

SOUTH KOREA

From: 201200/I Aug. 48
To: 271200/I Aug. 48

Headquarters, USAFIK
Seoul, Korea
27 August 1948

No. 154
Maps: KOREA, 1/250,000
East ASIA, 1/1,000,000

A. ARMED FORCES

1. Strength (Secret)

Police: 35,000
Constabulary: 57,765 (including 3,121 recruits and 760 cadets)
Coast Guard: 2,906 (including 140 cadets) (B-2)

2. Operational Activity (Confidential)

Border Incidents

At 221515 August a U.S. combat patrol heard 2 shots which originated from the north side of a hill at (896,8-1697,3) and observed 2 North Korean Constabularymen in fox holes in that area. Five minutes later 11 more shots from the same area were heard and 20 North Korean Constabularymen, observed on top of the hill, split into 3 groups and disappeared. Fifteen South Korean police in position at (897,7-1697,05) reported that they had killed 2 North Koreans at 221530 August. (B-2)

At 240430 August 5 or 6 North Korean Constabularymen attacked a South Korean police patrol from the TO WOON (927,4-1695,4) police box at a point approximately 1500 yards northeast of TO WOON. The firefight which developed lasted approximately 20 minutes. South Korean police investigating the area later found the body of a man who had been shot to death. The deceased was believed to have been an North Korean constabularyman but no identifying papers were found. (Police report)

At 180200 August 35 UNITED YOUNG MEN'S PARTY members crossed into North KOREA near (825-1698) and attacked the police box at KARHYON DONG (825-1699). Four of the 5 North Koreans on duty were killed. The South Koreans then returned south of the parallel. The UYMPs were armed with carbines provided by the South Korean police. (Police report)

The following table summarizes reported border incidents since

04 June:

Border Incidents	4-11 June	11-18 June	18-25 June	25-June	02 July	09-16 July	16-23 July	23-30 July	30 July	06 Aug.	06-13 August	13-20 August	20-27 August	TOTAL
Korean vs Korean	4	6	4	6	0	2	3	0	3	2	3	2	35	
Firing on US Personnel	0	1	2	0	0	1	2	1	0	1	1	0	9	
Ambushes of US Personnel	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	
Soviet violations of parallel*	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
Korean violations of parallel*	2	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	6	
Soviets vs Koreans	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
TOTAL	7	8	6	7	0	4	6	2	3	4	4	2	53	

*No firing involved

B. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE1. Departure of General HODGE

Lt. General John R. HODGE, Commanding General of the United States Army Forces in Korea since the beginning of the occupation on 8 September 1945, departed from KOREA by air on 27 August for the UNITED STATES.

General HODGE's imminent departure was announced publicly on 24 August. The release stated:

"Following the arrival of Mr. MUCCIO in SEOUL as Special Representative of the President of the UNITED STATES with ambassadorial rank, the Department of the Army has announced that Lieutenant General John R. HODGE is reassigned to duty in continental UNITED STATES and is ordered to report to the Chief of Staff, Department of the Army, for duty until assigned to permanent station. General HODGE expects to leave by airplane shortly for TOKYO, where after conference with General MacARTHUR he will fly on to Washington, D. C. and report for duty. The Department of the Army also announced that Major General John B. COULTER, United States Army, who arrived in KOREA 15 January 1948, has been named by the Department of the Army to command the United States Army Forces in Korea. General COULTER commanded the 7th Infantry Division with station in SEOUL from 15 January 1948 to 25 May 1948 and has been the Deputy Commander of the United States Forces in Korea since 26 May 1948."

General HODGE's farewell messages to U.S. personnel in KOREA and to the Korean people are given in Inclosures #1 and #2.

2. The Korean Governmenta. Recognition by the Republic of the PHILIPPINES

On 20 August the government of the Republic of the Philippines joined the UNITED STATES and CHINA in provisionally recognizing the Government of KOREA. President RHEE, in acknowledging receipt of such recognition, asked permission to send Dr. CHOUGH Pyong Ok as his personal representative with rank of Ambassador to MANILA at an early date. This permission was granted 25 August.

b. Relations with UNTCOK

The Korean Committee for Consultations with the Main Committee of UNTCOK (W/S #153) met with the Main Committee, for the first time, on 25 August. The chief of the Korean committee informed UNTCOK that the United States and Korea had signed an agreement concerning the transfer of authority over the Korean Security Forces (see para c below).

