

PART I
S. SOUTH KOREA

Secret

From: 071200/I May 48
To : 141200/I May 48

Headquarters, USAFIK
Seoul, Korea
14 May 1948

No. 139
Maps: KOREA, 1/250,000
East ASIA, 1/1,000,000

A. ARMED FORCES

1. Strength (Secret)

Police:	34,330
Constabulary:	31,316 (including 1,831 unsworn recruits)
Coast Guard:	2,785 (including 132 cadets)

2. Operational Activity (Confidential)

a. Border Incidents

On 06-07 May fire fights occurred between South Korean police and North Korean Constabularymen near (836-1698). These fights were caused by disagreements over the irrigation water which is controlled by reservoirs on both sides of the boundary. There have been no casualties to date in the three separate fights reported.

At 060400 May a group of fifty (50) North Korean Constabularymen violated the border, fired two rounds and threw dynamite bombs at the South Korean police station in NULMONG-NI (971-8-1695.5). South Korean police returned the fire and the NKC withdrew. No casualties were reported.

At 061605 May a US patrol was fired upon by North Korean Constabularymen who were south of the parallel near (833-1698). The North Korean Constabulary fired four (4) rounds but the Americans did not return the fire. There were no casualties in either party.

On 07 May the Coast Guard cutter TONGSHUN was seized by two former crew members who killed the Captain and Executive and forced the crew to sail the vessel to North KOREA.

On 10 May 5 or 6 North Korean Constabularymen came 200 yards south of the parallel near CHANG-NI (1084-1695), questioned the farmers and withdrew to the north. There was no firing.

At 130900 May 11 Soviet fighter planes violated the border near (981-1697) while engaged in target practice.

At 130945 May a U.S. patrol was fired upon by North Korean Constabulary in the vicinity of (833-1697). The NKC were located south of the parallel while firing. There were no casualties.

At approximately 140230 May an American patrol enroute to investigate a reported "invasion" by North Korean constabulary, was ambushed near (915-1695). It is reported that approximately thirty (30) rounds were fired and four (4) grenades were thrown. One grenade burst in the patrol vehicle, wounding a sergeant in the face. The vehicle, two carbines and a pair of field glasses were abandoned; a later patrol recovered the jeep.

b. Constabulary Action on CHEJU-DO

The primary mission of the Constabulary during the election period was the protection of balloting places. For this purpose the units were widely dispersed in small groups and no effective punitive action against the communists was undertaken. Since 12 May the Constabulary has been engaged in searching and destroying some of the numerous caves which are believed to serve as hiding places for the raiders of the island.

B. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE1. Election Returns

Incomplete and as yet unofficial election returns from the Office of the Chief Advisor, M.G., show that the 200 seat newly-elected National Assembly will be strongly rightist. If any communists were elected the most likely hiding places are the declarations "Non-partisan," "Dai Han Labor League," and "Christian Organization."

NSAKI - - - - -	56
HANKOOK DEMOCRATIC PARTY - - - - -	28
DAI DONG YOUTH CORPS - - - - -	13
CHOSUN DEMOCRATIC PARTY - - - - -	1
KOREAN NATIONAL YOUTH CORPS - - - - -	6
KOREAN INDEPENDENCE PARTY - - - - -	1
NON-PARTISAN - - - - -	82
DONG MIN DANG, CHOSUN REPUBLICAN PARTY,	
DAI HAN LABOR LEAGUE, CHRISTIAN ORGANIZATION,	
EDUCATIONAL ORGANIZATION, ONE FIVE CLUB,	
MIN TONG PARTY, PEOPLES UNIFICATION PARTY	1 each

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COMMENT: RHEE's NSAKI members won twice as many seats as the favored HANKOOK's candidates. How many of the 82 "Non-partisans" are NSAKI's or HANKOOKS has not been ascertained. The HANKOOKS, lost many seats which they felt fairly certain of winning. The Vice-Chairman of the HDP, PAIK Nam Oon, was overwhelmingly defeated by LEE Chong Chun, head of the DAI DONG YOUTH CORPS and a vice-chairman in NSAKI. It is probable that LEE exercises considerable control over the twelve (12) other DAI DONG candidates who won seats. It has been speculated that RHEE "promised" LEE Chong Chun the top post in the all-important, first-priority defense forces. In return LEE "promised" to support RHEE - against all opposition - in the future government.

