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PART I  
SOUTH KOREA

Secret

From: 051200/I Mar. 48  
To : 121200/I Mar. 48

Headquarters, USAFIK  
Seoul, Korea  
18 March 1948

No. 130  
Maps: KOREA 1/250,000  
East ASIA, 1/1,000,000

A. ARMED FORCES

1. Strength (Secret)

Police:	No change
Constabulary:	No change
Coast Guard:	No change

2. Operational Activity (Confidential)

Negative

B. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

1. Political Activities

a. UNTCOOK Activities (Confidential)

The Commission's open meeting on 08 March in the Duk Soo Palace, with Dr. MENON presiding, was devoted to the main trends of discussion and debate in the LITTLE ASSEMBLY concerning further instructions to UNTCOOK. The attitudes of the LITTLE ASSEMBLY representatives were:

The US interpretation of the General Assembly resolution of 14 November was that immediate elections should be held where possible in KOREA, for, knowing that RUSSIA's intentions of non-cooperation limited to South KOREA any elections that might be held, the General Assembly nevertheless passed the resolution authorizing Korean elections.

CANADA questioned the legality of any action taken by the LITTLE ASSEMBLY, adding that at best the LITTLE ASSEMBLY "decision" was extended only as advice, as its interpretation of what should be done.

AUSTRALIA also questioned the legality of LITTLE ASSEMBLY actions but believed that elections for consultative purposes would be desirable.

The ARAB states abstained from voting. Their views were that they could neither condone the present situation nor favor any elections which would likely lead to permanent partition (such as that of PALESTINE).

The Scandinavian states considered the LITTLE ASSEMBLY decision unrealistic, NORWAY pointing out that the only hope for a lasting solution lay in continued negotiations and cooperation with the SOVIET UNION.

COMMENT: Present indications are that elections will be held, Canadian and Australian opposition notwithstanding.

The motivation for CANADA's opposition to elections is not known, the issue of legality being probably only a convenient device to use at the moment. To combat the categorical statement of Dr. LIU to some 80,000 Koreans in SEOUL stadium that elections would be held by the Commission, and to meet the issue of the published Commission press release stating that elections would be held, Mr. PATTERSON maintains that the actions were illegal due to violations of parliamentary procedures. No mention is made of the fact that General HODGE worked closely with the commission in deciding the election date.

In view of CANADA's consistent and strong opposition to elections at this time it is more than likely that Mr. PATTERSON will attempt to follow through on the recent press release affording an opportunity to end the Commission's work: "The whole question of observing the elections and implementing the resolution of the Interim Committee is now under consideration by the Commission." Resolutions to postpone elections or to refer the entire matter to the General Assembly can be expected. Canadian opposition seems so strong that Mr. PATTERSON (and perhaps the Australian delegate) may withdraw from the Commission rather than commit CANADA to observation of the election.

Korean reaction to UNTCOOK at this time can be considered to include: partial loss of confidence; confusion as to UNTCOOK's intentions; bolderment at the apparent lack of unity.

b. RHEE Prepares For Elections (Confidential)(1) Attempts to Prevent Possible UNTCOK Slowdown:

The possibility that the Canadian, Australian, and Syrian representatives may try to block the enforcement of a general election in South KOREA spurred RHEE Syng Man to immediate action aimed at preventing any obstruction to the implementation of the U.N. Interim Committee's (LITTLE ASSEMBLY's) resolution on KOREA (See W/S #129 par II a, (1)).

RHEE instructed his WASHINGTON lobbyists to take aggressive measures toward convincing the respective home offices of the representatives in the possible opposition bloc that further delay in the South Korean elections could culminate in widespread civil distress. He also radiogrammed INDIA's Prime Minister Jawaharlal NEHRU to permit UNTCOK Chairman MENON (who plans to return permanently to INDIA) to remain in KOREA until the completion of "our election program."

From WASHINGTON, RHEE lobbyist, Ben C. LIMB, notified RHEE that he (1) managed to secure an opportunity to present "our viewpoint" over the Canadian network, and (2) cabled the Australia, Canadian, Indian and Syrian governments that: "... The UNITED NATION's resolution on KOREA constitutes the basic foundation for the peaceful solution of Korean problems... and a precedent for the gradual solution of other world problems.... Please advise your representative to act favorably toward immediate election... The (resent) opposition of your representative threatens the lives of 30 million people. Their blood is on your hands. If you believe in democracy you must fulfill the obligations accepted by a majority of the UN General Assembly and the Interim Committee."

