

UNCLASSIFIED
PRIORITY

13 May 48

FROM : CG USAFIK
TO : CINCPK (G-2)
NR : GBI-5069

This is G-2 Highlight 145. 13 May 48.

Re election on Cheju Do. according to report brought back by Staff Off yesterday 40 out of a total of 221 dists failed to have any votes cast either because election officials had disappeared or voters had disappeared. Judging fr the few ballot boxes which have already been opened. about 90% of the registrants in the operating districts voted.

New subj. As for the rest of South Korea, since election day we have recd a few reports of isolated attempts to kill police or burn police boxes.

I believe the Communists have definitely crawled into their holes but I make no prediction as to how long they will stay there.

• 정치상황 요약(1948. 5. 23)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER



INCOMING MESSAGE

JS
rdo
LFS

[Signature]
PRIORITY

CINC

23 May 48

FROM : CG USAFIK
TO : JCOS
INFO : CINCPK
NR : ZGCG 714



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6 AUG 75

Subj is summary of political situation.

The 10 May elections can only be judged as an overwhelming victory in South Korea over Communism. Over 80% of all eligible voters in the zone actually voted, in the face of an all out ~~boycott~~ ^{boycott and effort to stop elections} on the part of the Communists, jointed by dissident groups for disgruntled Kim Koo and Kim Kiu Sic. Violence, killings, including assassinations of some 25 election officials and candidates, attacks on police to get weapons, assassinations of Rightist leaders, sabotage and mass threats against voters, did not stop South Koreans from voting. Cheju Island was the only place where voting was below the gen average. This island with population of about 300,000 has a long history of rebellion against the mainland, of family feuds

and local sectionalisms. The Communists were able to import into Cheju enough agitators^{and} and utilized these factors plus the few real and many imaginary grievances^{there} to get together bands of raiders to terrorize the inhabitants to the point where election officials were afraid to function in many precincts^{where}. Where the polling places did function, however, the percentage of voting was comparable to other areas on the mainland. One of the 3 election districts was normal in voting.

The elected representatives show an encouraging spread in political attitudes, although it can safely be said none of them are willing to sell out to Russia if they can keep any volition through American support. It appears that the two largest blocks are adherents of Syngman Rhee and of the Han Kuk Democratic Party (which are definitely not the same groups) with a probable edge in strength to the Democratic Party. About 60 of those elected cannot be identified as adhering to either of the 2 larger groupings, and appear to hold the balance of power. One very healthy feature is the indication that expenditure of campaign funds by various candidates and groups seemed to have little effect on their being elected, indicating that when "Kim" votes secretly, he picks the man he wants. Although women voted in at least as high if not higher percentage of total than did men, no women candidates were elected. Most women still believe woman's place is in the home.

Despite the fact that Rhee did not gain a clear initial majority, Korean psychology is such that he will without a doubt be selected as the first nominal head of the new govt. He is the only Korean who is known to all Koreans, is a legendary figure in Korea, and his constant stand against Communism makes no other line of action possible in the Korean mind. The fight in the assembly will be on the type of govt (US type versus a Parliamentary type), on the high officials other than the president and on the powers left in the hands of the president.

After their early efforts to sabotage and to avoid observing elections in South Korea, ^{perhaps} tapering gradually to a very critical observation of the election, it appears now that the UNFOLK will approve the election with the probable dissenting vote of Mughir, Syrian delegate. It is possible he may also make a minority report. Even Jackson, Australia, and Patterson, Canada, appear to have dropped their early pre-indoctrination and have expressed themselves as highly satisfied with what they saw. Mughir, with 3 members of the Secretariat, Schmidt (principal secretary), Milner and Engers, continued efforts to find fault and have been the focal point of bombardment by floods of Communist and dissident complaints. Most of the complaints concern "free atmosphere" and center around the claims that they were not free to oppose the elections rather than anything having to do with freedom of candidates or voting. Informants inside the commission insist that Schmidt is a Cominform agent. A Reuters correspondent now here, went to school with Milner and brands him a Red. Engers has consistently been identified with their activities. A reliable informant within the commission reports that the unfavorable Mughir statement for the election was written by Schmidt and Milner and sold to Mughir (a young university student in US) while he was smarting from imaginary rebuff received while interfering with processes of law and order on election day. The statement was not seen before publication by any other member of the commission and was patently made public for the express purpose of giving Moscow ammunition to discredit the election. It was promptly discredited by the rest of the delegates by a press release to effect that it represented the views of the 1 member only.

It appears for the first time, that there is some awareness on the part of the commission that they have further responsibility under the UN resolution. They have indicated that the most of them will return to Seoul after preparing their report, but it is difficult to predict their action after that. All of them are anxious to foresee what the US expects to do here, and all of them indicate an anxiety that the US forces will withdraw under conditions that will allow the Communists to take control of South Korea. This concern on their part is enhanced by recent stateside reports that the withdrawal is under way, and by a realization growing out of their observations here that South Koreans do not favor Communism. In other words, continuing reports of early withdrawal, although set up in the UN resolution, will no doubt work against our progress here in stabilization with UN backing and blessing.

The Soviet power turn off has been expected as another weapon to try to put the "American imperialists" in a bad light. To date, it has reacted against them in South Korea, but continued propaganda, both all out against the US and laying the blame for cut off on the US may have some effect on good will toward the US, especially as the power cut off begins visibly to affect industrial production. Our best defense on this is to keep power production in South Korea to the highest possible level. In this we are severely handicapped by shortage of fuel and slow arrival of rehabilitation materials that have long been requested.

Sporadic Communist violence continues, and no doubt will keep going as soon as the local Communists can reorganize and be reinforced. Boundary incidents indicate that North Koreans are being whipped to a frenzy to make them show hostility in hope of making South Koreans feel they are not being protected. Guerrilla resistance continues on Cheju, but constabulary action appears to be getting results. The final outcome is yet to be seen. Communists have no "face" on mainland South Korea, and some few patriotic Koreans who have "fronted" for them are renouncing them. However, their "torpedoes" are still well paid and continue some activity. Indications are that their next big effort will come when the Representative Assembly meets, which is now planned to be Monday, 31 May. Reports are that they will concentrate on assassination of elected representatives.

3 Communist newspapers, used almost exclusively as hand bills and wall posters, are being used entirely to print the Kremlin line in the form of statements of this or that local Communist front organization, many of which have recently appeared in the effort to avoid old and recognized names. It may become necessary to get heavy-handed on these so-called "new organs".

There is a lot of political jockeying going on under the surface now, in realignment of non-Communist power, preparatory to the coming session of the assembly. We are definitely in for a rough time in handling the power hungry Korean elected representatives and in keeping an orderly turnover of controls.

Recommendations:

That withdrawal talk be played down for the time being.

That everything possible be done to assist US in building up electric power potential to overcome possible propaganda effects.

HODGE

• 제9연대 41명 탈주(1948. 5. 29)

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