RHEE has already stated to the press his preference for the election of a president by popular, rather than assembly, vote. In this event, he has good reason to believe that he will be victorious, for he has no real competition in South KOREA-wide popularity. A popular election, furthermore, would give him an opportunity to win a bona-fide victory over persons like KIM Koo, KIM Kyu Sik, KIM Seung Soo and CHO Byong Ok. These individuals are stronger than RHEE in sectarian following and are important as political powers, but they do not approach RHEE in national appeal. The two KIMs are considered to have lost the last vestiges of prestige with the shutting off of electric power. (As reported in W/S #138, Part I, B, 1, c) Their one valid claim of success in PYONGYANG was a guarantee that power would not be shut off.

It is interesting to note that, although 19 women ran for office (three of them in SEOUL electoral districts), no woman was elected.

According to Korean press articles RHEE has "advised" electees that the first task of the assembly must be the establishment of a strong defense force. Following this he will urge the North Korean People's Army to expel the Russians and join the South Korean government. In addition, U.S. forces will be requested to remain and provide arms and protection for the new government.

2. UNTOOK Activity

On 13 May, Yasin MUGHIR, Syrian delegate on the UN Commission and present UNTOOK Chairman, issued a statement in which he announced that the Commission "had not yet committed itself to advise the elected representatives to immediately establish a national government."

According to MUGHIR, members of UNTOOK expressed widely divergent "appraisals" of the 10 May elections. Some members, said MUGHIR, doubt whether "the elections will contribute to the solution of the Korean problem... and do not want to regard the elections in South KOREA as nationwide. With perhaps some reservation as to the terminology, they want to call them 'decidedly rightist elections.' Other members of the Commission, while not completely satisfied with the achievements of the Commission, are inclined to think that these elections may be one step towards the unification and sovereignty of KOREA... and that those factions which opposed the elections are a very small minority.... Still others are not ready to express a final opinion on the situation...."

MUGHIR, stated that a "certain degree of caution and reservation" should accompany UNTOOK's appraisal of the "efficiency" which surrounded the polls on election day. MUGHIR was thus referring to "certain violations of the electoral law and the recommendations of the Commission," particularly the patrolling of members of youth organization who "assisted the police in keeping peace and order."

The statement announced a desire that the representatives, before forming a government, make an effort to gain the support of "those elements which opposed the elections, in order to achieve unity for KOREA."

"General MacARTHUR had objections to the presence of the Commission in JAPAN," the statement continued, and "the Commission wishes to emphasize that it will give serious attention to the matter through official channels." The Commission has decided to write "the first part of its report outside KOREA," MUGHIR concluded.

In press release Number 63, issued 14 May 1948, the Commission stated that Mr. MUGHIR's statement in press release Number 59 (published as Annex #2 to P/R # 833) was purely a statement of his own views.

COMMENT: Mr. MUGHIR's statement is considered to have succeeded in: alarming or infuriating South Koreans; presenting MUGHIR's resentment of the attitude of SCAP; and furnishing communist propagandists with very useful material.

3. Civil Unrest

a. South Korean Public Defeats Communism At Polls

Detailed and extensive communist plottings against the election, which had been affirmed and reaffirmed by reports evaluated at "B" and lower, was met head-on and crushed by a pro-KOREA public during South KOREA's election. Communists had counted on a public lethargy, so essential wherever communists seek to seize control, which didn't exist.

For 12 weeks communists of both North and South KOREA had organized, propagandized and terrorized against an election in South KOREA. But on 10 May over 90 percent of the voting public of South KOREA cast their ballots -- not so much for either rightism or leftism but for independence.

