

2. A fence be erected around the entire American housing area and sufficient Korean Army guards be posted to prevent recurrence of this type of sabotage.

Harry H. Moore
HARRY H. MOORE
Capt CE
Investigating Officer

Hq KMAG, APO 404
7 June 1949

Approved.

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERTS:

W. J. Bartosik
W. J. BARTOSIK
Lt Col AGD
Adjutant General

• 제주도에서 무자비한 주민살해·마을방화(1949. 7. 28)

Liaison Office
KMAG, APO 404
% PM, San Francisco

28 July 1949

Major General C. L. Mullins, Jr.
Headquarters, 2nd Army
Fort Meade, Maryland

Dear General Mullins,

Hodge and Company turned the defense of the peninsula over to the Korean Constabulary. The Constabulary was changed into an Army - on paper. Intensive recruiting was initiated and some fairly good training has been conducted. The South Korean Army, as it stands today, is probably as well trained as was the United States Army in 1940; probably better in the infantry. The artillery lacks direction and a realization of its capabilities and limitations. The infantry has finally been convinced of the necessity for small unit tactical training instead of close order drill. Training ammunition is not as plentiful as could be desired, but local live targets give rifle practice without benefit of individual coaching.

The 38th Parallel has become an arbitrary "front" line between two hostile forces. The North Koreans utilize a Constabulary on the Parallel and hold their tactical divisions well to the rear in reserve and in training. The South Koreans utilize both Army and Police on the 38th. This creates friction between the two agencies due to a clearly defined policy of authority or zones of responsibility. Indicative is the guard system on critical installations. Both Police and Army guard the same installation. Persons passing are challenged by the Police, and then thirty yards further are challenged by the Army.

Our border skirmishes have been relatively minor to date. The largest number of troops that have actually been committed

at one time is equivalent to about a regiment. Brigades have been committed but have never made contact with their full force.

The North Koreans have trained a few thousand guerillas for operations in the Northern parts of South Korea. These guerillas have generally been of poor calibre, poorly equipped, and more poorly lead. The first two companies that came across were wiped out in a week. Their training has been largely political with little emphasis on small unit tactics. They are bothersome and have caused the South Korean Chief of Staff to fritter away a lot of training time chasing them around the hills, which is undoubtedly their mission.

The rebellion at YOSU last year could have been quite serious had it not been stopped. As it is, we are probably better off due to the fact that we were able to weed out a lot of future trouble-makers. Weeding out is a simple process. Summary and Special Courts, appointed by regimental commanders, try and award death penalties. A good Summary Court Officer can handle 60 or 70 cases in the morning, and supervise the executions in the afternoon. If ammunition is scarce, bamboo spears work quite efficiently. It is necessary, however, to make a number of thrusts and is quite tiring on the soldiers. The soldiers are a tireless lot though.

The extended resistance of the rebels on CHEJU Island was due, in part, to poor commanders in the Police and Army. They were equally ruthless in killing villagers and burning towns as the Communists. It was necessary to pull out all of the National troops there and replace them with fresh troops who had been instructed to offer clemency. The natives stopped supporting the rebels when they were assured that they would no longer be killed if they tried to surrender. Within a month all but token resistance had been eliminated.

• 한국군 훈련 상황(1949. 8. 19)

SECRET

UNITED STATES MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
APO 404

AIRMAIL

% Postmaster
San Francisco, California
19 August 1949

Major General Charles L Bolte
Director of Plans and Operations
Department of the Army General Staff
Washington 25, D C

Dear Charlie:

This is letter number two to you personally on Korean and KMOG affairs to supplement our weekly G-3 Operations reports. Although those reports are mimeographed, they are made expressly for you; but, we send them also to CINCPAC and to the Ambassador here. Please let us know if we should continue these letters which I try to get out at least monthly.