

# 1948. 11. 12. 주한미육군사령부 정보참모부 주간요약보고

XXIV CORPS G-2 W/S #165 PART I

## A. ARMED FORCES

### 1. Strength (Secret)

Police: No change

Constabulary: 46,251 (including 619 cadets and 18 recruits)

Coast Guard: 2,904 (including 267 cadets)

NOTE: The above figures do not reflect casualties and desertions during the recent revolts in CHOLLA-NAMDO and TAEJU or constabularymen recently arrested for communist activities.

### 2. Operational Activity (Confidential)

#### a. Border Incidents

On 05 November four North Korean Constabularymen led by an officer crossed the parallel in the vicinity of (391.C-1627.2) and wounded a member of the UNITED YOUNG MEN'S PARTY. (F-3)

On 08 November two North Korean Constabularymen came south of the parallel approximately 200 yards and shot at a South Korean woman. (B-2)

COMMENT: These are the first border incidents reported since 12 October.

	04-11 Jun	11-18 Jun	18-25 Jun	25 June	02 July	02-09 Jul	09-16 Jul	16-23 Jul	23-30 Jul	30 July	06 August	06-13 Aug	13-20 Aug	20-27 Aug	27 August	05 September	05-10 Sep	10-17 Sep	17-24 Sep	24 September	01 October	01-08 Oct	08-15 Oct	15-22 Oct	22-29 Oct	29 October	05 November	TOTAL
Border Incidents																												
Korean vs Korean	4	6	4	6		2	3			3	2	3	2	4	3	1	2				1				1	1	50	
Firing on US Personnel		1	2			1	2	1			1	1				1	1	2			3	1	2					23
Ambushes of US Personnel							1									1												1
Soviet Violations of Parallel*							1									1												2
Korean Violations of Parallel*		2	1				1				1							1	1	2								10
Soviets vs Koreans													1	1														3
TOTAL	7	9	6	7		4	6	2	3	4	4	3	5	5	5	2	5	7	5	3					1	1	83	

\* No firing involved.

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b. Effect on Constabulary of Recent Uprisings in SOUTH KOREA

Though as reported in W/S #163, page 6, the presence of communists in the constabulary has been known for many months and constabulary officials have been diligently searching them out, the YOSU uprising apparently caused an acceleration of the loyalty program. By 9 November, 1,571 constabulary officers and enlisted men had been arrested for suspected communist activities. (PMAG report)

Another pronounced and perhaps more important result of the mutiny and its successful suppression is that the overall morale of the Constabulary is reportedly high. Individuals and units that participated in subduing the uprising properly feel that they made a good showing in the operation, and U.S. advisors state that individual bravery was of a high caliber. In recognition of their outstanding action the Korean Government is decorating these heroes. LEE Bum Suk, the Minister of National Defense, has personally presented the awards in many instances.

Another important factor which developed during the YOSU uprising, and was more conspicuous during the TAEGU rioting, was the cooperation between the police and Constabulary. The TAEGU police promptly deployed to defend the city against the rioters. Later, in the city, when a group of policemen were fired upon by constabularymen, it is reported that they did not return the fire because they were not sure that the constabularymen were rioters. Near KUMHON, the next day, rioters were surrounded and subdued by a combined force of constabulary and police. In addition to cooperation between units of the two forces which were actually committed against the mutineers, leaders of both organizations in adjacent areas met and formulated plans by which each force could be used to the best advantage, and also maintained liaison between the two forces. This coordination and cooperation has continued during the mopping up actions in CHOLLA-NAMDO, CHOLLA-PUKTO and the TAEGU area and is evident between the police and Coast Guard in their combined operations against the mutineers on the islands near YOSU.

B. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE1. National Assembly

Considerable friction in the government arose from the differences of opinion regarding proposals made by the National Assembly to cope with the "emergency situation" in Korea. A 20-man Emergency Committee headed by Assemblyman LEE Chong Chun, who is also the leader of the UNITED YOUNG MEN'S PARTY, formulated eight recommendations which are aimed at strengthening the government. The last recommendation stated that the government should be held responsible for the recent rebellion and that the cabinet should be reorganized in order to renew the faith of the people in the government.

On 06 November, at the Assembly's invitation, President RHEE appeared to participate in the discussions of the emergency situation. He delivered an address in which he appealed for greater cooperation between the executive and legislative branches and asserted that a reorganization of the government should not be affected until Korea's case is decided by the United Nations.

