

1948. 09. 17. 주한미육군사령부 정보참모부 주간요약보고

PART I
SOUTH KOREA

From: 101200/I Sept 48
To : 171200/I Sept 48

Headquarters, USAFIK
Seoul, Korea
17 September 1948

No. 157

MAFS: KOREA, 1/250,000
East ASIA, 1/1,000,000

A. ARMED FORCES

1. Strength (Secret)

Police: No change.
Constabulary: 51,877 (including 582 cadets, 767 unsworn recruits and 1,118 absent, missing or unreported).
Coast Guard: 3,075 (including 185 cadets)

2. operational Activity (Confidential)

Border Incidents

Between 102400 and 110100 September unknown persons (presumably Koreans) drove a truck south of the parallel into the village of KOUM-WI (930.3-1696.5), fired 3 rounds at the police box and escaped to North Korea.

At 170420 September 4 North Korean Constabularymen were observed south of the parallel near (937.8-1696.4). A U.S. outpost fired on the NKC who then withdrew to the North. It is believed one NKC was wounded.

	04-11 June	11-18 June	18-25 June	25 June - 02 July	02-09 July	09-16 July	16-23 July	23-30 July	30 July - 06 August	06-13 August	13-20 August	20-27 August	27 August - 03 September	03-10 Sept	10-17 Sept	TOTAL
Border Incidents																
Korean vs Korean	4	6	4	6		2	3		3	2	3	2	4	3	1	43
Firing on US Personnel		1	2			1	2	1		1	1				1	11
Ambushes of US Personnel							1									1
Soviet Violations of Parallel*						1								1		2
Korean Violations of Parallel*	2	1		1				1		1						6
Soviets vs Koreans		1											1			2
TOTAL	7	8	6	7		4	6	2	3	4	4	2	5	5	2	65

* No firing involved

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B. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

1. U.S. - Korean Agreement

a. Property and Finance

On 11 September representatives of the United States and the Republic of Korea completed an agreement covering the possession of property and various financial accounts. The agreement was signed for the Korean Government by Prime Minister LEE Bum Suk and Foreign Minister CHUNG Taik Sang. For the United States the agreement was signed by John J. Muccio, special representative of the President of the United States and Major General John B. Coulter, Commanding General, USAFK.

By the agreement the Government of the Republic of Korea received:

- (1) All property and accounts of the South Korean Interim Government;
- (2) All vested properties (formerly Japanese-owned) which have been held in trust and administered by the United States since the Japanese surrender, together with all sales contracts arising from past sales of vested properties, such as land, and including the bulk of the industrial assets in South Korea;
- (3) All foreign exchange created during the three years of occupation, including U.S. dollars, Hongkong dollars and pounds sterling on deposit with correspondent banks throughout the world;
- (4) Miscellaneous assets, such as 101 locomotives valued at \$7,070,000, various capital improvements valued in excess of \$32,000,000, and certain military supplies not being used by the American forces.

The United States Government also agreed to waive all payment for approximately \$250,000,000 worth of relief and rehabilitation supplies already received or scheduled for delivery in Korea, and agreed to pay for the bulk of imports ordered from Japan for Korean use.

Also included in the agreement was a settlement of the \$25,000,000 Foreign Liquidation Commission loan made by the United States to Korea. Settlement will be made in won and will cover the cost of certain buildings in Seoul which the Department of State desires to use as official residences and offices. The bulk of the won value of the loan, however, will be placed by the U.S. Government in an educational fund to be jointly administered by the Korean and American Governments for the benefit of students of their respective nations.

In addition, full payment, amounting to \$24,000,000, for labor supplied by Koreans to the occupying forces has been placed in cash in the account of the new Korean Government. (For National Assembly action on the agreement, see para B, 2, below.)

b. Administration

On 15 September the President of the Republic of Korea and the Commanding General jointly announced "the transfer of the administration of the Department of Internal Security" to the Republic of Korea. (For earlier (24 Aug) document regarding control over Korean and American security forces, see W/S 154, page 5.)

