

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 040800/I Nov 48  
To : 050800/I Nov 48

Headquarters, USAFIK  
Seoul, Korea  
1000/I 05 November 1948

*Confidential*

P/R #981

MAPS: KOREA, 1/250,000  
Eastern ASIA, 1/1,000,000

*Historical*

1. ARMED FORCES

Negative

2. POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

Police Auxillary Force To Be formed In INCHON

A meeting called by the chief of the Division "A" police in INCHON (960-1630) on 30 October was attended by representatives of 10 rightist youth groups and KWIK Sang Hoon, National Assemblyman from INCHON. The purpose of the meeting was to organize an auxillary police force in INCHON to assist the police in the event of any communist subversive action.

The chief of Division "A" police said that although no instructions had yet been received from the president to organize a "people's volunteer army" that he desired each rightist youth group to make available 20 to 30 members to assist the police in case of emergency.

KWIK Sang Hoon stated that it was the young men's responsibility to guard the state and that he desired all rightist young men to establish a "people's volunteer army" willingly.

The present plan is that each youth group will furnish a specified number of men, size of the group depending on the size of the disturbance, to patrol a certain area in INCHON. The men would be given police identification passes and weapons which they would draw from the police at the time they are called to duty. Members of this auxillary force would be authorized to arrest and interrogate any persons causing trouble. (CIC S/I 01 Nov. B-3)

The following youth groups participated in the meeting:

- United Young Men's Party (DAI DONG CHUNG NYUN D.L.N)
  - Northwest Young Men's Association (S.W BUK CHUNG NYUN H.W.EI)
  - Korean National Youth Corps (CHOSUN MIN JOK CHUNG NYUN D.L.N)
  - Three Equalities Principle Young Men's Corps (S.M KYUN CHUNG D.L.N)
  - Great Korean Independence Young Men's Corps (DAI H.L.N DOK LIP CHUNG NYUN D.L.N)
  - Great Korean Young Men's Party (DAI H.L.N CHUNG NYUN D.L.N)
  - Korean Veterans Association (YOOK HAE KONG KOOK CHUL SIN DONG CHI H.W.EI)
  - Patriotic Friends Young Men's Party (A.I CHI CHUNG NYUN D.L.N)
  - Marine Laborers Alliance (H.LI SANG NO DONG YUN M.L.I.NG)
  - Free Laborers Union (CHI YOO HO DONG CHU H.L.P)
- (CIC S/I 01 Nov. B-3)

3. CIVIL UNREST

a. Communist Constabularymen Arrested In INCHON

During the period 27 October to 03 November 40 members of the 11th Constabulary Regiment were arrested for communist activities.

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Among those arrested was Lt. HUN Dong Huk, finance officer of the 11th Regiment. Interrogation of the prisoners revealed no information concerning plans for future disturbances. (CIC Flash Report. C-3)

b. Disturbances Planned In South Korea

Each communist cell in SEUL is reportedly preparing for disturbances which will begin on about 5 November. The disturbances are reportedly to be initiated at INCHON and then move toward SEUL. (CIC Flash Report. C-2)

c. Communists Apprehended In KYONGSANG-NAMDO

On 25 October 6 prominent Communists were arrested in PUSAN. All six are reported to have been members of the group which attacked a police box in KUMHAE Gun (1188-1362) on 9 May. One rifle, improvised handgrenades, dynamite and ammunition were confiscated from the Communists. (CIC P/R #258. B-2)

On 31 October, in coordinated raids, KYONGSANG-NAMDO police arrested 219 persons suspected of being communist leaders. (CIC P/R #258. B-3)

d. Villages Attacked In KYONGSANG-NAMDO

On 31 October a mob attacked the village of SINGMIN-NI (1074-1395). During the fight with the local police 1 member of the mob was killed. The rest of the mob escaped. (CIC P/R #258. C-3)

On 29 October 15 men entered KOREM-NI (1316-1152) and threatened the village guards. The rioters said they "came from a North Korean submarine." The rioters beat the guards, stole one carbine and escaped. (CIC P/R #258. B-3)

e. Communist Killed In PUSAN

On 27 October 1 member of the SOUTH KOREAN LABOR PARTY shot a fellow party member when a secret meeting being held in PUN CHON NI (1402-1212) was raided by local police. The communist who was shot was apparently mistaken for one of the policemen. None of the communists were arrested. (CIC P/R #258. B-2)

f. Rebel Leader Killed on CHEJU-DO Identified

The guerrilla leader killed on CHEJU-DO on 29 October, reported in P/R #977, has been positively identified as LEE Duk Soo, second in command of the CHEJU-DO guerrilla forces. (CIC P/R #258. A-1)

g. Communist Killed on CHEJU-DO

On 03 November the bodies of 7 civilians were discovered in CHEJU City (952-1152). The victims are reported to have been known communists in CHEJU City. (CIC P/R #258. A-2)

4. PSYCHOLOGICAL

Translation of SEUL Newspapers. (See Incl. #1)

5. SABOTAGE AND ESPIONAGE

Negative

6. INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING ADJACENT AREAS

Negative

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The Commanding General issued the following statement on 02 November concerning the uprising in CHILLA-NMDO.

