• 제6사단장이 제주분견대 지휘관에게 보낸 서신(1948. 3. 1)

HEADQUARTERS 6TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 6

1 March 1948

THRU: Commanding Officer
20th Infantry Regiment
APO 6 Unit 2

TO : Commanding Officer
Cheju Detachment

I hope you have read the Defense of Duffer's Drift. If not you should read it. Your situation is comparable to the author's. It is always interesting and to one's advantage to sit down and estimate the situation. Never be caught in the position, "When in danger - when in doubt - run in circles, scream and shout." What would you do if a foreign power landed on the field near your barracks, as if by accident, but probably by design? What would you do if one of their ships was ostensibly shipwrecked? In short, what would you do if a group of armed men, of foreign origin, landed on your isolated island?

You, of course, would contact the Military Government commander. On the other hand, suppose you were unable to contact him. What would you do? Think it over. Talk to him about it? What is the International law involved? What is to our (the United States) best interest?

You, as an officer in command of troops, must be sure that you have anticipated situations such as these. You must be certain that you have mobility. You must be certain that you have communications. You must have "plays" to meet probable situations.

How would you contact such a group? Would you do it yourself in such a manner that you would be held as hostage, leaving your detachment without a head? Would you send a message by one of your Enlisted men, arranging for the leader of the visitors to meet you at a place where you could dominate the situation? Have you thought of these things? Have you considered what you would do? If not, you better start thinking.

Seldom in your life will you have the independent command you have now. Looking backward, I can anticipate that there will be many times in your career when you will criticize the commanders over you for not doing this and not doing that. You now have the opportunity of being an independent commander yourself. You are the target for comment. You should look forward, backward, and into the present. You have the privilege, the duty, and responsibility on your shoulders. In other words, you are in a position to be criticized by your subordinates and superiors, if in an emergency you are found wanting. Any lack of preparation, of discipline, or of training, on your part, might mean a great deal to your country. Lack of imagination, lack of forethought, lack of planning, might be disastrous. I am writing this letter to stimulate the thoughts and actions of you and those who follow you in this assignment. You should certainly take advantage of this rare opportunity when you, as a soldier, are placed upon your own. Remember that "it is much easier to be controversial than constructive." Your resources are limited, but

certainly forethought, planning, anticipation, and time, are all available to you in unlimited quantities. Are you or are you not, going to take advantage of them? You may seldom have such an opportunity.

Sincerely,

ORLANDO WARD
Major General, U. S. Army
Commanding

• 제6사단장이 20연대장에게 보낸 서신(1948. 5. 19)

HEADQUARTERS 6TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 6

19 May 1948

Colonel Rothwell H. Brown
APO 6 Unit 2
Cheju Do

Dear Brown,

I am sorry you are leaving the Division, and certainly wish you the best of luck in your new assignment. I am glad that they have assigned you in charge of Cheju Do, and I am sure that from here on out the place will quiet down considerably.

I have one caution, which may or may not be pertinent, but I cannot help but remember there have been times in the past when disturbances and revolutions of tremendous size were held in South America and other places without Communistic instigation. That doesn't mean there are not some on Cheju. On the other hand, I do feel that the main trouble is that engendered by hatred of the police. These disturbances will continue until this irritation has been removed by replacing those in whom the populace have no confidence, and by demonstrating the proper attitude.

Another matter that I would like to invite your attention to is the evident poor state of discipline and interior economy of the Military Government Detachment there on Cheju. They compared very poorly with yours on my last trip. I feel sure that you will take the necessary steps to straighten it out. I also noted that they drove very fast through the town, which is not a good idea as resentment is created very quickly when we have automobile accidents. Armed Korean civilians have been reported walking the streets. Enough of advice.

Good luck to you and I hope we can serve together again some one of these days. You have done a fine job.

Please remember me to Mrs. Brown and the children.

Sincerely,

ORLANDO WARD
Major General, U. S. Army
Commanding