

HEADQUARTERS
PROVISIONAL MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP
APO 235 UNIT 2

WLR:ee

33

29 September 1948

3. It has also come to my attention that the Minister of National Defense has directed that orders to the Constabulary be published in Korean only, with an information copy translated into English. As you know, operational control of the Korean Constabulary still rests with the Commanding General, USAFIK, and it is of paramount importance, therefore, that all orders pertaining to operational control of the Constabulary be cleared with the appropriate American Advisor, prior to publication.

W. L. ROBERTS
Brigadier General U. S. Army
Chief
Provisional Military Advisory Group

· 김포에서 수신된 제주도발 무선 내용(1948. 10)

COPY OF VOICE RADIOGRAM FROM KIMPO RELAYED FROM CHEJUDO

AMERICAN ADVISOR, KC, HQ, PMAG

Activity broken out South side of Island. Five (5) police and villagers, number unknown killed. Raiders burning houses. Investigation report follows.

CAPTAIN BURGESS
American Advisor
9th Regiment

· 제5여단소속 미군 고문관의 지위 및 능력(1948. 10. 9)

AMERICAN ADVISOR CAPACITY IN THE 5th BRIGADE

Capt J H W Treadwell, Chief, PMAG
Advisor, 5th Brigade Gen Roberts

9 October 1948

WHEW:WLR:ee

1. The highlighting of the recent Cheju Do operations has brought certain deficiencies to light, which - it is felt - should have previously been corrected by the American Advisors. Past operations on Cheju Do generally have been under the control of DIS Headquarters. Present operations, however, are - in the opinion of a Corps Commander - entirely a Korean responsibility. It is felt that the entire mounting and support of present and projected operations should be handled by Koreans through proper command channels, with a minimum of American interference. It therefore devolves upon the 5th Brigade to supply the entire tactical and logistical support of current operations of the 9th Regiment. As pointed out above, it is felt that the 5th Brigade has failed to provide proper support, and that immediate corrective action is indicated on the part of the American Advisors through Korean channels.

2. Inspections of the units on Cheju Do have indicated marked shortages of essential equipment of all categories. For example, shoes, clothing, maps, rifles, ammunition and rations were all short; further,