

1948. 11. 19. 주한미육군사령부 정보참모부 주간요약보고

XXIV CORPS G-2 W/S #166 PART I

A. ARMED FORCES

1. Strength (Secret)

Police: 34,111 (as of 05 October)

Constabulary: 43,629 (including 602 cadets and 18 recruits)

Coast Guard: 3,603 (including 371 cadets)

2. Operational Activity (Confidential)

a. Border Incidents

At 141300 November 40 North Korean Constabularymen entered the town of SANGSUNAE (1101-1695) and remained until discovered by police at 141500 November. (Police report) U.S. personnel observed an estimated 50 NKCC cross into North Korea in the vicinity of SANGSUNAE at 141700 November. (B-2)

On 15 November an estimated 40 NKCC entered the town of WONDAE RI (1119-1696) and engaged in a firefight with the police of that village. Results were not reported. (C-3)

	04-11 Jun	11-18 Jun	18-25 Jun	25 June	02 July	02-09 Jul	09-16 Jul	16-23 Jul	23-30 Jul	30 July	06 August	06-13 Aug	13-20 Aug	20-27 Aug	27 August	03 September	03-10 Sep	10-17 Sep	17-24 Sep	24 September	01 October	01-08 Oct	08-15 Oct	15-22 Oct	22-29 Oct	29 October	05 November	05-12 Nov	12-19 Nov	TOTAL
Border Incidents																														
Korean vs Korean	4	6	4	6		2	3		3		2	3	2	4	3	3	1	2		2	1					1	1	1	51	
Firing on US																														
Personnel		1	2			1	2	1			1	1				1	1	2		6	1	2							22	
Ambushes of																														
Us Personnel							1																						1	
Soviet Violations of Parallel*							1									1													2	
Korean Violations of Parallel*	2	1		1				1			1								1	1	2							1	11	
Soviets vs Koreans	1												1	1															3	
TOTAL	7	8	6	7		4	6	2	3	4	4	3	5	5	5	2	5	7	7	5	3				1	1	1	2	90	

* No firing involved.

b. Police Efficiency and Morale

Subsequent to the passage of the National Traitor Law (Weekly Summary #157), a survey was made to determine how morale and efficiency of the police have been affected by the passage of the law and also by the failure of the Minister of Internal Affairs to appoint a director of National Police.

The passage of the law has caused some apprehension on the part of higher ranking policemen who served on the police force under the Japanese. The general attitude of these is that they only worked for the Japanese to earn a living and that consideration should be given for the work they have performed since the liberation of Korea. It is considered likely that, at least until prosecutions under the law are initiated, the personnel who will be affected will remain satisfactorily efficient because of their hope that they will escape punishment through the clause in the law which provides that no punishment need be awarded to those who give evidence of having honestly repented.

Many of the newer policemen - that is, those who were not in the police force during the Japanese occupation - favor the complete implementation of the National Traitor Law. It is considered very probable that these policemen are not motivated by patriotism as much as by the knowledge that there will be more opportunities for promotion if higher ranking officers are purged. There has been a report that in KYONGSANG NAMDO younger policemen are showing some insubordination toward their superiors whom they know to be directly affected by the law. However, in the same provinces, fellow officers continue to vindicate police who served under the Japanese on the promise that the Japanese occupation was accepted by Koreans in every walk of life.

The failure to appoint a new director of National Police (to replace CHOUGH Byong Ok) has had no appreciable effect on the morale, according to reports. It is considered however, that morale will be raised by the appointment of a National Director to whom the police of lower echelons can look for specific guidance. The appointment of a new Chief of Metropolitan Police on 3 September and of a new Chief of Division "D" on 28 September resulted in a raising of morale in the localities concerned.

Morale of the police in the southern provinces has reportedly been increased by knowledge of the fact that in many cases the police who opposed the mutineers during the YOSU and subsequent uprisings performed not only efficiently but very courageously.

It is considered likely that the efficiency and morale of the police is affected to a considerable degree by relationships between the police and the Constabulary. For many months police have considered the Constabulary thoroughly infiltrated with communists. The Constabulary have shown sympathy with civilian resentment of extreme police brutality. In spite of mutual antagonism, the cooperation between the police and the Constabulary during the YOSU and subsequent uprisings was notable. This cooperation took the form not only of fighting side by side against a common enemy - the mutineers - but also the form of accord and understanding effected by police and Constabulary officials on the provincial levels. However, there is still a strong feeling among the police that police are the only security forces which can be counted upon to protect the Government. This attitude has been expressed also by YUN Tchi Yong, Minister of Internal Affairs, who, as late as 19 November 1948, stated that he was willing to cooperate with the new commanding general of the Constabulary but felt that it would be better to utilize police as the main defensive force of the Republic. This distrust of the Constabulary and the belief that the police are the only reliable force in South KOREA has led policemen, particularly in the southern provinces, to state that part of the U.S. equipment being issued to the Constabulary, vehicles and heavy weapons, should be supplied to the police. The police make a understandable complaint that their weapons - carbines and Japanese rifles - are not adequate for a force which is at any time subject to being committed against Constabulary mutineers who are armed with M-1 rifles. A commensurate lowering of morale is evident.

