

Secret

From: 161800/I Mar  
To : 231800/I Mar

Headquarters, USAFIK  
Seoul, Korea  
1000/I 27 March 1947

G-2 Weekly Summary

No. 80  
Maps: KOPEA, 1/250,000  
Eastern ASJA, 1/1,000,000

1. OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

a. Surrendered and Disarmed - No Change: 179,276

b. Progress of Repatriation - This Period To Date

Japanese Civilians Arriving from  
N of 38°(N-KOREA, CHINA and MANCHURIA) 0 287,998

Japanese Evacuated to JAPAN 0 881,667

Other Nationals Evacuated  
CHINESE 0 1,521  
FYUKYUANS 0 274  
FORMOSANS 0 103

Koreans Arriving from  
JAPAN 0 1,103,270  
North KOREA 558 395,923  
MANCHURIA by Land 132 299,142  
MANCHURIA by Water 0 3,120  
CHINA by Water 0 58,133  
PACIFIC Ocean Areas 0 13,986  
CHINA by Land 0 13,458  
SEA Areas 0 7,244  
FORMOSA 0 3,449  
AUSTRALIAN Areas 0 3,051  
HAWAII 0 2,646  
FYUKYUS 0 1,755  
PHILIPPINES 0 1,406  
HONG KONG 0 302  
North INDO CHINA 0 118

TOTAL Koreans Returning 690 1,907,003

TOTAL Repatriates Moved Since Aug 45 2,790,496\*

c. Estimated Remaining Japanese Civilians in S KOREA 49\*\*

d. Koreans Returned to KOREA  
Attempted Illegal Entry to JAPAN 16,514

e. Illegal Passengers Apprehended in Korean Waters 416

\*2 picked up that were not carried on 9 March to 16 March report.  
\*\* 49 Japanese remain in South KOREA as of latest USAMGIK census report.

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3. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

a. Sabotage - The following cases were reported:

(1) Reports from Sixth Division state that (a) the police telephone line connecting two military installations in CHONJU<sup>1</sup> was cut during the night of 12-13 March 47; (b) on the night of 13-14 March 47, the telephone line to the quarters of the Commanding Officer of the MG group in CHONJU was cut; (c) on 22 March 47, reversing rods were removed from nine engines in the PUSAN railroads yards, rendering the locomotives inoperative.

(2) Seventh Division reports that between 1500 and 1530 hours on 18 March 47, the telephone line to OP #5 was cut.

(3) CIC reports that (a) on 22 March 47, the trolley switch at the car barn was rendered inoperative, and (b) switches were removed from the generator and transformer at the South Gate sub-station of the SEOUL Electric Company.

b. Espionage - None reported.

c. Secret Organizations - None reported.

d. Mail Interceptions:

Communist minorities activities in South KOREA

Three interceptions received during this period reveal the activities of minority Communist inspired groups in South KOREA. Two of these deal with the school strike. In the first the writer states, "The strike at the College of Literature and Science has been led by a few Bolshevik students. The student meetings have been usually held with an attendance of only half of the student body. Moreover, the strike has been led by a few struggling committees. The other students have no liberty to freely express their opinions because of the actions of a terrorist party which has been organized by the radical students". The second letter claims that the strike has been fomented by a group of communist inspired professors and accuses two professors, by name, of being Russian subjects. The third intercept, a police report, indicates that a group of fifty South Korean students who reportedly belong to the CHOSUN IN MIN DANG (Korean People's Party - I) are engaged in spying out the weapons and equipment in police stations and their location. Of interest in this intercept is the report that this group of students is alleged to be cooperating with a "North Korean Disturbing Group" which has entered South KOREA disguised as peddlers and war refugees on this mission. (See paragraph 5 for further indication of such organized groups infiltrating South KOREA.)

Living conditions in North KOREA

Additional confirmation of difficult living conditions in North KOREA were contained in six intercepts during this period. Although all six originated in South KOREA, two indicate that the writers speak from first hand knowledge. One letter comments on living conditions in HUNGNAM<sup>2</sup> - "The shortage of food in North KOREA, especially in HUNGNAM, is very serious. The price of rice is 2,000 yen per small mal and soy bean residue is from 850 yen to 1,000 yen per piece. The people cannot eat even this on their present income. Therefore, I moved to SEOUL the other day with my family". Three other letters comment on movement to South KOREA as the only solution to the difficult living conditions. One intercept, a police report, comments on the smuggling of rice to North KOREA, and indicates that large quantities of rice are thus being lost.