Numerous Assemblymen made speeches in which they continued to express their difference of opinion with that held by the President. Pointed out in the arguments of National Assemblymen who supported the Emergency Committee's proposals were the unfavorable results of the government's suppression of the press (W/S #160, page 5 and W/S #164, page 18), the continued resentment of the farmers toward the grain purchase program, the decrease in the support of the government by youth organizations which aided it, installing the present regime and were heretofore staunch supporters of it, and other developments and blunders which have occurred and have resulted in widespread uncertainty among the people regarding the government's attitude toward the welfare of the nation.

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On 08 November the National Assembly adopted five of the eight proposals drawn up by the Emergency Committee:

- a. The government and all patriotic organizations should set up an agency for the collection and distribution of commodities to help the families of soldiers and policemen who were killed in the recent riots.
- b. The purchase of rice from the farmers should be devoid of the compulsory tactics used in previous collections.
- c. Stricter controls of traffic between North and South Korea should be instituted.
- d. There should be a joint conference of all political organizations to formulate plans aimed at uniting the people behind the government.
- e. The government should be responsible for the rebellion and the cabinet should be strengthened in order to renew the faith of the people in the government.

Two other proposals, pertaining to the dissolution of youth groups and the establishment of a militia, were returned to the Emergency Committee for rewriting. The Committee elaborated on the two proposals and re-submitted them to the floor, where the following five recommendations of Committee recommendations were passed by a vote of 86 to 7:

- a. Fifty thousand men from patriotic youth groups should be organized into a Youth League for Protecting the Nation.
- b. A Supreme Committee composed of seven representatives from the three branches of the government and another seven members representing youth groups should be established. One representative from each of the following youth groups should serve on the Supreme Committee:

- (1) Korean Young Men's Alliance
- (2) Great Korean Independence Youth Corps
- (3) Northwest Young Men's Association
- (4) National League of Korean Students
- (5) United Young Men's Party (Corps)
- (6) Korean National Youth Corps
- (7) National Youth Group

- c. After investigation by the Supreme Committee, those youth groups and persons having military training will be permitted to become a part of the militia.
- d. Following the adoption of decisions which will establish a militia, all youth groups will be unified into a Youth League for Protecting the Nation, which will pursue a compulsory military training program.
- e. Following the establishment of the Youth League for Protecting the Nation, all youth groups will be dissolved.

These proposals were forwarded to the executive branch which as yet has not given a formal reply. President RHEE did, however, issue statements to the press and on the radio in which he reiterated his opposition to any reorganization of the government at this time. He also maintained that the government should not have to bear the responsibility for a situation (the YOSU mutiny) which was entirely the result of communist activity (see page 18, this summary).

COMMENT: Fairly reliable sources have reported that the movement for the reorganization of the government is being fostered primarily by the HANKOOK DEMOCRATIC PARTY and is aimed at the removal of four or five members of the cabinet, including YUN Tchi Yong, LEE Bum Suk and Louise YIM.

2. New Vice Minister of Justice

PAIK Han Sung replaced KWON Sung Yul as Vice Minister of Justice on 28 October. KWON became Chief Procurator. PAIK is not known to be a member of any political party.

3. Civil Unrest

a. Isolated Mutineers in CHOLLA-NAMDO

- (1) Delayed reports indicate that at least part of the group of Constabularymen of Company "E", 4th Constabulary Regiment, who mutinied on 02 November in NAJU (972-1336) are still at large.

This group, reportedly armed with 45 M1 rifles, 4 carbines, 1 pistol and a box of ammunition, were surrounded in the vicinity of NAJU on 02 November, but escaped during the night and headed toward CHONGSONG (980-1370). An estimated 40 Constabularymen, believed to be the mutineers, were seen in the vicinity of IMU-NI (963-1345) at 030000 November. (Constabulary Report)

One Constabulary officer and 12 enlisted men, believed to be part of this group, were reportedly surrounded by 2 companies of the 4th Regiment on the night of 03-04 November and 04-05 November but escaped both times. (B-3)

At 090100 November an estimated 50 persons, including Constabulary mutineers and civilians, attacked a police box in KOCHANG Gun (974-1398). The attackers were repulsed after a 20 minute fire fight. (B-3) The KOCHANG police located the mutineers and, with the aid of Constabulary troops, attacked them at 091300 November. Three mutineers were killed, 3 were taken prisoner and police and constabulary reportedly had the remainder surrounded. Loyal forces confiscated 7 M1 rifles and 300 rounds of ammunition. One prisoner stated that the strength of the mutineers was 49. (B-3) This group was later identified as members of Company "E", 4th Constabulary Regiment, who mutinied at NAJU (PMAG report)

