

at one time is equivalent to about a regiment. Brigades have been committed but have never made contact with their full force.

The North Koreans have trained a few thousand guerillas for operations in the Northern parts of South Korea. These guerillas have generally been of poor calibre, poorly equipped, and more poorly lead. The first two companies that came across were wiped out in a week. Their training has been largely political with little emphasis on small unit tactics. They are bothersome and have caused the South Korean Chief of Staff to fritter away a lot of training time chasing them around the hills, which is undoubtedly their mission.

The rebellion at YOSU last year could have been quite serious had it not been stopped. As it is, we are probably better off due to the fact that we were able to weed out a lot of future trouble-makers. Weeding out is a simple process. Summary and Special Courts, appointed by regimental commanders, try and award death penalties. A good Summary Court Officer can handle 60 or 70 cases in the morning, and supervise the executions in the afternoon. If ammunition is scarce, bamboo spears work quite efficiently. It is necessary, however, to make a number of thrusts and is quite tiring on the soldiers. The soldiers are a tireless lot though.

The extended resistance of the rebels on CHEJU Island was due, in part, to poor commanders in the Police and Army. They were equally ruthless in killing villagers and burning towns as the Communists. It was necessary to pull out all of the National troops there and replace them with fresh troops who had been instructed to offer clemency. The natives stopped supporting the rebels when they were assured that they would no longer be killed if they tried to surrender. Within a month all but token resistance had been eliminated.

• 한국군 훈련 상황(1949. 8. 19)

SECRET

UNITED STATES MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
APO 404

AIRMAIL

% Postmaster
San Francisco, California
19 August 1949

Major General Charles L Bolte
Director of Plans and Operations
Department of the Army General Staff
Washington 25, D C

Dear Charlie:

This is letter number two to you personally on Korean and KMOG affairs to supplement our weekly G-3 Operations reports. Although those reports are mimeographed, they are made expressly for you; but, we send them also to CINCPAC and to the Ambassador here. Please let us know if we should continue these letters which I try to get out at least monthly.

KMAG AFFAIRS

a. We are reaching the saturation point now on dependents. Officers must now await their turn on priority lists for quarters as they become available.

b. Officers in the field in the provinces, in general, seem to prefer it. We supply them by plane once a week and by train where possible. They have, in general, good quarters, roofs to keep perishables and adequate indigenous help.

c. Training of the Korean Army is our reason for being here, and I am keeping that uppermost in the heads of the Advisors. However, house-keeping and administrative matters tend to chisel heavily into the picture.

d. Morale of Officers, men and dependents continues to be excellent. Everything is being done to make them comfortable and reasonably content. KMAG personnel mainly lives in a small compound surrounded by a double wire fence guarded by a Korean M P Company, which in turn, is supervised by our small group of M Ps. Even at that, we continue to average one jeep theft weekly, in spite of all precautions, such as collecting and guarding behind wire all vehicles at night, removal of distributor rotors and certain wiring expedients. However, with the help of Korean M Ps, road blocks are occasionally set up and, as a result, usually several stolen jeeps are picked up. It is not a heavy crime in Korea to steal from the 'rich' Americans, and we know they are constantly plotting. It is not infrequent to have a report that a house has been cleaned out.

If you want to dump on an Officer, don't send him here; try Okinawa, Alaska, Guam. Many Officers and DACs who went to Japan last year want to return here, now.

e. RELATIONSHIP WITH AMER

Continues excellent with fewer and fewer cases of friction.

JAS has recently released two Officers and twenty-eight men from their communications set up. We are absorbing some in vacancies and releasing the others.

JAS is delivering services to KMAG 100% better than a month ago. They are trying hard. The system is working okay.

f. RELATIONSHIP WITH KOREANS

This is improving daily as counterparts are getting closer together. With Minister (of National Defense) and Staff, it could not be better. They accept 90% of our advice and back it up.

Jap-trained Officers are much better than Chinese-trained ones, although there are exceptions. Jap-trained Officers tend to revert to Jap methods unless closely watched. Chinese-trained (?) Officers tend to want more rank and face over and above the inflated rank which they once had.

Again, I want to point out that the sincerity and honesty of the Advisors in their advice and work is getting results. The Koreans are smart and, even now, cannot figure out why we work so hard for (as they see it) no selfish purpose; they think we should be after money, promotion, loot or something and since we are not getting any of the above, they appear puzzled. They cannot figure out that we are doing a job as ordered. They do not realize that we are training a group of people to shoot for America and to take the losses in Korean blood before American blood is shed.

AUGUST 15 - CRITICAL DAY

As is usual on these "critical" days, nothing happened. The Army parade was a knock-out. They looked like veterans - equipment, uniforms, vehicles all spotless. If they can only fight as well as they parade, we are "in". Next critical day is September 19, election day as proclaimed by the north. They usually have one day per month which can be called "tense".

TRAINING THE KOREAN ARMY

a. Progress has slowed down the last two months due to expansion to 100,000 and the consequent addition of new regiments, new headquarters, transfer of key leaders, movement of units, losses of one to two battalions per regiment for cadres of new units. We are trying to firm up and stop at 100,000, as there are not enough weapons for more.

b. A complete range season is being majored right now, concurrent with small unit tactics. Batches for shooting are being manufactured, advisors are handling most preliminaries themselves, records are being kept. By the end of September, we expect to have an army which shoots almost as well as the U S Army. We plan on battalion and higher exercises this Fall. We are minimizing parade ground work and, concurrently with basic training, small unit exercises are held; these are mainly squad and platoon exercises such as patrolling, attack and defense and particularly security measures.

c. Within the last fifteen months, we have sent 20,000 men through schools. This includes all types of schools, such as OTS, Signal, Quartermaster, Ordnance, Engineer, Weapons, G-2 and Intelligence, et cetera.

One top Advisor is coordinating all schools. This month we are starting two new and important ones - a Staff School and an Infantry School. For several months, they will be heavily souped up with Americans as instructors and full use will be made of the four recent Korean graduates of Fort Benning.

d. We have had translated, printed and distributed to units, a four foot stack of American training manuals. This work continues.

• 피쉬그라운드 대위 제주방문 보고서(1949. 11. 29)

UNITED STATES MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Office of the Chief
APO 404

c/o Postmaster
San Francisco Calif
29 November 1949

Sir:

Captain Fishgrund of this office visited Cheju Do on 16, 17, 18 and 19 November and I pass on to you his observations and recommendations.

a. Certain building materials, particularly cement is in short supply for the people to use in rebuilding homes. Suggest you make representation to the proper sources with the view of making it possible for these poor people to construct good homes. The representatives from Cheju Do in the Assembly should properly help them out.

b. The only telephone line around the island is now the police line. It would seem that commercial use should be made of this line, at least while the other lines are restored. This too is a job for representatives of the Island and the Department of Communications.

c. The inhabitants report that the assemblymen from the island visit