

PART I  
SOUTH KOREAFrom: 111200/I June 48  
To: 181200/I June 48Headquarters, USAFIK  
Seoul, Korea  
18 June 1948

No. 144

Maps: KOREA, 1/250,000  
East ASIA, 1/1,000,000A. ARMED FORCES1. Strength (Secret)

Police:	34,900
Constabulary:	60,954 (including 26,116 recruits)
Coast Guard:	2,999 (including 131 cadets)

2. Operational Activity (Confidential)a. Border Incidents

At 141045 June three Americans and two Koreans were fired upon by North Korean Constabularymen while on route to inspect the irrigation reservoir at (836.4-1697.9). One Korean member of the party was slightly wounded. (A-1)

At 142140 June a South Korean police patrol was ambushed near (910.1-1696.9) by North Korean Constabularymen. One South Korean was wounded. (C-3)

On 14 June the missing South Korean Coast Guard vessel "KOWON" was reported by Radio PYONGYANG to have landed at WUISAN (1040-1830). (Radio PYONGYANG)

At 151020 June South Korean police at (1090.6-1696.4) were fired upon from north of the parallel by North Korean Constabularymen. (C-3)

At 171030 June a large group of the North Korean Constabulary crossed the parallel near (919.3-1693.8) and molested South Korean farmers until forced to withdraw by South Korean police. (B-3)

At 171730 June a DAI DONG YOUTH member, while patrolling the parallel with five other members, was wounded by two of about 30 rounds of rifle fire from about 60 North Korean Constabularymen. The South Korean patrol was located at (916.2-1696.6) whereas the NKCC were located at (916.3-1697.1). (Police report)

COMMENT: The first incident listed above occurred at the same place at which a group of Americans and Koreans was fired upon on 26 May 1948 (See W/S #141). The letters of 29 May and 02 June to the Soviet Commander concerning attacks on Americans remain unanswered.

The number of incidents reported this week, 5, is a sharp decline from the totals of the past two weeks, 9. It may be that this decline is the result of new orders to the South Korean police to avoid contact with North Koreans whenever possible.

b. Constabulary Action on CHEJU DO

The Constabulary completed operation Order Number 4. Fifty-three prisoners were taken, 4 raiders were killed attempting to escape and raider supply points containing about 2 tons of miscellaneous supplies were captured. The island commander believes that operations in the mountains are complete.

B. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE1. National Assemblya. Proceedings

During the period covered the National Assembly met six times. The major issues considered were: a resolution inviting North Koreans to hold a free election and participate in the National Assembly; selection of a new Nominating Committee; approval of the Nominating Committee's proposals; bombing incident of LIANCOURT ROCKS (see para D); and the summer grain collection program.

At the 12 June session, a resolution expressing the sentiments of the National Assembly toward its fellow countrymen in North KOREA was adopted. The resolution pointed out that the CAIRO and POTSDAM Conferences had promised Korean independence but that trusteeship, as proposed by the MOSCOW Agreement, was not the proper solution. Therefore, the US-USSR Joint Commission had failed and it was necessary for the United Nations to solve the problem by holding a free election in the area where it was possible. It commiserates with the North Koreans because they could not hold a free election due to the Soviet boycott of the UN Resolution, and it concludes with the statement:

"Hereby we, all the members of the National Assembly, resolve to express our sincerest desires to our fellow countrymen in North KOREA:

"We hope you, our fellow countrymen in North KOREA, will hold a general election soon in a free atmosphere, in accordance with the UN Resolution as we did, and elect the true representatives of the people, sending them to the National Assembly (to sit with us)."

On the same day a new Nominating Committee was approved by the Assembly (paragraph b, below).

At the 15 June session a motion was made calling for investigation of the bombing of Korean fishing vessels by American aircraft on 08 June off LIANCOURT ROCKS, which was reported in all local newspapers. The Assembly approved an amended motion to refer the question to the Foreign Affairs Committee. On 16 June, a representative of the Commanding General, USAFIK, made a statement for him to CHANG Myun, of the Foreign Affairs Committee, assuring him that no Korea-based planes were involved in any such reported incident, that an investigation was under way and as soon as completed a full report would be made, and that if it was found that U.S. forces were responsible the UNITED STATES would do everything possible to compensate and comfort the bereaved.

