• 보급 고문관의 제주도 제2연대 시찰보고(1949. 2. 10)

HEADQUARTERS
KOREAN MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP
OFFICE OF THE ORDNANCE ADVISOR
APO 235

KMAGAOD 472

10 February 1949

SUBJECT: Report of Ordnance Advisor's Trip to 2nd Regt - Cheju

TO: Chief
Korean Military Advisory Group
APO 235

4. Comments regarding each of the specific observations noted under par 3, above, are as follows:

g. Some of the non-Ordnance activities observed and believed worthy of note are as follows:

(1) Liaison planes dropping propaganda leaflets, hand grenades and mortar shells rather indiscriminately.

(2) The superiority attitude of the KA soldier and local police to the native populace is believed to be un-necessarily harassing and driving peaceful citizens to rebel activities.

(3) KMAG personnel are believed to be un-necessarily subjected to hazards due to meager numbers, lack of communications, dependence entirely on KA soldiers for guard, inferior facilities and continually stirred-up local villages through executions apparently without trial, and encroachment on civilians' rights by soldiers not believ to be too well controlled or disciplined.

F. C. WOOTERS
Lt Col, Ord Dept
KMAG, Ordnance Advisor

• 로버츠 준장의 사면 프로그램 보고서(1949. 3. 19)

HEADQUARTERS
KOREAN MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP
APO 235

WLRice

19 March 1949

Sir,

The other day you asked me to inform you of the results we have of the amnesty program in the ChollasDos and in Cheju Do.

I have the honor to inform you that in Honam during the period 1-17 January, 5765 SKLP, 52 Rebels and 1664 Guerrillas have turned in. In Cheju Do 2200 Civilians have surrendered to the 2nd Regiment. Reports indicate 300-500 are turning in daily.

Be assured, sir, of my highest regard.

W. L. ROBERTS
Brig Gen USA
Chief

His Excellency, President Syngman Rhee
Republic of Korea, Seoul

• 로버츠가 웨드마이어 장군에게 보낸 서신(1949. 3. 25)

HEADQUARTERS
KOREAN MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP
APO 235

25 March 1949

300.6

Dear Wedemeyer:

I have your letter of 11 March and feel that I might express some personal thoughts on the Korean situation for your information. They,of course, are my own and right frequently I like my stuff better than that of others.

I confess I do not know the answer to the problem of whether to take troops out of here or not. This I do feel however--if the American troops are removed, it will be no time until North absorbs or attacks South or vice versa. Since there is China talk of making a peace with the Commies there, there is also a growing school here who thinks similarly. With American troops here, a very very stabilizing effect is obtained. Without us the government will be weaker and jittery. They lean heavily for advice and act on it much more than the Chinese did. They are determined to outdo the Chinese I feel. Since you were here they realize the power I have in my recommendations to Mister United States, and particularly with reference to waste in supply matters they are for the first time realizing they must conserve, maintain and protect supplies. Even my bitter G4 Advisor, Major Geist, is pleased with what they've done to tighten up supply methods and practices. Geist says Korea can now supply 97% of QM items. If we pull our troops out of here chances are we lose the 300,000,000 plus already dropped in here, the ECA program should or would stop within a year, our face would not be helped in the Orient.

In the long run, the furnishing of arms and certain equipment is cheap for that great industrial nation of ours. By doing that we have others fighting for us instead of our own boys taking the rap. We've got to take the chance that they will not be turned on us. We can always spare a few Advisors. A few advisors in whom they have confidence are worth their weight in gold. Let the US be the arsenal! Quit giving them all kinds of expensive gadgets. Base essentials, shooting irons, ammo, some radios, very little more transportation. Again I say the furnishing of manufactured rifles is relatively cheap for the US even though it spells big dollar value. By trading these arms and ammo for our combat team the US might retain a friend. Otherwise I feel that sooner or later they'll go into the enemy camp one way or another.

When Mr. Hoffman was here he spoke like this, South Korea was a perfect spot to see what American dollars could do against Soviet propaganda. If this token force is removed that will at least be jeopardized, perhaps lost.

We still must not neglect the possible change in attitude of the Government and the people if and when the ROT leaves. They may become bitter as most gift receivers do when the source is cut off. If they do become surly