(2) LEE Chong Chun Joins RHEE:

LEE Chong Chun, head of the UNITED YOUNG MEN'S PARTY (DAI DONG YOUTH CORPS), accepted a vice-chairmanship in RHEE's NATIONAL SOCIETY FOR THE ACCELERATION OF KOREAN INDEPENDENCE.

LEE was the "commander-in-chief" of the Korean army and navy in the provisional government, and, although he has enjoyed an ambiguous association with both RHEE Syng Man and KIM Koo, he has heretofore been generally regarded as part of the KIM Koo entourage. Returning to KOREA from CHINA with RHEE in April 1947, he proceeded to combine the strength of 20-odd rightist youth groups to form the UYMP as a nucleus of the future South Korean defense forces, which he expects to command. Recently he told a USAFIK informant that his youth corps included some ten affiliated units from North KOREA and 14 from South KOREA, with the North Korean units actually located in South KOREA at the present time. The DAI DONG's total membership, he said, was now 3,200,000; in addition there were 700,000 members in auxiliary organizations. Thus he claimed control of several million votes which would include close relatives of his followers. LEE is of the opinion that he can deliver ninety per cent of this support to the RHEE camp; the remainder, he said, are likely to follow KIM Koo into opposition.

Prior to the passage of the UN resolution permitting elections in South KOREA, the UYMP remained-- publicly, at least -- uncommitted toward eventual, formal conversion into military units. At present, however, LEE's youth groups and LEE himself are primarily concerned with building an army. Also of foremost concern to "Marshal" LEE is the South Korean development of hydroelectric power, communist North KOREA's omni present threat to the security and economic stability of South KOREA.

LEE believes that the success of a program to develop South Korean industry to meet civil and military requirements hinges upon assistance from the UNITED STATES, who, he stated, would thereby necessarily continue to exercise controls which would restrict Korean sovereignty.

COMMENT: On 03 March, LEE Chong Chun and four other youth leaders were appointed to NSAKI's Central Standing Committee: YOO Chin San of the General Alliance of Korean Young Men, SUH Sang Chun of the Great Korean Independence Young Men's Corps, MOON Bong Jai of the Northwest Young Men's Association, and LEE Bun Sik of the SKIG-sponsored Korean National Youth Corps. (B-3)

Of these appointments to membership in RHEE's inner-fold, the appearance of LEE Bun Suk is the least expected. LEE Bun Suk was LEE Chong Chun's chief-of-staff in the Provisional Government. As head of the Korean National Youth (whose membership is estimated to exceed a half million), his policy has, until now, been "neutral." KNY members, however, are known to have participated in some "political" activities conducted by other youth groups, usually those of the extreme right.

The rivalry between the two LEEs is well known; it is denied by neither. As commander and chief-of-staff in CHINA, each was contemptuous of the other. Since their return to KOREA, however, both have aspired to become the top military figure in the future Korean government. Their alignment with RHEE indicates that South KOREA's leading presidential candidate has made some promise of fulfilling this ambition, probably with no concrete suggestion as to who should be subordinate to whom.

In exchange, RHEE undoubtedly has been assured by the LEEs that they would exert all effort to see that their followers mark ballots appropriately, come voting time. Neither LEE can foretell what part of their legions will support RHEE at the polls or in the future Korean defense forces, and LEE Chong Chun's assertion that he can sway 90% of his youth's votes in the right direction contains considerable truth, but knowing his proneness to exaggerate, 75% is probably a better figure, the remainder being a boastful adulteration of his stock-in-trade. LEE admitted that probably 10% of his present following will continue to support KIM Koo.

### (3) RHEE's National Representatives Group:

At the NSAKI office on 05 March, the representatives of 68 political parties and social organizations participated in a meeting at the NSAKI office which resulted in the creation of a "representative group" composed of 33 members for the purpose of assisting the UN Commission in carrying out South Korean elections.

RHEE opened the meeting with an address in which he emphasized the need for proceeding - without foreign interference - toward the establishment of a government. Korean problems must be solved by the Koreans themselves, he declared. The decision to hold elections in South KOREA has been made; opposition to it must be over-come and unanimity in action must prevail. Following his brief address he left the meeting.