A question pertaining to the continuance of the summer grain collection program came up before the assembly on 15 June and was referred to the Committee on Agriculture for inquiry and report.

By a unanimous vote, the National Assembly adopted a resolution of appreciation for friendly remarks toward KOREA made by the President of the UNITED STATES on 12 June at Berkeley, California.

COMMENT: CHO Bong Am, representative from INCHON who claims to be an anti-Stalin communist showed pro-Stalin prejudices during the debate on the resolution adopted at the 12 June session. CHO opposed the proposed resolution because it was not "pro-USSR." He said he would oppose such an anti-USSR resolution outside of the Assembly also.

A portent of a possible trend may have been revealed during the 12 June meeting. During debate on the resolution passed by the Assembly on that date, SHIN Ik Hi, in the chair, on three different occasions refused to recognize Dr. RHEE when the latter sought the floor. On issues of greater importance, SHIN Ik Hi is reputed to be prepared to oppose RHEE. Should SHIN support the HANKOOK DEMOCRATIC PARTY-sponsored draft constitution, which is to be presented to the Assembly on 21 June, the provision for a Prime Minister and a responsible cabinet may be adopted over RHEE's objections.

b. Committees

The Constitution Committee during the week debated and adopted a draft constitution to be presented to the National Assembly on 21 June. A major change in the original draft prepared by YU Chin Ho, member of the special committee of legal assistants appointed to advise the Constitution Committee, was the rejection of the bicameral system of government in favor of a unicameral body. The controversial article calling for the creation of a cabinet and prime minister was upheld by the committee.

A new Nominating Committee composed of 19 members was selected on 12 June to nominate the required number of members of the nine Standing Committees provided for under the House Rules.

Nominations of members to the following committees, as required by Article 16 of the House Rules, were approved by the Assembly on 17 June:

<u>COMMITTEE</u>	<u>MEMBERSHIP</u>
1. Legislative and Judicial	20
2. Foreign Affairs and National Defense	30
3. Internal Affairs and Public Peace	20
4. Fiscal and Economic	40
5. Industrial, Labor, and Agricultural	40
6. Education and Welfare	20
7. Transportation and Communication	15
8. Qualifications	15
9. Discipline	15

c. Factions and Parties

Three parties or factions have thus far developed prominence in the National Assembly:

- (1) The HANKOOK DEMOCRATIC PARTY claims 86 members of whom about 70 are reported to be amenable to discipline.
- (2) The SAM IL Club, headed by SHIN Ik Hi and LEE Chung Chnm, was formed in opposition to the HDP and claims approximately 60 members.
- (3) On 10 June The INDEPENDENT Club was formed by merging the YOON IL (6-1) and the MINU Club. Led by CHO Bong Am, (see comment par B, 1, a) the INDEPENDENCE Club claims a membership of 52 representatives and appears to represent leftist political views.

COMMENT: Factions within the various clubs make it difficult to determine club or "party" strength. On any issue which may arise, SHIN Ik Hi is said to be able to deliver 24 votes and LEE Chung Chun 13. The INDEPENDENCE Club is composed of members without common objectives who may be expected to split apart in a strong contest.

Other clubs previously reported, such as the YOUNG MEN'S Club, do not now appear to be separate political organizations.

d. Relations with UNTCOCK

UNTCOCK has failed to place itself on record as formally recognizing the Korean National Assembly. Determined efforts have been made by individual members of the Commission to obtain UNTCOCK recognition of the National Assembly, but so far they have met an equally adamant opposition.

COMMENT: A resolution adopted by the Commission on 10 June informing the representatives to the National Assembly that UNTCOCK "is now ready for such consultation as the elected representatives may request" carefully avoided any reference to the Korean National Assembly. De facto recognition however, appears to have been made since the cover letter was addressed to "Dr. Syng Man RHEE, Chairman of the Korean National Assembly." This issue is still under debate at UNTCOCK.

e. Roster of National Assembly Officers and Committees (Unclassified)

A roster of Korean National Assembly Officers and Committees follows:

	<u>NAME</u>	<u>PARTY</u>
Chairman:	RHEE Syng Man	NSAKI
Vice-Chairman:	SHIN Ik Hŭ	NSAKI
	KIM Dong Won	HDP
Secretary General:	Dr. CHUN Kyu Hong (non-member)	
Liaison Committee:	(5 members)	
	YUN Chi Yung	KNYC
	LEE Han Koo	KIP
	CHANG Ki Yung	HDP
	CHANG Myun	INDEPENDENT *
	KIM Doo Yun	HDP
Ways & Means Committee:	(3 members)	
	KIM Joon Yun	HDP
	PAIK Kwan Soo	HDP
	KIM Sang Don	INDEPENDENT
Correspondence & Press Committee:	(3 members)	
	HUH Jong	HDP
	CHUNG Hai Jun	NSAKI
	LEE Han Bal	INDEPENDENT
Committee on Rules:	(15 members)	
	SUH Chung Hŭi, Chairman	HDP
	YUN Chi Yung	HDP
	RHEE Yoo Sun	NSAKI
	CHUNG Koo Chan (San)	NSAKI
	SUNG Nak Su	NSAKI
	KIM Myung Dong	INDEPENDENT
	BAI Hoon	INDEPENDENT
	KIM Bong Doo	INDEPENDENT
	CHUNG Kwang Ho	HDP
	KIM Chang Wul	INDEPENDENT
	KIM Yak Soo	KOREA REPUBLICAN PARTY
	RHEE Won Hong	NSAKI
	CHOI Yoon Dong	HDP
	CHUN Chin Han	DAI HAN LABOR LEAGUE
	CHANG Ki Yung	INDEPENDENT

\*Catholic leader

	<u>NAME</u>	<u>PARTY</u>
Constitution Drafting Committee: (30 members)		
	SU Sang Il, Chairman	HDP
	LEE Yun Yung, Vice Chairman	CDP
	LEE Chung Chun	DAI DONG YOUTH
	CHO Bong An	INDEPENDENT
	SU Sung Dal	NSAKI
	HONG Ik Pyo	INDEPENDENT
	KIM Kyung Bai	INDEPENDENT
	KIM Hyo Suk	NSAKI
	PAK Hai Keuk	INDEPENDENT
	KOO Choong Hoi	INDEPENDENT
	HUH Jong	HDP
	KIM Sang Duk	MIN TONG
	LEE Kang Oo	INDEPENDENT
	CHUNG Do Yung	NSAKI
	KIM Ik Ki	NSAKI
	CHO Hun Yung	HDP
	YUN Byung Ho	INDEPENDENT
	YOO Hong Uyl	INDEPENDENT
	LEE Han Koo	INDEPENDENT
	LEE Chong Lin	INDEPENDENT
	KIM Myung In	INDEPENDENT
	CHOI Kyu Ok	NSAKI
	PAIK Kwan Soo	HDP
	O Yong Kook	HDP
	SHIN Hyun Don	NSAKI
	YOON Suk Koo	INDEPENDENT
	O Suk Choo	NSAKI
	KIM Joon Yun	HDP
	KIM Ok Choo	INDEPENDENT
	YOO Sung Kap	TAN MIN

Outside Specialists Assisting the Constitution Drafting Committee:  
(10 members)

RO Chin Sul,	Chief Justice
YU Chin O,	Author and Professor of Law at Korea University
KO Pyung Kook,	Ex-Dean of the Law of College of Seoul National University
KWON Sung Yul,	Deputy Director of Department of Justice
IM Moon Hwan,	Research Officer of National Economic Board
CHA Yun Hong,	Secretary of National Election Committee and Businessman
YUN Kil Choong,	Secretary of National Election Committee and Former Legal Expert with KILA
KIM Yong Kun,	Secretary of National Election Committee and Former Legal Expert with KILA
RO Yong Ho,	Secretary of National Election Committee and Former Legal Expert with KILA
HAN Kun Cho,	Lawyer

Abbreviations used to denote party affiliations:

NSAKI	NATIONAL SOCIETY FOR THE ACCELERATION OF KOREAN INDEPENDENCE
HDP	HANKOOK DEMOCRATIC PARTY
CDP	CHOSEN DEMOCRATIC PARTY
KNYC	KOREAN NATIONAL YOUTH CORPS
KIP	KOREAN INDEPENDENCE PARTY

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## 2. Communist Aims and Operating Procedure