The transfer of government functions from the jurisdiction of the South Korean Interim Government (SKIG) to the responsible departments of the Republic of KOREA is nearing completion. All departments of the new government, with the exception of the Department of Finance, have assumed control of at least part of their normal functions.

The following transfers have been made:

SMIG Agency

Republic of Korea

Departments

Department of Agriculture Agriculture Improvement Service	Department of Agriculture
Department of Commerce	Department of Commerce and Industry
Department of Internal Security	Department of National Defense
Office of Foreign Affairs	Department of Foreign Affairs
Department of Transportation	Department of Transportation
Department of Public Works Department of Police	Department of Internal Affairs
Department of Labor Department of Public Health & Welfare	Department of Social Affairs
Department of Justice Office of Chief Justice	Department of Justice
Department of Education	Department of Education
Department of Communications	Department of Communications

Offices

National Consumer Goods Board	Office of Planning
Department of Public Information	Office of Public Information
Office of Korean Civil Service (B-2)	Office of Administration

2. National Assembly

a. Proceedings

Consideration of a new set of House Rules drafted to replace the temporary House Rules adopted before the promulgation of the Constitution occupied the major portion of the time spent on legislative activity during the period. Discussion of the revised House Rules began on 11 September. On 14 September, the Assembly agreed to refer the draft of the new rules to the Legislative and Judicial Committee for final re-touching.

The Assembly also (1) agreed to refer the Korean-American transfer negotiation instrument to the committees on Finance and Economy, Foreign Affairs and Home Affairs; (2) decided that "The official date of the Republic of Korea shall be fixed as the day of Tan Kun" (15 August, 4281); and announced receipt of the Government's law governing the purchase and collection of summer grains.

During closed sessions on 16 and 17 September the provisions of the U.S.-Korean Financial and Property Agreement (para B, 1, above) were deliberated. Strong criticism of several provisions of the agreement came from the floor. Of particular concern to critics was (a) alleged failure of Korean negotiators to secure more careful appraisals and audits of properties and accounts affected by the agreement, (b) the amount of property given to the United States Government, and (c) the kind and quantity of property turned over to the security forces.

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President RHEE and Prime Minister LEE Bum Suk appeared in the Chamber and urged the Assembly to approve the agreement, stating that the Americans had been generous and suggesting that the Koreans show less concern for "trifles."

On 17 September, LEE Chong Chun, chairman of all Standing Committees announced the "Resolution of the Committees":

"It is resolved that the Committee agrees to support the Korean-American Agreement."

Following the presentation of this resolution, a motion was passed to obtain Assembly approval of the agreement on 18 September, 17 September being a Korean holiday and the reason for the absence of approximately 80 Assemblymen.

b. National Traitor Law

The National Traitor Law, passed 07 September by the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea (W/S 156, page 4) provides for the establishment of a Board of Special Investigation to investigate all persons suspected of coming under the National Traitor Law. The Board is to consist of 10 National Assembly members who were (1) active in the Korean Independence Movement or (2) "possessed of fervent patriotism and of learning and virtue." This Board is charged with investigating such persons as active collaborators with the Japanese in the annexation of Korea to Japan, those appointed peers in the Japanese government and those persons who persecuted members of the Korean Independence Movement or their families. In addition, officials in the Japanese regime, those active in pro-Japanese organizations and other collaborators with the Japanese fall in a sub-category. To assist in investigations, the Board is authorized to appoint Investigation Divisions in SEOUL and the provinces, subject to approval by the National Assembly.

The judicial body under the Traitor Law consists of a Special Court, elected by the National Assembly, of one Chief Justice, three Special Presiding Judges and 12 Judges. Of this group five must be from the National Assembly, six from justices of the High Court and five private citizens of "fervent patriotism and of learning and virtue." The judgement of this Court is final; there is no appeal.

There is also established an Office of Special Procurator, who is elected by the National Assembly. This office consists of one Special Chief Procurator, one Assistant Chief Procurator and seven Special Procurators. These prosecuting attorneys must base each case on findings forwarded by the Board of Special Investigation plus such special investigation as can be accomplished within twenty days.

