

PART I

SOUTH KOREA

From: 221200/I Oct 48  
 To: 281200/I Oct 48

SECRET

Headquarters, USAFIK  
 Seoul, Korea  
 29 October 1948

No. 163

MAPS: KOREA 1/250,000  
 East ASIA, 1/1,000,000

A. ARMED FORCES

1. Strength (Secret)

Police: No Change,

Constabulary: 47,374 (including 894 cadets and 21 recruits)

Coast Guard: 2,906 (including 257 cadets)

NOTE: The above figures do not include casualties and desertions during the 19-27 October revolt.

2. Operational Activity (Confidential)

a. Border Incidents - Negative

COMMENT: The lack of border incidents since 12 October may be explained by one or more of the following reasons, listed in order of their probability.

1. Fear by the North-Koreans that any action against South KOREA would damage the case of the People's Republic before the UN General Assembly.

2. An attempt to keep South Koreans and Americans off guard so that the element of surprise will be achieved at such time as the alleged "smashing" of South KOREA takes place.

3. The removal of Soviet troops who may have encouraged attacks by North Koreans from positions along the parallel.

4. The lack of any parallel violations by South Koreans.

b. Constabulary Operation (Restricted) - See B, 6a (Civil Unrest)

	04-11 Jun	11-18 Jun	18-25 Jun	25 June	02 July	02-09 Jul	09-16 Jul	16-23 Jul	23-30 Jul	30 July	06 August	06-13 Aug	13-20 Aug	20-27 Aug	27 August	03 Sept.	03-10 Sep	10-17 Sep	17-24 Sep	24 Sept	01 Oct	01-08 Oct	08-15 Oct	15-22 Oct	22-29 Oct	TOTAL
Border Incidents																										
Korean vs Korean	4	6	4	6			2	3		3	2	3	2	4	3	1	2					2	1			48
Firing on US Personnel	1	2					1	2	1		1	1					1	1	2		6	1	2			22
Ambushes of US Personnel								1																		1
Soviet Violations of Parallel*							1										1									2
Korean Violation of Parallel*	2	1		1				1		1								1	1		1	1	2			10
Soviets vs Koreans												1	1													3
TOTAL	7	8	6	7			4	6	2	3	4	4	3	5	5	2	5				7	5	3			86

\* No firing involved.

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B. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE1. National Assembly (Unclassified)

The National Assembly reconvened 27 October and heard the reports of the Vice Ministers of Internal Affairs and National Defense concerning the rebellion in CHOLLA NAMDO (see Civil Unrest below). These reports were not acceptable to the Assembly and the Ministers were asked to appear 28 October and give a more detailed account. After making their report in closed session the Ministers asked that the National Security Law be speedily passed.

2. Korean Ambassador to China Named (Unclassified)

CHONG Han Bom was named Ambassador to China by President RHEE Syng Man on the 25 October.

During the American occupation of Korea CHONG served as president of the New Korea Company, the former Japanese-controlled holding company. He headed the Korean Athletic Association and accompanied the Korean participants in the latest Olympic Games. He is forty-six years old, was in LONDON for about fifteen years, and joined the Korean government-in-exile in CHUNGKING, China in 1943. He is not known to be a member of any political party.

3. Civil Unresta. Constabulary Mutiny (Restricted)

Rioting began in southern CHOLLA NAMDO about 200200 October when approximately 40 enlisted men of a battalion of the 14th Regiment of the Constabulary mutinied under the leadership of a non-commissioned officer at YOSU (1070-1300), prior to or while being loaded to move to CHEJU-DO. The rebels, whose strength had increased to between 400 and 500, commandeered a train at YOSU and arrived in SUNCHON (1040-1320) at 200930 October and attacked and occupied the town. (A-1) Rebel elements advanced toward the town of NAMWON (1030-1380) during the afternoon of 20 October but were met by Constabulary units south of NAMWON and withdrew back to SUNCHON in the early morning of 21 October. (C-3)


During the evening of 22 October SUNCHON was retaken by Constabulary forces. A battalion of the 15th Regiment from HADONG (1075-1345) attacked rebel forces in KWANGYANG (1058-1329) on 22 October. This force was repulsed and withdrew back to HADONG. (C-3)

Constabulary units from SUNCHON moved southward toward YOSU on 23 October. The rebels from the SUNCHON area withdrew to the southwest and occupied POLGYO RI (1030-1310) and POSONG (1010-1305). (A-2)