Dr. LUNA, Main Committee Chairman, announced that, though most of the Commission was leaving Korea, the seat of the Commission remains in Korea and that the Main Committee would be in Seoul for consultation.

COMMENT: This meeting of consultees was largely a formality inasmuch as the Koreans had no points to discuss. It is, however, now a matter of record that the provisions of the UN Resolution of 14 November 1947 are being carried out. It is not expected that the Koreans will request consultation very frequently. The head-in-the-sand attitude and stumbling progress of UNTCOK have long since cost the Commission a great deal of the respect of the Korean leaders.

When Dr. Luna announced that only the Main Committee would remain in Seoul, John M. CHANG (CHANG Myun), Korean Chairman, replied that he and CHANG Ki Yung would also be in PARIS but that KOH Il Chang would remain to consult with the Main Committee as needed. It has been reported that the Koreans do not expect to consult with the Committee unless serious obstacles are encountered in negotiations with American authorities.

c. Transfer of Negotiations Show Progress

(1) U.S. - Korean Military Agreement Signed

The first of the agreements for the transfer of authority from the United States to the Government of KOREA was announced on 24 August, when President RHEE and General HODGE signed a document regarding control of Korean and American security forces. The "interim agreement provides for the progressive turning over to the Korean Government of jurisdiction over and command of all Korean security forces (police, Constabulary, and Coast Guard) as rapidly as is possible, consistent with the common security of the Republic of Korea and the United States Army Forces in Korea. During the period of the agreement the United States Army will continue to assist the Korean Government in the training and equipment of the constabulary and coast guard. It also provides for the use of those areas and facilities essential for the maintenance of United States troops until the withdrawal from Korea is completed as visualized in paragraph 4 of Resolution II of the United Nations General Assembly, 14 November 1947. The agreement is effective only until the United States troops have withdrawn from Korea."

COMMENT: President RHEE, cantankerous and obstinate during the past week, did not sign the agreement readily. RHEE objected to provisions which retained United States Government authority over U.S. personnel while such personnel were outside the limits of American installations or compounds as an infringement of Korean sovereignty. RHEE's irritability is partly attributed to the resentment aroused by the action of his legislative branch in hammering out a national traitor law to force RHEE to rid himself of "undesirable" cabinet appointments (see para e below).

(2) Public Funds and Property

On 26 August it was announced that during the tenth meeting of the Korean and American representatives who are negotiating the initial transfer of public funds and property from the South Korean Interim Government to the Government of the Republic of Korea the Korean Delegation was presented with financial statements of the various accounts of SKIG and the U.S. Military Government in Korea. This tenth meeting, held on 25 August, concluded preliminary considerations of the initial financial and property settlement. Negotiations, while necessarily detailed and complex, have been conducted in a spirit of harmony and cooperation, and it is believed that they will lead shortly to the conclusion of an agreement. Overall negotiations have progressed to the point that only technical details remain to be settled.

d. Diplomatic Representatives

(1) The Korean delegation to the United Nations General Assembly is to consist of the following persons:

John M. CHANG (CHANG Myun)	Chief Delegate
CHANG Ki Yung	Alternate Delegate
CHOUGH Pyong Ok	Councillor
KIM Hwa Lan (Helen)	Member
CHUN Kyu Hong	Legal Advisor
KIM Woo Pyung	Economic Advisor

(2) Following discussion of the Korean problem at the United Nations General Assembly in Paris, John M. CHANG will act as Special Representative to the Vatican to express the gratitude of the President of Korea to the Pope (see W/S #153, page 6).

e. The National Assembly

(1) The Amnesty Law was passed by the National Assembly on 20 August by a vote of 115 to 2, with 152 present. Later during this session, discussion of the proposed National Traitor Law was resumed. Opposition to several vaguely worded provisions in the draft of this law resulted in further deliberations on the measure at the following session, on 23 August. It was decided then to postpone the second reading of the proposed law to 25 August. Discussion of the bill continued on that day; no decisions of importance were reached.

(2) During the period the Assembly also (a) adopted a motion to dissolve all committees formed prior to the enactment of the House Rules; (b) heard the Minister of Commerce, Louise YIM's emotional self-emulation, and (c) bade farewell to General Hodge who appeared briefly in the Assembly Hall on 25 August.

