

PART I
SOUTH KOREA

Secret

From: 141200/I May 48
To : 211200/I May 48

Headquarters, USAFIK
Seoul, Korea
21 May 1948

No. 140

Maps: KOREA, 1/250,000
East ASIA, 1/1,000,000

A. ARMED FORCES

1. Strength (Secret)

Police: No change
Constabulary: 38,123 (including 7,356 recruits)
Coast Guard : 2,911 (including 132 cadets)

2. Operational Activity (Confidential)

a. Border Incidents

On 13 May two U.S. soldiers crossed the 38th parallel into North KOREA for a "thrill." The men were apprehended by the SOVIETS, detained until 17 May and then returned to South KOREA.

At 151330 May approximately 100 North Korean Constabularymen and 30 South Korean police exchanged fire across the parallel near (889-1698). No casualties were reported.

At 151500 May two North Korean Constabularymen violated the boundary to fire on a truck moving from North KOREA into South KOREA. Three South Korean police returned the fire. There were no casualties.

Between 160245 and 160430 May approximately 70 North Korean Constabularymen twice attacked a South Korean police box near (919-1686). About 3,500 rounds were exchanged; no casualties were reported.

At about 191120 May a SOVIET YAK-9 fighter plane landed near YOJU (1050-1610). The pilot set fire to his plane and destroyed it. The pilot stated that he was lost and landed when he ran out of gasoline. He is being returned to SOVIET control.

b. Constabulary Action on CHEJU DO

Operations of the constabulary on CHEJU DO continue. On 14 May the constabulary assisted the police in repelling attacks on HALLIM (934-1138); five of the raiders were killed. On 16 May the constabulary investigated O DUNG NI (954-1146) and OSA RI (951-1149), killing one raider and taking 169 prisoners.

B. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE1. Election Results

Incomplete returns from the Office of the Chief Adviser, MG, show that 7,008,954 South Koreans, or 90.6% of the registered voters, cast ballots in the 10 May elections. Final returns are expected to vary slightly from this, but in the direction of a greater number of voters and a resulting higher percentage. The percentage of void ballots, 3.8%, is not expected to change.

Further O.C.A. statistics reveal that the government will be rightist, but that there will be a contest between the NSAKIs and HANKOOKS for control:

	Candidates declared party <u>affiliation</u>	National Election Committee estimate of <u>voting strength (incomplete)</u>
NSAKI	57	60
HANKOOK DEMOCRATIC PARTY	29	75
DAI DONG YOUTH CORPS	13	15
KOREAN NATIONAL YOUTH CORPS	6	10
KOREAN INDEPENDENCE PARTY	1	17
MINOR PARTIES	8	8
KIM KYU SIK and LEFTISTS*	---	10
NON-PARTISAN	85	
CHOSUN DEMOCRATIC PARTY	1	
	200	195

*CHO Bong Am (Inchon), KIM Pak Soo (Pusan), and KUN Choi Keun (Kwangha Island) are former communists.

COMMENT: The NEC estimate of voting strength is considered reasonable. Although RA Yong Kyun, general secretary of the HANKOOK DEMOCRATIC PARTY headquarters in SEOUL and a newly elected member of the National Assembly, notes that 84 successful candidates are members of the HANKOOK PARTY, he makes no assertion that all are loyal to the Party.

Guided by the pragmatic adage that the only former communists are buried, this office believes that CHO, KIM and YUN will represent the Soviets.

Considering the facts that the election committees were exacting in their acceptances of ballots and that a large part of the voting populace was illiterate, the percentage of void ballots is very low. This in turn is an additional indication that few communists carried out their instructions to cast blank ballots, to write in the names of persons not candidates for office, and to vote for the PEOPLE'S Committee (W/S #137).

2. Anti-Election Groups

Except on CHEJU DO (Part I, 2, b) the activities of Korean organization which opposed the 10 May election have subsided. Police action, combined with community vigilance, has discouraged a protraction of the Communist campaign to terrorize South Koreans into abandoning participation in any phase of the election, whether as candidates, officials, or voters.

3. UNTOCK Activities

Members of UNTOCK departed from SEOUL for SHANGHAI on 16 and 18 May to write their report on the pre-election and election phases of their mission in KOREA. The Commission anticipates returning to SEOUL during the first week in June.

4. Korean Interim Legislative Assembly

After a one month adjournment KILA reconvened on 19 May and passed a resolution "to commence ceremonies to dissolve at 1400 20 May." Speeches, and cocktails were the solution to the modus operandi of dissolution.

