

have been 7 at Cholla Namdo and 2 in Seoul city. Raiders smashed furniture and seized records. 2 raiders reported arrested so far. Attacks on police boxes in Cheju-Do are considered to be further extension of Provincial Campaigns and not directly connected with registration. Figures of registration will be covered in Seoul POLADS.

• 공산주의자들의 폭력행위에 대한 긴급보고(1948. 4. 22)

HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
APO 235

*My Jc*

22 April 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WECKERLING

SUBJECT: Flash Reports on Communist Acts of Violence

1. The following are flash reports on communist acts of violence:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>INCIDENT</u>
17 April	CHEJU-UP, CHEJU DO	Police lines west of CHEJU-UP cut. Total of 36 telephone poles cut down.
	SIN CHOD, CHEJU DO (one mile northwest of ECPOACHON (964-1155)	Three civilians killed. One civilian seriously injured and two other civilians missing.
19 April	CHEJU City (950-1150) CHEJU DO	Police detail repairing telephone lines fired upon.
	AEWOL (931-1146) CHEJU DO	Civilian killed.
20 April	MOSULPO (925-1116) CHEJU DO	Constabulary compound approached by mob.
	CHEJU City (950-1150) CHEJU DO	Snipers open fire on Cheju City.

• 제주도에서의 활동 보고(1948. 4. 29)

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DISPOSITION FORM

SUBJECT: REPORT OF ACTIVITIES AT CHEJU DO ISLAND

TO: Colonel A.C. Tychsen FROM: Lt. Col. Schewe DATE: 29 Apr 48 COMMENT NO.  
A/C of S, G-3 G-3

1. Pursuant to instructions from Colonel A. C. Tychsen, G-3, XXIV Corps, Lt. Col. M. W. Schewe proceeded to Chaju Do Island by air on 27 April 1948. His mission was to contact Lt. Col. John Mansfield, Commanding Officer, 59th Military

Government Company at Cheju Do, and to make an estimate of the situation on the island; to observe activities, and to ascertain the proposed plans of Col. Mansfield for the reduction of guerilla activities and control of the civil population on Cheju Do. A report of the findings was to be submitted to this headquarters.

2. Upon arrival at Cheju Do at 1200, 27 April, Colonel Schewe called upon Colonel Mansfield at his headquarters, and together they proceeded to the air strip where, with Colonel Brown, Commanding Officer of the 20th Infantry Regiment, Major Geist, in charge of 20th Infantry Regiment Troops on Cheju Do, and Captain De Reus, Advisor to the 5th Korean Constabulary Regiment, they discussed the situation. Col. Brown informed Colonel Mansfield as to the instructions of the Commanding General, USAFIK, on the handling of the situation at Cheju Do, i.e.:

- a. The Constabulary must function at once.
- b. All civil disorders must cease.
- c. That a definite tie-in would be made between the Constabulary and the National Police to promptly reduce guerilla activities.
- d. American military forces would not be involved.

Colonel Brown asked Lt. Col. Mansfield if he thought that he could handle the situation with the Korean forces available. The reply was in the affirmative.

3. The attached map shows the activities already engaged in and those planned.

a. The entire unit of those elements of the 5th Korean Constabulary Regiment at Cheju swept the villages (indicated 1 on Map) on 27 April, starting at 1230. Reports from the air observers (Lt. Poinxter, 6th Division, pilot, and Capt. Burns, MG) were that the DIS unit functioned very well - all exits to the sea were blocked; all roads blocked; and that Constabulary units could be observed proceeding in an orderly fashion through streets, and entering buildings and homes. This report was verified by Captain De Reus, Military Advisor to the 5th Korean Constabulary Regiment, who proceeded to the villages by vehicle. Colonel Schewe did not accompany Captain De Reus, as he was informed by Col. Mansfield and Capt. De Reus that it was not desired that too many U. S. Military personnel be present in the villages during the operation.