c. Police Plans for Future Revolts (Confidential)

The National Police in CHOLLA-NAMDO have formulated the following plans for operations in the event of future revolts by the constabulary in their district:

1. Police will be withdrawn from Ri and Myun boxes and assembled at Gun Police Stations which will be fortified.
2. Communication lines used by revolting units will be severed at terminal points.
3. Road blocks will be erected and demolitions will be used if necessary.
4. Railroad lines will be denied the revolters by destruction of switches, tracks or bridges when and if necessary.
5. A curfew will be imposed immediately in the area involved. Civilians will be required to remain indoors.
6. Police forces are not expected to actively engage the revolters, but only to prevent their advance until the arrival of Constabulary forces. (C-2)

COMMENT: This plan is significant in that it is the first evidence of efficient prior planning by the police.

d. Constabulary Casualties in CHOLLA-NAMDO - TAEGU Revolts
(Confidential)

The following are the casualties of the Constabulary for period 19 October to 08 November, according to incomplete reports:

Killed	52	
Wounded	127	
Missing	263	
Joined Mutineers	391	(FMAG Report)

B. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

1. National Assembly (Unclassified)

The Military Organization Law was passed by the National Assembly after the completion of its second reading on 15 November and referred it to a committee for polishing prior to its dispatch to the President for approval.

On 16 November the National Assembly rejected by a vote of 79 to 37, a proposal to discontinue discussion of the National Security bill. Many of the legislators who favored abandoning the bill were also among those that proposed that foreign troops be withdrawn (see W/S 162, page 16). The Assembly completed the first reading of the National Security bill on 18 November and began the second reading on the following day. On 17 November the National Assembly adopted a resolution to dispatch a request on behalf of the National Assembly, to the Chairman of the United Nations General Assembly that the UN approve the government of the Republic of Korea as the legal government of Korea.

2. New Constabulary Commander and Chief of Staff Appointed (Unclassified)

Colonel CHAI Pyung Duk, Acting Supreme Chief of Staff, announced that Colonel LEE Yung Chun, present Commander of the 1st Brigade, has been appointed Commanding General of the Constabulary and that Colonel CHUNG Il Kwan, presently Chief of Staff of the Constabulary, will be the Deputy Commander of the Constabulary and the Chief of Staff. The appointment of General SOHN Ho Sawn as the Military Attache to China was also announced. (B-1)

COMMENT: (Confidential) It is considered that the removal of SOHN Ho Sawn was a result of rumors that KIM Koo was attempting to enlist a personal following within the constabulary through General SOHN, his disciple. (see W/S #164, page 5) It is also reported that friction has existed between General SOHN and the premier, General LEE Bum Suk, since their days in China.

Colonel LEE, a former colonel in the Japanese Army, is rated by American advisors as one of the best brigade commanders in the Constabulary.

It is considered likely that General KIM Hwang Il will be given a position in the security forces at a future date.

3. Temporary Law on Local Administration Proclaimed (Unclassified)

The Temporary Law on Local Administration went into effect on 18 November, when it was signed by President RHEE. No date has been set for the election of MYUN and EUP officials as prescribed in the law (W/S 164, page 4).

4. New Vice Minister of Education (Unclassified)

SON Jin Tai was appointed Vice Minister of the Department of Education on 13 November, filling the position formerly occupied, unofficially, by MOON Chang Wook (W/S 161, page 5). Prior to his appointment, SON was a professor of history and culture at SEOUL University. He is not known to be a member of any political party.

b. Mutineers and Raiders Still Active in CHOLLA-NAMDO and CHOLLA-PUKTO (Confidential)

Isolated groups of Constabulary mutineers, reinforced by civilian raiders, have continued to attack police and Constabulary units in CHOLLA-NAMDO and CHOLLA-PUKTO. The following incidents occurred during the period 11-19 November 1948:

On 11 November a police box at KWANSAN-NI (1046-1371) was attacked and burned by a mob of an estimated 500 raiders, 300 of whom were dressed in Constabulary uniforms. (C-3)

On 12 November an estimated 100 raiders, including Constabulary mutineers, attacked a police box at KUN BAIK Myun (1008-1305). (C-3)

Fifty Constabulary mutineers attacked a police box in SADO-NI (1048-1359) on 12 November. After burning the police box this group continued toward KURYE (1046-1357) where they were met and repulsed by a force of police and Constabulary. (C-3)

On 13 November 70 policemen attacked a raider mountain hide-out in the vicinity of NAMCHANG-RI (982-1370). (B-3)

On 14 November 60 Constabularymen of the 12th Regiment, while attacking a mutineer force in the CHIRI SAN (1070-1370) area, were captured by the mutineers. (Constabulary report)

On 15 November 40 members of the 34d Constabulary Regiment were reportedly captured by mutineers in the vicinity of SANCHONG (1050-1370). Twenty of those captured were reported to have escaped and re-joined their unit. (Police report)

On 15 November two trucks loaded with Constabulary enroute from NAMWON (1040-1380) to KURYE (1046-1357) were attacked in the vicinity of BANKE HILL (1030-1370). One truck was burned and an unknown number of Constabularymen, including the Commanding Officer of the 12th Regiment, were killed. (B-3)

Five mutineers were killed, 1 wounded and six captured in the vicinity of SAKA RI (982-1385) by elements of the 14th Constabulary Regiment on 15 November. (Police report) This group of mutineers is believed to be part of Company "E", 4th Constabulary Regiment, who mutinied at NAJU (970-1330) on 02 November. (see W/S #164, page 8).

