

hidden in rough mountainous area.

Reports indicate that mutineers are low on food and ammunition. If true this will probably result in continued raids on small towns and villages but will make it possible for Constabulary Units to locate mutineer concentrations and clear the area.

3. On Cheja Do guerrilla activity continued with 18 guerrillas killed and 2 Constabulary men killed. An estimated 113 homes were destroyed by fire. (Police and Constabulary Reps)

• 국가보안법 / 국군조직법(1948. 12. 5)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

EMS

INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

5 Dec 48

FROM : CG USAFIK

TO : DA (INTELLIGENCE DIV, GSUSA)

INFO : ANA CHINA (G-2)

NR : ZGBI 2007 (WEEKLY NR 49, PERIOD 28 NOV TO 4 DEC 48)

Current intelligence.

1. 3 bills became laws this week: The Mil Orgn Law, The National Security Law and the Temporary Law on Postal Censorship. The National Security Law specifies punishment for those "pose as a govt," "seek to consolidate or go together with the object of disturbing the tranquility of the state, go themselves as or form an orgn with the aim of murder or incendiary action and destruction of communication facilities, deliberately incite or indulge in propaganda to attain the aims of the orgn or give weapons, money, supplies, promises and other things with the aim of implicating others in the clutches of this law." Penalties range from imprisonment for life to imprisonment for 1 year. The law also provides that, "those who have committed a crime as specified in this law, but have confessed voluntarily shall have their punishment mitigated or shall be entirely exonerated."

Comment: The law should suffice for the prosecution of Communists and any other dissident gp.

The Temporary Law on Postal Censorship states that the Pres, in the interest of national security is auth to suspend all communications with foreign countries and the area north of the 38th Parallel; the Pres may establish an agency to censor mail; the Minister of Communication may require the registry of dispatch or receipt of a missive and mails which endanger national security or the peace of the nation or which are ambiguous may be confiscated.

The "Law on the orgn of the National Armed Forces" (WEEKLY NR 47) outlines the structure of the National Defense and provides for conscription. The Pres is to be the Supreme Comdr. Assisting the Pres are 4 agencies:

- (1) The Supreme National Defense Committee
- (2) The Central Intelligence Bureau
- (3) The Committee of Controls over resources for

National Defense

(4) The Mil Affairs Council.

Directly under the Supreme Comdr is the Dept of National Defense headed by the Minister of National Defense. Under the Minister of National Defense is the Hq of the Army and Navy. This hq functions under the Chief of the General Staff, who will be the highest mil official in the armed forces. Subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff and both on an equal level are the Chiefs of Staff for the Army and Navy. The Army will consist of a RA and a Defense Army (Militia). The RA shall not exceed 100,000 personnel during peace time and the str of the Militia will be dep upon the str of the RA.

The Navy likewise shall consist of 2 components, the Regular Navy and the defense Navy. The Regular Navy is limited to a peace time str of 10,000 and the str of the Defense Navy depends on the Regular Navy str.

Other noteworthy features of the law are the provisions for establishment of mil division districts, naval districts, fleets and naval bases, and the air personnel as part of the Army.

The law gives broad powers to the Pres. He is auth to establish by decree:

- (1) The orgn of the Army and Navy;
- (2) The Mil and Naval District;
- (3) Fleets and Naval Bases.

In addition he has the power of appointing and dismissing the key officers (subj to a decision by the cabinet in the case of generals) in the armed forces. The Chief of the General Staff will be selected from those officers presently in the mil service.

Comment: The law is ambitious for a country as economically weak as Korea. The establishment of fleets, naval bases and an air army or service will depend on the budget. It is probable that the implementation of this law will be an expansion, on a limited scale, of the already existing facilities, for instance the present Coast Guard will probably form the basis for the Navy..

Another feature of the law which may cause difficulty is the power of the Pres to determine the composition of the Army and Navy hqs, all other necessary orgns. This may lead to a duplication of effort, wherein bureaus are orgnized to perform function which properly belong in a general or special staff section. The usual political difficulties may also be encountered in the appointment of the Chiefs of Staff. The mil orgn as provided for in this law is sound; the implementation of the last is what will determine its effectiveness.

2. On 26 Nov Pres Rhee broadcast an appeal to the Youths of Korea to participate in the Militia which is to be established under the Dept of National Defense.

3. The CG, in a press statement 27 Nov, stated that the American mil mission in Korea is making satisfactory progress in training the security forces of Korea.

Comment: This is the first official announcement of the existence of the mil advisory gp.

4. The foreign minister of the Republic of Korea on 26 Nov appealed to the US State Dept for a postponement of US trp withdrawal.