- 1 - CHONJU (1010-1430) (35°48'N-127°08'E)
- 2 - PUSAN (1200-1340) (35°05'N-129°02'E)
- 3 - HUNGNAM (1020-1870) (39°30'N-127°14'E)

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COMMENT: There have been several indications that the high price of rice has led to increased smuggling activity between the North and South. It is further reported that government agencies in North KOREA actively foster this illegal trade as long as the flow of food-stuffs, especially rice, is to the North. Traders, on their way to South KOREA check at North Korean border outposts, surrender their identification certificates, and receive travel permits which allow for their reentry into North KOREA. There are indications that it is this traffic that has helped hold the price of rice in South KOREA at a falsely high level.

e. Telecommunications:

(1) Telegraph -- No change

(2) Telephone -- Lines to points north of the 38th parallel remain inoperative during the period.

4. CIVIL RELATIONS

a. The Press:

There were several items of interest to the press during the period. These consisted of both local items and world wide news of Korean or possible Korean interest. Locally the results of the investigation of the strike on CHEJU DO by Dr. CHO, police head, terrorism, as manifested by the bombing of LYUH, Woon Hyung's home, the departure of three Korean representatives to the Pan-Asiatic Conference, the shooting of two Russian soldiers on the 18th of March by South Korean police (see par 5), and, at the end of the period, the twenty-four hour rail and utilities strike were all given complete coverage in the newspapers.

The bombing of the home of LYUH, Woon Hyung brought the CHUNG OI SIN PO (Foreign and Domestic News - LN), published by LYUH, to editorialize on the subject of "Warlike Elements and Terrorists". This paper sees in the attack an attempt to bring about a third world war -- "Taking advantage of President TRUMAN's speech on the aid to GREECE and TURKEY, there are political leaders and youth groups in KOREA who are trying to start a third war. ....The attack on Mr. LYUH's home was timed with President TRUMAN's speech. ....when the very existence of Mr. LYUH is an obstacle to the reactionary elements, it is natural that warlike elements should attack his home as preciously planned."

All newspapers carried the information of the conflict on 18 March, between four South Korean police and two Russian soldiers just south of the 38th parallel, which resulted in the death of the Russians. Since the newspapers sources of information were releases by US agencies, they reported the information with fair accuracy. However, certain errors, apparently innocent mistakes of the individual reporters, resulted in some papers printing articles which stated that US troops had been involved. In general there was no comment on the incident other than such broad inferences as -- "The Korean police exhausted their patience and tact and at last, as a means of self defence, one fired on the Russian soldiers."

Of late the Korean press has turned more and more to the outside world for help toward eventual economic and political freedom - truly it has ceased to be "The Hermit Kingdom". In this period the items of special interest from outside were various relays from the UNITED STATES press dealing with the Korean problems. The most interest was aroused by the rumor that KOREA would receive from the US six hundred million dollars as an aid in her reconstruction. This subject, taken by the newspapers, to be in line with the aid to be given to other countries, as indicated by the President's speech, received varying but favorable reactions in South KOREA. The HAN SUNG ILBO (Seoul Daily - RW) editorially expresses KOREA's

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appreciation but hopes that this is a prelude to political independence and that with economic aid will come political aid so that KOREA can be a sovereign independent state in the near future. The CHA YOO SHIN MUN (Korean Free Press - LW) carried Acting Secretary of State ATCHESON's denial of this rumor in which he said that although the question of additional help to KOREA was under consideration no amount had been decided upon.

Also of interest from the UNITED STATES was Dr. RHEE's announcement that a separate South Korean government would be established within 30 to 60 days. The KYENG HYANG SHIN MUN (Rural and Urban News -RW) carried the State Department's denial of this announcement, in which it was classed as "only Dr. RHEE's personal opinion and suppositioning".

b. The People

(1) General Strike

South Korean industry, communications, railroads, and some phases of government and maritime operations were disrupted in varying degrees by a general strike which had its origin in the engineering section of the PUSAN railroad yards on 212100Z March 47. Secretly conceived and initiated by the Communist dominated Council of All Korean Labor Unions (CHAWN PYAWNG), the strike has spread within fifteen hours to six of the leading cities of the CHOLLA provinces\* --- which are leftist strongholds and to SEOUL, TAEJU, INCH ON and several smaller communities in Southwestern KOREA. The strike was not without disturbances, but they did not assume large scale proportions. There are eleven reported dead with an unknown number of injured. (See Inclosure #1 for disturbances and #2 for a chronology of events).

