are:

Chairman:	KANG, Gui Kang
Vice Chairman & Org. Sec:	KOO, Yong Soo
Chief of Staff & Gen Aff:	KAN, Tae Sook
Propaganda Section:	KOO, Chil Chong
Youngmen's Section:	IM, Tae Song

(2) SPECIAL COMMITTEE, CHEJU UP MYON

The Special Committee of the SKLP in Cheju up myon directs the underground organization of the party in this myon ONLY. Again, the committee itself is organized on the same lines as the General Committee of Cheju up myon, and according to information available at this office, it receives all its orders from the CHEJU DO Committee.

Mission of Special Committee

The members of this Special Committee direct the subversive activities of the party. It is their mission not only to place single informants into strategic listening posts such as MG Offices, the National Police, Constabulary, schools and rightist organizations, but to constantly further the aims of the party by building up, within the above mentioned organizations, small and secret cells, called SEPO. This subversive, fifth column organization has, according to local law enforcement agencies, successfully penetrated all government agencies located in Cheju Up Myon.

It was emphasized by two informants that the Special Committee for Cheju Up Myon directs the activities of the SEPO in this Capital Myon only, and that no such Special Committee exists in the eleven other Myons. A constant flow of information is furnished by these secret calls to the Chairman of the Special Committee in Cheju Up Myon. One striking example of the ruthlessness and cold efficiency of this subversive organization might well have been the murder of the Commander of the 11th Constabulary Regiment, whose movements certainly were reported by SEPO members of the Constabulary.

In addition, this subversive Special Committee has been set up to assume, without the usual inefficiency or interruptions concomitant to such a move, the function of the CHEJU DO Committee, should the SKLP ever be outlawed. In that event, the Cheju Up Myon Special Committee would simply broaden its mission and would become the top committee of the island underground. The following personalities make up the Cheju Up Myon Special Committee:

Chairman:	KIM, Un Han
Chief of Organization Section:	KANG, Tae Sook
Chief of Propaganda Section:	I, Chang, Soo
Chief of Students Section:	HAN, Koo Sop
Chief of Finance Section:	I, Chang Ock

d. MYON COMMITTEES

Myon Committees on Cheju Do are organized in the same manner as the top committee of the Island, with the functions of various staff sections, as in all lower echelon

military and para-military organizations, in the hand of one staff member.

e. VILLAGE COMMITTEES

Again, as stated above, the village committees combine the duties of several staff sections in the person of one staff member. However, Interrogations reports agree that the village committee consists of at least three members, a Chairman, Propaganda Section Chief and Organization Section

f. PEOPLES COMMITTEE

Several Interrogation reports state that in at least one village raiders pressured the villagers into nomination, and then, by acclamation, election of a Chairman of a Peoples Committee. In this instance, the person who had served as Chairman of the Peoples Committee which was set up subsequent to Jap surrender in 1945 was elected. This voting procedure took place under the watchful eye of a group of armed raiders. The Chairman of the Peoples Committee, who is at present detained at the Cheju Do civilian prisoner camp, stated that he appointed, after the raiders left the village, a propaganda Section and a Membership Section Chief, as ordered by the raiders(see below 2. Military Bureau (3) Training and Security , for details)

2. MILITARY BUREAU

NOTE: One source claimed that the name of this Bureau was changed to Fighting Committee for National Salvation in early April 1948. This report will continue to use the term Military Bureau.

INTRODUCTION

The Armed Forces of the SKLP of Cheju Do are directed by the Military Bureau of the Peoples Liberation Forces. Two major components exist, the Peoples Liberation Forces(or Emancipation Forces, one Korean word carries both connotations) and the CHA WI DAI(Self-protection Society). The members of the Peoples Liberation Army are the Mountain Raiders and they may be compared with first line combat troops. The CHA WI DAI fulfills the functions which in a standard army are taken over by the Services of Supply with the addition that this organization acts as manpower replacement pool for the Mountain Raiders and is responsible for liaison between villages and raider camps.

a. PEOPLES LIBERATION FORCES, (MOUNTAIN RAIDERS)

Small groups of raider forces were organized and lived in former Jap military installations located on the slopes of HALL IM mountain prior to January 1948. According to Police reports, one of the first reports of large-scale military training was received early in February 1948, when 300 raiders were reported training in the hills of AEWCL (see sketch, Cheju Do) Myon. Dynamite,

supplies of food and civilian clothing were found at the training site.