A segment of that same public braved nearly 30 days of communistic terrorism throughout the land to serve on election committees. At least 22 were killed and more were crippled by gangs of communist terrorists who also struck at homes and families of these election officials. Candidates, four of whom were killed before election day, were subjected to an even more

concentrated campaign of terrorism. Another fraction of the public, members of patriotic youth groups, served as election-day deputies to protect queues of voters, voting booths and ballot boxes from armed communist raiders. As a result, the number of communist attempts to disrupt the election was surprisingly few in view of known communist plans.

Even at that, 14 members of this public and 5 policemen were killed in communist attacks on election day (see table: "Violence In South KOREA During the 08, 09, 10 May Election Era"). At least 277 more members of the public and 71 policemen died in the 12 weeks of communist terrorism which preceded the election (see table: "Number of Persons Killed In South KOREA During 1948"). But a patriotic Korean public cast ballots in the first general election of the nation's 4000 years.

b. Violence In South KOREA During the 08, 09, 10 May Election Era

See Table on Page 8.

c. A Week's Violence In South KOREA

Anti-election violence during election week in South KOREA was heaviest on CHEJU-DO and, on the mainland, in KYONGSANG-PUKTO.

A summary of acts of violence involving communists for the week is as follows:

- (1) 34 attacks on police: 8 in KYONGGI-DO outside of SEOUL, 7 in SEOUL, 6 in KYONGSANG-NAMDO, 4 in KYONGSANG-PUKTO, 7 on CHEJU-DO, 1 in CHUNGCHONG-NAMDO and 1 in KANGWON-DO.
- (2) 7 police killed: 3 in KYONGSANG-NAMDO, 2 in CHOLLA-NAMDO, 1 in KYONGGI-DO and 1 in KYONGSANG-PUKTO.
- (3) 42 rioters killed: 20 in KYONGSANG-PUKTO, 8 in CHOLLA-NAMDO, 3 in SEOUL, 2 in KYONGGI-DO outside of SEOUL, 2 in KANGWON-DO, 5 on CHEJU-DO, 1 in CHOLLA-PUKTO and 1 in CHUNGCHONG-NAMDO.
- (4) 45 rightists and members of rightist and police families killed: 20 on CHEJU-DO, 10 in KYONGSANG-PUKTO, 6 in CHOLLA-NAMDO, 3 in SEOUL, 2 in KYONGGI-DO outside of SEOUL, 2 in KANGWON-DO and 2 in KYONGSANG-NAMDO.
- (5) 3 attacks on government buildings: 2 in CHUNGCHONG-NAMDO and 1 on CHEJU-DO.
- (6) 12 labor strikes: 10 in KYONGSANG-PUKTO (all 10 in TAEGU) 1 in KYONGSANG-NAMDO and 1 in CHUNGCHONG-NAMDO.
- (7) 1 major school strike in TAEGU, KYONGSANG-PUKTO.
- (8) 53 attacks on voting booths: 12 in KYONGSANG-PUKTO, 11 in SEOUL, 7 in KYONGSANG-NAMDO, 6 in KYONGGI-DO outside of SEOUL, 6 on CHEJU-DO, 6 in CHUNGCHONG-NAMDO, 3 in CHOLLA-PUKTO, 1 in CHOLLA-NAMDO, and 1 in KANGWON-DO.
- (9) 8 attacks on CHEJU-DO towns.
- (10) 104 assorted demonstrations, disorders, arson cases and attacks on rightist offices and homes. The largest number of these incidents, 45, occurred on CHEJU-DO.

b. VIOLENCE IN SOUTH KOREA DURING THE 08, 09, 10 DAY PERIOD WRA (REPORTS NOT ALL CONFIRMED)

Dates	Attacks on Police	Police Killed	Communists Killed	Rightists Killed	Voting Booths Raided		Strikes *	Sabotage **	Sabotage ***	Sabotage ****
					8	9				
SEOUL	1	6				1:10				
KWANGGI DO	1	7	1			1:5		5:1		
KANG-ON DO		1				1:4		2:2	1:1	
CHUNGCHONG								6:1	1:1	2
MAIDO		1								
CHUNGCHONG										
PIKTO										
KYONGSANG	2	2								
PIKTO			1	10	3	6	3	5:2	12:10	3
KYONGSANG										4
MAIDO	3	1	1			2		5:2	2:2	2
CHOLLA										
PIKTO										
CHOLLA					1			2:2		3
MAIDO										
CHOLLA						2		1:2	1	1
MAIDO										
CHOLLA DO	7	2	2			1		2	10	3
Daily									4	
TOTAL	13	5	20	2	0	5	11	3	17	18
3 DAY									9	14
TOTAL	38								24	24
									7	6
									13	8
									37	5