At 190530 November 48 Constabulary reported that KURYE (1070-1385) was surrounded by an organized group of rebels estimated at 300. One battalion of the 4th Regiment, KWANGJU, left immediately to relieve KURYE. Part of 2 battalions of the 12th Constabulary Regiment were in the city. The rebels are reported to have 2 mortars and a small amount of ammunition for same. It is not known whether or not the mortars are being used.

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The following is a recapitulation of the results of the above operations:

<u>CASUALTIES</u>		<u>EQUIPMENT</u>
<u>CONSTABULARY MUTINEERS</u>		<u>EQUIPMENT CONFISCATED</u> (by Loyal Forces)
Killed	7	40 Japanese rifles
Wounded	1	18 M-1 Rifles
Captured	22	Miscellaneous clothing and equipment
<u>CIVILIAN RIOTERS</u>		<u>EQUIPMENT LOST</u> (by Loyal forces)
Killed	4	2 Mortars
Wounded	0	27 rounds mortar ammunition
Captured	10	
<u>LOYAL FORCES</u>		
Killed	1	
Wounded	1	
Captured	80	

The Constabulary have made the following estimate of the mutineer and civilian raider strength in CHOLLA-NAMDO and CHOLLA-PUKTO.

PAEGUN-SAN Area (1060-1340)	250 Constabulary mutineers 50 Armed civilians
KOHUNG Area (1030-1285)	150 men (Breakdown into Civilians)
POLGYO-RI Area (1034-1313)	200 men (and mutineers not available)
POSUNG Area (1008-1305)	100 Constabulary 200 Armed Civilians

By 17 November three battalions of the 12th Constabulary Regiment, 200 men of the 3rd Constabulary Regiment and one battalion and a reinforced company of the 2nd Constabulary Regiment had been committed against mutineer and raider groups in the NAMWON (1040-1380) - KURYE (1048-1357) area. (PMAG report)

COMMENT: Because of the nature of the terrain, the dispersion of the mutineers and civilian rioters, and the possible assistance, either voluntarily or involuntarily, which can be rendered by the populace, the mop-up of these groups by Constabulary and Police will be difficult and attacks on police boxes and raids on villages can be expected to continue.

c. Guerrilla Activities on CHEJU DO (Confidential)

According to a PMAG report, dated 12 November 1948, constabulary units engaged raider groups at WOLLWANG BONG (982-1147) and at HALLIM (925-1140). These operations resulted in the death of 47 raiders. Another report disclosed that raiders attacked a constabulary command post; 4 raiders were killed.

COMMENT: Credit for successful sorties against the guerrillas may be given villagers who are now assisting the authorities by giving information concerning guerrilla locations and plans. Recent guerrilla attacks and burning of homes have aroused civilian antagonism toward the raiders in many locales.

d. Possible Dissension Within Constabulary (Confidential)

A recent report by an Intelligence Officer of the Constabulary indicates that there are disaffected elements within the 10th Constabulary Regiment, located at KANGHUNG (1780-1670). The factors contributing to this condition are competition between the Regimental and Assistant Regimental Commander for the allegiance of the officers, restriction of enlisted men, use of enlisted men for unpleasant personal tasks by officers and the existence of Communist elements among the non-commissioned officer personnel.

In addition to these internal elements Constabulary personnel come under the influence of communists in the area and tranders from North KOREA who attempt to further the communist cause. (C-3)

COMMENT: The mountain area northwest of KANGHUNG has long been known as a hideout of communist guerrilla groups and the 10th Regiment, which has been in this area for more than 3 months, would undoubtedly be infiltrated or influenced by these elements. Consequently should any of the disaffected elements within the 10th Regiment take any action they would probably be strongly supported by Communists in the area and possibly by forces from North of the parallel

Since the purge of Communists from the Constabulary began on 15 September at least 58 members of the 10th Regiment, including 10 officers, have been arrested.

e. Soviet Influence on the Recent Uprising in South KOREA (Secret)

The following information from G-2, FEC, concerning the Communist instigated uprising in South KOREA was allegedly sent from the Headquarters of the People's Republic of Korea to the Headquarters of the League of Koreans Residing in Japan (Zainichi Chosenjin Kemmei).

"The People's Republic of Korea in order to overthrow the South Korean Government has formulated plans to conduct three (3) separate uprisings in South KOREA in the near future.

The attacks led by the North Korean Communists will be well organized but will be localized, and once they have launched upon an attack, they will not receive any aid in the form of reinforcements or supplies from the North Korean Government.

The recent uprising in South KOREA was carried out strictly upon orders from MOSCOW and mainly as a test to determine exactly what action the South Korean Government would take in order to quell the uprising and to what extent the American Occupation Forces would take part under such circumstances. The South Korean Government and the American Occupation Forces will be closely observed and a detailed report as to their action will be reported to the North Korean Government.