South KOREA's reorganizing communist minority is presently emphasizing new, old and seasonal aims with the intent to engage in active anti-government operations. The 11 aims listed below have been discussed in clandestine meetings and publicized surreptitiously since the communist failure to negate the 10 May elections:

1. "Eliminate" all rightists in the National Assembly.
2. "Eliminate" all rightists who cooperate with or work for Military Government.
3. "Oppose" the summer grain collection.
4. "Oppose" the sale of vested farm lands to the farmers. (Communists advocate confiscation of land from large property holders without compensation, and free redistribution of this land to the farmers as has been done on a large scale in North KOREA.)
5. "Oppose" the South Korean government.
6. "Oppose" recruiting for the Constabulary. (Communists term this recruiting "forced mobilization.")
7. "Support" the political view of anti-separate government as voiced by Rightist KIM Koo and Middle-Roader KIM Kyu Sik.
8. "Support" the "people's fight" on CHEJULDO.
9. "Demand" the immediate withdrawal of both armies from KOREA.
10. "Demand" the release of patriots from jails.
11. "Demand" more rations.

B-2 information claims that SOUTH KOREA LABOR PARTY operational orders, already issued, call for the organization of three-man fighting groups which are to collect weapons to be used in fighting for the above aims. Examples of assignments are: blacksmiths and jewelers are to make hand grenades, employees of trucking companies are to obtain gasoline for sabotage purposes, and in at least one province each communist is to report the names and movements of at least eight rightists and employees of Military Government.

C-3 information reports that current operational instructions remind communists that "the manner of fighting should exhibit great cruelty"... "it is a victory for us to sacrifice 10 persons for one policeman."

## 3. Civil Unrest

a. At least 29 people died in South KOREA this week as communist assassins struck at rightists, and as police ran down and fought small battles with communist squads. Among those assassinated this week was Colonel PAK Chin Kyung, Commanding Officer of the Korean Constabulary forces on CHEJULDO and an outstanding combat leader. His assassin escaped.

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b. Weekly Violence Summary

A summary of acts of violence involving communists for the week as reported up to 18 June is as follows:

	Seoul	Kyonggi-Do	Kangwon-Do	Chung-Do	Chungcheong-Do	Pukto	Cholla-Namdo	Cholla-Pukto	Kyongsang-Namdo	Kyongsang-Pukto	Cheju-Do	Total
Attacks on towns											1	1
Attacks on police							1					1
Police killed							2					2
Communists killed							6			10	5	21
Rightists killed							4		1	2	1	8
Demonstrations, disorders, arson, & attacks on rightists										3	1	4
Attacks on government buildings							1					1
Sabotage (communications)												
Sabotage (RR lines)												
Sabotage (roads)												
Sabotage (bridges)												
Sabotage (power)												
Strikes (labor)												
Strikes (schools)												

c. Delayed Reports Covering Last Week

Delayed reports of incidents that occurred during the week ending 11 June which were not carried in last week's summary (see Part 1, B, 4, a., W/S #143) are:

	Seoul	Kyonggi-Do	Kangwon-Do	Chungcheong-Do	Pukto	Chungcheong-Namdo	Cholla-Namdo	Cholla-Pukto	Kyongsang-Namdo	Kyongsang-Pukto	Cheju-Do	Total
Attacks on towns												
Attacks on police												
Police killed												
Communists killed						1	1			1		3
Rightists killed			1						2	1	6	10
Demonstrations, disorders, arson, & attacks on rightists			1							1		2
Attacks on government buildings												
Sabotage (communications)									1			1
Sabotage (RR lines)												
Sabotage (roads)												
Sabotage (bridges)												
Sabotage (power)												
Strikes (labor)												
Strikes (schools)												

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d. 1948 Communist Activities In South KOREA