A battalion of the 5th Regiment embarked by LST at PUSAN at 222350 October and attempted a landing at YOSU at 230940 October. After meeting stiff resistance, including machine gun fire from the rebels, the invading force withdrew to the LST. At 231500 October the invading force was again afloat in YOSU Bay. (A-2)

By 251600 October Constabulary units which had arrived from the north occupied the high ground north of YOSU. The estimated strength of the rebels in YOSU at this time was between 500 and 1000, including civilian sympathizers. (C-3) On 26 October loyal forces entered the town at two points and were met by well organized resistance. (B-2)

At 271300 October YOSU was retaken by Constabulary units attacking from the north and elements of the 5th Constabulary battalion who again landed in YOSU. Three large groups, estimated between 1500 and 2000 were seen by air observers under Constabulary guard in YOSU at 271400. (A-2)



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Meanwhile, Constabulary units had advanced toward KWANGYANG from HADONG and SUNCHON on 24 October, forcing the rebels to withdraw to the PAEGUN-SAN (1060-1340) mountain area. (B-3) On the same date a battalion from the 4th Constabulary Regiment moving down from the north occupied POSONG (1000-1300) and by 242000 a battalion of the 6th Regiment, moving down from the northeast, occupied POLGYO RI (1030-1310). The Constabulary confiscated 57 M-1 rifles, 6 BAR's, 6 carbines, 1 LMG, 38 Japanese rifles and 1 shotgun in the operation against POSONG. (B-2)

On 25 October Constabulary units from the KWANGYANG area, HADONG and KURYE (935-1350) began an attack toward the PAEGUN-SAN area. (C-3) During the afternoon of 26 October rebel forces began to withdraw from the PAEGUN-SAN area northwest toward KURYE and northeast toward the CHIRI SAN (1070-1370) area.

On 26 October rebel forces attacked KURYE and occupied a police box on the outskirts of town at 260800. (Police Report) At 261730 October an air observer saw a large North Korean flag flying over a building in KURYE. (A-2) The rebels withdrew east and northeast from KURYE. Constabulary units occupied the town during the night of 26 October. (C-3)

An estimated 300 rebels were located in the PAEGUN-SAN area, CHIRI-SAN area and the area east of KURYE on 27 October. Constabulary units are still engaged in mopping up operations in these areas. (C-3)

On 28 October Constabulary forces operating northeast of KURYE captured 30 mutineers and confiscated 5 LMG's, 30 cases of .30 caliber ammunition and 1 radio. (C-3)

Estimates of the number of people killed by the mutineers in SUNCHONG, including police and civilians, averaged about 500.

On 25 October 400 prisoners from the SUNCHON and YOSU area arrived at the TAEJON (1040-1490) prison.

COMMENT: For many months the Constabulary has been accused, principally by the police, of harboring communists in its ranks. Although most of the accusations may have been made in good faith, it is believed that some were based on jealousy. Constabulary officials have diligently attempted to identify and dismiss communists found in the Constabulary. The success of their efforts is indicated by the fact that although elements of at least six Constabulary regiments came in contact with the mutineers, the only reported case of Constabulary deserting to the mutineers was that of the one company that was in SUNCHON when the mutineers arrived in greatly superior force. It is considered that the outbreak and suppression of the mutiny clearly indicate that although there are communists in the Constabulary they have not gained a sufficient following to constitute a menace to the Republic of Korea or to cause the Constabulary to be regarded with great suspicion.

b. Communist Activity (Confidential)

(1) During the period many reports were received which confirmed the information that the SOUTH KOREA LABOR PARTY is gathering signatures on petitions calling for the "withdrawal of the U.S. Army." (See W/S #162). Several sources report that every member of the SOUTH KOREA LABOR PARTY and its affiliates is responsible for obtaining 200 signatures which are to be turned over to their respective headquarters on 15, 21 and 31 October 1948. Several reports were also received which indicate that instructions have been given to the members of the SOUTH KOREA LABOR PARTY to gather goods and cash for Soviet farewell gifts. One handkerchief or a cash donation is the minimum requirement. PYONGYANG radio has made much of gifts presented to the Soviets by North Koreans.