Information received from MOSCOW indicates that the American Occupation Authorities will probably hesitate to take any action in any internal affair." (C-3)

f. Communist Activities (Confidential)(1) Guerrilla Activities

During the reporting period; numerous reports were received which revealed that guerrilla organizers were active in KYONGSANG PUKTO, KANGWON DO and KYONGSANG NAMDO. Guerrilla activities included recruitment of new members, training, collecting food supplies either through force or intimidation, sporadic attacks on individuals and demonstrations in the outlying districts.

(2) Government Amnesty Law (Confidential)

Since the implementation of the Government Amnesty Law (see W/S #159, page 6) on 27 September 1948, a total of 881 persons classified as political prisoners have been reported as released throughout South KOREA. Of this total of political prisoners released, 106 are considered prominent communists by the police. 91 of these were released at INCHON (960-1630), 7 at CHONJU (1010-1430), 1 at CHUNGHON (1060-1680), and 7 at KWANGJU (990-1350). It is the opinion of the police that most of the released political prisoners, especially the more prominent communists, are now more energetic in their party work than they were prior to their arrests and that their positions in the party have been enhanced by their prison terms. According to a report from PUSAN, (1200-1300) released prisoners are demanding governmental assistance on problems of living conditions and that, under the guise of supporting the Government, they are continuing their work to strengthen the communist cause. Former political prisoners have reportedly attempted to reorganize a South Korea Labor Party branch in IRI (990-1440) and have attempted to contact SOUTH KOREA LABOR PARTY members in CHUNGHON. There has been an increase in communist activities noted in INCHON since the Amnesty Law was implemented. Since 91 of the 101 political prisoners reported released from INCHON are considered prominent communists, the release of these prisoners has undoubtedly strengthened the communist position in that locality.

The general attitude of the public, except for communist followers, appears to be that although the Government's action in passing the Amnesty Law was commendable, more discretion should have been shown in the release of political prisoners. Only a minority of the people who have expressed any opinion believe that prisoners will become better citizens.

COMMENT: The communist strength can be considered to be increased by at least the number of prominent communists released, and although there has been no evidence of an increase in communist activities (except in INCHON). This is probably due to continued police surveillance of the released prisoners.

g. Police Arrests in South KOREA (Confidential)

During the period 31 October-13 November 1948, the police arrested approximately 5,300 persons throughout South KOREA. Included were leftists, moderates and dissident rightist elements. These arrests were made in effort to preclude the possibility of any communist riots and disturbances on the anniversary of the Russian Revolution, 07 November. Many of those arrested were released within a few days; however, no figures are available at the present time as to the number to be prosecuted. LYUH Woon Hong, moderate, who attended PYONGYANG Conference, says he had to sign a statement supporting the Republic before his release from jail.

h. Dates for Riots and Disturbances (Restricted)

The following reports concerning dates for communist riots and disturbances have been received during the period of this report; these are in addition to the recapitulation of current dates reported in W/S #165:

- (1) "The SOUTH KOREA LABOR PARTY was instructed to riot in INGHON (960-1630) prior to 25 November 48." (B-2)
- (2) "On 10 December the North Korea People's Army is to start a coordinated attack on South KOREA through the MUKHOJIN NI (1205-1645) coast guard base. Prior to the attack, leftist sailors will act as liaison agents between the North Korea People's Army and leftists in South KOREA and in the coast guard. Word will also be passed to South KOREA communists to start uprisings at the time of the initial attack on the MUKHOJIN NI coast guard base." (C-6)

NOTE: This is the second report concerning this date and location of possible attack.

- (3) "At some future date, rebellious elements in PUSAN will attempt to sabotage American fuel tanks on pier #3, PUSAN dock area. The explosions of the fuel tanks will be the signal for setting fires throughout PUSAN and for attacks on police stations and government installations." (C-3)
- (4) "Leftists in KYONGSANG PUKTO are planning to assassinate public officials and rightists and their families in conjunction with riots and disturbances at some future date." (C-3)
- (5) "The SOUTH KOREA LABOR PARTY issued secret instructions that all members on railroads were to go on strike on 19 November 1948." (C-3)
- (6) "The SOUTH KOREA LABOR PARTY, PUSAN branch, is planning to riot and cause disturbances by stealing arms and ammunition from the U.S. Army warehouse on pier #3, PUSAN." (F-3)

i. Restrictions Imposed on Inhabitants of CHEJU DO (Restricted)

On 09 November 1948, the CHEJU DO middle schools were closed by the provincial governor pending investigation of subversive activities by teachers and students. Loyalty checks on numerous teachers and students were subsequently initiated by the authorities. The middle schools will not be reopened until the investigations are completed.