The representatives then proceeded to develop their election plans. YOO Chin San (see Comment under (2)), suggested that 18 members be elected to form the "Highest Committee" responsible for the establishment and execution of the election program. LEE Chong Hyun of the CHOSUN DEMOCRATIC PARTY argued that 18 members would not provide adequate representation for the various groups and recommended that the number be increased to 31, in the spirit of the 3-1 (March 1st) movement. MYONG Chai Sei objected to this, stating that RHEE himself had set the size of the group at 18, from which he will pick seven men to consult with the UN on more important problems. YOO Chin San angrily reproached MYONG by saying that it is not proper to disclose RHEE's intentions in this meeting. MYONG apologized.

LEE Chong Hyun's proposal was accepted unanimously, changing the proposed 18 member committee to 31 members. Nine members were then elected to appoint the 31 members to comprise this "Highest Committee." The

nine were:

MYONG Chai Sei  
OH Yoon Hwan  
LEE Chong Hyun  
PAIK Nan Hoon  
HWANG Hak Bong

CHOI Kyu Sul  
KANG In Taik  
HWANG Hyun Sook  
KIM Hyong

Following discussions by this electoral committee and by the general meeting, the following persons, eventually numbering 33, were appointed:

<u>APPOINTEE</u>	<u>IDENTITY</u>
RHEE Syng Man	
OH Sei Chong	Chairman, NSAKI
LEE Shi Yong	National Congress, NSAKI
LEE Yoon Yong	Chosun Democratic Party, NSAKI
KIM Sung Soo	President, Hankook Democratic Party
SUH Sang Chon	Youth Leader, NSAKI
CHOI Kyu Hwan	Labor Leader, NSAKI
MYONG Chai Sei	Vice-chairman, NSAKI
SHIN Ik Hi	Vice-chairman, NSAKI; KILA
PAK Nan Hoon	Vice-chairman, NSAKI; Hankook Democratic Party
LEE Chong Chun	Vice-chairman, NSAKI, UYMP
PAK Soon Chun*	President, Patriotic Women's Association; NSAKI
CHONG Chin Han	Chairman, Great Korean Labor Alliance
LEE Bun Suk	Korean National Youth; NSAKI
MOON Bong Chai	President, Northwest Young Men's Association, UYMP; NSAKI
YOO Chin San	President, General Alliance of Korean Young Men; NSAKI
KANG In Taik	NSAKI
KIM Choon Yong	Hankook Democratic Party
HWANG Hyun Sook	Patriotic Women's Association
LEE Chul Sang	Chairman, All Korea Students' League
HWANG Bo Ik	KILA; NSAKI
PAK Hyung Suk*	KILA; Chosun Democratic Party
PYUNG Yong Tai	Professor, Korea University; RHEE propagandist

<u>APPOINTEE</u>	<u>IDENTITY</u>
OH Yoon Hwan	No other data
KIM Hwa Lan (Helen)*	President, IMMA College
YIM Yong Bin	Methodist minister
KIM Chang Suk	Confucious scholar
CHOI Kyu Sul	NSAKI
KIM Hun	No other data
HWANG Ai Duk*	Patriotic Women's Association
LEE Chong Hyun	Chosun Democratic Party
YOON Sei Bok	Religious leader
LEE Tai Yoon	No other data

\* Female

The original list of appointees by the electoral committee included KIM Koo and CHO So Ang, who were appointed out of an awareness that the Canadian and Australian representatives in UNTOOK would object to the group as being entirely a pro-RIEE body. Intense debate arose over the inclusion of these two leaders, who have thus far maintained that they will not support the election. Finally, it was decided that the names of KIM Koo and CHO So Ang should be excluded.

The mission of the group was described as follows:

1. To elect delegates and entrust them to consider the electoral law.
2. If necessary, change the election date (09 May), since it was set by occupation authorities.
3. If necessary, change the composition of the 15-man Central Election Committee, since it was formed by occupation authorities.
4. Iron out difficulties on election day, taking particular precaution to avoid having "too many candidates."
5. Take up the problem of a special electoral district.

COMMENT: This list of 33 persons was obtained from press and CIC reports (B-2). Changes are expected. LEE Shi Yong, and KIM Chang Sook have already announced (12 March) that they would not participate in the activities of the group. However, a great majority of the others are dependable RIEE handymen who can be relied upon to provide a docile acceptance of every maneuver and proposal which RIEE desires to pursue. RIEE contends that the group represents all major Korean political, social and business organizations which do not include communists or communist sympathizers. Using it as a "representative" body he hopes to dominate all phases of the election, the authority and preparations of the American Command notwithstanding.