A brief analysis of this law indicates two types of punishment; mandatory, which is provided for in the Constitution under Article 101 and aims at active collaborators contributing to the annexation of Korea by Japan, peers in the Japanese government and persecutors of members of the Korean Independence Movement; and discretionary, for officials in the Japanese government, those who were active in pro-Japanese organizations and other collaborators. It must be noted, however, that the Court is free to abstain from punishing any defendant where evidence is clearly established that the defendant sincerely repents his actions.

This law gives exclusive responsibility for investigation to the Board and the police have no authority whatsoever. Further, it can be seen from the organization of the Board and the Special Court that the National Assembly fully controls operations of these bodies. The only requirement set forth for trained legal personnel is that six judges of the Special Court must be lawyers.

The constitutionality of the law in many cases is open to question. Its basis, Article 101 of the Constitution, speaks only of the

enactment of penal provisions and does not provide for ex post facto prosecution nor for other deviations from the Constitution.

COMMENT: Considering that the only body authorized to issue indictments is a purely political one, and that any defendant can escape punishment by "proving" repentance, the law offers unlimited possibilities for political machinations.

3. Diplomatic Committee of the Unification Society

On 08 September, the Standing Committee of the SOCIETY FOR THE ACCELERATION OF UNIFIED INDEPENDENCE (S.U.I) elected a Diplomatic Committee consisting of SUL I Sik, Hwang Chin Nam, CHANG Cha Il, EUM Hang Sop, P.I Song Yong and SHIN Ki on to draft a letter to UN Secretary General Trygve Lie requesting permission to appear before the General Assembly. KIM Kyu Sik, Vice-Chairman of S.U.I has not yet agreed to sign the letter, stating that the signature of S.U.I's chairman, KIM Koo, would suffice.

COMMENT: It is considered unlikely that the Secretary General of the United Nations will facilitate the appearance of a group which steadfastly opposed the election sponsored by the United Nations.

4. Civil Unrest

a. Communist Activity

(1) No reports concerning communist-inspired violence have been received during the past two weeks. The present reorganization of cells and other low level units throughout South KOREA, the SOUTH KOREAN LABOR PARTY'S directives to "wait," the presence of SKLP leaders in North KOREA, and police vigilance have undoubtedly been the contributing factors for this non-violence period.

(2) The following reports concerning dates for communist riots and disturbances have been received during the past month from sources evaluated from F to B:

(a) "The SOCIAL LABOR PARTY faction of the LABORING PEOPLES PARTY is aligning itself with the NORTH KOREAN LABOR PARTY for the purpose of creating civil war in KOREA at the time of the United Nations meeting in Paris in September 1948." (F-6)

(b) "Communist cells are being reorganized for period of riots and terrorism about 20 September 1948, the date the United Nations Assembly convenes in Paris." (3 reports: B-3, C-3, F-3)

(c) "On 25 September 1948, riots and disturbances will take place all over South KOREA." (F-3)

(d) "Three regiments of the North Korea Peoples Army have infiltrated into South KOREA to help overthrow the South Korean government prior to 01 October 1948, Memory Day." (F-6)

(e) "In November 1948, there will be rioting all over South KOREA." (C-3)

(f) "Agitation movements against the South Korean people will begin before the end of November 1948." (C-3)

(g) "Fighting will take place throughout South KOREA in December 1948." (B-3)

COMMENT: As in the past, several of the above reports include promises of invasion by the North Korean armed forces to coincide with the uprising. (see Part II, B, 4).

b. Communist Violence

- (1) Weekly Violence Summary - Negative
- (2) Delayed Reports Covering Last Week - Negative
- (3) 1948 Communist Activities in South KOREA