3. Moderate Activity

a. Twenty-Five Political Organizations Denounce North Korean Government

Twenty-five political organizations affiliated with either the SOCIETY FOR THE ACCELERATION OF UNIFIED INDEPENDENCE or the NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE FEDERATION, or both, signed a "joint communique" which was released to the press on 25 August. The text of the communique, which denounces communist violation of the provisions of the 30 April PYONGYANG agreement (W/S #138, page 5), is as follows:

"JOINT COMMUNIQUE

"The independence of Korea which was promised by the Allied Powers - the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Great Britain - appears to become more remote with the passage of time. The division of the nation is intensified by the occupation of American and Soviet troops.

"Motivated by the belief that our unification and national independence should be accomplished in accordance with the principle of self-determination, we advocated a joint conference of the leaders of North and South Korea. This conference was held in Pyongyang in April 1948. The political leaders of North and South Korea reached complete accord regarding the establishment of a central government and national unification. The following joint communique was released on 30 April:

"1. A nation-wide political conference shall be held following the withdrawal of Soviet and American troops.

"2. A unified provisional central government shall be formed.

"3. A nation-wide election shall be held.

"4. The Constitution shall be enacted.

"5. A formal central government shall be formed.

"The North Korean leaders however, have convoked the so-called Second Joint Conference of North and South Korean Political Leaders, in contradiction to the firm and solemn agreement previously made, in order to establish a People's Republic in North Korea, and adopted a resolution which is contrary to the Joint Communique issued at Pyongyang on 30 April 1948. The so-called Constitution of the People's Republic has been promulgated and the North Koreans are trying to enforce an election in order to establish a government.

"The undersigned political parties declare:

- "1. That the so-called Second Joint Conference of North and South Korean Political Leaders is illegal.
- "2. We have dispatched no representatives to the so-called Second Joint Conference of North and South Political Leaders.
- "3. We denounce all the other activities and trend of events that have taken place in North Korean which are contrary to the provisions of the Joint Communique formulated on 30 April. We, hereby, make this firm and solemn declaration at home and abroad.

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1. NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE FEDERATION | 15. PATRIOTIC OLD MENS SOCIETY |
| 2. KOREAN INDEPENDENCE PARTY | 16. LEAGUE OF PATRIOTS FOR THE INDEPENDENCE |
| 3. DEMOCRATIC INDEPENDENCE PARTY | 17. FIRST HWANGHAE PROVINCE YOUTH CORPS |
| 4. NEW PROGRESSIVE PARTY | 18. KOREAN NEW CIVILIZATION PARTY |
| 5. KOREAN FARMERS PARTY | 19. REVOLUTIONARY COLLEAGES YOUTH SOCIETY |
| 6. SAM IL COLLEAGUES SOCIETY | 20. PATRIOTIC COLLEAGUES SOCIETY |
| 7. PATRIOTIC YOUTHS COLLEAGUES GROUP | 21. KOREAN INVENTORS ASSN, |
| 8. INDEPENDENT WOMENS LEAGUE | 22. CANTON & HONGKONG SOC. |
| 9. YOUTH SOCIETY FOR FOUNDING A NATION | |
| 10. REPATRIATES ASSOCIATION | |
| 11. KOREAN STUDENTS FEDERATION | |
| 12. NORTHWEST STUDENTS FEDERATION | |
| 13. NATL CONSTRUCTION STUDENTS FEDERATION | |
| 14. NORTHWEST UNION OF CHRISTIAN ENDEAVOR SOCIETY | |
| | 23. CHRISTIAN NEW DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY |
| | 24. INDUSTRIAL REHABILITATION ASSOCIATION |
| | 25. SOUTH KOREA CHUN DO KYU YOUTH FRIENDS PARTY" |

COMMENT: It is known that in many instances the organizations which signed this communique are divided in their attitude toward the Second Pyongyang Conference and the North Korean elections. Nevertheless, this public denunciation of the "trend of events" which have led to the establishment of a separate government in North Korea furnishes irrefutable denial to probable Soviet claims before the U.N. General Assembly that their central government has the undivided endorsement of all South Korean political organizations not included in the South Korean Government.