RIEE will probably encounter opposition to this group from the HANKOOK DEMOCRATIC PARTY and, possibly, the CHOSUN DEMOCRATIC PARTY. The HANKOOKS are in a position to wield more influence in the formation of a government than their present proportion of representation in the group allows.

The CHOSUN DEMOCRATIC PARTY, meanwhile, is primarily concerned with obtaining assurance that a "special electoral district" for North Koreans living in South KOREA will be established. In this way, the CDP seeks to increase its representation in the future government.

The "special electoral district" was, in fact, provided for in the KILA-formulated election bill over bitter opposition which included the HANKOOK DEMOCRATIC PARTY and RHEE spokesmen.

c. KIM Koo and the Opposition:

The rightists' problem child, KIM Koo, was the leading figure among the non-communists opposing the South Korean elections. He and an unknown number of loyal - or merely confused - rightists continued to announce their refusal to participate in any program which appears to circumvent the problem of unification.

The moderate NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE FEDERATION formally declared its non-participation in the elections. "Retired" KIM Kyu Sik told a USAFIK representative on 05 March that there was no possibility of inducing the NIF to change its collective mind about this. However, he reportedly agreed to use his influence in preventing the Federation from making any statements which would be injurious to the American position.

COMMENT: On 08 March, KIM Koo was served a subpoena to appear on 12 March as a witness for the defense in the CHANG Duk Soo assassination case. Frequently rumored to have directed the assassination, KIM Koo seemed undisturbed when he was presented the subpoena, and joked about the 250 won fee he would earn as a witness.

On the other hand, one of RHEE's underlings confided that "many people" could not understand why the "true responsibility" - meaning KIM Koo's guilt - has not been disclosed by the authorities. The confidant wishfully stated that KIM Koo's political prestige is completely nullified, and he is no longer a figure of potential importance. Yet he did not conceal his disappointment over the fact that KIM Koo remained a free citizen (thereby indicating that RHEE still has considerable respect for KIM Koo's power) and said he would be relieved to see action taken that would remove KIM Koo as a threat to RHEE's pre-eminence.

For public consumption, RHEE said that it was regrettable that KIM Koo's name has been dragged into the CHANG Duk Soo crime, and that he did not believe that KIM Koo was guilty.

On the day KIM Koo appeared at the Throne Room of the Capitol Building in SEOUL, he reportedly told metropolitan pressmen that he agreed to testify at the trial not because he was in any way involved in CHANG's murder but because of the consideration due "international courtesy": His presence in court was requested by the President of the UNITED STATES.

d. Communist Activities in South KOREA During the Week 051200-121200 March

South Korean communists continued their usual propaganda, boycott and violence this week in an effort to gain their immediate objective - the collapse of the 09 May election program. The old three-way communist formula, as used by Korean communists who were told 20 years ago at the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International in MOSCOW to "strengthen their work in the ranks of the proletariat," seemed capable of being only a harrassing force as the week wound up in a series of punitive anti-election measures taken by a well-organized but numerically-weak COMMUNIST PARTY.

Propaganda Activities:

From KAESONG, which is broadside to the northwest border, to the southeast deep-water port of PUSAN, party members distributed propaganda via handbills, chalk slogans, petitions, secret periodical publications and the legal press. Attacking the election through the UNITED NATIONS Temporary Commission on KOREA, communist propagandists continued to represent UNTCOCK as a pawn of "American imperialism." Demands for UNTCOCK's withdrawal have been made in open press statements to the UN delegates while a "wait-and-see" public was still being urged to rid South KOREA of the international body which "will split KOREA into two parts forever." Stacks of petitions that decry the Commission were also addressed to the American commander in KOREA this week. (NOTE: In more than one past instance communist petitions have been the product of fraudulent operations wherein people are coerced into signing petitions which they are not given time to read, or illiterates are told the petitions concern the always-popular demand for a larger rice ration. Long lists of "ghost signatures" of a non-existent public have also appeared upon communist petitions.) Communist propagandists were also quick to vary their releases with red-tinted interpretations of objections to the election as voiced in UN councils by CANADA and AUSTRALIA.

The alternative which the communists have sought to offer in place of separate elections in South KOREA has been the "Draft Provisional Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of KOREA" as announced from PYONGYANG, "the temporary capitol of the Republic of KOREA," so say the draft's authors, "until SEOUL can be properly established as the capitol of the Republic."