The plan was to thoroughly close all exits from each village; search the homes for hidden weapons, entrenching tools, shovels, axes, picks, and wire cutters; also, to locate any suspicious characters, organizers, and Communists. The National Police, under the supervision of the Korean Constabulary, participated, and were to screen the civilian personnel. The entire operation was under the personal direction of Colonel Kim, Commanding Officer of the 5th Korean Constabulary Regiment. The results of the sweep of the villages (#1) were entirely negative. One item of interest noted is that there were almost no young men in the villages or observed in the fields. Upon questioning the women of the village by the Police with reference to the whereabouts of the men of the villages, there were three stock answers given: (1) "My husband is dead"; (2) "My husband is on the mainland"; or (3) "My husband has gone to Japan". Some few stated they had no husbands, but this statement was generally false, and upon further questioning, their statements were changed to "I don't know".

NOTE: The above statements were made to Colonel Schewe by Colonel Kim (through an interpreter), Captain De Reus, and Mr. Merritt, CID, MG, at Cheju on the evening of 27 April.

b. Plans for operation #2 to be conducted 28 April were thoroughly discussed by Colonel Kim, Korean Constabulary, Major Moon, Korean Constabulary, Captain De Reus, Captain Bruns, MG Advisor to National Police, and Mr. Merritt, CID, MG. Colonel Schewe was present at the discussion during the entire time, as an observer only. However, he did tell Colonel Kim that the Commanding General, USAFIK, was very desirous that the operation at Cheju Do would succeed, and, further, that the eyes of all South Korea were focused on the success or failure of the Korean Security Forces at Cheju Do. Because of this he must not fail. Colonel Kim stated that he thoroughly understood, and that the Constabulary would function.

c. Operation #2. April 28.

The 5th Korean Constabulary unit at Cheju moved their bivouac site at 1000 by trucks and foot and started to sweep the villages indicated. Colonel Schewe observed the start of the operation from the air in an B-5. The march was orderly, and well disciplined, and the units promptly detrucked, formed and started to function. All civilians were stopped on the roads and those on the roads and in the villages were then marched to a central collecting point. This procedure was observed in the four villages - 6, 7, 8, and 9. The operation proceeded in an orderly fashion. Korean Constabulary units could be observed going through houses and buildings. It was impossible to observe more than this from the air. No reports as to the operation were available at headquarters of the 59th Military Government Company when Colonel Schewe arrived there at 1150. He departed that headquarters at 1240 for the airstrip and return to this headquarters.

4. Future Operations:

a. Operation #3 - Colonel Mansfield stated at 1200, 28 April, that the plans for 29 April were to start the 5th Korean Constabulary Regiment and the 9th Korean Constabulary Regiment from Cheju and Moeulpo 29 April and sweep toward HOHO-AK Hill, as it is believed that the armed bands are in the hills.

b. Operation #4 - 30 April. The 5th Regiment is to sweep the villages in Area 4.

c. Operation #5 - The 5th and 9th Regiments are to sweep the hills towards KYORAE-RI. (Tentative date, May 1)

d. Future operations will be dependent upon the results gained from preceding operations.

5. Colonel Schewe's estimate of the situation at Cheju-Do.

a. Present forces on Cheju-Do are adequate to cope with the situation IF they are vigorously pushed by the Commanding Officer, 59th Military Government Company.

b. It appears that the Communist organizers and guerilla forces are in the hills; thus, prompt, vigorous action should be taken to run them down.

c. Police and De Dong Youth have been acting in such fashion that the civilian population is very anti-police and will not now cooperate with them only through fear, if at all.

d. Present guerilla forces number between 1,000 and 3,000 and are well dispersed in small groups.

e. There is a need for better communications (radio) between units in Cheju-Do.

f. The operation prior to 28 Apr 1948 had not been as aggressive as the situation warrants.

M. W. SCHEWE  
Lt. Colonel (Inf)  
G-3 Section  
XXIV Corps

· 제주도 선거(1948. 5. 13)

HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND  
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE  
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

**INCOMING MESSAGE**