(2) The following reports concerning dates for communist riots and disturbances have been received during the period of this report; those are in addition to those reported previously (W/S #157, #158, #160, #161 and #162):

- (a) "...if the rioting in December is successful, the Peoples Army of North Korea will occupy South Korea by February." (B-6)
- (b) "About 30 October, the SOUTH KOREA LABOR PARTY plans to call strikes in all railroad stations. At the same time, riots will be instigated in TAEGU (1160-1440), KAESONG (950-1690) and KANGNUNG (1180-1660)." (B-3)
- (c) "The Korean Democratic Patriotic Young Men's Association and the Democratic Student's League will instigate demonstrations and spread leftist propaganda until 07 November. All leftist activity will be confined to small raids, terrorism and propaganda until sometime after that date. When the time arrives, guerrilla bands, about 20-40 men in each, will attack small villages, kidnap pro-Japanese and pro-Americans and try them in "People's Courts." (C-3)
- (d) "A large scale riot will occur on the anniversary of Korea about 05 November. All leftists released by the amnesty Law will attack police boxes, assassinate policemen and rightist leaders." (C-3)
- (e) "The students group of the INCHONG branch of the SOUTH KOREA LABOR PARTY will attack members of the NATIONAL YOUTH CORPS, the NORTHWEST YOUNG MEN'S ASSOCIATION and the UNITED YOUNG MEN'S PARTY in the near future, and communist demonstrations are planned for 31 October in INCHON." (C-3)
- (f) "The NORTH KOREA PEOPLES REPUBLIC sent instructions to the SOUTH KOREA LABOR PARTY ordering strikes in all schools. The SKLP is to make unreasonable demands upon school authorities, thereby causing continual strife and unrest which will agitate the people into a state of anxiety and violence." In order to help the SKLP accomplish their mission, the NORTH KOREA PEOPLES REPUBLIC promised to send guerrilla bands. (B-2)
- (g) "At KYONGJU (120-1440), attack squads are in contact with 700 members of the Korean constabulary and planning riots for late October or early November in accordance with the SOUTH KOREA LABOR PARTY's plan for increased activity leading to the outbreak of guerrilla warfare. Opening attacks by guerrilla forces in KYONGSANG PUKTO will take place in KYONGJU GUN (1220-1440), YONGCHON GUN (1190-1450) and KUNWI GUN (1160-1480)." (B-2)
- (h) "Leftists from KYONGSANG NAMDO, KYONGSANG PUKTO, CHUNGCHONG PUKTO and CHUNGCHONG NAMDO intend to hold a meeting on 31 October or 01 November to formulate plans to destroy a railroad bridge at WONDONG (1191-1378). This will cut off railroad transportation between PUSAN (1200-1340) and TAEJON (1040-1490)." (F-6)

- (i) "The INCHON (960-1630) branch of the SOUTH KOREA LABOR PARTY plans to hold demonstrations between 25 October and 18 November. Groups will shout slogans, sing songs and distribute handbills. No violence is expected because demonstrations are for the benefit of INCHON citizen." (C-3)
- (j) "On or about 07 November, leftists will attack and terrorize by bombing and burning homes of members of rightist organizations in PUSAN (1200-1340). Other subversive groups will help in this terrorism against the rightists." (C-6)
- (k) "The SOUTH KOREA LABOR PARTY decided to attempt a general strike throughout South Korea during the early part of November." (B-3)

COMMENT: The most probable date for widespread rioting is considered 07 November, the anniversary of the Red Revolution.

c. Guerrilla Activity On CHEJU DO (Unclassified)

Guerrilla activities on CHEJU DO continued during the period. Guerrillas attacked the constabulary and police in two instances, fired into 2 towns, blocked roads, cut communications between several towns and ambushed 2 vehicles carrying constabulary members or civilians. Those acts resulted in the death of 2 civilians and injury to 4 constabulary and 2 civilians. Raider casualties are unknown. Air reconnaissance during the period disclosed that many scattered mass meetings were held in villages and that North Korean flags were being displayed. The constabulary continued its operations in an attempt to disrupt guerrilla activities; approximately 50 agitators and demonstrators were apprehended in the South gun by the constabulary. On 28 October, 25 to 30 armed raiders attacked the SAMWANG (North side of CHEJU CITY (950-1150) Police box. Gasoline and Japanese grenades were used during the attack by raiders. 3 police and 3 raiders were reported killed and 5 police wounded.

d. Communist Violence (Restricted)

(NOTE: The following charts do not include any figures on the YOSU rebellion).