5. According to a B-2 source representatives of the North-west Young Mens Association, United Young Mens Party, the General Alliance of Korean Young Men, Korean Independence Young Mens Society, the National Society for the Acceleration of Korean Independence Youth Corps and the Korean Veterans Association met in Seoul 29 Nov at the reqst of Pres Rhee. The Korean National Youth Corps was not represented. The representatives were to discuss a merger of all youth orgn into the "Great Korean Youth Association. The objectives of the orgn are:

- (1) To combat Communism
- (2) To unify Korea
- (3) To furnish a source of manpower for a National Guard
- (4) To improve the mind and body of Korean Youth.

The representatives stated that they would furnish the president 200,000 men if:

(1) President Rhee would actively head the organization,
(2) Arms were issued and training in their use conducted by American offa down to co level.

(3) The following ministers were replaced: Prime Minister, Minister of Home Affairs, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, Minister of Industry and Commerce.

Comment: This consolidated corresponds peferally to a proposal which the assembly fwded to the president early in Nov to have 50,000 men from the Patriotic Youth Groups organize into a youth league for protecting the nation. (WEEKA Nbr 46). The plans of consolidation were perhaps also influenced by an appeal which President Rhee broadcast to the Youth of the Republic 26 Nov. In view of President Rhee's adamant stand against reorganization of the govt at this time, it is unlikely that Rhee will meet condition (3) above. The present limited supply of mil equipment will preclude fulfillment of condition (2). Such being the case Rhee will probably reject condition (1), which apparently is intended to afford the new group a higher official backing than that held by the Korean National Youth Group which was built by and continues to pledge allegiance to Prime Minister Lee Bum Suk.

It is obvious that even a partial consolidation of the youth to support the Republic will strengthen it.

Military:

1. Strength: Police-no change; Constabulary-43,702, Coast Guard-3,490.

2. Two parallel incidents were reported during the period. Both involved only Koreans.

Subversive:

2. Raiders continued to be active on Cheju Do and to be rounded up by the constabulary. During this period it was reported that 2 towns were attacked, 50 Rightists killed, 30 Communists killed and a delayed summary for the period 11-26 Nov lists a total of 167 Communists killed.

3. Small groups of mutineers and sympathizers are still at large in Cholla Namdo. Police and constabulary units are scouring the area to apprehend those still active. Police report that 328 policemen were killed and 46 injured in Cholla Namdo during the period 19 Oct-13 Nov. (Police report) the constabulary reports that as of 29 Nov 1,714 (including 50 civ) persons have been tried for participation in the Yosun-Sunchon uprising. Of this total 866 received the death sentence, of whom 67 have been executed, 150 received a life sentence, 541 were dismissed and the remainder received sentence of from 12-20 years imprisonment. As of 29 Nov 900 prisoners were awaiting trial. (Constabulary report).

6. Communist violence, including all reports except those for Yosun, Taegu, Naju and Kangwon Do, total 2 attacks on towns, 1 attack on police, 50 Rightist killed, 30 Communists killed (all on Cheju Do), 3 attacks on Rightist, 2 acts of sabotage, 2 labor strikes and 1 school strike. Delayed reports list 167 Communists killed, and 2 attacks on Rightist. No Rightist-inspired acts of violence were reported. Three individuals were attacked by persons of unknown political affiliation during the period and a delayed report lists 1 such attack on 18 Nov.

Sabotage and Espionage: On 30 Nov a Korean communication cable was cut by unknown persons near (977-1635). (A-1).

Psychological:

1. Reporters from 2 different Korean newspapers informed American officials that certain "directives" had been issued to all Korean newspapers by the office of public information of the Korean Govt. These alleged "directives" are believed to have originated in the central committee on propaganda (WEEKA Nbr 48) and are intended as a guide in handling certain news items. They include the following:

(A) The govt in North Korean should be referred to as "The North Korean Puppet Regime."

(B) Expressions of protocol should not be used in reference to Kim Il Sung and other leaders of the govt in the north.

(C) Newspapers should not report news or speculation

regarding withdrawal of US Forces; no news or comments agitating against prolonged occupation should be printed.

(D) Comments condoning the actions of rebel units or expressions of sympathy toward rebel activities of any kind should be prohibited.

(E) Expressions connoting that the attrition in the south is "mutual slaughter of race" should be avoided because it tends to convey the idea of equality between the rebels and the National Army.

(F) Writers should not use statements of slander and abuse which are of no direct advantage to the nation and society.

Comment: It is probable that the Korean "man in the street," to whom withdrawal has been preached for 3 years, is not yet sold on the gov'ts 2-weeks old campaign for continued occupation until the security of Korea is assured. Even among those who are most strongly advocating continued occupation there is undoubtedly a mental tug-of-war between a realistic realization of the necessity for such occupation and the wishful desire for "self-determination." Though such leaflets and handbills as have appeared opposing continued occupation have been branded "leftist" by the Korean Gov't, it is not certain that the moderates are not also involved.