Boycott Activities:

Communists are boycotting UNTCOCK. They can also be expected to boycott the election.

Nowhere was this more plainly illustrated last week than at the UNTCOCK council table itself where an empty chair still sits in line with a black nameplate across which "UKRAINE" is spelled out in white letters.

Other seats in UNTCOCK chambers which remained empty last week were those reserved for five top-ranking communist leaders of both North and South KOREA. In February, Sub-Committee #2, whose purpose is to confer with public figures of all political shades, issued a public notice that it desired to consult with HU Hun, South KOREA's number-two communist leader now in hiding from an arrest warrant issued against him last year for instigating riots; YOO Yawng Choon, the Chinese-educated woman leader of the communist SOUTH KOREA LABOR PARTY's auxiliary and spokesman for women communists before the US-USSR Joint Commission in June 1947; PAIK Yong Hi, an old communist official of the Korean government which fell to the Japanese and one of 13 reorganizers of the party-line KOREAN DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S FRONT; KIM Won Bong, a HWANGPAO Military Academy graduate who achieved prominence and arrest as a communist promoter of violence in April 1947; and HAW Sawng Taik, a COUNCIL OF ALL-KOREAN LABOR UNIONS chairman who was just completing a year's prison sentence (for inciting that communist labor union to riot) when Sub-Committee #2 asked him to confer with them concerning elections.

Although the American commander publicly granted a 10-day amnesty to HU Hun on 19 February to permit his appearance before the Sub-Committee, neither Mr. HU, nor any of the remaining four has as yet made any move to confer with the Sub-Committee.

It was HAW who most aptly illustrated the communist boycott strategy last week. He had emerged from prison on 19 February and after conferring with communist party liners announced in the 06 March press his personal and not surprising boycott of Sub-Committee #2. He also took advantage of the news value behind his announcement to lash out at UNTCOCK with a statement on "interference (in Korean affairs) by foreign countries."

Violence Activities

Renewed outbursts of violence broke out in KYONGSANG-NAMEO on the night of 09-10 March in a continuing communist attempt to convince UETOOK and a watchful world that South KOREA is not yet ready for a general election (see par 2, "Civil Unrest").

Supplemental Support Received by S/K Reds

Supplemental support, some direct and some indirect, continued to assist the communist anti-election stand this week.

In South KOREA the KIM Koo faction on the right and the "middle-roads" on the left still decry separate elections (see "KIM Koo and the Opposition," par B/1/c).

Radio PYONGYANG gave air support to South Korean communist in continuous broadcasts through the week "against the reactionary separate elections of South KOREA." Cried KIM Il Sung, North KOREA's MOSCOW-directed leader, in a 30-minute speech on 09 March: "AMERICA and the Korean reactionary elements are now staging a comic opera entitled, 'Elections'...I appeal to the whole of the Korean people, all true democratic powers and all of those with a patriotic conscience and hopes for freedom and independence of our fatherland to make every sacrifice to check the realization of (the election which will) divide our country and again enslave our people!" Affirming predictions of a communist boycott against South Korean elections, KIM Il Sung called out, "Let us not take part in the comic opera elections." A signal for South Korean to initiate further violence against the election was given by KIM in his closing statements, "Let us participate far and wide in the movement denouncing the election!"

The day before, Radio PYONGYANG had droned, "The heroic people's resistance, which spread throughout South KOREA since 08 February (the date North KOREA "celebrated" the second anniversary of the founding of the North KOREA PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE), is a struggle for enforcing the Draft Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic in South KOREA as well (as North KOREA) ...it is also a struggle against the formation of a separate government and enforcement of the South KOREA provisional constitution which will chain the people in the medieval darkness forever."

c. Korean Interim Legislative Assembly (Confidential)

After referring to the Discipline Committee the twenty members who walked out on discussion of the resolution to petition the UN for immediate elections KILLA adjourned until 16 March.

COMMENT: Despite MG wishes, little more constructive activity is expected from KILLA. Members desire time and opportunity to electioneer; certain members may fear the embarrassment incumbent upon publication of findings by the committee investigating bribery charges. The general feeling of the members that KILLA is useless in view of the approaching elections is supplemented by the feeling of futility among those who wish, but are unable to accomplish, land reform.