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEPT*	TOTAL
Attacks on towns				5	73	9	1			88
Attacks on police		130	118	50	86	12	11	11	2	420
Police killed		33	20	15	34	4	1	5		112
Rightists killed	1	14	14	81	144	51	10	1	1	317
Communists killed	1	74	75	70	155	83	33	22	1	514
Disorders, demonstrations, arson, attacks on rightists' offices and homes	6	118	69	126	196	81	24	12		632
Attacks on government buildings		9	14	2	9	3				37
Sabotage (Communications)	14	53	58	32	57	8	1			223
Sabotage (RR lines)	1	12	6		8		1			28
Sabotage (locomotives)		50			24					74
Sabotage (roads)		13	5	2	5			1		26
Sabotage (bridges)		6	2	5	4					24
Sabotage (power)					7	1				8
Strikes (labor)		14	6	3	16	1				40
Strikes (school)		7	5	4	9					25

*Incomplete

c. Other Violence

(1) No rightist-inspired acts of violence were reported during the period.

(2) A summary of acts of violence on the part of persons of unknown political affiliation as reported up to 17 September 1948, is as follows:

	Seoul	Kyonggi Do	Kangwon Do	Chungcheong Namdo	Chungcheong Pukto	Cholla Namdo	Cholla Pukto	Kyongsang Namdo	Kyongsang Pukto	Chaju Do	TOTAL
Assassination								1			1
Anti-grain collection											
Political terrorism											
Demonstration				1							1
Resistance to arrest											
Arson											
Unclassified											
Attacks on police											
Attacks on individuals											
Sabotage (communications)											
Sabotage (railroad lines)											
Sabotage (power)											
Sabotage (bridges)											
Strikes (labor)											
Strikes (school)											

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(3) Delayed Reports Covering Last Week


Delayed reports of incidents involving other than communists which occurred during the week ending 10 September but which were not carried in last week's summary are:

	Seoul	Kyonggi Do	Kangwon Do	Chungchong Namdo	Chungchong Pukto	Cholla Namdo	Kyongsang Namdo	Kyongsang Pukto	Cheju Do	TOTAL
Assassination						1				1
Anti-grain collection										
Political terrorism										
Demonstration										
Resistance to arrest										
Arson										
Unclassified										
Attacks on police										
Attacks on individuals										
Sabotage (communications)										
Sabotage (railroad lines)										
Sabotage (power)										
Sabotage (bridges)										
Strikes (labor)										
Strikes (school)										

(4) Monthly summary of acts of violence on the part of persons of unknown political affiliation:

	JULY	AUG	SEPT*	TOTAL
Assassination	7		2	9
Anti-grain collection	9	1		10
Political terrorism	1	1		2
Demonstration	15	9	1	25
Resistance to arrest	5	9		14
Arson	2	3		5
Unclassified	11	11		22
Attacks on Police		1		1
Attacks on individuals		4	1	5
Sabotage (communications)	1	4	3	8
Sabotage (railroad lines)				
Sabotage (power)				
Sabotage (bridges)				
Strikes (labor)				
Strikes (school)	1			1

*Incomplete



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C. WAR POTENTIAL1. Economic - Cost of Living

Cost of living items in SEOUL were steady during the week ending 11 September. There was no reported change in any prices checked.

Wholesale prices in South Korea rose in August to 186% of the 1947 average, compared with 171% in July 1948 and 98% in August 1947. The upward trend during the last three months was preceded by five months of general price stability. In August prices rose on grains, fish, raw cotton and salt. Substantial increases in controlled prices for rice, barley and wheat were authorized 01 August and for salt 15 August. Smaller increases in the price of firewood, lumber and rubber shoes were partly offset by lower prices for cotton yarn, cotton shirting, paper, hemp and soy beans.

The 1948 summer grain collection program was reported to be 99.4% completed on 9 September. Most provinces exceeded their quotas, whereas CHOLLA NAMDO fell substantially below quota.