- (2) Police units, as well as Coast Guard (W/S #164, page 4), have been used in the round-up of mutineers who escaped south of YOSU (1070-1300) to TOLSAN-DO (1078-1289). On 05 November 95 mutineers were captured in the TOLSAN-DO area. (Police report)

b. Casualties in CHOLLA-NAMDO Uprising

No figures of casualties suffered in the YOSU uprising have yet been made available by either the police or the constabulary. A report submitted by a committee of the National Assembly is admittedly inaccurate.

c. Effect of YOSU-SUNCHON Uprising on Banking Conditions

- (1) The following are highlights of a report made by PARK Seung Joo, head of the Branch Department of the Bank of Chosun, upon his return from a trip to appraise the damage to banks in YOSU and SUNCHON.

## (a). YOSU

- (1). About 4/5 of the city was burned including the branches of the Industrial Bank, the Mutual Aid Bank and one Financial Association. Cash and records of all banks were saved.
- (2). The insurgents broke into the Bank of Chosun, forced their way into one vault from which 35.5 million won was taken. They did not find 370 million won in the main vault.
- (3). All banks and the Financial Association removed their assets and records to the Bank of Chosun, and on 1 November opened for limited business. Withdrawals from individual accounts are limited to 2000 won per week. Corporations and businesses could withdraw any amount for materials and wages with approval of the Constabulary Commander.

- (b). SUNCHON. The insurgents held the city one day (NOTE: They held the city from 20 to 22 October) and during that time raided all banks and took cash as follows:

Industrial Bank	6.	Million Won
Cho Keung Bank	1.9	Million Won
Mutual Aid Bank	1.	Million Won
Financial Associations	<u>1.15</u>	Million Won
	9.05	Million Won

SUNCHON banks reopened for business on 04 November without restrictions or limitations on withdrawals.

- (2) The Banking Advisor pointed out that the insurgents had taken over 44.5 million won, and this may tempt other gangs to try armed holdup. It was recommended that cash be divided and stored in different places during banking hours. It was again recommended that the banks review the security of all branches and, where deemed necessary, increase the guard and other security features, as well as keep exposed cash at a minimum.

d. Communist Activities

- (1). Several reports received during the period state that the SOUTH KOREAN LABOR PARTY is making collections of money and rice from its members according to their total capital. The quota scale was broken down as follows:

- First Class: consists of members worth 10,000,000 won. Required to donate 300,000 won and 1 bag of rice.
- Second Class: consists of members worth more than 500,000 won. Required to donate 50,000 won and 1 bag of rice.
- Third Class: consists of members worth more than 200,000 won. Required to donate 10,000 won and 5 mals of rice.
- Fourth Class: consists of members worth more 50,000 won. Required to donate 1,000 and 2 mals of rice. (C-3)

COMMENT: During each rice harvest season, it has been the practice of the SOUTH KOREA LABOR PARTY to initiate a food and monetary collection program to help further its cause. In outlying districts where no police protection is afforded, farmers are forced into making donations or are robbed of their grain.

- (2). The SOUTH KOREA LABOR PARTY's signature campaign for the "withdrawal of U.S troops" (see W/S #162) in HOENGSONG Gun, KANGWON DO, was thwarted by police action and the subsequent arrest of 29 members. Several arrestees admitted faking over ten thousand chop marks in an effort to meet their assigned quota. Other persons arrested were implicated for placing their chop marks on blank pieces of paper.
- (5). Officials of the EMERGENCY REVOLUTIONARY ARMY and the ANTI-IMPERIALISM PEOPLE'S ARMY, parties affiliated with the SOUTH KOREA LABOR PARTY, held a meeting recently to complete plans for a merger of the two factions. At this meeting it was decided that the "army" will not be committed in any riots or disturbances in South Korea as long as the American troops remained because the "army" would have to fight the Americans, which would result in international complications. Therefore, its present activities will be concerned with strengthening the organization and collecting information. (C-3)

e. Dates for Communist Riots and Disturbances

The following is a recapitulation of current reports concerning dates for possible future communist riots and disturbances. These have been received during the period, 10 September - 13 November 1948. Reports for dates prior to 13 November 1948 have been omitted.