(1) Weekly Violence Summary as reported up to 29 October:

	SEOUL	KYONGGI-DO	KANGWON-DO	CHUNGCHONG	NAMDO	CHUNGCHONG	PUKTO	CHOLLA	NAMDO	CHOLLA	PUKTO	KYONGSANG	NAMDO	KYONGSANG	PUKTO	CHEJU DO	HWANGHAE DO	TOTAL
Attacks on towns																2		2
Attacks on police																2		2
Attacks on Constabulary																3		3
Police killed																3		3
Rightists killed																2		2
Constabulary killed																		
Communist killed																3		3
Demon, disorders, arson & attacks on rightists		2														1		3
Attacks on Govt. Bldgs																		
Sabotage: RR Lines											1							1
Communications																2		2
Roads																1		1
Power																		
Strikes: Labor																		
Schools																		

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(2) Delayed Reports which were not Covered in Last Week's Summary (W/S #162, page 2): (Restricted)

	SEOUL	GYONGGI-DO	KANGWON-DO	CHUNGCHONG	NAIDQ	CHUNGCHONG	PUKTO	CHOLLA	NAIDO	CHOLLA	PUKTO	GYONGSANG	NAIDO	GYONGSANG	PUKTO	CH'JU DO	HWANGHE DO	TOTAL
Attacks on towns																		
Attacks on police																		
Killed: Police																		
Rightists																		
Constabulary																		
Communists														1				1
Demon., disorders, arson & attacks on rightists														1				1
Attacks on Govt Bldgs																		
Sabotage: RR Lines																		
Communications																		
Roads																		
Bridges																		
Power																		
Strikes: Labor																		
Schools																		

(3) 1948 Communist Activities in South Korea (Restricted)

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT*	TOTAL
Attacks on towns				5	73	9	1			4	92
Attacks on police	130	118	50	86	12	11	11	4	5	427	
Attacks on Constabulary										3	3
Killed: Police	33	20	15	31	4	1	5	1	11	132	
Rightists	1	14	14	81	144	51	10	1	7	8	331
Constabulary										1	1
Communists	1	74	75	70	155	83	33	22	1	9	523
Demon., disorders, arson & attacks on rightists	6	118	69	126	196	81	24	12	7	9	648
Attacks on Govt Bldgs	9	14	2	9	3						37
Sabotage:											
Communications	14	53	58	32	57	8	1			2	225
Railroad lines	1	12	6		8		1			1	29
Locomotives		50	24								74
Roads		13	5	2	5			1		1	27
Bridges		6	9	5	4						24
Power					7	1					8
Strikes: Labor	14	6	3	16	1						40
School	7	5	4	9							25

\* Incomplete

e. Other Violence (Restricted)

- (1) No rightist-inspired acts of violence were reported during the period.
- (2) A summary of acts of violence on the part of persons of unknown political affiliations as reported up to 29 October 1948 is as follows:

	SEOUL	KYONGGI-DO	KANGWON-DO	CHUNGCHONG NAMDO	CHUNGCHONG PUKTO	CHOLLA NAMDO	CHOLLA PUKTO	KYONGSANG NAMDO	KYONGSANG PUKTO	CHEJU DO	HWANGHAE DO	TOTAL
Assassinations												
Anti-grain collection												
Political terrorism												
Demonstration												
Resistance to Arrest												
Unclassified												
Attacks on police												
Attacks on Constabulary												
Arson												
Attack on individuals												
Sabotage: Communication												
Railroad lines												
Power												
Bridges												
Strikes: Labor												
Schools												

- (3) Delayed Reports which were not covered in last week's summary (W/S #162, page 11): (Restricted)

	SEOUL	KYONGGI-DO	KANGWON-DO	CHUNGCHONG NAMDO	CHUNGCHONG PUKTO	CHOLLA NAMDO	CHOLLA PUKTO	KYONGSANG NAMDO	KYONGSANG PUKTO	CHEJU DO	HWANGHAE DO	TOTAL
Assassinations												
Anti-grain collection												
Political terrorism												
Demonstrations												
Resistance to Arrest												
Arson												
Unclassified												
Attacks on police												
Attacks on Constabulary												
Attacks on individuals												
Sabotage: Communication												
Railroad lines												
Power												
Bridges												
Strikes: Labor												
Schools												