* Labor and Schools
 ** Communications and Power
 *** Locomotives
 **** Railroad Lines

d. Delayed Reports Covering Last Week

Delayed reports of incidents that occurred during the week ending 07 May which were not carried in last week's summary (see Part I, B.2.b., W/S #138) are:

- (1) 6 attacks on police: 3 in KYONGSANG-PUKTO and 3 on CHEJU-DO.
- (2) 1 policeman killed on CHEJU-DO.
- (3) 30 rioters killed: 20 on CHEJU-DO, 8 in KYONGSANG-PUKTO and 2 in CHOLLA-NAMDO.
- (4) 4 rightists and members of rightist families killed in KYONGSANG-PUKTO.
- (5) 3 attacks on registration booths: 1 in CHOLLA-PUKTO, 1 in CHUNGCHONG-NAMDO and 1 in KANGWON-DO.
- (6) 1 attack on a village in CHOLLA-PUKTO.
- (7) 23 assorted demonstrations, disorders, arson cases and attacks on rightist offices and homes.

e. Number of Persons Killed In South KOREA During 1948

See table on Page 10.

f. 1948 Communist Activities In South KOREA

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	1st 2 Wks in MAY* TO	
Attacks on Police	: 0	: 130	: 118	: 50	: 46	: 350
Police Killed	: 0	: 33	: 20	: 15	: 8	: 76
Rioters Killed	: 1	: 74	: 75	: 70	: 77	: 297
Non-Rioters Killed	: 1	: 14	: 14	: 81	: 67	: 177
Disorders, Demonstrations, Arson and Attacks on Rightist Offices and Homes	: 6	: 118	: 69	: 126	: 97	: 416
Attacks on Government Buildings	: 0	: 9	: 14	: 2	: 6	: 31
Sabotage (Communication)	: 14	: 53	: 58	: 32	: 33	: 195
Sabotage (RR Lines)	: 1	: 12	: 6	: 0	: 8	: 27
Sabotage (RR Locomotives)	: 0	: 50	: 0	: 0	: 23	: 73
Sabotage (Roads)	: 0	: 13	: 5	: 2	: 2	: 22
Sabotage (Bridges)	: 0	: 6	: 9	: 5	: 3	: 23
Strikes (Labor)	: 0	: 14	: 6	: 3	: 14	: 37
Strikes (School)	: 0	: 7	: 5	: 4	: 7	: 23
Attacks on Registration & Election Booths	: 0	: 0	: 0	: 56	: 55	: 111
Attacks on Towns	: 0	: 0	: 0	: 5	: 11	: 16

* Incomplete

C. WAR POTENTIAL1. Cost-of-Living

Cost-of-living items in South KOREA showed a slight overall rise during the period 03 to 08 May. Of the 25 items*, seven increased from 3 to 12%, and four items declined from $\frac{1}{2}$ to 7% as compared to prices during the previous period. The remaining 14 items showed no change.

*Cost of Living Items Checked (03-08 May)

x Polished Rice	Matches	Flannelette
x Barley	Beef	Kwang-mok (Cloth)
x Wheat	Pork	Silk Hyungju (Clotl.
x Soybeans	x Eggs	x Silk sooksoo (Clotl.
- Red Beans	Korean cabbage	Cotton socks
- Dried nyungtai (Fish)	x Radish	Anthracite
Soy Sauce	Rubber shoes	Firewood
- Sugar	Laundry soap	- Charcoal
- Salt		

x Increased
- Decreased

Rice Price Summary (Monthly Averages)