It is also known that at least two of the parties which were represented at the first Pyongyang Conference - the LABORING PEOPLES PARTY (CHANG Kun Sang) and the SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (LYUH Woon Hong) - are divided into so many cliques that no one would sign the communique as the party representative. However, the signature of the NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE FEDERATION may well be considered to commit all members of the Federation, of which the LABORING PEOPLES PARTY and the SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY are two.

Although the signatories boycotted the South Korean election and thus to a considerable extent damaged the prestige of the South Korean government, their denunciation of the North Korean election constitutes full compensation. The signatories should be regarded as having demonstrated sincerity and patriotism; it is certain that they realize that they have signed their death warrants if the communists ever overrun South Korea.

It will be noted that none of the communist parties who signed the 30 April Pyongyang Communique joined in this denunciation.

b. Letter From KIM Kyu Sik

Subsequent to the issuance of the communique denouncing North Korean activities (see paragraph 3 above), KIM Kyu Sik, WON Sei Hoon, KIM Boong Jun, and TCHEI Dong O, all members of the National Independence Federation and former members of KILA, requested an interview with the Commanding General, in 26 August, purportedly in order to tell him goodbye but probably to make their peace with the Commander of the Occupation Forces. When illness prevented KIM Kyu Sik from keeping the appointment, the Commanding General sent KIM a photograph and a letter. The following letter was in reply:

"145:6 Samchung Dong
Seoul, Korea
26 August 1948

"Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge, U.S. Army
Commanding General, USAFIK
Seoul, Korea

"Dear Gen. Hodge:

"Many thanks for your photograph and your very kind letter. Your photograph will always occupy the honored place in our home as much as you yourself will always occupy the most prominent place in the grateful memory of the Korean people (of So. Korea, at least) for the sincere efforts and untiring energy you have given toward helping poor Korea and her people. Best wishes & bon voyage.

Yours very sincerely,

Kuisic Kimm"

4. Civil Unrest

a. Guerrilla Activity on CHEJU DO

During the reporting period, delayed reports from CHEJU DO disclosed renewed raider activity. Attacks and raids against the police and rightists resulted in the death of two policemen and injury to an additional five. Prompt action by the police caused the guerrillas to take refuge in the mountains, but guerrilla raids and reprisals are expected to continue.

b. North Korea Election Day

25 August 1948, the day of the North Korea election, was unmarked by civil disturbances in South Korea.

c. Communist Violence

(1) Weekly Violence Summary

A summary of acts of violence involving communists for the week as reported up to 27 August is as follows:

	Seoul	Kyonggi Do	Kangwon Do	Chungchong Namdo	Chungchong Pukto	Cholla Namdo	Cholla Pukto	Kyongsang Namdo	Kyongsang Pukto	Che ju Do	TOTAL
Attacks on towns											
Attacks on police				1							1
Police killed											
Rightists killed											
Communists killed											
Demonstrations, disorders, arson & attacks on rightists										2	2
Attacks on government buildings											
Sabotage (communications)											
Sabotage (RR lines)											
Sabotage (Roads)											
Sabotage (Bridges)											
Sabotage (Power)											
Strikes (Labor)											
Strikes (Schools)											

(2) Delayed Reports Covering Last Week

Delayed reports of incidents which occurred during the week ending 20 August but which were not carried in last week's summary (See W/S #153, page 11) are:

	Seoul	Kyonggi Do	Kangwon Do	Chungchong Namdo	Chungchong Pukto	Cholla Namdo	Cholla Pukto	Kyongsang Namdo	Kyongsang Pukto	Che ju Do	TOTAL
Attacks on towns											
Attacks on police										2	2
Police killed										2	2
Rightists killed											
Communists killed						1	1		1		3
Demonstrations, disorders, arson & attacks on rightists									1	2	3
Attacks on government buildings											
Sabotage (communications)											
Sabotage (RR lines)											
Sabotage (Roads)											
Sabotage (Bridges)											
Sabotage (Power)											
Strikes (Labor)											
Strikes (Schools)											

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(3) 1948 Communist Activities in South KOREA.