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(4) Monthly summary of facts of violence on the part of persons of unknown political affiliations (Restricted)


	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT*	TOTAL
Assassinations	7		4	8	19
Anti-grain collection	9	1		1	11
Political terrorism	1	1			2
Demonstrations	15	9	8		27
Resistance to Arrest	5	9			14
Arson	2	3			5
Unclassified	11	11		4	26
Attacks on police		1	2	1	4
Attacks on Constabulary				1	1
Attacks of Individuals		4	3	4	11
Sabotage: Communications	1	4	4	2	11
Railroad lines				2	2
Power					
Bridges					
Strikes: Labor					
Schools	1				1

\* Incomplete

f. Civil Unrest Map (Restricted)

SEE NEXT PAGE

CIVIL UNREST MAP



- |                                  |                           |
|----------------------------------|---------------------------|
| Assassination Involving Unknowns | Attacks on Rightists      |
| Rightists killed                 | Sabotage (Communications) |
| Attacks on Towns                 | Attacks on Constabulary   |
| Attacks on Police                | Sabotage (Railroad line)  |
| Demonstrations                   | Police Killed             |

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D. MOBILIZATION POTENTIAL1. Economic Review (Confidential)

a. The following report of recent economic developments was prepared by the State Department Economic Minister:

General: South Korea, outside the area of insurrections in South CHOLLA province, remains generally quiet, and no major economic repercussions stemming from that rebellion have been noted as yet. Overall prices have remained generally steady during the past ten days, with overall prices in October at least 5% below September 1948. A drop of 25% in the blackmarket price of cereals during the past month has checked at least temporarily the upward trend of other prices. A major exception is the price of fuel wood, which is undergoing a normal seasonal rise. The present blackmarket price of rice in SEOUL is about 16,000 won per suk (50 won per pound). Only about 50 out of 400 million won in the banks in YOSU and SUNGCHON were reported seized by the communists. The hydroelectric plant near POSONG, with a rated capacity of 3,000 kilowatts, apparently was not seriously damaged following the insurgent occupation of the area for several days. The trouble spots are predominantly agricultural and fishing areas, and no major destruction of industrial installations were reported. The rebellion and subsequent unrest may adversely affect the grain purchase program, which is just getting under way.

Finance: The currency circulation, 32,263 million won on 27 October, is up over one billion since 02 October, due principally to heavy purchases of tobacco leaf and withdrawals from the central bank by commercial banks which are building cash reserves against an anticipated outlay for rice purchase. Government revenues for the first 20 days of October was 1.7 billion, or approximately the same as for the similar period in September. The net government overdraft during the same period fell by 152 million as compared with a net increase in the deficit of 3.7 billion won in September. The indication is that heavier than necessary initial advances are being drawn by the new government. Total government revenues from 16 August to 20 October was 5.8 billion won and the net increase in the overdraft during the same period was 3.6 billion won. The total increase in the overdraft since the beginning of the fiscal year on 01 April is 5.4 billion won. While the new government's spending rate appears to be slackening from the September figure, indications are that its expenditures will outstrip that of the South Korean Interim Government for a comparable period. However, government approval of bank loans thus far is moderate and single the turn-over of the Finance Department, totals only 511 million won, half of which is for the purchase of export marine products.

Agriculture and Food: The national crop reporting board's check on actual harvests throughout south Korea indicates that the 1948 yields are unusually good. However, crop damage from typhoons and floods in the southern provinces was found to be greater than anticipated in the pre-harvest estimate. The crop board's 1948 rice harvest estimate, scheduled for release in early November, appears likely to be from 5% to 10% below the preliminary production estimate of 17,020,250 suk. Rice purchases for 1948 are now under way, but the program has not yet gained any real momentum. The government is now concentrating mainly upon the collection of rental rice from tenants on Korean-owned farms and price due as payment on vested farms. The maximum total receipts from those two sources is estimated to be about 2.5 million suk. Government stocks of cereals total about 185,000 metric tons as of 01 November. It is planned to hold the daily staple ration at two hop per person during November and December, making a monthly consumption, including supplementary and special rations, of about 95,000 metric tons. If the government can attain its rice purchasing goal, the ration could be upped to about 2.5 hop during most of 1949. Agricultural Minister CHO Bong Am is still confident the rice purchase goal can be attained, and recently stated that he hoped to raise the standard ration to 3 hop in November. However, most Korean and American observers feel that the government will not collect more than half of the proposed goal unless it exhibits considerably more drive and efficiency than it has thus far.