Since then, raiders have been active all over this island, killing non-supporters, burning homes, taking prisoners and terrorizing the countryside.

(1) ORGANIZATION

All reports agree that each Myon of Chajju Do has furnished enough personnel to staff at least one company of raiders who are now on active duty. These companies, and Battalions, often have adopted the name of their native village or town. Depending on such intangibles as the pressure exerted by the Constabulary, sudden action of the Police, the number of personnel at any one raider camp varies constantly.

(2) ORDER OF BATTLE

Based on information collected from all sources, the following composite picture of the average T/O of raider units may be drawn up:

UNIT	STRENGTH
Battalion, one or more for each myon	60 to 80
Company, Two companies per Battalion	25 to 35
Platoon, Two platoons per company	13 to 15
Squads, Two squads per platoon	5 to 7

There is evidence that Battalion Commanders have staff sections, with intelligence, ordnance, supply and medical sections identified. One report stated that when subject(of that report) became ill while serving with the raiders, he was visited daily by a physician, who administered medicine and gave injections, but that no separate hospital building existed.

Company Commanders are assisted by Deputy Commanders for Political Affairs which is typical of all armies who are influenced or patterned after the Soviet Army. One informant who served as cook in a camp, stated that his unit consisted of about 80 men, with this group divided into one Battalion of two companies and one Mobile Combat Unit (Ke Dong Poo Dae) with the latter moving only upon the direct orders of the Commanding General of the raiders.

Officers are usually identified by Jap-type pistols and steel helmets, and in most cases, by Jap-type officer swords.

NOTE: One document, which was taken from SKLP liaison man, was printed in a form of a general information bulletin, apparently for dissemination to all units stated that "... Steel helmets will no longer be worn"...

Saputes are not rendered and no insignia, identifications, or other military emblem have been reported. Raiders address each other as "Comrade" (Tong Mu).

(3) TRAINING AND SECURITY

Reports differ somewhat on the extent of military

discipline and training practiced at raider camps. One report stated that "... Three rollcalls are taken daily, with men billeted together lining up in column of two in front of their quarters to be counted by commander, and that after morning rollcall rigorous physical training was scheduled, with men on the run for about one hour. Reports referring to another camp included the statement that only household duties such as collecting wood, making charcoal and carrying provisions from supply caches were accomplished while in camp.

Guards (Korean: PIKEE, Lookout) are posted at the entrance of most camps, with two checkpoints, about 100 yards apart, reported at one raider camp. One report stated that a rigid separation of all men stationed in one building was enforced, with these men, all of them new arrivals, ordered not to leave the immediate vicinity of their billets. Buildings at this camp were spaced about 100 yards apart, and report went on to say that no personal contact was established between occupants of adjacent buildings. Only when actually going out on a raid was personnel of several buildings lined up in column of two, rollcall was taken, and weapons and ammo issued.

(4) POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION

Political officers attached to raider units constantly stress the aims of the SKLP and urge personnel, especially prior to raid to accept as utter truth such statements as "... all persons in a certain village are worthless, deserve to be killed, and are traitors to the Korean Peoples Republic"... Detailed instructions were given by Political officers in case of capture by Police or Constabulary, which included such warnings as not to reveal location of camp, number of personnel and to mislead and lie.

Carefully prepared, written, instructions are furnished to unit commanders concerning " Agitation-Propaganda " activities, with each step carefully considered should raiders decide, as they have done frequently, to call a mass meeting of all villagers, who then will be addressed by the commander of the raiders. Such questions as: "Will not indoor meetings be hazardous?" are asked on the instruction sheet and answers are given in detail.