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUG	TOTAL
Attacks on towns				5	73	9	1		88
Attacks on police		130	118	50	86	12	11	9	416
Police killed		33	20	15	34	4	1	5	112
Rightists killed	1	14	14	81	144	51	10		315
Communists killed	1	74	75	70	155	83	33	19	510
Disorders, demonstra- tions, arson, attacks on rightists' offices and homes	6	118	69	126	196	81	24	10	630
Attacks on government buildings		9	14	2	9	3			37
Sabotage (Communica- tions)	14	53	58	32	57	8	1		223
Sabotage (RR lines)	1	12	6		8		1		28
Sabotage (locomotives)		50			24				74
Sabotage (roads)		13	5	2	5				25
Sabotage (bridges)		6	9	5	4				24
Sabotage (power)					7	1			8
Strikes (labor)		14	6	3	16	1			40
Strikes (school)		7	5	4	9				25

d. Other Violence

(1) No rightist inspired acts of violence were reported during the period.

(2) A summary of acts of violence on the part of persons of unknown political affiliation as reported up to 27 August 1948, is as follows:

	Seoul	Kyonggi Do	Kangwon Do	Chungchong Namdo	Chungchong Pukto	Cholla Namdo	Cholla Pukto	Kyongsang Namdo	Kyongsang Pukto	Chcju Do	TOTAL
Assassination											
Anti-grain collection											
Political terrorism											
Demonstration			2								2
Resistance to arrest								1	1		2
Arson											
Unclassified		1				1	1			1	4
Attacks on police											
Attacks on individuals											
Sabotage (communi- cations)											
Sabotage (railroad lines)											
Sabotage (power)											
Sabotage (bridges)											
Strikes (labor)											
Strikes (school)											

(3) Delayed Reports covering Last Week

Delayed reports of incidents involving other than communists which occurred during the week ending 20 August but which were not carried in last week's summary are:

	Secul	Kyonggi Do	Kangwon Do	Chungchong Nampo	Chungchong Pukto	Cholla Nampo	Cholla Pukto	Kyongsang Nampo	Kyongsang Pukto	Cheju Do	TOTAL
Assassination											
Anti-grain collection											
Political terrorism											
Demonstration											
Resistance to arrest							1				1
Arson											
Unclassified		1		1		2					4
Attacks on police											
Attacks on individuals								1			1
Sabotage (communications)								1			1
Sabotage (railroad lines)											
Sabotage (power)											
Sabotage (bridges)											
Strikes (labor)											
Strikes (school)											


(4) Monthly summary of acts of violence on the part of persons of unknown political affiliation:

	JULY	AUG*	TOTAL
Assassination	7		7
Anti-grain collection	2	1	10
Political terrorism	1	1	2
Demonstration	15	9	24
Resistance to arrest	5	6	11
Arson	2	3	5
Unclassified	11	11	22
Attacks on police		1	1
Attacks on individuals		2	2
Sabotage (communications)	1	2	3
Sabotage (railroad lines)			
Sabotage (power)			
Sabotage (bridges)			
Strikes (labor)			
Strikes (school)	1		1

*Incomplete

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C. WAR POTENTIAL1. Economic - Cost-of-Living

Cost of living items in SEOUL were steady during the week ending 21 August. Rice, the only item which rose in price, reached 1,250 won per small mal. (Source: National Price Administration).

Cost of Living Items Checked in SEOUL (16-21 August)

Polished rice	Matches	Flannelette
Barley	Beef	Kwang-mak (cloth)
Wheat flour	Pork	Silk myungju (cloth)
Soy beans	Eggs	Silk sook soo (cloth)
Red beans	Radishes	Anthracite
Dried myungtal (fish)	Korean cabbage	Firewood
Sugar	Rubber shoes	Cotton Socks
Salt	Laundry soap	Charcoal
	Soy sauce	

RICE PRICE SUMMARY * MONTHLY AVERAGES

Unit: 1 small mal (16.67 lbs)

	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>	<u>JULY</u>	<u>27 AUG*</u>
SEOUL	743	746	707	655	740	895	1053	1310
KANGWON DO	791	860	772	750	816	920	1033	
CHUNGCHONG PUKTO	586	657	654	600	723	943	900	
CHUNGCHONG NAMDO	630	662	613	576	660	860	943	
KYONGSANG PUKTO	541	550	502	550	583	807	983	
KYONGSANG NAMDO	650	707	650	640	666	868	973	
CHOLLA PUKTO	608	608	550	566	703	850	942	
CHOLLA NAMDO	558	575	508	541	728	875	1008	
CHEJU DO	733	680	617	740	733	983	1708	
AVERAGE	648	676	619	659	706	889	1060	

Source: National Price Administration (except 27 August price).