COMMENT: Although KILA failed to accomplish any great volume of constructive legislation, it did provide valuable legislative experience for its members. It must also be borne in mind that its exact status and powers were not clearly defined in the Korean mind, a deterrent to aggressive action by any legislative group. Prestige evidently attended KILA membership, for the final session reported that 11 of 32 KILA candidates were elected to the new constitutional assembly.

5. Civil Unresta. A Week's Violence In South KOREA

Communist-inspired violence abated everywhere in South KOREA following election week. A small flurry of ineffective bombing incidents against homes belonging to rightists broke out in SEOUL.

CHEJUL-DO was the only place in South KOREA where communist anti-election violence met with any degree of success (apparently the National Election Committee has decided that two of CHEJUL-DO's three seats in the new legislature remain unfilled because less than half of the ballot boxes in the two districts were received).

A summary of acts of violence involving communists for the week is as follows:

	SEOUL	KYONGGI DO	KANGWON DO	CHUNG- YONGG DO	CHUNG- SUNG DO	CHUNG- SUNG DO	CHOLLA NAMDO	CHOLLA SUNGDO	FUKYO	KYONG- NAMDO	KYONG- SANG DO	FUKYO DO	CHEJU- DO	TOTAL
Attacks on towns													3	3
Attacks on police	5						2				1			8
Police killed		1					2							3
Communists killed	1										10	2		13
Rightists killed			2				3				2	2		9
Demonstrations, disorders, arson & attacks on rightists	8			3				1	3	3	3	3		18
Attacks on government buildings														
Sabotage (communications)								1			1			2
Sabotage (RR lines)														
Sabotage (roads)														
Sabotage (bridges)													1	1
Strikes (labor)														
Strikes (school)														

b. Delayed Reports Covering Last Week

Delayed reports of incidents that occurred during the week ending 14 May which were not carried in last week's summary (see Part I, B, 3. c., W/S #139) are :

	SEOUL	GYONGGI DO	YANGWON DO	CHUNGCHONG DO	PUKTO	CHUNGCHONG NAMDO	CHOLLA NAMDO	CHOLLA PUKTO	GYONGSANG PUKTO	GYONGSANG NAMDO	PUKTO	CHUNDO	TOTAL
Attacks on towns						1				1			57
Attacks on police	5					1	1			5			17
Police killed	1					1	4		1	3			13
Communist killed									2	2			13
Rightists killed				2		2	1		7	5			31
Demonstrations, disorders, arson & attacks on rightists												2	2
Attacks on government buildings												1	1
Sabotage (communications)													
Sabotage (RR lines)													
Sabotage (roads)													
Sabotage (bridges)													
Strikes (labor)													
Strikes (school)	1												1
Attacks on voting booths		9	1	1						3			14

c. 1948 Communist Activities In South KOREA

1st 3 Weeks


	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	in MAY*	TOTAL
Attacks on towns	0	2	0	5	61	66
Attacks on police	0	130	118	53	65	366
Police killed	0	33	20	15	23	91
Rioters killed	1	74	75	70	102	321
Non-rioters killed	1	14	14	81	100	210
Disorders, demonstrations, arson & attacks on rightist offices & homes	6	118	69	126	124	434
Attacks on government buildings	0	9	14	2	7	32
Sabotage (communications)	14	53	58	32	42	199
Sabotage (RR lines)	1	12	6	0	8	27
Sabotage (RR locomotives)	0	50	0	0	24	74
Sabotage (roads)	0	13	5	2	3	23
Sabotage (bridges)	0	6	9	5	4	24
Strikes (labor)	0	14	6	3	14	37
Strikes (schools)	0	7	5	4	8	24
Attacks on registration & election booths	0	0	0	58	68	126

* Incomplete

d. Rightist Youth Groups Brawl in CHINHAE

On 13 May in CHINHAE (1160-1350) a mixed crowd of 200 rightists from the United Young Men's Party and the National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence engaged in a fight. UYNP members were accused by NSAKI members of planning to set fire to the local fire station. Two UYMP members and a fireman were injured. After police dispersed the crowd several members of the UYMP bombed the home of the assistant fire chief.

CIVIL UNREST CHART



LEGEND

○ COMMUNIST KILLED	⊗ COMMUNICATIION SABATOGGE
⊙ RIGHTIST KILLED	⊕ BRIDGE SABATOGGE
⊖ ATTACKS ON POLICE	⚡ POLICE KILLED
⊛ ATTACKS ON TOWNS	

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C. WAR POTENTIAL1. South Korean Economya. Immediate Electric Power Outlook

Prior to 14 May army operations and South Korean industry were sustained at the level at which they functioned by an average of 100,000 KW of electric power, 60,000 of which was supplied from North KOREA and 40,000 of which was produced in South KOREA.