On 20 October, all fishing boats were ordered into harbor to prevent traffic between CHEJU DO and YOSU during the mutiny. As of 12 November, the boats had not been released.

j Communist Violence (Restricted)

(NOTE: The following charts do not include any figures on the YOSU or TAEGU outbreaks)

(a) Weekly Violence Summary as reported up to 19 November

	SEOUL	GYONGGI-DO	KANGWON-DO	CHUNGCHONG	NAMDO	CHUNGCHONG	PUKTO	CHOLLA	NAMDO	CHOLLA	PUKTO	KYONGSANG	NAMDO	KYONGSANG	PUKTO	CHUNDO	HWANGHAE DO	TOTAL
Attacks on towns																		
Attacks on police			2															2
Attacks on constabulary																		1
Police killed			2															2
Rightists Killed																		
Constabulary Killed																		
Communist Killed			2													51		53
Demon, disorders, arson & attacks on rightists														1				1
Attacks on Govt. Bldgs																		
Sabotage: RR lines																		
Communications																		
Roads																		
Power																		
Strikes: Labor																		
Schools																		

(2) Delayed Reports which were not Covered in Last Week's Summary (W/S #165, page 12) (Restricted)

	SEOUL	GYONGGI-DO	KANGWON-DO	CHUNGCHONG	NAMDO	CHUNGCHONG	PUKTO	CHOLLA	NAMDO	CHOLLA	PUKTO	KYONGSANG	NAMDO	KYONGSANG	PUKTO	CHUNDO	HWANGHAE DO	TOTAL
Attacks on towns																		
Attacks on police																		
Killed: Police																		
Rightists																		
Constabulary																		
Communists																		
Demon, disorders, arson & attacks on rightists																2		2
Attacks on Govt. Bldgs																		
Sabotage: RR lines																		
Communications																		
Roads																		
Bridges																		
Power																		
Strikes: Labor																		
Schools																		

(3) 1948 Communist Activities in South KOREA (Restricted)

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV*	TOTAL	
Attacks on towns				5	73	9	1			4	4	96	
Attacks on police		130	118	50	86	12	11	11	4	9	11	443	
Attacks of constabulary										3	1	4	
Killed: Police		33	20	15	34	4	1	5	1	15	11	147	
Rightists	1	14	14	81	144	51	10	1	7	12	2	337	
Constabulary										1	1	2	
Communists	1	74	75	70	155	83	33	22	1	151	130	784	
Demon, disorders, arson & attacks on rightists		6	118	69	126	196	81	24	12	7	11	3	653
Attacks on Govt Bldgs			9	14	2	9	3						37
Sabotage:													
Communications	14	53	58	32	57	8	1			2		225	
Railroad lines	1	12	6		8		1			1		29	
Locomotives		50	23									74	
Roads		13	5	2	5			1		1		27	
Bridges		6	9	5	4							24	
Power					7	1						8	
Strikes: Labor		14	6	3	16	1						40	
Schools		7	5	4	9							25	

* Incomplete

k. Other Violence (Restricted)

(1) Rightist Terrorism

According to a delayed report, on 07 November 1948, members of the UNITED YOUNG MEN'S PARTY in PUSAN attacked the headquarters of the KOREAN VETERANS ASSOCIATION and seriously injured one KVA member.

On 09 November 1948, members of the CHEJU DO branch of the NORTHWEST YOUNG MEN'S ASSOCIATION beat to death the Chief of the General Affairs Section of that unit. NWYMA members stated that this official was a known communist and that they had only intended to interrogate him, not kill him.

(2) A summary of acts of violence on the part of persons of unknown political affiliations as reported up to 19 November 1948 is as follows:

	SEOUL	GYONGGI-DO	KANGWON-DO	CHUNGCHEONG	CHUNGCHEONG	CHOLLA	MANDO	CHOLLA	PUKTO	GYONGSANG	MANDO	GYONGSANG	PUKTO	CHEJU DO	HWANGHAN DO	TOTAL
Assassinations																1
Anti-grain collection																1
Political terrorism																1
Demonstration										1						1
Resistance to arrest																1
Unclassified																1
Attacks on police																1
Attacks on constabulary																1
Attacks on Govt Bldgs																1
Arson																1
Attack on individuals																1
Sabotage: Communications																1
Railroad lines																1
Power																1
Bridges																1
Strikes: Labor																1
Schools																1

(3) Delayed Reports which were not covered in last week's summary W/S #165, page 14) (Restricted)

Negative

	SEOUL	GYONGGI-DO	KANGWON-DO	CHUNGCHONG	NAMDO	CHUNGCHONG	PUKTO	CHOLLA	NAMDO	CHOLLA	PUKTO	GYONGSANG	NAMDO	GYONGSANG	PUKTO	CHJU DO	HWANGHAE DO	TOTAL
Assassinations																		
Anti-grain collection																		
Political terrorism																		
Demonstrations																		
Resistance to arrest																		
Arson																		
Unclassified																		
Attacks on police																		
Attacks on constabulary																		
Attacks on individuals																		
Attacks on Govt. bldgs																		
Sabotage: Communications																		
Railroad lines																		
Power																		
Bridges																		
Strikes: Labor																		
Schools																		

(4) Monthly summary of facts of violence on the part of persons of unknown political affiliations (Restricted)