* 27 August Price: Source: Open markets (5) in SEOUL; price is for new small mal (18.48 lbs or 10 liters)

Currency Exchange Rate: U.S. dollar equals 1100 won
(OPEN MARKET) Military script dollar equals 370 won

2. Population

a. <u>Surrendered and Disarmed</u>	No change:	179,376
b. <u>Progress of Repatriation</u>	<u>This Period</u>	<u>To Date</u>
<u>Japanese Civilians Arriving from</u> N of 38°N KOREA, CHINA and MANCHURIA	0	288,532
<u>Japanese Evacuated to JAPAN</u>	0	884,296
<u>Total Koreans Returning</u>	891*	2,158,916

*Incomplete report

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	<u>This Period</u>	<u>To Date</u>
<u>Total Repatriated Mined Since</u> <u>15 August 1945</u>		3,042,618
c. <u>Koreans Apprehended While Attempting</u> <u>Illegal Entry to JAPAN</u>	405	25,243

COMMENT: The small number of Koreans returning this week reflects the close supervision the North Koreans are maintaining over the 38th parallel during the period of the North Korean election.

D. PSYCHOLOGICAL1. National Traitors:

a. Moderate Press Comment: SEOUL's moderate newspapers spear-headed the prodding of the National Assembly into passing an effective national traitor law. The editor of CHOSUN ILBO (Korean Daily News) portrayed a nation "burning with indignation" because its leaders had failed to rectify the errors of the Military Government in permitting the employment of "traitors" in high positions. "Traitors" said CHOSUN ILBO, include not only those in the police department and other government offices but also persons who acquired wealth and rank through nefarious means in the fields of finance, industry, politics, and journalism. This paper demanded a thorough purge of all officials in the present government who are found to have been "catpaws" of the Japanese.

MINJU ILBO (Democratic News) also pointed out the "injurious effect" of the appointments of "national traitors" to government posts. It, too, urged that the "evil influence which bled the Military Government" be removed from the present administration.

SEOUL SHIN MUN (Seoul Daily News) contrasted the rapidity of the action taken against traitors in North KOREA with the obvious reluctance to take similar steps in South KOREA. "Swift and correct" punishment of persons who committed "anti-Korean acts" was advocated. The paper asserted that efforts of former officials in the Japanese Government to obtain positions in the new government were scandalous and that measures should be taken against them immediately to prevent wholesale corruption and the downfall of the administration.

b. Other Comment: Rightist DAE HAN ILBO (Great Korean Daily), on the other hand, advised that only the most important traitors be punished because, said the editor, "all who had to work under the Japanese are guilty, more or less."

Another point of view was present in the following statement by a revered old non-political Korean on 20 October 1945:

"There are hundreds of able and useful men who are denounced and ostracized as Pro-Japanese. But who are the self-righteous denouncers? Most of them are the very fellows who, up to the "Noon of the 15th of August 1945," bowed to the East, repeated the Japanese national oath, and shouted banzai for the Tenna, on every public occasion in schools, in churches, in factories, in Government and great business offices, in department stores and in wedding and funeral gatherings. Most of them Japanized their names. Why did they do these pro-Japanese things? Simply they had to or go to jail. Why do they, then, throw first stones at others? For two reasons: (1) to throw dust into the eyes of people to cover up their unsavory past; (2) to extort money from the fears and worries of certain persons for party and personal pockets.

"Indeed it is absurd to stigmatize anybody for having been pro-Japanese. During the 34 years of Japanese annexation (from 1911 to 1945) what was the status of KOREA? Was she an independent Kingdom? No. She was a part of JAPAN, and so recognized by other Powers including America. If so, the Koreans were Japanese, willy nilly. Then, as the subjects of JAPAN, what alternative could we, who had to live in KOREA, have but to obey the orders and demands, however, arbitrary, of the Japanese regime? If we had to send our sons to battlefields and our daughters to factories, could we refuse to do anything that the militarists commanded? Therefore it is a nonsense to denounce anybody for what he did under the status of a Japanese subject."

2. Transfer of Administration

Several editors expressed anxiety regarding the delay in the transfer of administration from American to Korean hands. Newspapers commented nervously on the "lip-deep promises" made to effect the transfer immediately. SEOUL SHIN MUN stated on 27 August that "already a week has gone by since the proclamation of the Korean Republic, but still there is little progress in the transfer of the asserted administrative power." That only undelayed transfer can sweep away the misunderstanding and doubt of the Korean people.

