

c. Operation #2. April 28.

The 5th Korean Constabulary unit at Cheju moved their bivouac site at 1000 by trucks and foot and started to sweep the villages indicated. Colonel Schewe observed the start of the operation from the air in an L-5. The march was orderly, and well disciplined, and the units promptly detrucked, formed and started to function. All civilians were stopped on the roads and those on the roads and in the villages were then marched to a central collecting point. This procedure was observed in the four villages - 6, 7, 8, and 9. The operation proceeded in an orderly fashion. Korean Constabulary units could be observed going through houses and buildings. It was impossible to observe more than this from the air. No reports as to the operation were available at headquarters of the 59th Military Government Company when Colonel Schewe arrived there at 1150. He departed that headquarters at 1240 for the airstrip and return to this headquarters.

4. Future Operations:

a. Operation #3 - Colonel Mansfield stated at 1200, 28 April, that the plans for 29 April were to start the 5th Korean Constabulary Regiment and the 9th Korean Constabulary Regiment from Cheju and Mosulpo 29 April and sweep toward BOHO-AK Hill, as it is believed that the armed bands are in the hills.

b. Operation #4 - 30 April. The 5th Regiment is to sweep the villages in Area 4.

c. Operation #5 - The 5th and 9th Regiments are to sweep the hills towards KYORAE-RI. (Tentative date, May 1)

d. Future operations will be dependent upon the results gained from preceding operations.

5. Colonel Schewe's estimate of the situation at Cheju-Do.

a. Present forces on Cheju-Do are adequate to cope with the situation IF they are vigorously pushed by the Commanding Officer, 59th Military Government Company.

b. It appears that the Communist organizers and guerilla forces are in the hills; thus, prompt, vigorous action should be taken to run them down.

c. Police and Do Dong Youth have been acting in such fashion that the civilian population is very anti-police and will not now cooperate with them only through fear, if at all.

d. Present guerilla forces number between 1,000 and 3,000 and are well dispersed in small groups.

e. There is a need for better communications (radio) between units in Cheju-Do.

f. The operation prior to 28 Apr 1948 had not been as aggressive as the situation warrants.

M. W. SCHEWE
Lt. Colonel (Inf)
G-3 Section
XXIV Corps

• 제주도 선거(1948. 5. 13)

HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED
PRIORITY

13 May 48

FROM : CG USAFIK
TO : CINCPAC (G-2)
NR : GBI-5069

This is G-2 Highlight 145. 13 May 48.

Re election on Cheju Do. according to report brought back by Staff Off yesterday 40 out of a total of 221 dists failed to have any votes cast either because election officials had disappeared or voters had disappeared. Judging fr the few ballot boxes which have already been opened. about 90% of the registrants in the operating districts voted.

New subj. As for the rest of South Korea, since election day we have recd a few reports of isolated attempts to kill police or burn police boxes.

I believe the Communists have definitely crawled into their holes but I make no prediction as to how long they will stay there.

• 정치상황 요약(1948. 5. 23)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER



INCOMING MESSAGE

JS
rdo
IFS

[Signature]
PRIORITY

CINC

23 May 48

FROM : CG USAFIK
TO : JCOS
INFO : CINCPAC
NR : ZGCG 714



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Subj is summary of political situation.

The 10 May elections can only be judged as an overwhelming victory in South Korea over Communism. Over 80% of all eligible voters in the zone actually voted, in the face of an all out ~~boycott~~ ^{boycott and effort to stop elections} on the part of the Communists, jointed by dissident groups for disgruntled Kim Koo and Kim Kiu Sic. Violence, killings, including assassinations of some 25 election officials and candidates, attacks on police to get weapons, assassinations of Rightist leaders, sabotage and mass threats against voters, did not stop South Koreans from voting. Cheju Island was the only place where voting was below the gen average. This island with population of about 300,000 has a long history of rebellion against the mainland, of family feuds