## D. PSYCHOLOGICAL - Reactions to the Constabulary Revolt (Unclassified)

1. Official Statements: While the constabulary and police were regaining areas taken by the insurrectionists (B. 3a above), President RHEE, Premier LEE Bum Suk and Constabulary chief Brigadier General SONG Ho issued statements in further efforts to weaken the strength of the rebels and thus hasten the termination of hostilities.

On 22 October, LEE Bum Suk, in his dual capacity of Premier and Minister of National Defense, sternly warned the rioters that they had committed one of the gravest of crimes and that death before the firing squad could be avoided only if the rebels killed their leaders, destroyed their weapons if necessary, and surrendered immediately. LEE also stated that loyal troops had blockaded the rebel forces and were moving in on the captured areas. YOSU, he said, had already been recaptured. (LEE corrected the latter statement in his report to the National Assembly on 28 October, announcing that the town had been retaken on 27 October.)

On 28 October LEE Bum Suk issued a statement in which he reported that the "loyal army and navy had eliminated all resistance, except in few small pockets." LEE declared that this "terroristic activity of the Communists" was "synchronized with the application for United Nations recognition of the Russian puppet government in North Korea. While it was intended primarily to change the opinion of the United Nations General Assembly, it also represented a part of an elaborate plot for a small minority of Communists to take over the control of all South Korea."

LEE stated that the "North Korean radio reported all details of the uprising...long before full reports were available in South Korea." LEE added that "the work of the Communist organizers was made easy by the fact that recruiting and training of our constabulary was under the atmosphere of joint cooperation between the left and right with no adequate provision to check the communistic propaganda. Korean leaders repeatedly warned these officials of the presence of the communist Trojan Horse in the constabulary, but their warnings were ignored....

Many of the men the Americans recruited for our constabulary were self-styled refugees newly arrived from north of the 38th parallel, who were accepted without proper investigation." (NOTE: LEE later stated that this sentence was a misinterpretation of his Korean statement.) Concluding, LEE announced that "the new government is taking vigorous steps to weed out the Communists not only in the constabulary but in every other position where they can damage our country. The Communist underground, while very active, is quite small, and can never prevail against the millions of loyal democratic Koreans."

General SONG Ho issued a statement which in one paragraph promised the rioters the "hand of friendship" and in the next asserted that "the time for generosity" in the treatment of mutineers had passed.

President RHEE, on 27 October, based his appeal to the rioters on national consciousness and the homogeneity of the Korean people.

He declared that the "disgraceful revolt" was "instigated by undesirable elements." RHEE was willing to let "by-gones be by-gones" and urged the constabulary and police to "embrace each other with affection" and "do the things which will win the confidence of the people."

On 28 October, RHEE made a statement in which he promised, that "those who joined the insurgents would be punished accordingly." He urged the people to persuade the remaining rebels to "repent their sins." If this is impossible, he advised, "report them to the police in order to keep strict peace and order."

b. Cost-of-Living: (Unclassified)

RICE PRICE SUMMARY MONTHLY AVERAGE  
(Unit: 1 small metric mal (18.48 lbs))

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP*	OCT**
Seoul	817	821	778	721	814	985	1158	1200		840
Kangwon Do	870	946	849	825	898	1012	1136	1133		
Chungchong Namdo	793	728	674	634	726	946	1037	1083		
Chungchong Pukto	645	723	719	660	795	1037	990	1033		
Kyongsang Namdo	715	778	715	704	733	955	1070	950		
Kyongsang Pukto	594	605	552	605	641	888	1081	1050		
Cholla Namdo	614	633	559	595	801	963	1109	1008		
Cholla Pukto	669	669	605	623	773	935	1036	1200		
Cheju Do	806	748	679	814	806	1081	1879	1033		
AVERAGE	713	744	681	725	777	978	1166	1087		

SOURCE: National Price Administration (except Sept & Oct prices).

\* Incomplete

\*\* 29 October price: SOURCE: Open markets (5) in SEOUL; price is for the metric mal (18.48 lbs. or 10 liters).

Currency Exchange Rate: U.S. dollar equals 1,050 won  
(Open Market) Military Payment Script equals 500 won.