	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV*	TOTAL
Assassinations	7		4	8	6	25
Anti-grain collection	9	1		1		11
Political terrorism	1	1				2
Demonstrations	15	9	3		1	28
Resistance to arrest	5	9				14
Arson	2	3				5
Unclassified	11	11		6		28
Attacks on police		1	2	2	2	7
Attacks on Constabulary				1		1
Attacks on individuals		4	3	6	3	16
Attacks on Govt bldgs				1		1
Sabotage: Communications	1	4	4	2		11
Railroad lines				2		2
Power						
Bridges						
Strikes: Labor						
Schools	1				1	2


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Civil Unrest Map (Restricted)

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WEEKLY CIVIL UNREST MAP



- | | | | |
|---|----------------------------------|---|--|
| ⊕ | Communist Attacks on Police | ⊖ | Attacks on Rightist Involving Unknowns |
| ○ | Communist Killed | ⊙ | Assassinations Involving Unknowns |
| ⊗ | Police Killed | | |
| ⊙ | Communist Attack on Constabulary | | |

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C. WAR POTENTIAL1. Economica. Economic Review (Confidential)

The following review of recent economic developments was prepared by the State Department Economic Mission:

General - Prices have remained generally steady in recent weeks, with no widespread evidence of panic buying or accelerated flight from won to goods. The continued decline of the blackmarket price of grain resulted in a drop of the overall wholesale price index from 186 (1947 = 100) in September to 177 in October and to below 175 in mid November. This counter seasonal trend (prices advanced sharply in the fourth quarter during the last three years) is explained in part by a bumper rice crop plus the lax enforcement of grain control provisions, with the resulting plentiful supply of grain on the more or less open market at present. The possibility of a breakdown in the government ration system in December may result from the delay in grain purchases and the exhaustion of government foodstocks which may sharply reverse this trend.

Food and Agriculture - Only two thousand metric tons of 1948 rice had been purchased by 10 November but the program is gaining momentum and forty five thousand tons additional rice has been purchased during the past ten days. The total purchases as of 20 November are 47,000 tons, which is 4.2% of the goal of 1,126,000 metric tons. The agriculture minister increased the cereals ration in SEOUL to three hop (360 grams or 1,575 calories) per person per day for the last half of November, against the advice of almost all his food specialists. The present government foodstocks of about 125,000 metric tons will be exhausted within 30 days at the present rate of consumption. Minister CHO Bong An, admits that increasing the ration is a risky gamble, but claims the increased ration will lower the open market grain prices still further and thus stimulate grain sales to the government. The ration in most of South KOREA even now is not averaging much over two hop (280 grams) per person per day because the local officials are loath to accelerate the depletion of the already dangerously low food stocks despite the agriculture minister's order to increase the ration. The open market price of polished rice in SEOUL is now about 14,000 won per suk as compared to the present government price to consumers of 3,000 won per suk and the new price which is effective 1 December of about 5,600 won per suk. Even if the rate of the government grain purchases increases sharply a default in the December ration in many areas is probable because of the physical difficulty of getting 1948 rice processed and transported to the 10,000 ration stores throughout South KOREA.

Electric Power and Industrial Production - The power output averaged 65,000 kilowatts for the first half of November, it is up from the October low of 50,000 kilowatts but is still below the November goal of 80,000 kilowatts. YONGWOL production averaged about 35,000 kilowatts. YONGWOL coal production is increasing with an output of 12,000 metric tons for September, 19,000 in October, and the possibility of 20,000 in November. Favorable progress is being made in the replacement of worn cables carrying coal from the mine at YONGWOL to the thermal plants. The coal output of all other mines in South KOREA is averaging 40,000 metric tons since July 1948, as compared to an average of 60,000 tons monthly for the first half of 1948. The reasons for the decline include power shortage, inefficiency of management and unproductive labor. The government is considering an incentive wage increase for miners and basic changes in management of the government owned mines in an effort to step up production nearer the goal of 90,000 tons monthly. Mineral production has largely recovered from the summer slump but does not exceed the relatively low level of production for the first half of 1948. The overall industrial production is at about two thirds the level it was prior to the cutoff of North KOREA power last May, with the output averaging not more than 25% of the overall capacity. -17-

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The relative high level of production of the numerous household and other small industries continues to be a major factor in meeting consumer needs. The continued progress of rehabilitation of the power system give hope for future increases in production of the larger plants.

Finance - Currency in circulation as of 16 November was at an all time high, 35.6 billion won; this is an increase of 3.3 billion since 27 October, which is due largely to bank loans for rice purchases. The government overdraft, after falling by 152 million in the period 01-20 October rose by 1.2 billion won from 20 October to 10 November, this is due principally to the heavy tobacco purchases by the Monopoly Bureau. Government revenues in October were at an alltime high at more than 3 billion won; receipts continued strong for the first 10 days in November, totaling more than 912 million. Won purchases from the army finance officers at 450 won per dollar totaled 48,551 dollars in the period 02 through 31 October. Private remittances at the same rate through the Korean foreign exchange bank bring the grand total of dollars available in October to the Korean economy through the legal exchange to 56,000 dollars. The blackmarket rate of dollars and gold is generally steady. Military payment certificates are selling at 550 won and greenbacks at 1,100 won per dollar. The gold price is 1,550 won per gram. The latest national budget data follows: Original SKIG fiscal year appropriations in won, 28.4 billion; civilian supply budget for government agencies, 6.3 billion; SKIG supplements, 6.7 billion; Government of the Republic of KOREA supplements to 10 November, 2.4 billion; grand total is 43.7 billion. The revenue estimate for the fiscal year remains at 25.6 billion, with revenue for the first seven months (April through October) at about 15 billion won. Requests for supplemental appropriations pending 12 November totaled 3.7 billion, which was all for flood damage relief. Revised budget estimates for the second half of the fiscal year submitted by 5 of the departments and offices vastly increased expenditures, for example: agriculture was raised from the half yearly total of 600 million to 4.9 billion, and communications was raised from the half yearly total of 600 million to 2.8 billion. While these estimates are not approved and probably are exaggerated, they indicate a disquieting trend. No information is yet available on the budget planning for the next fiscal year.