Source: National Price Administration

Cost of Living Items Checked In SEOUL (06-11 Sept)

Polished rice	Matches	Flannelette
Barley	Beef	Kwang-mak (cloth)
Wheat flour	Pork	Silk myungju (cloth)
Soy beans	Eggs	Silk sok so (cloth)
Red beans	Radishes	Anthracite
Dried myungtai (fish)	Korean cabbage	Firewood
Sugar	Rubber shoes	Cotton socks
Salt	Laundry soap	Charcoal
	Soy sauce	

RICE PRICE SUMMARY MONTHLY AVERAGES*
Unit: 1 small metric mal (18.48 lbs)

	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUN</u>	<u>JUL</u>	<u>AUG</u>	<u>17 SEPT</u>
SEOUL	817	821	778	721	814	985	1158	1262	1250
KANGWON DO	870	946	849	825	898	1012	1136	**	
CHUNGCHONG									
PUKTO	645	723	719	660	795	1037	990		
CHUNGCHONG									
NAMDO	793	728	674	634	726	946	1037		
KYONGSANG									
PUKTO	594	605	552	605	641	888	1081		
KYONGSANG									
NAMDO	715	778	715	704	733	955	1070		
CHOLLA									
PUKTO	669	669	605	623	773	935	1036		
CHOLLA									
NAMDO	614	633	559	595	801	963	1109		
CHIEJU									
DO	806	748	679	814	806	1081	1879		
AVERAGE	713	744	681	725	777	978	1166		

Source: National Price Administration (except 10 Sept price).

* 10 September price: Source: Open market (1) in SEOUL; price is for the metric small mal (18.48 lbs or 10 liters)

** August provincial averages not available.

COMMENT: The sharp fall in price of rice in SEOUL from 1416 last week to 1250 this week is reported by market operators to be due to anticipation of the National Assembly refusing to order a rice collection.

Currency Exchange Rate: U. S. dollar equals 1000-1100 won.
(OPEN MARKET) Military script dollar equals 400-450 won

2. Population

a. <u>Surrendered and Disarmed</u>	No Change:	179,920
b. <u>Progress of Repatriation</u>	<u>This Period</u>	<u>To Date</u>
<u>Japanese Civilians Arriving from N of 38° N! KOREA, CHINA and MANCHURIA.</u>	No Report	2,3,532
<u>Japanese Evacuated to JAPAN</u>	0	884,933
<u>Total Koreans Returning</u>	Unknown	2,165,210
<u>Total Repatriates Moved Since 15 August 1945</u>	0	3,050,143
<u>Koreans Apprehended While Attempting Illegal Entry Into JAPAN</u>	0	25,243

Source: G-3, XXIV Corps

D. PSYCHOLOGICAL

Seoul newspapers editors furnished no extensive discussion of the establishment of the government in North Korea nor further comment on the National Traitor Law, the chief developments in Korea during the preceding period. The North Korea election was largely ignored by the right-wing press, while leftist CHOSUN CHOONG ANG ILBO (Korean Central Daily News) carried the usual heavy proportion of "news items" upholding the Communist cause. The editors of this paper gave prominence to the acclamations of the new "central" government formulated by North and South Korean Communist spokesmen and organizations.

President RHEE, the Prime Minister, the Chairman of the National Assembly, members of the Cabinet, and numerous private citizens of KOREA, called on the Commanding General on 15 and 16 September to express sympathy and regret at the death of 36 American soldiers in the train accident which occurred on 14 September at CHOCHIMON (1026-1527).

At the end of the period covered by this summary, press reaction to the train wreck began to appear in SEOUL dailies. In some instances, reporters' coverage of the accident were written to reflect the responsibility of Minister of Transportation MIN Hi Sik, a holdover from SKIG, for failing to prevent loss of life through faulty administration and failure to accept the blame for the previous serious accidents on South Korea's railways, and some editors indicated a desire to propagandize this shortcoming, along with the pro-Japanese charges already leveled at MIN, to secure his removal from the Cabinet.

E. SABOTAGE AND ESPIONAGE

Three reports have been recently received concerning the targets being assigned to North Korean espionage agents dispatched to South Korea. These targets include political conditions and leaders; location, strength and equipment of police boxes; location and production of important South Korean factories; the type, effectiveness and number of weapons possessed by the Korean Constabulary; the extent to which the Korean Constabulary and Police are being trained by U.S. troops; methods used to guard villages along the 38th parallel and the language (Korean or Chinese) used in police reports. (C-3)