CHA YOO SHIN MUN (Korean Free Press) a moderate newspaper, implied that the procrastination in the activities of the U.S. and Korean conferees was resulting in restlessness among the people. Rightist BOO IN SIN BO (Women's Press) "could not help pointing out" that the "American attitude prior to the establishment of the Korean Government was far different from its present attitude, which is very obscure." The editor warned that unless the situation is altered considerably the independence of the Korean Republic will prove to be a falsehood.

COMMENT: The nationalistic pride and impetuosity of the Korean is abundantly evidenced by the haste to seize complete authority over all phases in the administration of their country without allowing even a reasonable period for the explanation of the details of the functioning of Korean governmental machinery. American representatives in the transferral negotiations have reported that progress has in general been smooth; the majority of the occasional delays in the proceedings are attributable to Korean reluctance to accept any decision which entails American supervision over any aspect of present operations, no matter how brief or limited such supervision may be. It is believed that public anxiety to complete the transfer will help to spur Korean representatives in the negotiations to more prompt positive action in order to speedily accomplish transfer of authority. (See Part I, 2, C (2)).

3. Proclamation Number 2:

CHOSUN ILBO, on 21 August, saw no reason for the continued existence of the "MacARTHUR Ordinance" (Proclamation Number 2) "which was proclaimed for the purpose of protecting occupational forces. The paper demanded the release of " 1,654 persons" who have been imprisoned for violating the "dishonorable ordinance."


4. General HODGE

The departure of General HODGE occasioned numerous editorials which praised the American Commander's unrelenting fight for Korean independence and rehabilitation. Right-wing PYUNG WHA ILBO (Peace Daily) and moderate HAN SUNG ILBO (Seoul Daily) as well as other newspapers expressed sincere gratitude for the "virtue, ability and kindness" which enabled General HODGE to fulfill a difficult task. Editors revealed a common desire that the departing General continue his struggle for the prosperity and freedom of the Korean people.

E. SABOTAGE AND ESPIONAGE

Negative

KOREAN GOVERNMENT



— RESPONSIBILITY
- - - MEMBERSHIP

D. DIRECTOR
AD. ASST. DIRECTOR

M. MINISTER
VM. VICE MINISTER

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HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
APO 235

28 August 1948

COMMANDING GENERAL'S STATEMENT TO U.S. PERSONNEL

The following statement was issued to all U.S. personnel in Korea by the Commanding General prior to his departure:

"I have known for several weeks that I would soon be faced with saying farewell to the USAFIK occupation team. I have tried to find words to express fully my deep emotion at leaving this fine command and my sincere appreciation for the loyal and faithful work done by all members of our occupation team both military and civilian. I now realize that the words I know are inadequate to carry the thoughts.

"My dilemma has been partially solved during the past few days by the receipt of a letter from the President of the United States and message from the Secretary of the Army. They are addressed to me as the Commander of our team, but as that Commander, I am in a position to know that they are in actuality a personal commendation to each man and woman of you. I pass the letter and message on to you with the hope that each one of you will realize as well as I do how utterly impossible it would have been for your commander to have accomplished anything without your loyal and sustained support and the high degree of teamwork you have displayed in working for our mission."

"LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES"

"The White House
Washington
August 15, 1948

" My Dear General Hodge:

" The achievement of constitutional government in Southern Korea completes the difficult task that was assigned to you. Your mission has been accomplished with outstanding success.

" As the government of this area is turned over to the Korean people, it must be very satisfying to you, as it is to our Government, to know that you have been instrumental in restoring freedom to a persecuted nation.

" You led United States troops to liberate Korea from the tyranny of a ruthless conqueror. The people of your area of this troubled country have held a free election in which a remarkably high percentage of the qualified voters participated. Now the responsibility for their own destiny rests with the elected representatives of a free people.

" By your skill, initiative and diplomacy you have overcome seemingly insurmountable obstacles and you have earned the gratitude of the people, both of the United States and of Korea.