	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE*</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>Attacks on towns</u>	0	0	0	5	73	4	82
<u>Attacks on police</u>	0	130	118	50	86	7	391
<u>Police killed</u>	0	33	20	15	34	2	104
<u>Communists killed</u>	1	74	75	70	155	4	423
<u>Rightists killed</u>	1	14	14	81	144	23	277
<u>Disorders, demonstrations arson &amp; attacks on rightists' offices &amp; homes</u>	6	118	69	126	196	29	544
<u>Attacks on government buildings</u>	0	9	14	2	9	1	35
<u>Sabotage (communications)</u>	14	53	58	32	57	5	219
<u>Sabotage (RR lines)</u>	1	12	6	0	8	0	27
<u>Sabotage (RR locomotives)</u>	0	50	0	0	24	0	74
<u>Sabotage (roads)</u>	0	13	5	2	5	0	25
<u>Sabotage (bridges)</u>	0	6	9	5	4	0	24
<u>Sabotage (power)</u>	0	0	0	0	7	0	7
<u>Strikes (labor)</u>	0	14	6	3	16	0	39
<u>Strikes (schools)</u>	0	7	5	4	9	0	25
<u>Attacks on registration &amp; election booths</u>	0	0	0	58	68	0	126

\* Incomplete

e. KIYC Recruiting Draws Rightist Wrath

The recruiting program of SKIG's KOREAN NATIONAL YOUTH CORPS has brought the wrath of the rightist GREAT KOREAN INDEPENDENCE YOUNG MEN'S CORPS down upon it in TAECHANG NI (1073-1567), according to a delayed report. The rightists attacked the KIYC during the latter's local dedication ceremonies on 09 June. On the following day (KIYMC members kidnapped two KIYC members and beat them into unconsciousness. (C-3)

CIVIL UNREST CHART



LEGEND

- |                     |                              |
|---------------------|------------------------------|
| ○ COMMUNIST KILLED  | ☉ ATTACKS ON TOWNS           |
| ⊙ RIGHTIST KILLED   | Ⓜ ATTACKS ON GOVT. BUILDINGS |
| ⊕ ATTACKS ON POLICE | ⊗ POLICE KILLED              |

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C. WAR POTENTIAL1. Electric Power Situation (See Part II, par. B, 1)2. Cost-of-Living

The upward trend in prices continued in SEOUL during 07-12 June. Eleven of the 25 cost-of-living items checked\* increased from 1 to 7%, with firewood again showing the biggest rise. (See W/S #143, Part I, C,1,b.)

A decline was seen in the price of five items, but the drops were substantial. Korean cabbage fell 13%, salt 12.5%, dried nyungtai 11.76%, radishes 11.39%, and sugar 9.09%.

The 930 won peak which rice hit last week was surpassed. On 11 June polished rice was selling for 940 won per small mal in SEOUL. The new high is attributable, in part, to (1) the effect of the draught on the barley harvest prior to last week's rains, and (2) farmers holding rice for higher prices.

The sizeable fall in the price of rice at the end of the last period proved to be short-lived and was due to the effect of the appearance of long-awaited rains.

\*Cost of Living Items Checked in SEOUL (07-12 June)

x Polished rice	Matches	Flannelette
x Barley	Beef	Kwang-mok (cloth)
Wheat	Pork	x Silk nyungju (cloth)
x Soybeans	x Eggs	x Silk sooksoo (cloth)
x Red beans	- Korean cabbage	Cotton socks
- Dried nyungtai (fish)	- Radish	x Anthracite
Soy sauce	x Rubber shoes	x Firewood
- Sugar	x Laundry soap	Charcoal
- Salt		

x Increase  
- Decrease

Rice Price Summary (Monthly Averages)  
Unit: 1 small mal (16.67 lbs)

	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>18 JUNE</u>
SEOUL	743	746	707	655	740	940
KANGWON DO	791	860	772	750	**	
CHUNGCHONG PUKTO	586	657	654	600	723	
CHUNGCHONG NAMDO	630	662	613	576	660	
KYONGSANG PUKTO	541	550	502	550	583	
KYONGSANG NAMDO	650	707	650	640	656	
CHOLLA PUKTO	608	608	550	566	703	
CHOLLA NAMDO	558	575	508	541	728	
CHEJU DO	733	680	617	740	**	
AVERAGE	648	676	619	659		

Source - \*\* Data not yet available  
National Price Administration, SKIG

5. Population

a. <u>Surrendered and Disarmed</u>	-	No change:	179,376
b. <u>Progress of Repatriation</u>	-	<u>This Period</u>	<u>To Date</u>
<u>Japanese Civilians Arriving from</u> <u>N of 38° N KOREA, CHINA and MANCHURIA</u>		0	288,529
<u>Japanese Evacuated to JAPAN</u>		6	884,033
<u>Total Koreans Returning</u>		2,060*	2,123,203
<u>Total Repatriates Moved Since 15 Aug 45</u>			3,007,856
c. <u>Koreans Apprehended While Attempting</u> <u>Illegal Entry to JAPAN</u>		0	23,923