b. Rice Prices (Unclassified)

The price of rice in SEOUL 19 November 1948 averaged 790 won per small metric mal.

RICE PRICE SUMMARY MONTHLY AVERAGE
(Unit: 1 small metric mal (18.48 lbs))

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP*	OCT**	NOV***
SEOUL	817	821	778	721	814	985	1158	1200	1364	766	790
KANGWON DO	870	946	849	825	898	1012	1136	1133	770		
CHUNGCHONG NAMDO	793	728	674	634	726	946	1037	1083	1100		
CHUNGCHONG PUKTO	645	723	719	660	795	1037	990	1033	798		
KYONGSANG NAMDO	715	778	715	704	733	955	1070	950	1100		
KYONGSANG PUKTO	594	605	552	605	641	888	1081	1050	1062		
CHOLLA NAMDO	614	683	559	595	801	963	1109	1008	1040		
CHOLLA PUKTO	669	669	605	623	773	935	1036	1200	1045		
CHEJU DO	806	748	679	814	806	1081	1879	1033			
AVERAGE	713	744	681	725	777	978	1166	1087	1034		

SOURCE: National Price Administration (except October and November prices).

* Incomplete

** October price: Source: Open markets in SEOUL.

*** 19 November price: Source: Open markets (5) in SEOUL; price is for the small metric mal.

Currency Exchange Rate: U.S. dollar equals 1,100 won.
(Open Market) Military Payment Script equals 550 won.

c. Progress of the Grain Purchasing Program (Unclassified)

On 18 November 1948, the Civil Affairs Section, USAFIK, reported that a total of 253,626 suk of rice has been collected, which is still behind the November 1947 collection. The government, in an attempt to accelerate the program and to obtain the $7\frac{1}{2}$ million suk quota, has authorized the Minister of Agriculture to spend 40 million won in order to enlighten the farmers and to reveal to them the necessity for complete cooperation with the government's rice program.

COMMENT: No information has been received concerning the farmers' attitudes and reactions toward the government's incentive program of issuing consumer goods coupons plus payment for rice turned in. American advisors state that no prediction can be made concerning the rice collection until approximately 01 December because of the late start of the program and the fact that recent figures submitted are entirely from Korean sources.

2. Population (Restricted)

a. <u>Surrendered and disarmed:</u>	No change	179,920
b. <u>Progress of Repatriation</u>	<u>This Period</u>	<u>To Date</u>
Japanese civilians arriving from north of 38° N. Korea, China and Manchuria	0	288,535
Japanese evacuated to Japan	0	884,972
Total Koreans returning	2,360	2,184,061
Total repatriates moved since 15 August 1945		3,071,520
Koreans apprehended while attempting illegal entry into Japan	0	25,594

D. PSYCHOLOGICALI. Executive-Legislative Dissension

The dissension between the executive and legislative branches of the government (W/S 165, page 5) resulted in widespread discussion by Government officials, political observers, newspapers and the general population. While the National Assembly strongly advocates a "reorganization" of the government, the executive branch of the present administration continues to publicize its objection to this proposal, which it terms an effort to "overthrow the government," considered inopportune, in view of the status of the Korean question before the United Nations.

In discussing the issue editors of the PYUNG WHA ILBO (Beace Daily) and KOOK CHEI SIN MUN (International Times), generally staunch supporters of the present government, defended the position of the executive branch and accused the HANKOOK DEMOCRATIC PARTY of turning the National Assembly into an "implement of party strife." The HANKOOKS were charged with endeavoring to sabotage the existing cabinet in order to seize control of the reins of government. It was suggested by these writers that the legislators should first reflect upon themselves to determine whether or not the branch of government which they represent is constituted to best withstand untoward criticism before they propose action to reform the Cabinet.

Other newspapers defended the contentions of the National Assembly and declared that RHEE's announcements that the Assembly's action constitutes an act of disloyalty were contrary to the privileges granted by the constitution. It was asserted that the people, who are supposedly sovereign in the Republic of Korea, should take an interest in performance and requirements.

On 13 November SHIN Ik Hi, Chairman of the National Assembly, told Assemblyment that he expressed to the president the attitude of the legislators regarding the President's remarks concerning proposals for reorganization of the government. SHIN's report follows, in part:

"We told him, frankly, that we did not take this to mean that the Government should be overthrown, but rather that it should be revised in order that it could be strengthened. We pointed out that our real wishes had apparently been misunderstood, in view of the remarks the President had made in his radio address.