"In accordance with the policy of this command that its personnel be kept informed on matters pertaining to--and affecting--our mission in Korea, a factual summary of the situation surrounding the recent uprising in Y.SU follows:

"On Wednesday, 27 October, at 1330 hours, word was received at this headquarters that hostilities had ceased. This information came in the form of a message from Korean Constabulary authorities, relayed by radio from a Korean Coast Guard vessel in Y.SU harbor. The message read--"Y.SU is ours. Prisoners not counted. Contact with friendly troops good. . ." The fall of this southern city, from which the mutiny stemmed, marked the end of the week-old uprising. A few rebel bands escaped into the CHIRI Mountains, northeast of SUNCHUN and to several small islands off the Y.SU peninsula. As of this date Korean Constabulary units are mopping up these areas and effectively apprehending the disloyal elements.

"The outbreak was launched during the night of 19-20 October, when forty (40) members of a Korean Constabulary unit stationed in Y.SU mutinied under the leadership of one of their non-commissioned officers. These men were part of a force scheduled for duty on the island of CHEJU. They staged their revolt on the verge of their departure. The swiftness with which the uprising spread lends credence to the allegation that it was communist-inspired and carefully planned. A short time prior to this action, a major attached to the unit at Y.SU was arrested on charges of inspiring to overthrow the government in conjunction with Communist elements. Subsequent information has indicated that the uprising was engineered by a handful of professional Communist agitators such as have been active in various isolated areas in the Republic of Korea.

"As stated above, the insurrection spread swiftly. Several hundred civilians joined with the rebels in Y.SU, and attacked police and government installations in that city. Early in the morning of 20 October, nearly five hundred (500) rebels and their organized sympathizers commandeered a train and moved on SUNCHUN, about twenty miles to the northwest. In this small city similar tactics were employed. By this time, quick action on the part of government officials was causing Korean Constabulary units to converge on the trouble zone. By noon of the same day, rebel forces were being engaged by the vanguard of the approaching loyal elements. Fighting continued in SUNCHUN and Y.SU during that day. Reports from prisoners captured in the first stages of the uprising indicate that many participants, both military and civilian, were under the impression that they were following legitimate orders. The strength of the rebel groups was estimated at this time to be approximately 2400.

"While the situation remained fluid for the following three days, the Constabulary of the Republic of Korea took concerted and decisive action, and launched the effective offense which precipitated the defeat of the insurgents. During this period, actions of varying degrees of intensity also took place in P.SUNG, KWANGYONG, HLDONG, KURYE, KOKSUNG and intermediate points. Korean Coast Guard units were active in the waters surrounding the Y.SU peninsula.

"By the morning of 25 October the situation in the SUNCHUN sector had been reduced to local engagements with separated and disorganized bands of rebels attempting to escape to the CHIRI and PLEGUN mountains, or the islands to the south. Y.SU was still in the hands of the rebels, though loyal Constabulary and Coast Guard elements were closing in and consolidating plans for the recapture of that stricken city.

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"On the following day, mopping-up operations were intensified and numerous prisoners taken. The situation in Y.SU remained unchanged while units of the Korean Constabulary captured the high ground north of the city and generally improved their positions. It might be well to note here that during the foregoing operations, ground and air observers noted many flags of the North Korean puppet government being flaunted over public buildings in some of the towns mentioned previously. Broadcasts from PYONGYANG indicated possible prior knowledge of the abortive uprising.

"Morning of 27 October saw the surrender of the rebel forces in Y.SU, after a well-coordinated attack by land and seaborne forces. Order was restored quickly, and prisoners and captured equipment processed efficiently. Fires raged in portions of the city, but were brought under control the next day. Their spreading was prevented by hastily organized squads of fire-fighters.

"Thus the short-lived revolt was quelled. Many lives were lost needlessly and much suffering endured by the affected population--because a communist-inspired minority decided to take law into its own hands. This graphically illustrates to what extent these subversive elements will go in order to gain their insidious objective.

"The military and law-enforcing services of the Republic of Korea deserve great credit for the manner in which they performed their duty to their nation. They acted with speed and determination, handicapped by difficult communications and terrain--and limited equipment. They successfully confined the revolt to an area of approximately 40 to 50 miles. With little more than basic training, and untried in combat, all elements involved came through their first campaign with distinction. Their loyalty was irrevocably established.

"The Republic of Korea is a free and independent nation, with a government chosen by its people in a free election. That government stands today as a symbol of Democracy. As such it effectively and expeditiously stamped out an uprising aimed at its downfall. In so doing, it has gained the plaudits of other free nations.

"In the early stages of the disturbance, rumors were circulated and, unfortunately, appeared in the press, that Seoul was in a state of panic and further, that an officer of the United States Army had been killed. Both reports were false, as is usually the case with rumors.

"In conclusion, it is my pleasure to commend the United States Army personnel in Korea. Their calm and seasoned behavior was indicative of the results of sound training and in the best interests of the service. I am sure that all of us, Americans and Koreans alike, have learned a lesson."

*W. H. ...*  
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- 1 Incl.  
 Translation of SEUL Newspapers

Under the provisions of par 33a (1), AR 380-5, 15 August 1946, authority is hereby granted for destruction of this document after it has served its purpose, and is of no further value to the receiving agency. This authority is extended to cover destruction of previous issues of this publication in accordance with the foregoing instructions.

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The following key to evaluation is UNCLASSIFIED and may be detached by the receiving offices:

<u>SOURCE</u>	<u>INF. RELATION</u>
A - Completely reliable	1 - Confirmed by other sources
B - Usually reliable	2 - Probably true
C - Fairly reliable	3 - Possibly true
D - Not usually reliable	4 - Doubtfully true
E - Unreliable	5 - Improbable report
F - Reliability cannot be judged	6 - Truth cannot be judged

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