Apparently for security reasons officers, according to several reports, are not addressed by name but simply as: Commander... (Chi Hwi Kwan)

(5) WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION

US and Japanese-made firearms are used by raiders, with a preponderance of equipment of Jap manufacture, in the main, Jap 99 rifles. Presence of US carbines and M-1 rifles has been ascertained, and one report stated that a Mobile Combat Unit consisting of about 25 men, was armed with 10 US carbines and 15 Jap 99 rifles. Ammo was furnished, in almost all reported instances, only when actual raid was planned, and then each rifle carrying raider was handed from 20 to 30 rounds, with orders to return unused ammo after

raid. Parts of Jap machine guns, in deteriorated condition, have been found at camps which were raided by Constabulary.

Additional weapons carried by raiders include Jap officer swords, bayonets, axes-like long daggers concealed as walking sticks or short clubs, and bamboo spears. No Soviet made equipment has been recovered within the last three weeks, nor has its presence been mentioned by all sources contacted.

(6) LINES OF SUPPLY

Close liaison is maintained by all raiders with its "parent" agency, the SKLP in the villages of its myon, which furnishes, on a previously arranged schedule, food-stuffs, clothing, money, personnel replacements, orders and information. The unit of the SKLP responsible for liaison and supply of the raiders in the CHA WI DAI.

b. CHA WI DAE (Self Protection Society)

This organization, part and parcel of the SKLP was formed throughout Cheju Do on village level about February 1948 and changed its name early in May 1948 to IN MIN CHA WI DAI (Peoples Self Protection Society)

(1) ORGANIZATION

Ostensibly formed to protect the village from the activities of the raiders, this organization is, in effect, the homebase, the supply dump of shifty raider units. It is like the organization which it supports, organized along military lines, with officers (leaders) for each village district of street, and platoons and squads. The direction of the village CHA WI DAI is in the hands of the village committee chairman of the SKLP.

(2) MISSION

Mission of the CHA WI DAI is not what its name implies. Instead of protecting the villages from the attacks of the raiders, the CHA WI DAI actively takes part in terror attacks and joins the raiders when a unit makes a strike against the village. Warning is issued only when the Constabulary or the Police are in the vicinity. Members of the CHA WI DAI perform tasks of supply organization which has been commissioned to keep an army in the field.

Collections of foodstuffs and monies are made periodically, and such collections are turned over to the chairman of the local SKLP committee for delivery to liaison men of the raider units. Meticulous records, which have been taken from former members of the CHA WI DAI, state when and what and by and from whom certain amounts were collected, with future delivery schedules set down on paper. One report stated that two raiders actually served as district leaders of the CHA WI DAI and that, through them, closest liaison was maintained between the raider myon unit and the village organization of the SKLP. Sources contacted could not furnish information regarding CHA WI DAI

organization on myon level. All agree that up to this date, only village and district (within village) organizations seem to be functioning.

c. SEPO (SUBVERSIVE CELLS)

(1) MISSION AND ORGANIZATION

Every effort is made by the SKLP to place its agents and informants into such listening posts as Government offices and law enforcement agencies, Schools and rightist groups.

NOTE: One document, not dated but apparently printed since Constabulary drive started stated in substance that members (of the SKLP) serving as Policemen should be especially alert during these tense days..

As stated above, when the mission of the Special Committee of Cheju Up Myon was discussed, it is the task of these informants not only to observe and report, i.e. adopt a kind of passive role, but to proceed actively to organize a subversive cell (SEPO)

It is not known whether members of this fifth column organization report to the local Chairman of the village or myon, or if they report through special, as yet unidentified channels to the Cheju Do Committee of the SKLP. No information is available at present which supports the contention that the Special Committee of Cheju Up Myon directs the activities of this subversive organization throughout the Island.

d. AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS

The parties listed below, nominally independent leftist groups, support the policies of the SKLP and many of their members hold dual memberships.


KOREAN DEMOCRATIC PATRIOTIC
YOUNG MEN'S ASSOCIATION (MIN AI CHUNG)

SOUTH KOREAN DEMOCRATIC WOMEN'S (NAN CHOSEN MIN JOO
UNION YUH CHA DONG MAING)

ALL KOREAN COUNCIL OF LABOR
UNIONS (CHUN PYUNG)

R. Hunger, T/Sgt
3-2 XXIV Corps

ORGANIZATION OF SOUTH KOREAN LABOR PARTY, CHEJU DO



CHEJU DO PROVINCE

CHUJA MYON