NOVEMBER DATES

1. "In November there will be rioting all over South Korea." (C-3)
2. "Agitation movements against the South Korea people will begin before the end of November 1948." (C-3)
3. "Disturbances will be directed by the SOUTH KOREA LABOR PARTY sometime in November." (C-3)

2. "The 3rd Detachment of the DEMOCRATIC LIBERATION ALLIANCE ARMY in the YONGMUN SAN (1050-1640) area is awaiting instructions to instigate uprisings during the harvest season." (C-3)
3. "SOUTH KOREA LABOR PARTY members are attempting to infiltrate the KOREAN NATIONAL YOUTH CORPS and plan for attacks on police boxes in conjunction with partisan and vanguard bands." (E-2)
4. "The SOUTH KOREA LABOR PARTY has issued the following instructions to all provincial headquarters:

Period: 07 October to an indefinite date

- a. Instigate strikes in factories, public offices and public utilities.
  - b. Start sporadic attacks on small outlying police boxes.
  - c. Hold the armed troops in the PAL GANG (1160-1450) mountain range in KYONGSANG PUKTO in readiness. These troops will act as shock troops for the invasion by the North Korean forces." (B-3)
5. "The SOUTH KOREA LABOR PARTY will instigate strikes and riots in schools and working places in TAEJU (1150-1430) following the completion of the signature campaign demanding the withdrawal of the American troops." (B-3)
  6. "The SOUTH KOREA PEOPLE'S LIBERATION REVOLUTIONARY VANGUARD ACTION CORPS will commence rioting in KAESONG (950-1690), YANGNUNG (1180-1660), TONGDUCHON NI (1000-1690), and TAEJU (1160-1440), in the very near future." (C-3)
  7. "The SEOUL SOUTH KOREA LABOR PARTY has sent men and women to KAESONG (950-1690). These riots will be held in abeyance pending the results of the YOSU riots." (B-2)
  8. "In the very near future, approximately 50 leftist employees of the CHONGPYONG (1040-1660) electric power plant, in conjunction with leftist elements of the UNITED YOUNG MEN'S CORPS and the KOREAN NATIONAL YOUTH, plan to sabotage the power plant and the transportation system utilized to carry timbers from CHONGPYONG." (C-2)
  9. "Uprisings in YOSU and SONGJON will spread to KOCHANG (1090-1410) HAMYANG (1070-1390) and TAEJU (1150-1430) in the very near future." (B-2)
  10. "The SOUTH KOREA LABOR PARTY is planning a "people's revolution" in January or February 1949, which will attempt to overthrow the South Korean government. (B-4) Prior to the revolution, scattered disturbances will be carried out in South Korea in order to test the communist strength and to find the best starting point." (B-3)

11. "The time to revolt for unified independence is definitely 1948." (C-3)
12. Five (5) additional reports, evaluated C-3, have been received which disclosed that possible riots and disturbances will occur during or after the United Nations sessions regarding the Korean question. Riots will also be instigated in South Korea if the Russians boycott the United Nations or if the United Nations Assembly takes unfavorable action on the North Korea situation.

f. Communist Plot Uncovered on CHEJU DO

On 31 October 1948, the CHEJU DO branch of the NORTHWEST YOUNG MEN'S ASSOCIATION uncovered a communist-inspired plot to set up a "People's Republic" government on CHEJU DO. Included within the plot were plans to assassinate police staff officials and high ranking government officials, to turn prisoners loose and give them and members of the KOREAN DEMOCRATIC PATRIOTIC YOUNG MEN'S ASSOCIATION police arms and ammunition. Eleven members of the CHEJU DO police and various members of the SOUTH KOREA LABOR PARTY implicated in the plot were subsequently arrested by the police, thus eliminating any chance for a successful coup d'etat. (A-2)

g. Guerrilla Activities on CHEJU DO

During the period, reports were received that the guerrillas made 3 attacks on the police and 2 attacks on villages. These attacks resulted in the death of 2 police, 1 constabulary member and 50 guerrillas. During the attacks on the villages, the raiders resorted to arson and destroyed approximately 40 buildings and homes. (A-2)

On 11 November CHEJU DO police reported that guerrillas attacked the villages of SIAM NI (937-1147) and CHCCHON NI (960-1155) and burned approximately 110 homes. The attacks resulted in the death of 80 raiders and one policeman. (The figure of 80 raiders killed is not accented at present by this office.)