\* Incomplete report

D. PSYCHOLOGICALThe Press - Public Opinion

a. The LIANCOURT ROCKS Incident: On 11 June the right-wing CHOSUN ILBO (Korean Daily News) reported that on 08 June unidentified planes bombed and strafed fifteen fishing vessels near the LIANCOURT ROCKS, about 140 miles east of KANGWON Province. (The CHOSUN ILBO report of the effects of the bombing and strafing closely approximated a later report from a USAF agent: 16 persons killed or missing, 8 seriously wounded, 21 persons slightly wounded; 23 fishing vessels were involved in the incident. On the following day, the incident was carried and enlarged upon by all metropolitan newspapers, along with the comments by Korean spokesmen, who exploited the event fully even though the details of the reports are still without adequate verification.

The incident itself sufficed to arouse the indignation of the political leaders and the press, and the word "unidentified" (planes) did little to temper the statements which appeared in all SEOUL newspapers demanding that a thorough investigation, compensation, and punishment commensurate with the crime be effected immediately.

Political reactions came at once. RHEE's NSAKI suggested that the bombing incident might worsen relations between the US and KOREA; the moderate National Independence Federation indignantly declared that "weak as KOREA is, she cannot be silent when her people have been bombed by a foreign nation"; the Democratic Independence Party labeled the bombing "inhumane"; KIM Koo made a statement in which he said that unless severe punishment is dealt those responsible for the misfortune, Korean-American friendship will deteriorate; and the CHOSUN DEMOCRATIC PARTY demanded that authorities publish the "real facts" of the bombing, adding that "we cannot permit our good fishermen to be used as testing materials."

On 16 June General HODGE issued a special press release in which he stated that "no U.S. planes based on or assigned to units in KOREA were in the area, or bombed, or had any part whatsoever in the affair." He added that "further investigation, including the possibility of involvement of American planes based on JAPAN, is being conducted by the Far East Air Force and the Far East Command" and that "the Korean people can be assured that if it is found that American planes were responsible, the American authorities will do everything that can be done to compensate and to comfort the bereaved for the loss of life and property.... Koreans are urged to suspend judgment until all the facts are clarified and a full report can be made."

b. Japanese in KOREA: For approximately two weeks, beginning with a report from PUSAN that certain former Japanese officials in KOREA had returned to the peninsula for some mysterious (but no good) purpose, Korean newspapers have printed scores of articles which again aggravated fears that the Japanese were preparing to resume control over KOREA under U.S. auspices. The reports spread so rapidly and grew to such proportions that many Koreans, whose gullibility is unlimited with respect to the Japanese potential for treachery, placed some degree of credence in stories that Japanese troops were being used in current CHEJULDO operations and that the aircraft involved in the LIANCOURT ROCKS incident were piloted by Japanese.

The rumors originated from the following report carried in the moderate MIN JOO ILBO (Democratic Daily), a newcomer among SEOUL newspapers, and the source was a Korean press correspondent from PUSAN):

"On 04 June I met MIZUDA HAKOYUKI, former Japanese director of the Bureau of Finance in the Japanese Government General in KOREA. In a confused manner he told me that Shinohara TOKISABURO, former director of education, and KIMISHIMA, former vice-president of the Bank of Chosun, are also here. He (MIZUDA) failed to tell me why

they are here. Considering their high position in the Japanese imperialistic, tyrannical government in KOREA, they should be prosecuted as war criminals. Their actions here will attract much public attention, regardless of whether they are here on personal or official business."

