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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
Department of Police
APO 235 Unit 2

19 April 1948

SUBJECT: Police Situation on Cheju Do

TO : Advisor to the Director, Korean National Police, -PO
235 Unit 2

1. On a recent inspection of the Police on Cheju Do, I found conditions as follows:

a. The islands are divided into two police Districts, #1 at Headquarters in Cheju City, #2 with Headquarters at Suki Po. There are 24 Police Boxes with approximately 22 of the boxes located in the small villages along the shore line.

b. There are 450 policemen and 10 police women permanently assigned to Cheju Do, and since April 3, 1948 an additional 195 policemen were sent to the island to temporarily strengthen the police. At the present time each police box has 11 men.

c. The Police have 373 American carbines, 119 Jap carbines, 72 Jap rifles, 59 Jap pistols, 6 American pistols and 6 .30 caliber machine guns. They also have sufficient ammunition for these weapons.

2. From April 3 to April 15 1948 inclusive, rioting and attacks on police boxes resulted in the following:

Number instances:	31	Rioters killed:	5
Police killed :	7	Rioters wounded:	1
Police wounded :	10	Police Boxes and	
Police missing :	2	Police homes	
Civilians killed:	17	burned:	6
Civilians wounded:	49	Civilian homes	
		burned and pos-	
		sibly burned:	18
		Carbines lost:	6
		Arrests made by	
		police during	
		rioting:	137

The following weapons were used by the rioters: Jap 99 rifles, Jap 44 rifles, home made hand grenades, various types of explosives, picks, shovels and bamboo spears. American carbines lost by the police were used in several attacks on police boxes after April 3, 1948.

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3. In District #1 Police Station at Cheju City I found 226 male prisoners and 2 female prisoners. In District #2 Police Station at Suki Po, I found only 1 male prisoner. The prisoners at District #2 are transferred to #1 at Cheju City as soon as the police have completed their investigation, and the case turned over to the prosecutor's office. The following is a break down of the charges, arresting agencies and status of case of the prisoners held at District #1:

Arrested by #1 District:	209
Arrested by #2 District:	20
Total	<u>229</u>

Under Police Investigation:	155
Already sentenced :	18
Under Prosecutors Investigation:	53
CIC Cases:	3
Total	<u>229</u>

Suspect of rioting:	137
Unauthorized meetings and distributing hand bills:	61
Swindling:	1
Impersonating police:	1
Theft:	10
Assault and battery:	3
Murder:	4
Robbery:	2
Smuggling:	1
Receiving stolen goods:	1
Strike:	2
Bribery by Gov. officials:	2
In incendiaryism:	1
Disposing Gov. property:	1
Possession of weapons:	1
Inciting to riot:	1
Total	<u>229</u>

4. On April 14 1948 180 Constabulary were moved from Mo Sil Po, their Headquarters, to Police District #1 at Cheju City, and approximately 50 moved to Police District #2 at Suki Po, to take over guard duty formerly handled by Police. This will strengthen the Police on Cheju Do for actual police work, and the Constabulary will be on alert in case of any emergencies.

5. Nearly all of the rioting and attacks on police boxes occurred in Police District #1. Since the police boxes have all been strengthened with more men there may be some attempts by the rioters to attack the boxes in District #2, assuming #2 boxes have not been strengthened. I noticed in many of the villages in District #1 that all the men have left and gone into the mountains. I did not notice this condition in District #2 and things appear to be operating normally. Information was received by the Police that the SKIP has up three camps at Asu Sun, Nokame and

Ta Nak Bung, Asu Sun being the Headquarters with approximately 300 men armed with 100 guns and swords (Jap). These three villages are located in the central mountainous part of the island, and the rumor is that they have located some former Jap arms, ammunition and food that was stored in caves by the Jap army.

CONCLUSIONS: There has been very little effort on the part of the Police and the South Korea Interim Government officials to inform the people on Cheju Do on what is being done to establish a Government in Korea. Police Chief Kim Young Bai has never visited any of the Police Boxes since being in Cheju Do for one year. He is very reluctant to accept any advice from the Americans. The morale of the police in the out lying districts is very low, and they appeared very nervous and jittery in some boxes. On April 13 1948 Chief Kim Yong Bai placed 15 policemen on two Jap fishing boats manned by a Japanese crew that had been impounded about 1 March by the Customs pending a United States Army Provost case, and instructed the police to patrol the islands and also to do some fishing. Chief Kim Young Bai told the Korean Customs Chief he had permission from Lt. Col. Mansfield, CCOA, to use the boats and did not notify Captain Burns, Public Safety Officer, of his plans. On April 13 1948 while these two boats were in a Port at Sang Su Do, the police on one boat went ashore and this boat, manned by the Japanese crew, escaped. Captain Burns, USA, did not learn of the use of the boats or the escape of the one boat till the night of April 15. Captain Burns ordered Chief Kim to have the one boat returned to Cheju Do and re-impounded pending the results of the Provost Court. action. Captain Robert Burns is very capable of handling the police job, but is handicapped by having many other assignments with the 59th Military Government Group, which is caused by the lack of army personnel.

RECOMMENDATIONS: A police official of equal or higher rank than Chief Kim Young Bai be placed temporarily in charge of Cheju Do until after the election. A new Chief be placed in Cheju Do at some future date or Cheju Do be placed under Division H as before. The District #1 police station at Cheju City be renovated and the cell block enlarged to adequately accommodate the police prisoners without over crowding.

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RECOMMENDATIONS OF JOINT KOREAN AMERICAN CONF. LETTER TO GEORGE HODGE.

OTHER PART NOTED ELSEWHERE. PP. 5, 6, 7.

V RECOMMENDATIONS

1(a) To raise, as rapidly as possible, the standard of efficiency of Korean police, practical measures should be taken which will gradually eliminate those policemen, particularly those who served under the Japanese with the rank of Lieutenant or above, whose actions are incompatible with the established principles of democracy in the police system.

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