"The President told us that he would consider the question of the revision of the Government, but that when it should take place and what kind of revision it should be could not yet be determined.

"We then said that we hoped that both the Assembly and himself could forget our past misunderstandings. To this he agreed."

COMMENT: (Restricted) RHEE himself has indicated that he is cognizant of the need for changes in his administration which would result in a greater degree of support by the people. Reportedly, in conferences with leaders of the National Assembly, he discussed the possibility of bringing KIM Sung Son, Chairman of the HANKOOK DEMOCRATIC PARTY, and KIM Koo, outstanding figure in non-communist opposition to the present government, into the administration. It was agreed, the report stated, that these two political leaders could bring much needed support to the government if they set out to do so, but it was considered highly improbable that the two men, who are bitter enemies, would participate together in any activity, regardless of its importance to the welfare of Korea.

The plans of the HANKOOK DEMOCRATIC PARTY to obtain greater power in the Republic of Korea have been reported from numerous sources and are undoubtedly true. Recently it was reported that the HANKOOK DEMOCRATIC PARTY would not fully apply its pressure for reorganization of the present government until a later date, since, they reason, that in the event the Republic of Korea is reorganized now and is not recognized by the United Nations, the HANKOOK DEMOCRATIC PARTY will be blamed for the failure to gain recognition.

2. Chinŏsŏ Communist Gains: . .

The recent successes of the Chinese Communists evoked an abundance of comment in Seoul newspapers. Stressed were: (1) the need for increased U.S. aid to the Nationalists and (2) the adverse effect which the developments portend with relation to the security of Korea.

Korean Communists concurred in the assumption that the Republic of Korea has reason to fear the progress of the Communist Forces in China, as evidenced by reports that branches of the South Korea Labor Party felt that these triumphs would expedite the advent of communism in South Korea particularly in view of the discord resulting from the insurrection and the opportunities which will follow with withdrawal of American soldiers.

3. Rebellion (Yosu-area)

a. Survey of opinion in area: A recently completed survey of the YOSU-SUNCHON area resulted in the following report concerning the elements involved:

(1) Rightists - The majority of the right-wing was in opposition to rebel activities, although only the NORTHWEST YOUNG MEN'S ASSOCIATION is known to have offered the assistance of tangible manpower. On the other hand, no definite information was uncovered to show that rightists had joined the rebels. At present, rightist youths are showing strict adherence to the rules in effect for the duration of the emergency and the curfew, which is being enforced with extreme rigidity and is a high incentive for punctuality as a result of the ruthless manner with which tardy wayfarers are dealt.

(2) Police and Constabulary - To the satisfaction of a large portion of the population, the police were the chief target of the Constabulary mutineers. (Note: According to one mutineer, the leaders of the mutiny told the rest of the regiment that the police had revolted and the regiment had been ordered to suppress them.) In some instances police died in opposing Constabulary drives in which they were hopelessly out-numbered by the attackers; in other cases the police took flight at the first signs of danger.

(3) Leftists - Most left-wing groups in the combat area either openly joined the rebels or have been giving them assistance. Those who are known to have aided the rebels in the YOSU-SUNCHON area have either been executed by loyal troops and the police or have fled. Police have arrested known left-wing members on general principles. Many innocent people have been killed or jailed in the thorough measures now being employed by the army and the police. In so far as possible, the innocent are being sorted from the guilty and it is certain that all persons believed to have been leftists at any time prior to their apprehension will receive little mercy.

The people hesitate to discuss any topics in which political inclinations may be revealed, since there are so many persons either belonging to or spying for one of the two merciful extremes in the area. The abundance of propaganda and counter-propaganda in support of either the Republic of Korea or the Democratic People's Republic has thoroughly confused the non-combatant population.

b. Rebel Press: During the period which the rebels held YOSU they published the YOSU PEOPLE'S PRESS in which they publicized and attempted to justify the ends they were seeking to achieve. The contents of the paper were almost identical to the script of Radio PYONGYANG. RHEE Syng Man, KIM Sung Soo and LEE Bum Suk were accused of selling their country to the Americans and enslaving the Korean people by betraying the father-land to imperialists who support a perpetual division of the country in order to facilitate colonization. Rebel editors promised a fight to the end for the achievement of real independence. They set forth a two point program: 1) revenge for fallen brethren and 2) the withdrawal of American troops. They pledged support to the People's Army and to the Democratic People's Republic.

c. Defense Minister's Statement: On 15 November Minister of National Defense, LEE Bum Suk, publicly announced that reports by communist agencies to the effect that uprisings in South Korea are spreading are "contrary to facts," (W/S #164, page 17). LEE said that activities in CHOLLA-NAMDO have been "restored to a normal state and we are exerting all efforts to rehabilitate the area." He stated that the net had been thrown and that present operation involve only a search for "some of the little fish" who "always get away." LEE also said that reports of foreign news agencies that martial law has been proclaimed are untrue.

E. SABOTAGE AND ESPIONAGE

Negative