It appears for the first time, that there is some awareness on the part of the commission that they have further responsibility under the UN resolution. They have indicated that the most of them will return to Seoul after preparing their report, but it is difficult to predict their action after that. All of them are anxious to foresee what the US expects to do here, and all of them indicate an anxiety that the US forces will withdraw under conditions that will allow the Communists to take control of South Korea. This concern on their part is enhanced by recent stateside reports that the withdrawal is under way, and by a realization growing out of their observations here that South Koreans do not favor Communism. In other words, continuing reports of early withdrawal, although set up in the UN resolution, will no doubt work against our progress here in stabilization with UN backing and blessing.

The Soviet power turn off has been expected as another weapon to try to put the "American imperialists" in a bad light. To date, it has reacted against them in South Korea, but continued propaganda, both all out against the US and laying the blame for cut off on the US may have some effect on good will toward the US, especially as the power cut off begins visibly to affect industrial production. Our best defense on this is to keep power production in South Korea to the highest possible level. In this we are severely handicapped by shortage of fuel and slow arrival of rehabilitation materials that have long been requested.

Sporadic Communist violence continues, and no doubt will keep going as soon as the local Communists can reorganize and be reinforced. /Boundary incidents indicate that North Koreans are being whipped to a frenzy to make them show hostility in hope of making South Koreans feel they are not being protected. Guerrilla resistance continues on Cheju, but constabulary action appears to be getting results. The final outcome is yet to be seen. Communists have no "face" on mainland South Korea, and some few patriotic Koreans who have "fronted" for them are renouncing them. However, their "torpedoes" are still well paid and continue some activity. Indications are that their next big effort will come when the Representative Assembly meets, which is now planned to be Monday, 31 May. Reports are that they will concentrate on assassination of elected representatives.

3 Communist newspapers, used almost exclusively as hand bills and wall posters, are being used entirely to print the Kremlin line in the form of statements of this or that local Communist front organization, many of which have recently appeared in the effort to avoid old and recognized names. It may become necessary to get heavy-handed on these so-called "new organs".

There is a lot of political jockeying going on under the surface now, in realignment of non-Communist power, preparatory to the coming session of the assembly. We are definitely in for a rough time in handling the power hungry Korean elected representatives and in keeping an orderly turnover of controls.

Recommendations:

That withdrawal talk be played down for the time being.

That everything possible be done to assist US in building up electric power potential to overcome possible propaganda effects.

HODGE

▪ 제9연대 41명 탈주(1948. 5. 29)

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▪ 임시군사고문단의 임무(1948. 7. 2)

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
APO 235

~~TFOOP 350.4~~ 334

SUBJECT: Mission of the Provisional Korean Military Advisory Group

TO: Commanding General,
United States Army Military Government in Korea
APO 235, Unit 2

1. The present mission of the Provisional Military Advisory Group, which is assigned to USAMGIK, will be as outlined in this letter. For