

of their strength armed with bamboo spears and other 50% with Japanese 99 rifles, carbines and M-1's captured from Security Forces or brought in by mutineers. Occasionally homemade and Japanese grenades are reported. Some weapons are probably received from North Korea. There is no info as to vehicles or heavy weapons.

6. Targets and Operational Plans:

Targets are conventionally to attack police boxes and kill police, to assassinate govt officials and other prominent Rightists, to arouse hostility toward Republic of Korea through propaganda, and occasionally to sabotage communications. It is noteworthy that, except during election period and Yosu mutiny, numerous plans and threats to assassinate Rightists have not materialized. Plans call for raids on towns and villages incident to attack of targets.

8. Communications and control by North Korea:

For Communist activities in general, orders originate in Pyongyang. They are sent to SKLP Hq in Haeju Coordinates (870-1700) North Korea, and from that point are transmitted to South Korea through agents or smugglers who are crossing 38th Parallel daily. Unconfirmed reports have been received that communication is also effected by rad. Several C sources report that liaison is maintained from both National and Provincial SKLP central committees directly with head of each guerrilla force. (As noted in Par 1, other reports state that head of mil bureau is parallel to head of provincial central committee). Communications in South Korea (generally carried by courier, both male and female. Most of messages are oral rather than written. As another means of control North Korean auth are rptd to be sending trained organizers to ea province in South Korea to aid in preperation of plans and in tng guerrilla tactics.

Part C.

2. Constabulary:

The Yosu-Sunchon mutiny disclosed for certainty what has long been reported, that is that Constabulary has been infiltrated by Communists. However it also demonstrated that vast majority of Constabulary are loyal. Elements of at least 6 Regts were in contact with mutineers yet only unit to desert to mutineers was 1st Co sent (alone) against them. Not only were there no other reported disaffections during period of mutiny but units which subdued mutineers fought to best of their ability against rebellious elements.

On 2 Nov an uprising at Taegu indicated that Bn of 6th Regt was not entirely loyal. A disturbance took place on rifle range when Sgt being arrested for Communist activities killed arresting off. ~~Disturbance involved approx 400 Constabularymen and few civ sympathizers.~~ Most Constabularymen quickly surrendered to an American; 80 or 90 fled with their weapons and were rounded up next day. Extent of Communist influence has not yet been determined. Constabulary officials report that, as result of screening, 60 Communists have been found in Bn. It is probable that these characteristically exploited an incident which is easy to do with volatile Koreans. Significant is report that one method riot leaders used to get EM out of barracks when outbreak started was to appeal to throw loyalty to govt by pretending that they were to fight mutineers from Yosu who were approaching Taegu.

Since Sep, Constabulary Intelligence pers have arrested about 1,600 suspected Communists in Constabulary; the searching out is continuing.

• 국가보안법 통과 / 미군철수 반대(1948. 11. 28)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

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p13

INCOMING MESSAGE

~~Secret~~
PRIORITY

28 Nov 48

FROM : CG USAFIK

TO : GSUSA (FOR INTELLIGENCE DIV)

INFO : AMA CHINA, CINCPAC (G-2)

NR : ZOB1 1966 (WEEKKA NBR 48, PERIOD 21 NOV TO 28 NOV 48)



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Part 1. South Korea.

Current intelligence:

1. National Assembly on 19 Nov passed National Security Bill to control elements deemed inimical to welfare of Republic of Korea and on 20 Nov passed fol resolution by vote of 88 to 3: "In view of the present situation in Korea it is necessary for the occupying forces of US to remain in South Korea until Republic of Korea is able to defend itself." Proposal was signed by 98 Assemblymen. 13 members walked out on vote stating that resolution was contrary to public opinion.

Comment: On 14 Oct 48 some 25 percent of members of Assembly presented petition for immediate withdrawal of US troops (WEEKKA 42). Petition was referred to committee and has not been brought out since. Though by burying petition in committee majority of Assembly (or at least its leaders) indicated that they opposed withdrawal, they were apparently unwilling to publicly announce their opposition while popularity of opposition was doubtful.

Change in attitude of large nbr of Assemblymen from passive opposition to withdrawal to an active campaign for retention of troops is considered to be attributable to these factors:

A. Mutiny aroused in many Assembly men a distrust of the constabulary as defensive force.

B. Barbarity of Communists on larger scale than before aroused FEAF and many Assembly men.

C. President and ministers have exerted pressure for the retention of troops through public statements and through a rally.

(over)

Subversive:

2. On 19 Nov a raider group, estimated at from 600 to 900 men, attacked Kurye (1040-1356). Two Loyal Bns were committed against the attacker and 203 mutineers were killed, 27 of whom were identified as constabulary mutineers. In addition 37 mutineers and 450 SKLP members were captured. Loyal Forces captured 103 rifles and carbines 2 mortars and 8 machine guns. (Constabulary Report).

In 5 smaller operations against the mutineers in Cholla Namdo 12 constabulary men were killed, 2 civilians were killed and 52 arrested. Trials of prisoners from the Yosun-Sunchon uprising began during the period. Thus far, 309 have been given the death sentence, 124 life imprisonment and most of the remainder from 1 to 20 years. Few were acquitted.

Comment: The attack of Kurye is the largest concentrated effort made by any raider group since the uprising in Cholla Namdo was quelled. Results of action indicate that constabulary is capable of controlling situation when contact is actually made with raiders. Constabulary operations against raiders will be slow and difficult as long as raiders are able to remain

hidden in rough mountainous area.

Reports indicate that mutineers are low on food and ammunition. If true this will probably result in continued raids on small towns and villages but will make it possible for Constabulary Units to locate mutineer concentrations and clear the area.

3. On Cheja Do guerrilla activity continued with 18 guerrillas killed and 2 Constabulary men killed. An estimated 113 homes were destroyed by fire. (Police and Constabulary Reps)

• 국가보안법 / 국군조직법(1948. 12. 5)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

EMS

INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

5 Dec 48

FROM : CG USAFIK

TO : DA (INTELLIGENCE DIV, GSUSA)

INFO : ANA CHINA (G-2)

NR : ZGBI 2007 (WEEKLY NR 49, PERIOD 28 NOV TO 4 DEC 48)

Current intelligence.

1. 3 bills became laws this week: The Mil Orgn Law, The National Security Law and the Temporary Law on Postal Censorship. The National Security Law specifies punishment for those "pose as a govt," "seek to consolidate or go together with the object of disturbing the tranquility of the state, go themselves as or form an orgn with the aim of murder or incendiary action and destruction of communication facilities, deliberately incite or indulge in propaganda to attain the aims of the orgn or give weapons, money, supplies, promises and other things with the aim of implicating others in the clutches of this law." Penalties range from imprisonment for life to imprisonment for 1 year. The law also provides that, "those who have committed a crime as specified in this law, but have confessed voluntarily shall have their punishment mitigated or shall be entirely exonerated."

Comment: The law should suffice for the prosecution of Communists and any other dissident gp.

The Temporary Law on Postal Censorship states that the Pres, in the interest of national security is auth to suspend all communications with foreign countries and the area north of the 38th Parallel; the Pres may establish an agency to censor mail; the Minister of Communication may require the registry of dispatch or receipt of a missive and mails which endanger national security or the peace of the nation or which are ambiguous may be confiscated.

The "Law on the orgn of the National Armed Forces" (WEEKLY NR 47) outlines the structure of the National Defense and provides for conscription. The Pres is to be the Supreme Comdr. Assisting the Pres are 4 agencies:

- (1) The Supreme National Defense Committee
- (2) The Central Intelligence Bureau
- (3) The Committee of Controls over resources for