## (3) 1948 Communist Activities in South Korea (Restricted)

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV*	TOTAL
Attacks on towns				5	73	9	1			4	4	96
Attacks on police		130	118	50	86	17	11	11	4	9	9	440
Attacks of constabulary										3		3
Killed: Police		33	20	15	34	4	1	5	1	15	9	145
Rightists	1	14	14	81	144	51	10	1	7	12	2	337
Constabulary										1	1	2
Communists	1	74	75	70	155	83	33	22	1	151	67	741
Demon, disorders, arson & attacks on rightists		6	118	62	126	195	81	24	12	7	11	650
Attacks on Govt. Bldgs			9	14	2	9	3					37
Sabotage:												
Communication	14	53	58	32	57	8	1			2		325
Railroad lines	1	12	6		8		1			1		29
Locomotives		50	24									74
Rocks		13	5	2	5			1		1		37
Bridges		6	9	5	4							24
Power					7	1						8
Strikes: Labor		14	6	3	16	1						40
Schools		7	5	4	9							25

\* Incomplete

1. Other Violence (Restricted)

- (1) No rightist-inspired acts of violence were reported during the period.
- (2) A summary of acts of violence on the part of persons of unknown political affiliations as reported up to 12 November 1948 is as follows:

	SEOUL	GYONGGI-DO	KANGWON-DO	CHUNGCHONG	NAEDO	CHUNGCHONG	PUKTO	CHOLLA	NAEDO	CHOLLA	PUKTO	GYONGSANG	NAEDO	GYONGSANG	PUKTO	CHUNDO	HWANGHAE DO	TOTAL
Assassinations														2	2			4
Anti-grain collection																		
Political terrorism																		
Demonstration																		
Resistance to arrest																		
Unclassified																		
Attacks on police	1													1				2
Attacks on constabulary																		
Attacks on Govt. Bldgs																		
Arson																		
Attack on individuals	1													1				2
Sabotage: Communications																		
Railroad lines																		
Power																		
Bridges																		
Strikes: Labor																		
Schools																		

- (3) Delayed reports which were not covered in last week's summary (W/S #164, page 13) (Restricted)

	SEOUL	GYONGGI-DO	KANGWON-DO	CHUNGCHONG	NAEDO	CHUNGCHONG	PUKTO	CHOLLA	NAEDO	CHOLLA	PUKTO	GYONGSANG	NAEDO	GYONGSANG	PUKTO	CHUNDO	HWANGHAE DO	TOTAL
Assassinations												1						1
Anti-grain collection																		
Political terrorism																		
Demonstrations																		
Resistance to arrest																		
Arson																		
Unclassified																		
Attacks on police																		
Attacks on constabulary																		
Attacks on individuals																		
Attacks on Govt. bldgs																		
Sabotage: Communications																		
Railroad lines																		
Power																		
Bridges																		
Strikes: Labor																		
Schools												1						1

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## (4) Monthly summary of facts of violence on the part of persons of unknown political affiliations (Restricted)


	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV*	TOTAL
Assassinations	7		4	8	5	24
Anti-grain collection	9	1		1		11
Political terrorism	1	1				2
Demonstrations	15	9	3			27
Resistance to arrest	5	9				14
Arson	2	3				5
Unclassified	11	11		6		28
Attacks on police		1	2	2	2	7
Attacks on Constabulary				1		1
Attacks on individuals		4	3	6	2	15
Attacks on Govt. bldgs				1		1
Sabotage: Communications	1	4	4	2		11
Railroad lines				2		2
Power						
Bridges						
Strikes: Labor						
Schools	1				1	2

\* Incomplete

j. Civil Unrest Map (Restricted)

SEE NEXT PAGE

WEEKLY CIVIL UNREST MAP



- |  |                             |  |   |
|--|-----------------------------|--|---|
|  | Constabulary Killed         |  | Attacks on Individuals Involving Unknowns |
|  | Communist Attacks on Police |  | Attacks on Police Involving Unknowns      |
|  | Communist Killed            |  | Assassinations Involving Unknowns         |
|  | Police Killed               |  |   |
|  | Communist Attacks on Towns  |  |   |

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C. WAR POTENTIAL1. Economica. Cost-of-Living (Unclassified)RICE PRICE SUMMARY MONTHLY AVERAGE  
(Unit: 1 small metric mal (18.48 lbs))

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP*	OCT**
Seoul	817	821	778	721	814	985	1158	1200	1364	766
Kangwon Do	870	946	849	825	898	1012	1136	1133	770	
Chungchong Namdo	793	728	674	634	726	946	1037	1083	1100	
Chungchong Pukto	645	723	719	660	795	1037	990	1033	798	
Kyongsang Namdo	715	778	715	704	733	955	1070	950	1100	
Kyongsang Pukto	594	605	552	605	641	888	1081	1050	1062	
Cholla Namdo	614	633	559	595	801	963	1109	1008	1040	
Cholla Pukto	669	669	605	623	773	935	1036	1200	1045	
Cheju Do	806	748	679	614	806	1081	1879	1033		
AVERAGE	713	744	681	725	777	978	1166	1087	1034	

SOURCE: National Price Administration (except Sept &amp; Oct prices).