The last sentence in this report contained remarkable verity. Reaction was immediate and acrid and emanated from all directions. CHOSUN ILBO attempted to shed light on the "dark side behind the arrival of the Japanese." The paper admitted that its sources of information were "scraps of stories, gathered from well-informed circles." It stated that one of the Japanese asserted that he had come to KOREA "to investigate the financial situation, not as a Japanese official but by the direction of MacARTHUR's headquarters." An editorial in the CHOSUN ILBO asked "Why and how have the supreme dominators of the vicious Japanese government-general come to KOREA today?" The editor went on to relate the history of Japanese aggression in the Orient and warned that unless effective precautions are taken the temporarily suppressed ambitions of JAPAN to regain control of KOREA will manifest themselves in the repetition of tyrannous subjugation. The editorial concluded with the assertion that in the U.S. policy towards JAPAN lies the key to U.S. policy in the Orient and that this policy involves the vital question as to whether the UNITED STATES will aid or abandon KOREA.

Political parties and spokesmen seized upon the rumors to take a firm stand on an ever-popular issue. The minor parties had a field day. The moderate New Progressive Party blared forth with: "It is reported that the Japanese imperialists, our permanent foes, have returned to KOREA.... This is not to be endured. If the government were responsible for this matter it would face the accusations of the entire nation. These Japanese are the topmost war criminals - (these) cruel reprobates tried to make the Korean people change their names (into Japanese). The mere mention of these monsters makes us tremble, and we demand to know who let them come and why."

The "moderate" Popular Alliance stated: "After an absence of three years, Japanese imperialists are again among us... freely and boldly striding around in KOREA... this is an insult to our people (and) raises a strong suspicion that they are planning another invasion of our country."

LYUH Woon Hong's moderate SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY declared: "...We cannot endure the thought that the Japanese who made us change our names and robbed us of our food and money for the Japanese war machine are again among us. Whoever is responsible for their coming should be prepared to be the target of scorn and hatred of the Korean patriots and citizens."

Moderate CHA YOO SHIN MUN carried a statement issued by ten political parties, including the Democratic Independence Party, the strongest, single moderate organization. In part these parties -- largely, barnacles on the grounded middle-lane vessel, National Independence Federation, piloted by KIM Kyu Sik -- announced that "we, who are responsible for the protection of freedom and independence of the Korean people vow that we 30 million Korean people, in cooperation with CHINA and all other nations threatened with attack by JAPAN, will rise up and destroy the resurgent ambitions of the Japanese imperialists."

On 16 June General HODGE issued another special press release denouncing the rumors as fabrications of the Communists and urged the Korean people to "be alert to detect, disregard and discredit these falsehoods and that you (the Koreans) not become guilty of assisting those who wish to betray you by repeating Communist false rumors and propaganda, particularly during this critical period...."

COMMENT: Following the special releases on the LIANCOURT ROCKS bombing and the rumors of Japanese arrivals comment and criticism subsided. Regarding the bombing, the Commanding General's assurance that a thorough

investigation would be accomplished and full responsibility would be assumed by the UNITED STATES if her soldiers were to blame has quieted the public tide of unfavorable opinion toward the UNITED STATES. Latest comments hinted that perhaps the bombing was accidental but asked "what about the machine gunning?" Otherwise, there was general indication of a willingness to await the facts. The majority of the newspapers stopped fanning the "Japanese are back" flames, but the development conclusively emphasized the susceptibility of the Koreans regarding anti-Japanese propaganda themes: (see W/S #138, Part I, D).

The reactions to the bombing and Japanese stories again illustrate Korean ability to unite spontaneously in the face of external developments construed to be detrimental to the welfare and prestige of the Korean people. Any news, accompanied by the flimsiest of substantiation, merely suggesting the possibility of a resurgent JAPAN or infringement from any other source upon the rights of the Korean people rapidly welds the heterogeneous and bickering factions in KOREA. This susceptibility is and will continue to be fully exploited by the Soviets and their Communist propaganda machine.

E. SABOTAGE AND ESPIONAGE

On 05 June NAEPYONG NI (1087-1690) police arrested a North Korean boy who, allegedly, confessed poisoning wells in the area.

COMMENT: Many such reports of poisoning wells have been received but no authentic case of poisoning from well water has been discovered. A recent broadcast by South Korean police in CHUNCHON (1060-1680) warning the people of possible poison in local well water has resulted in a wave of rumors about all wells in South KOREA being contaminated with everything from poison to bacteriological warfare agents.

On 01 June a North Korean, allegedly a former member of the North Korean Railway Constabulary, was arrested near UIJONGBU (1000-1680). The agent admitted having made two previous trips to South KOREA to gather information.