2. Population: (Restricted)

a. Surrendered and disarmed: No change 179,920

b. Progress of Repatriation This Period To Date

Japanese civilians arriving from north of 38° N. Korea, China and Manchuria 0 288,535

Japanese evacuated to Japan 0 884,972

Total Koreans returning 1,090 2,179,012

Total Repatriates moved since 15 August 1945 3,066,369

Koreans apprehended while attempting illegal entry into Japan 0 25,594

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2. Radio PYONGYANG: The Communist radio in PYONGYANG made every effort to portray the revolt in southern Korea as a struggle between the people and the reactionary police of the "so-called government" headed by the "traitor" RHEE Syng Man. PYONGYANG broadcast exaggerations of the exploits of the rebels and recounted the action taken by the Korean government by endeavoring to depict the uprising as a full-scale popular-supported revolution, in which the democratic forces were winning and reported that throughout the embattled area the people welcomed and supported the founding of the "Democratic People's Republic" in North Korea. Both MOSCOW and PYONGYANG broadcast dispatches stating that American troops were "standing by" in preparation for "armed interference in the insurrection."

PYONGYANG attempted to convey the impression that the revolt which had its beginning in the 14th regiment of the so-called national constabulary" was moving northward and was destined to spread over the entire south of the 38th parallel, where the "reactionary elements" were being rapidly destroyed.

Seeking to achieve maximum embarrassment for the new government in south Korea, in the eyes of the democratic world, PYONGYANG charged that the RHEE government increased its already tight control over civil liberties by strictly prohibiting publication of news of the riots.

COMMENT: (Restricted) There was, in fact, a one-day embargo on news of the insurrection placed on the press by Assistant Director of Public Information KIM Kyong Won on 20 October. The brief embargo was aimed at preventing widespread hysteria. The following day, however, Director of Public Information KIM Dong Sung, on his return from his visit to TOKYO with President RHEE (W/S #162, page 4), lifted the embargo.

The North Korean authorities are apparently encouraging the actions of the "Peoples Courts" because PYONGYANG radio has, in effect, praised the executions conducted in SUNCHON (1040-1320) and YOSU (1070-1300).

3. Press: (Unclassified) The majority of the SECUL newspapers, particularly the moderate press, stressed the need for improved discipline in the nation's military organization and strongly advocated that measures be taken to prevent further agitation from sources whose aims are inimical to those of the Republic of Korea. Moderate CHOSUN ILBO (Korea Daily News) stated that the "mission of the military is to protect the nation" and that the defense forces should be "armed with a righteous purpose which is not isolated from the popular will." CHOSUN ILBO attributed the "confusion" in Korea primarily to the "psychosis of revenge among the people."

Moderate rightist KOOK JEI SHIN MUN (International News), with which Premier LEE is affiliated, declares that soldiers were instigated by Communists and demanded that military discipline be strictly enforced. HAN SUNG ILBO (Seoul Daily) and MINJU ILBO (Democratic News), both moderate, termed the revolt a "national incident" which will remain forever on the pages of Korean history. Therefore it is necessary, they pointed out, to prevent recurrence of such revolts with judicious measures. Particularly stressed was the need for eliminating the factors which induced young men to "follow the Communists."

Rightist DONG A ILBO (Oriental Daily News) stated that the mission of the Army "consists of preventing foreign invasions. It must carry out the supreme order of the nation, not the orders of any party or individual."

E. SABOTAGE AND ESPIONAGE (Confidential)

A CIC investigation of the train wreck on 14 September at NAIPAN-NI (1040-1520), in which 36 Americans lost their lives (see W/S #161, B), revealed that there was no definite evidence of sabotage and no communist leanings on the part of the train crew or the station officials. The CIC report was not made known to officials of the Republic of Korea. However, the procurator, who originally was to try some 35 Koreans for participation in a communist plot to wreck the train, is now planning to try only four, for negligence.

A CIC investigation of the removal of a rail from the track at OKCHON (1057-1492) on 04 October (see Weekly Summary #160) indicates that the rail had become disconnected by vibration and establishes no evidence of sabotage.

At 271550 October a railroad engine and a box car containing ammunition was derailed between KWAEUMOK (1048-1352) and KURAEKU (1042-1345). A rail had been cut but not removed. No damage resulted. (F-6).

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Authority: NND 745070