\* Incomplete

\*\* 13 November price: SOURCE: Open markets (5) in SEOUL; price is for the metric mal (18.48 lbs. or 10 liters).

Currency Exchange Rate: U.S. dollar equals 1, 100 won  
(Open Market) Military Payment Script equals 530 won.b. Progress of the Rice Collection Program

According to a report, dated 11 November 1948, from the Civil Affairs Section, USAFIK, the rice collection is slowly progressing. A total of 39,636 suk has been collected thus far. The quota for South Korea is approximately 7 $\frac{1}{2}$  million suk. In a recent press release the government stated that it is going to initiate a rationing system in mid-November when by it will issue a 3 hop ration per day.

COMMENT: American Advisors state that, because of the small store of rice on hand, the ration will consist of 1 hop of rice and 2 hop of other grains taken from the imported grain storage. At this time the rice collection program is far behind the November 1947 collection. However, government officials expect the collection figures to jump considerably during the latter part of November.

2. Population (Restricted)a. Surrendered and disarmed: No change 179,920b. Progress of Repatriation This Period To Date

Japanese civilians arriving from north of 38° N. Korea, China and Manchuria	0	288,535
Japanese evacuated to Japan	0	884,972
Total Koreans returning	1,151	2,181,703
Total repatriates moved since 15 August 1945		3,069,060
Koreans apprehended while attempting illegal entry into Japan	0	25,594

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D. PSYCHOLOGICAL1. Press Activities

Freedom of the Press: Objection to government control of the press continued to appear in SEOUL newspapers. Moderate MIN JU ILBO (Democratic News) deplored the application of provisions of a newspaper law formulated in 1906 by the Japanese. MIN JU ILBO maintained that this newspaper law was intended by the Japanese to exercise full control over the expression of ideas by Korean publications, and that implementation of similar measures by the present government would result in "gagging the people." The editor said that the mission of newspapers in democratic nations is to represent the people by expressing their sentiments. If the government heeds these sentiments and conducts itself accordingly it will eventually be strong and sound. Moderate CHOSUN ILBO (Korean Daily News) also objected to government use of the old Japanese newspaper law. CHOSUN ILBO said that the law was unconstitutional and exercises "illegal control over the sacred rights and freedom of the nation." The editor stated that what newspapermen "truly desire" was freedom from all "administrative curbs."

U.S. Presidential Election: Numerous SEOUL newspapers gave their opinion regarding the reasons for the election of President TRUMAN and the effect it would have on American policy. Several writers asserted that the election of Mr. TRUMAN revealed that the American people have permanently abandoned conservatism and have clearly illustrated the desire of the American people to keep peace in the world. Editors also stressed Dewey's action in conceding defeat, congratulating Mr. TRUMAN and offering full support to Mr. TRUMAN as the new President of the United States. The SEOUL editors implied that there was a marked contrast between the aftermaths of political campaigns in the United States and in Korea, in that in American politics campaigns are heated but there is general readiness to accept the results at the polls; in Korea, on the other hand, chicanery and slander as well as actions bordering on disloyalty to the government continue even after those persons who were successful in the elections have taken office.

2. The Government's Psychological Warfare

On 08 November the government began distributing 200,000 copies of a pamphlet which contained photographs and details of the recent rebellion. The pamphlet, while markedly more subdued in content than communist propaganda, emphatically blamed the bloodshed among the Korean people upon instigation by the Communists, who are seeking to destroy the Republic of Korea as part of their long-range plan to dominate the world. Leaflets prepared by the Department of Public Information and others by the Department of National Defense which warned the people against agitation by the communists and appealed to them to cooperate with the law enforcement agencies in their communities were air-dropped in CHOLLA NAMDO and SEOUL and were distributed in rural areas where possible.

COMMENT: The distribution of this literature by the government marks (1) the first major effort at counter propaganda by the Republic of Korea and (2) the government's efforts to familiarize the people with its stand regarding the rebellion and thereby gain sympathy for the opinion held by the executive branch with respect to the present situation rather than for the stand taken by the National Assembly, which maintains that the government should be held responsible for the recent uprising (see page 4, this summary).