South KOREA's power production capacity of 150,200 KW has never been realized because of these factors:

1. The hydroelectric plants depend upon spring and summer rains for capacity operation.
2. The thermal plants have never had sufficient coal to operate at capacity.
3. Equipment shortages limit the degrees of utilization of some plants.
4. Shortages of trained personnel limit the degree of utilization of the two power plants.

South Korean power production can be expected to increase because factors 2. and 3. listed above are being solved in part and because rains may be expected soon.

Commitment of coal reserves and operation of the power plant ELECTRA have permitted an immediate increase in production to a peak of about 75,000 KW at present. (The average is, of course, lower because coal reserves are insufficient for 24 hour plant operation.) If plant equipment now on order is obtained; if increased amounts of coal from JAPAN arrive; if trained personnel to operate the power plants are obtained; and if the rains come, then August could see an average production of about 90,000 KW. Attainment of this amount is considered questionable because of the difficulties in securing sufficient coal and trained personnel.

b. Cost-of-Living

Cost-of-living items* in South KOREA showed an increase in grains and cloth and a decrease in other commodities during the period 10 - 15 May.

The rise in grain prices is seasonal, while the increase in non-food items is due largely to the curtailment of government subsidies to factories producing consumer goods.

x Polished rice	Matches	x Flannelette
x Barley	Beef	x Kwang-mok (cloth)
x Wheat	Pork	x Silk myungju (cloth)
x Soybeans	x Eggs	x Silk sooksoo (cloth)
- Red beans	Korean cabbage	Cotton socks
- Dried myungtai (fish)	Radish	Anthracite
- Soy sauce	x Rubber shoes	Firewood
- Sugar	Laundry soap	Charcoal
- Salt		

x Increased
- Decreased

*Cost-of-Living Items Checked (10 to 15 May)

Rice Price Summary (Monthly Averages)

Unit: Won per small mal (16.67 lbs)

<u>AREA</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>21 MAY</u>
SEOUL	743	746	707	655	731
KANGWON DO	791	860	772	750	
CHUNGCHONG PUKTO	586	657	654	600	
CHUNGCHONG NAMDO	630	662	613	576	
KYONGSANG PUKTO	541	550	502	550	
KYONGSANG NAMDO	650	707	650	640	
CHOLLA PUKTO	608	608	550	566	
CHOLLA NAMDO	558	575	508	541	
CHEJU DO	733	680	617	750	
<u>AVERAGE</u>	648	676	619	659	

Source - National Price Administration, SKIG

2. Population

- a. Surrendered and Disarmed -- No change: 179,376
- b. Progress of Repatriation -- This Period To Date
- | | | |
|---|--------|-----------|
| <u>Japanese Civilians Arriving from</u>
<u>N of 38° N KOREA, CHINA and MANGHURIA</u> | 0 | 288,529 |
| <u>Japanese Evacuated to JAPAN</u> | 64 | 885,995 |
| <u>Total Koreans Returning</u> | 1,848* | 2,106,431 |
| <u>Total Repatriates Moved Since</u>
<u>15 August 1945</u> | | 2,990,653 |
- c. Korean Apprehended While Attempting
Illegal Entry to JAPAN 519 23,717

* Incomplete report

D. PSYCHOLOGICALThe Press

Responsibilities of the National Assembly was the chief topic of discussion for SEOUL editors. The Right-Wing press was unanimous in strongly recommending the establishment of a defense force, termed the most critical requirement for the preservation of the South Korean government. Other problems needing immediate solution, according to most metropolitan editors are unification, land reform, local administration, labor laws, and development of industry.

DONG-A ILBO observed that the PYONGYANG conference and the terrorism of the Communists failed to show results at the polls. This paper urged the rapid creation of an army because it is "doubtful" that the North Korean promise that the PEOPLE'S ARMY would not invade South KOREA would be kept.

GHOSUN ILBO, a Right-Wing paper which supported the PYONGYANG Conference, advised the successful candidates that unless they cast aside hopes for self-aggrandizement and strived to unify the nation and develop its economy, they would be subjected to the scorn of the entire electorate. The assemblymen, asserted the editor, must not seek to recover their campaign expenditures through graft as is the practice in other countries -- JAPAN, for example.

HAN SUNG ILBO joined and gave impetus to the trend which emphasized the need for unification and the concurrent necessity for building an army which could not only defend itself against imminent aggression from the North but eventually take the offensive and achieve a unified, non-communist government.

Communist-line organs have reduced their attacks upon UNTCOK, SKIG, and US policy through the medium of editorials, per se. Instead they convey their invective by "reporting" the statements of communist and moderate parties and spokesmen attacking the same targets concentrated on by Radio PYONGYANG.