2. Civil Unrest (Confidential)

Civil unrest continued during the period in the southern provinces of South KOREA as communists attacked police and rightists in CHOLLA NAMDO, CHUNGCHONG PUKTO, CHUNGCHONG NAMDO and KYONGSANG NAMDO.

There were three incidents in CHOLLA PUKTO and one each in CHUNGCHONG NAMDO and CHUNGCHONG PUKTO.

Superior organization became apparent, however, as communists attacked police and rightists in KYONGSANG NAMDO on 09, 10 and 11 March. In these attacks coordination as to timing and method appeared. The attacks occurred largely in the early morning hours and in general, were carried out by smaller groups than heretofore. Grenades, a weapon designed for small groups, were used extensively and police boxes were often surprised. The majority of the police attacks were made against small boxes. However, a main station was attacked in KOSONG (1135-1330) on 09 March and the city hall of CHINHAE (1160-1350) was set afire on the night of 09-10 March. In this province 16 police boxes were attacked on 09-10 March. According to police reports 5 policemen were killed, seven injured and 2 kidnapped in these assaults. Other casualties include one rightist kidnapped, 4 rioters killed and one wounded.

COMMENT: Since the February opening of the 1948 protest campaign of violence against UNTOOK and its deliberations on a separate election, guerrilla-like tactics have been used by a well-organized communist minority to strike at picked targets. This week those tactics have seemingly afforded red striking forces a chance to operate with a maximum of effectiveness and a minimum of deaths and arrests.

The past week's violence in a single area in KYONGSANG-NAMDO, which follows two similarly-planned periods of violence in two other provinces since 25 February, gives credence to the possibility that communist civil disorders will continue at sporadic intervals at given points selected from among South KOREA's nine provinces by the communist staff.

This would be a change in the old communist method of issuing orders to cells in all provinces for simultaneous disorders. Violence from those widely distributed orders rarely came as a complete surprise to the police who usually intercepted the orders in at least one place in time to issue a warning to all police divisions. The current pattern of designating single areas, however, gives the communists a reasonable assurance of maintaining the element of surprise. Illustrations of this new strategy followed the 07-10 February disorders when a coordinated rash of attacks broke out on 25 February in the western half of CHOLLA-PUKTO and continued in intensity through 28 February. Even though diversionary attacks occurred in neighboring provinces the main pre-SAM IL day (the Korean 01 March Memorial day) attempt was launched in the CHOLLA-PUKTO area. Almost as if the rioters had packed bag and baggage and crossed into the adjacent province of CHOLLA-NAMDO for a second phase of their activities, a similar series of disorders broke out in that province on 01 March when at least one policeman and eight rioters were killed. Continuing disorders through 02 March were also localized in a single group of islands offshore from CHOLLA-NAMDO. Sporadic and apparently unrelated incidents then continued at scattered points in the southern province until this week's 09-11 March attacks in separate areas between KOSONG (1130-1320) and TONGHAE (1200-1350) along the southeastern coastal area of KYONGSANG-NAMDO.

Communist strategy, which calls for a continuance of violence as a part of the anti-election program, may have forced South Korean reds into sending out a traveling group of civil disorder specialists supplied with Bank of Chosun notes turned in during the recent currency conversion in North KOREA. This currency is known to be coming over the border from North KOREA where it is no longer negotiable. Such a goon-squad could contact local communist leaders who would recruit party members and paid thugs to make up the attacking forces.

Evidence is not lacking, also, that North Korean communist agitators have been drifting over the border during recent weeks to supplement South Korean communist agitation strength which has been weakened by the arrests of figures connected with the continuing communist efforts since 07 February. Such agitators could well have sparkplugged the opening of a new civil disorder strategy in South KOREA.

C. WAR POTENTIAL (Secret)1. Economic - Rice Prices

The open market price of rice decreased slightly in SEOUL during early March. The following prices were obtained from SKIC's National Price Administration:

Unit: 1 nal (2.38 gals., polished rice)

Official Price: 140 Won

<u>AREA</u>	<u>PRICE (WON)</u>			
	<u>DEC.</u>	<u>JAN.</u>	<u>FEB.</u>	<u>12 MAR</u>
SEOUL	750	743	746	730
KANGWON DO	632	791	860	
CHUNGCHONG PUKTO	600	586	*	
CHUNGCHONG NAMDO	650	630	662	
KYONGSANG PUKTO	534	541	*	
KYONGSANG NAMDO	575	650	*	
CHOLLA PUKTO	634	608	608	
CHOLLA NAMDO	575	558	575	
CHILJU DO	729	733	*	
Average	631	648		