<u>AREA</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>14 MAY</u>
SEOUL	743	746	707	655	720
KANGWON DO	791	860	772	*	
CHUNGCHONG PUKTO	586	657	654	600	
CHUNGCHONG NAMDO	630	662	613	576	
KYONGSANG PUKTO	541	550	502	*	
KYONGSANG NAMDO	650	707	650	640	
CHOLLA PUKTO	608	608	550	*	
CHOLLA NAMDO	558	575	508	541	
CHEJU DO	733	680	617	750	
AVERAGE	648	676	619	*	

* Not yet available

Official Price -- 140 won

Source -- National Price Administration, SKIG

2. Population

a. <u>Surrendered and Disarmed</u>	-	No change:	179,376
b. <u>Progress of Repatriation</u>	-	<u>This Period</u>	<u>To Date</u>
<u>Japanese Civilians Arriving from</u>			
N of 38° N'KOREA, CHINA and MANCHURIA		0	288,529
<u>Japanese Evacuated to JAPAN</u>		0	383,931

<u>Total Koreans Returning</u>	951*	2,103,620
<u>Total Repatriates Moved Since 15 Aug 1945</u>		2,986,507
c. <u>Koreans Apprehended While Attempting</u>		
<u>Illegal Entry to JAPAN</u>		23,198

* Incomplete report

D. PSYCHOLOGICALThe Press

Election Day was heralded by the majority of Right-Wing newspapers as "a day which will decide the fate of our nation," and editors urged voters to "go to the polls with the idea that you are warriors on the battle-field."

DAI DONG SHIN MUN (Great Eastern News) was very dramatic in discussing the significance of the occasion. Interesting advice offered by this paper was: "One young representative will be of greater service to our country than a thousand old loafers whose interests in the election are entirely pecuniary."

This newspaper also encouraged eradication of the feudalistic concept of male superiority and appealed to the electorate to recognize the necessity for electing women who represent "fifteen million enslaved members of their sex." The alternative to inclusion of women in the national assembly, it was warned, will be "irrevocable unhappiness" in a government totally controlled by the "special class" (men).

Having defended young representatives and women candidates, DAI DONG SHIN MUN, which carried a series of editorials on advice to the voter, struck at effective electioneering, i.e. the "considerations" accompanying a candidate's reminder that he is number three on the ballot. "The destiny of our nation must not be determined by a cup of sake or any other form of token compensation," stated the writer as he hiccupped and fondled a new Swiss movement.

Election results were reported very favorably in Right-Wing newspapers. Editors emphasized the "unexpectedly successful" turnout and many gave details of early voting by young and old, male and female. Typical Right-Wing comment emanated from HYUN DAI ILBO (Modern Daily News) whose editors consistently advance the RHEE cause: "The general election on 10 May has ended triumphantly. Patriotic brethren who have fought for the independence of their motherland should now proceed with renewed vigor and bravely extend the new freedom across the 38th parallel."

MIN JOONG ILBO (People's Daily Times), a Right-Wing paper, realistically prescribed an early formation of a government which could immediately forestall transgression from terroristic elements (meaning Communists) which still threaten the security of the people.

SYN MIN ILBO (New Democratic News), a Communist-line organ, demanded that the election be declared void because it was not held in a free atmosphere and does not represent the majority of the Korean people.

E. SABOTAGE AND ESPIONAGE

The sabotage phase of the communist anti-election campaign this week was directed primarily against wire and rail communications in conjunction with other anti-election efforts.

At least forty major attempts were made to sabotage wire communication. The CHEJU-DO and KYONGSANG-PUKTO systems suffered the most.

Twenty-two locomotives were damaged, 17 in KYONGSANG-PUKTO, either by running pairs of locomotives together or by removing small essential parts. Railroad tracks were cut at six points in two provinces, KYONGSANG-PUKTO and CHOLLA-NAMDO. One train was derailed in a tunnel in CHOLLA-NAMDO where the tracks had been removed.

Six attempts were made to sabotage power facilities, three each in KYONGSANG-PUKTO and CHOLLA-NAMDO.

No reports of espionage were received this week.