Dear Wedemeyer:

I know your busy but feel you're the person to informally keep in touch with there about the Korean situation.

We are now in probably the quietest period for a large number of years -- the border or parallel incidents are practically nil now -- Communist activity is practically all underground now not only in the Army and police but in civilian activity too. Purges in the Army recently have succeeded in pulling the teeth of that group right efficaciously -- 500 alleged leftists in the Army are now being watched. Today (May Day) was quiet all over I hear. Down South in the Chiri-san mountain area the guerrillas have been beaten down by an intelligently conducted operation with 12 battalions. This force is now being sent back to its various stations. The several leaders of the guerrillas, the guerilla staff, and the bulk of the active force have been destroyed. Similarly in Cheju-do, the guerrilla force has been beaten down and most of the active members killed or captured along with their weapons.

Lee Bum Suk is out as Defense Minister but is still Premier. I hear he's on his way out of that job too. Sihn, who was Home Minister when you were here, is now Defense Minister. He is the best they have and I fear he may become Premier and thus we'd lose him. I have rumors though, now in the states, may be the Defense man. Bill Dean liked him above all except for his bottle habits.

The President went to Cheju-do recently and was widely acclaimed. It was a home run. Friday the 29th of April he returned from a week's trip in the South -- I think both the trips were excellent for the nation.

Mr Sihn and the President have both agreed to reorganize the Defense Department along the lines wanted by us. In them we get rid of the job of the Supreme Chief of Staff, give the Coast Guard more voice and reduce the Bureaus of National Defense Department.

My two-cents worth follows: -- the cheapest thing big industrial America can do is to furnish other peoples the product of our factories and resources in order that they may shoot for us and may shoot first, consequently 1 or 2 billions of dollar value is but a drop in the bucket and the finest bit of preparation we can make.

I feel that way about this South Korean Army, my work is to make them capable of shooting first and well for Uncle Sugar.

By all the agreements, my power here now is puny and after C-day will be punier. However I think I can still, by persuasion and sincere treatment of the leaders by the officers of KMAG, command their army and make it do what is necessary when the time comes.

Best personal regards,

Yours,

W. L. ROBERTS
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Commanding

• 미군 막사 화재 조사보고서(1949. 6. 1)

KORCAD [illegible] ADVISORY GROUP
APO 224

1 June 1949

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

REASON FOR INVESTIGATION

On 17 May 1949 a tropical prefabricated barracks on Cheju Do caught fire and was completely destroyed.

DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION

At 1250 hours, 17 May 1949 Capt. Richard A. Haskell and Sgt. William H. Rineheart entered building No. 1, located at the air strip, Cheju Do. As they entered the building they heard a dull explosion under the floor. Immediately the entire partition between the orderly room and the spare bedroom burst into flame and rapidly spread to other rooms of the building. Capt. Haskell gave the alarm and all personnel present tried to combat the flames. The fire spread so rapidly that no one could enter the building in order to save any Government or personal property, although several attempts were made to do so. The only fire fighting equipment available for combating the fire were fire extinguishers and buckets of water. There is no civilian or Korean Army fire fighting equipment on the island which could have been called upon for aid. The fire spread so rapidly that small fire extinguishers were of no use in fighting the fire.

The fire was not caused from fire in the building stove because there was no fire in the stove. There was no electric current on to have caused a fire by shortage in wires. There were no inflammable liquids other than lighter fluid in the building.

After the fire was out, Capt. Haskell inspected the ruins of the building and found a burned piece of bamboo about the size of bamboo used by guerilla forces on Cheju Do for making fire bombs of gasoline and gunpowder. This piece of burned bamboo was found at the approximate place where the fire started.

Normally all personnel would have been in the mess hall at the time of the fire, thus giving saboteurs an opportunity to set a fire bomb. The housing area is not fenced in so as to prevent entrance by anyone trying to destroy government property.

CONCLUSIONS

1. That the fire was started by sabotage since no other cause for the fire could be found and because there was an explosion followed by a very rapid spreading of the flames.
2. The building area occupied by Americans on Cheju Do is not sufficiently protected against repeated attacks of this kind.

3. The barracks building was completely destroyed by fire, and all contents both government and personal were completely destroyed.

4. There is not sufficient fire fighting equipment on Cheju Do to fight fires of this type.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That all concerned be relieved of responsibility for property destroyed by the fire.

2. A fence be erected around the entire American housing area and sufficient Korean Army guards be posted to prevent recurrence of this type of sabotage.

HARRY H. MOORE
Capt CE
Investigating Officer

Hq KMAG, APO 404
7 June 1949

Approved.

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERTS:

W J BARTOSIK
Lt Col AGD
Adjutant General

• 제주도에서 무자비한 주민살해·마을방화(1949. 7. 28) ·

Liaison Office
KMAG, APO 404
% PM, San Francisco

28 July 1949

Major General C. L. Mullins, Jr.
Headquarters, 2nd Army
Fort Meade, Maryland

Dear General Mullins,

. Hodge and Company turned the defense of the peninsula over to the Korean Constabulary. The Constabulary was changed into an Army - on paper. Intensive recruiting was initiated and some fairly good training has been conducted. The South Korean Army, as it stands today, is probably as well trained as was the United States Army in 1940; probably better in the infantry. The artillery lacks direction and a realization of its capabilities and limitations. The infantry has finally been convinced of the necessity for small unit tactical training instead of close order drill. Training ammunition is not as plentiful as could be desired, but local live targets give rifle practice without benefit of individual coaching.

The 38th Parallel has become an arbitrary "front" line between two hostile forces. The North Koreans utilize a Constabulary on the Parallel and hold their tactical divisions well to the rear in reserve and in training. The South Koreans utilize both Army and Police on the 38th. This creates friction between the two agencies due to a clearly defined policy of authority or zones of responsibility. Indicative is the guard system on critical installations. Both Police and Army guard the same installation. Persons passing are challenged by the Police, and then thirty yards further are challenged by the Army.

Our border skirmishes have been relatively minor to date. The largest number of troops that have actually been committed