\* Price not yet received by NPA

2. Surrendered and Disarmed - No Change: 179,376

3. <u>Progress of Repatriation</u>	<u>This Period</u>	<u>To Date</u>
<u>Japanese Civilians Arriving from</u> <u>N of 38°N KOREA, CHINA and MANCHURIA</u>	0	288,518
<u>Japanese Evacuated to JAPAN</u>	0	883,683
<u>Total Koreans Returning</u>	2,203*	2,075,665
<u>Total Repatriates Moved Since 15 August 45</u>		2,961,834

4. Koreans Returned to KOREA Attempted-Illegal Entry to  
JAPAN 22,108

\* Incomplete report

D. PSYCHOLOGICALThe Press (Restricted)

UN Activities: The return of MENON and HOO from LAKE SUCCESS on 05 March elicited strong praise of UNTCOK by extreme rightist HAN SUNG ILBO (Seoul Daily) which pointed out that the UN body has succeeded in grasping the reality of the situation in KOREA — "a nation proud of a single race, a single language, and a single tradition, capable of and entitled to enjoy independence." UN spokesmen have ploughed through the political morass in KOREA and emerged with a just solution for immediate Korean problems, the editor stated. Furthermore, this paper asserted, the UN itself enlarged its prestige by overcoming Soviet opposition to an equitable outcome to the Korean question.

Bribery Scandal: An appeal for "severe punishment" regardless of the importance of the individuals found guilty of complicity in the seven million won prostitution bribery scandal was made by the editors of right-wing CLOSUN ILBO (Korean Daily News). Asserting that police investigations are casting grim shadows on the moral standards of government officials, CLOSUN ILBO stated that the case has indicated a necessity for a thorough "purification of Korean politics and society." Our ancestors, said the editor, did not concern themselves with dishonorable acquisition of property, but since the LEE Dynasty, our "national spirit has badly degenerated."

The editor, like his fellow citizens who write their last names first, twisted the proverb to read: "Where there is no smoke there is no fire"; accordingly, he implied, the investigation of 19 KILLA members and other SKIG officials (both AN Chai Hong and KIM Kyu Sik have been mentioned in the press) indicates that there is good reason to believe that certain prominent persons are guilty. These should be ferreted out and punished in order that the faith of the public in their officials and leaders may be restored.

American Aid: "Why does not the American government give us 100,000,000 dollars when she gave JAPAN 300,000,000 dollars?" the far-right DONG A ILBO (Oriental Daily News) asked its 60,000 claimed subscribers on 10 March. A chir-whisker pull of the editorial pen suggested, "One of the reasons must be the 38-degree parallel."

In a demand taken from Dr. RYEE Syng Man's past verbal requisitions for dollar-aid without any American say-so in KOREA, the newspaper calls for economic assistance from AMERICA but adds, "We will welcome the aid if the UNITED STATES does not have any idea of participating in our national policy."

"We are now dissatisfied with the fact that American assistance to KOREA is not enough... we are expecting American assistance in the economic world," announced the edition's deep-columned story.

Land Reform in North KOREA: The in-line DOK LIE SINBO (Independence News), adhering to its role as a South Korean communist spokesman, re-wrote some North Korean propaganda last week for an 05 March editorial on the land reform anniversary north of the 38th parallel.

"Progressive people have had confidence that land reform in North KOREA will become an example to be enforced in South KOREA," hoped the editorial staff. Asserting that independence depended upon "agricultural revolution on a large scale," the Independence News termed the communist land reform program "a success of democracy" to be compared with the creation of the North KOREA People's Army and the Draft Constitution.

E. SABOTAGE AND ESPIONAGE (Confidential)

Four North Korean agents were apprehended this week: one in CHUNGMON (1060-1680); one in ONGJIN (840-1680); and two in GYONG KOK (918-1695). The first two men were seeking information for the communist NORTH KOREA LABOR PARTY. The latter two are said to be a part of an assassination group assigned the mission of killing high officials of the South Korean police.

Some sabotage was carried out in conjunction with the civil unrest in the southern provinces (see para. B.2). In addition to the city hall burned in CHINHAE (1160-1350), telephone lines radiating from MISAAN (1150-1350) were cut on 09 March and police records and equipment were damaged or destroyed.