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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFFAF0 500
4 November 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Commander-in-Chief and Chief of Staff

SUBJECT : Communist Inspired Uprising in South Korea

1. This study is based on information contained in USAFIK Radios ZGBI 1294, 22 Oct 47, Tab A, and ZPOL 1296, 23 Oct 47, Tab B. ZGBI Radio 1294 was based on interrogation of an allegedly disaffected Commanding Officer of Peace Preservation Corps, Pyongyang, Namdo Province (1). Highlights of the inclosed radios are as follows:

a. ZGBI #1294; Peace Preservation Corps would move into South Korea following establishment of Korean Government by Joint Commission and take over South Korean Police power. All electric power to be cut off. Shtikov proposed through Pak Ill O that North Korea must prepare for revolution and destroy all reactionaries such as Rhee and Kim Koo and Americans. The time for fighting is at hand. Next speaker said that time for attack must come just prior to the disarming of the North Korean Army (KPA) by the UN. Strategy discussed organization of penetrating force and orders to take no prisoners, to shoot all reactionaries. Password exchange to be made. Border Peace Preservation Corps Guards to prepare trenches and air-raid shelters. Supplies to be gathered include clothing and blankets. North Korean Armed Forces regulations would be supreme authority once hostilities commence. Personal opinion of subject U.S. Forces would be attacked.

b. ZPOL #1296; Sept 6 North Korean Army, Coast Guard, Security Police representatives met at Pyongyang. Members were informed of Shtikov's intention of requesting joint withdrawal of Soviet and U. S. Forces. Anti-American indoctrination emphasized. Representatives were told to return to their posts and prepare for eventual invasion of South Korea. Signal for invasion would be the suggested disarming of North Korean Army. Tactical plan of terrorism, assassinations and sabotage discussed for special corps to make initial penetration. Korean People's Army to follow. Third phase involved liquidation squads mopping up remaining resistance. No apparent plan for use of Soviet troops. Over-all plan to eventually include Korea as a member of USSR.

2. G-2 Comments:

a. This may be a strong indication of a Soviet plan to take over South Korea prior to withdrawal of forces, and before UN can take definite action.

(1) Subj rated F; info -2 (probably true)

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TAB A

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b. Information suggests the possibility that a hitherto unknown force, probably civilian and not in uniform, and most probably armed, exists or will be formed in N. Korea.

c. The existence of a carefully planned and supervised plan of action to take over by force the law enforcement agencies of S. Korea.

d. That the Soviets may intend to direct operations against U.S. Forces, under the guise of a "spontaneous uprising of the Korean people" and backed by the Korean People's Army (KPA).

e. There is no doubt but that the Soviets will do everything possible to insure Soviet domination of S. Korea. Actions along these lines will doubtlessly be intensified, now that the Korean problem has been placed before the UN. Information contained in subject radios is indicative of Soviet intent to accomplish domination, and control of S. Korea before U.S. Forces are withdrawn or a government can be established for Korea.

f. The possibility of a heretofore unreported organized force in North Korea is now revealed. Previously the "Peace Preservation Corps" was believed to constitute the security forces. However, specific reference is made to the Peace Preservation Corps, People's Army and Internal Affairs. As the security forces of N. Korea are believed to be under the Bureau of Internal Affairs; specific additional reference to Peace Preservation Units may well indicate the presence of an additional force, which suggests an organized group of Saboteurs.

This assumption is further confirmed by the report that just prior to hostilities all certificates and identifying papers are to be taken up and new small identification badges to be issued instead (unnecessary, if uniformed personnel is to be employed). Indications of impending action, is Jacobs report that Corps has knowledge that identification documents of some KPA units, as well as some security units have already been called in. However, new badges or documents have not been issued.

g. Conferences of KPA, Security Police and Coast Guard representatives were held on June 24th, Sept 6th, and a further conference to be held on Sept 28. At these conferences, representatives were indoctrinated as to the part they were to play in coming activities.

The alleged tactical plan consists of three phases: (1) entry of special groups into S. Korea to sabotage and assassinate police, constabulary, and Korean "reactionary leaders," (2) KPA to follow shortly and occupy principal centers, (3) liquidation squads to follow the Army. Representatives were told to go back to their posts and prepare for eventual invasion of S. Korea; the signal to be given when the UN attempts to disarm the KPA.

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These factors indicate the existence of a group, probably civilians, certainly not in uniform and possibly if not probably armed. G-2, FEC and XXIV Corps have steadfastly maintained the KPA would not be employed against U.S. Forces, at least so long as Soviet uniformed forces remained in Korea. Likewise, it is believed that the Soviets could not, without committing an Overt Act, allow uniformed forces trained and equipped by the Soviets to participate in attempted seizure of S. Korea. This would preclude the use of police, constabulary, etc., in uniform.

The use of an ostensibly civilian force, armed with Japanese equipment (a Soviet capability) could be employed in S. Korea, and could conceivably be used against U.S. Forces as well, under the guise of a spontaneous uprising of the masses.

This report, considered probably true by XXIV Corps, indicates a carefully laid plan to seize control of S. Korea and to attempt to establish a government loyal to the Soviet. The cutting off of power from N. Korea is a definite capability and may well be employed. Successful seizure of police control would give any such force virtual control of S. Korea and at the same time would involve U.S. Troops. Arms seized from the police could be used to further arm other S. Koreans loyal to the Communist cause.

It seems apparent that the Soviets are prepared to take a calculated risk in involving U.S. Forces. It is also a strong indication that some such force exists that can be employed. Reported directions to border units indicates they anticipated U.S. air action, otherwise there would be no necessity of constructing air raid shelters.

3. Conclusions:

a. The possibility exists the USSR may have at its disposal sufficient armed non-uniformed personnel to stage an attempt at seizure of S. Korea. A further possibility is indicated that the USSR may plan to use existing security forces; taking them out of uniform and employing them as saboteurs, etc., to create confusion and chaos. It is a considered opinion that such groups infiltrating into S. Korea, coupled with the leftist dissident organizations known to exist there, could seriously disrupt all types of communication and telecommunication. Such an "invasion" might well be the start of a bloody civil war. However Soviet and North Korean communist leaders' plans may be seriously disrupted, when and if, it becomes known that the proposed uprising is for the purpose of making a USSR satellite out of Korea, rather than the establishment of a free Korea. Existing plans may also be hampered by desertions such as the one referred to in ZGBI 1294 attached. If this plan is implemented action may be expected shortly. Willingness to involve U.S. Forces can only be accepted as a calculated risk the Soviets are willing to take. Warning

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is expressed that the assumptions and conclusions are based on one report only. However, this report was evaluated as probably true by Corps.

4. G-2 Action:

- a. Attached radio has been dispatched, Tab C.
- b. This information furnished G-3 for their consideration in any possible use of Plan "GUNSHOT".
- c. Requested penetration to verify the facts outlined in Radios ZGEBI 1294, Tab A and ZPOL 1296, Tab B.

3 Incls:

- 1 - Tab A, Rad ZGEBI 1294
- 2 - Tab B, Rad ZPOL 1296
- 3 - Tab C, Rad CINCCE TO USAFIK

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