

• 브라운(Brown)대령에게 보내는 비망록(1948. 6. 21)

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNAL SECURITY
APO 235, UNIT 3

21 June 1948

MEMORANDUM TO COLONEL BROWN;

2/0 K

It just occurs to me that you should be informed of the duties we expect of the Officers we are sending in view of your request on Sunday.

Today, we sent Lt Col Chai to be Regimental Commander of the 11th and Major Seng to be the Exec. Col Chai was chosen by all the heads here, and I like his appearance; his background seems to be excellent. I understand that Seng is a strong man and has a record of being ruthless. We are not sending an Inspector because this boy, Seng, is the best we have and you can use him as such.

W. L. ROBERTS
Brig Gen USA

• 제주도에 경찰 1천명 배치(1948. 9. 7)

ACTIVITIES OF DEPT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
WEEK ENDING 4 SEPTEMBER 1948

Commanding General
USAFIK

Commanding General
PMAO

7 Sept 48

1. Advisability of returning 2 Battalions now at Cheju Do to mainland for winter, as quarters for but 1 Battalion are available. Movement may take place in October if no incident occurs.

1,000 police reported to have been installed there in small towns recently.

9. Radio stations at all 5 Brigades now in full-time operation. Stations as follows: Seoul, Suwak, Taejon, Pusan, Kwangju. Regiments each have net operating. 3 local stations also on Cheju Do.

18. All Senior Brigade Advisors met here this week. Principal subject was living conditions of PMAO American Advisors now that MG installations and troops are leaving certain towns. Plan to centralize Brigade groups at each Brigade Hq. locality for simplicity of supply and advisors' work out to units. Cheju Do advisors will live at Kwangju and move to Cheju Do by boat, remaining there four work days. Rooms and houses at outlying localities being retained. Rations to be carried.

W. L. ROBERTS
Brig General U S Army
Commanding

• 로버츠가 이범석 국무총리에게 보낸 서신(1948. 9. 29)

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
PROVISIONAL MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP
APO 235 UNIT 2

WLR:ee

33

29 September 1948

3. It has also come to my attention that the Minister of National Defense has directed that orders to the Constabulary be published in Korean only, with an information copy translated into English. As you know, operational control of the Korean Constabulary still rests with the Commanding General, USAFIK, and it is of paramount importance, therefore, that all orders pertaining to operational control of the Constabulary be cleared with the appropriate American Advisor, prior to publication.

W. L. ROBERTS
Brigadier General U. S. Army
Chief
Provisional Military Advisory Group

· 김포에서 수신된 제주도발 무선 내용(1948. 10)

COPY OF VOICE RADIOGRAM FROM KIMPO RELAYED FROM CHEJUDO

AMERICAN ADVISOR, KC, HQ, PMAG

Activity broken out South side of Island. Five (5) police and villagers, number unknown killed. Raiders burning houses. Investigation report follows.

CAPTAIN BURGESS
American Advisor
9th Regiment

· 제5여단소속 미군 고문관의 지위 및 능력(1948. 10. 9)

AMERICAN ADVISOR CAPACITY IN THE 5th BRIGADE

Capt J H W Treadwell, Chief, PMAG
Advisor, 5th Brigade Gen Roberts

9 October 1948

WHEW:WLR:ee

1. The highlighting of the recent Cheju Do operations has brought certain deficiencies to light, which - it is felt - should have previously been corrected by the American Advisors. Past operations on Cheju Do generally have been under the control of DIS Headquarters. Present operations, however, are - in the opinion of a Corps Commander - entirely a Korean responsibility. It is felt that the entire mounting and support of present and projected operations should be handled by Koreans through proper command channels, with a minimum of American interference. It therefore devolves upon the 5th Brigade to supply the entire tactical and logistical support of current operations of the 9th Regiment. As pointed out above, it is felt that the 5th Brigade has failed to provide proper support, and that immediate corrective action is indicated on the part of the American Advisors through Korean channels.

2. Inspections of the units on Cheju Do have indicated marked shortages of essential equipment of all categories. For example, shoes, clothing, maps, rifles, ammunition and rations were all short; further,