"Very sincerely yours,

HARRY TRUMAN"

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Inclosure #1 to XXIV CORPS G-2 W/S #154

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" MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

" On the completion of your difficult tasks in Korea I wish to express to you my hearty congratulations. The Department of the Army is deeply appreciative of the soldierly and statesmanlike manner in which you have ever handled the delicate tasks entrusted to you. I know that it must be a source of much satisfaction to you, as it is to the American people generally and especially to the Army, that the achievement of constitutional government for the Korean people should mark the end of your labors there. Your highly commendable performance of these arduous duties has brought full freedom much closer to a people who have known only foreign overlordship for almost half a century. You have reflected great credit upon yourself and the Army of the United States."

" In spite of the many obstacles and inherent difficulties we have faced here, including understrength, rapid turnover, language barriers, lack of luxury living and rugged weather conditions for a considerable portion of each year, all of you have carried on in a cheerful and determined performance of difficult duties. Many of you have had to work in uncharted fields where individual judgment and initiative were paramount and where any quitting in fact of difficulties would have been disastrous.

" Your overall occupational accomplishments are covered in the two messages. On the purely military side, this command is second to none, either statistically man for man in such matters as health, discipline, athletics and military accomplishments, or in its overall tone and its performance of duty.

" It has been an honor and privilege to work closely with so many fine American citizens. I have full confidence that each of you will continue to give the same type of efforts for your nation in aiding the Koreans that you have given in the past. I have confidence that you will give your highly qualified new Commander, General Coulter, the same loyalty you have given to me.

" In saying a personal 'Farewell' to each of you, I add that no matter where I go or what I do in new permanent assignment, The Korean Command will be high in my thoughts and in my prayers and I shall watch with great interest your successes in the great work of stabilization still to be done here.

"To each and every member of the USAFIK occupation team I say 'Good luck, God Bless you, and I hope we meet again.'"

28 August 1948

COMMANDING GENERAL'S STATEMENT TO THE
KOREAN PEOPLE

On 25 August Lieutenant General John R. HODGE, Commanding General, United States Army Forces in Korea, released to the press the following message to the Korean People:

"After spending three years in your country and working for and with the Korean people toward establishment of their sovereign independence, I find it difficult to say farewell. During the period I have grown to respect and admire the Korean people and I believe I have grown to understand them. The only Koreans I do not admire are the Communists and their fellow travelers who are trying to sell your nation to the slavery of foreign dictatorship, and the grasping opportunistic politicians who work only for their own selfish gain.

"Although I have worked for several years without a vacation, I am gratified that I have stayed in Korea until the establishment of the Korean Government and to have seen the hundreds of thousands of happy Korean people celebrating that event on 15 August. I am gratified both because it marks a great achievement for the Korean people and because I feel that the United States Army Forces in Korea have been able to help in the establishment of this government.

"The future success of the Republic of Korea now rests entirely in the hands of the Korean people themselves. This is as it should be and is as the Korean people and free nations of the world wish it to be. This new status carries with it great responsibility, not only for Korean leaders, but for the entire Korean people. The leaders must drop all selfish personal ambitions and work solely for the welfare of the entire Korean nation. The people must unite in support of the government and forget their petty quarrels if the national independence is to be sustained. All must operate through their elected representatives to make their government what they want it to be. Pressure groups, operating for this or against that, must be avoided. The Korean people must be willing to accept and to make full and intelligent use of all outside assistance that is available. I have confidence that the patriotism and good sense of the Korean people, combined with their desire to maintain their sovereignty, will carry their nation to full united independence if they use their powers intelligently.

"I have made many hundreds of personal friends among the Korean people that I will greatly miss when I am gone. These friends include a large number of farmers, villagers and boys and girls in the country who have hunted with me during three winters in Korea, but do not know my name or official status. I shall miss them as much as I will prominent men and women, since their friendship is the comradeship of kindred spirits. Many of my best friends are those patriotic citizens who have labored faithfully in running the South Korean Interim Government to make possible the establishment of the new government, too often unthanked and unappreciated by their fellowmen. Many of my friends are in high places in the new Government, in business, industry and cultural pursuits. I deeply regret that I do not have the chance to tell them all goodbye in person.

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"In this, my final statement to the Korean people, I express to all of you my personal appreciation and thanks for the thousands of kindnesses and courtesies you have extended to me, and wish every one of you happiness, prosperity, good health and peace under your own sovereign government of a united Korea. You will never be out of my thoughts. Farewell, and may my God and your God bless you and guide you in all things."

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Inclosure #2 to XXIV CORPS G-2 W/S #154

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