An ultimatum, apparently previously prepared, was reserved until the strike has passed its initial phases, and then served upon the Commanding General on the morning of 22 March. Signed by HUN, Hun (not to be confused with HU, Hun), a CHAWN PYAWNG organizer and agitator, the ultimatum projected the following demands:

- (a) The reinstatement to their former jobs of all members reduced or discharged in the past; opposition to factory lock-out, unemployment, and reduction of personnel.
- (b) The increase of wages to meet rising prices. (They demand a minimum monthly wage of 8,000 yen per worker, a ridiculously high figure).
- (c) Four hops of rice daily to laborers and office workers; three hops to "ordinary men".
- (d) The dissolution of the General League for Great Korean Laborers, Korean Young Men's Association for National Construction, DAE HAN Democratic Youth Alliance, ALL KOREA Young Men's Association for the Acceleration of Independence, and the punishment of their leaders. (These organizations are charged with terrorism by the Japs).
- (e) The dismissal and punishment of persons in Military Government and police organizations of bad character. (In this category they list pro-Japanese, profiteers and oppressors).

\*KINSAN (370-1450) (36°00'N-126°42'E)      CPONGJU (1010-1430) (35°03'N-127°08'E)  
 TAEJON (1040-1430) (36°20'N-127°25'E)      KWANGJU (1010-1550) (37°23'N-127°10'E)  
 MOKPO (930-1300) (34°43'N-125°22'E)      SUNCHON (895-1800) (39°26'N-125°56'E)

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- (f) The release and reappointment to their old positions of those imprisoned for striking, demonstrating, displaying posters and participation in assemblages.
- (g) The release from imprisonment of HAN, Sawng Taik, chairman of CHAWN PYAWNG, PAK, Sei Young, vice-chairman, and LEE, Myun Po, secretary; the cancellation of the warrant for the arrest of PAK, Heun Yung.
- (h) The security of the perfect freedom of the trade union movement at once.

The ultimatum states that the laboring people of South KOREA have undertaken a twenty-four hour strike in order to strengthen by action the demands made in the document.

The document concludes with the threat of a violent, long-term strike should suppressive measures be taken or persecutions occur before or after the strike. Its author arrogantly places the responsibility for the consequences of such action upon the Commanding General and closes with: "...and on reading this memorandum we desire that it will not be said again 'that by the instigation of some part of...' or 'without any leisure to consider...' in an effort to obscure the case as has been done in the past".

COMMENT: These vague references are probably directed to press releases issued by the Commanding General subsequent to the October riots. Several releases stated that many honest, patriotic Koreans had been misled by vicious agitators to actions in which they would not have become involved had they given prior sober consideration to the consequences.

Action taken by the American Command was in accordance with the present policy to permit Koreans to cope with their own problems. AN, Chai Hong, Korean Civil Administrator (par 6c, W/S #75), assumed the responsibility with cool determination to terminate the strike as quickly as possible. In the initial reports he recognized the possible repetition of the tragedies that followed the September, 1946, strike (par 4b, W/S # 55).

To implement the Korean program, the Military Governor directed that American officers would not take important action without first consulting Mr. AN. It was decided that the SEOUL Electric Company's participation in the strike was a legal move in that the workers had submitted a list of grievances in January which had not yet received company action; other phases were declared illegal and orders were issued for the arrest of Leftist leaders suspected of fomenting national strife.

The strike was presumed to have been broken by 240800/I March at which time various suspects from leading Left Wing parties were in custody, approximately ninety percent of the South Korean workers were back on the job, and normal work and living had been generally resumed.

COMMENT: In early March, indications of Leftist inspired strike action appeared in propaganda and in frequently held unauthorized meetings of the Council of All Korean Labor Unions (par 4d (3), W/S #77), but it was felt that the Left was not strong enough to undertake an effort, national in scope, until a later date (par 4b (4), P/R#477). The premature general strike may have been a test of strength preliminary to a more violent future effort designed to elicit sympathy from the World Federation of Trade Unions delegation expected to visit KOREA in the near future. It may have been a protest against Rightist attacks (4b (1) W/S # 78 and article d. of the ultimatum noted above) and the arrest of party leaders following an unauthorized gathering subsequent to the 17 - 19 February Congress of the Council of All Korean Labor Unions (article g);

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other demands in the ultimatum are not new. It is interesting to note that this is the first action to follow the February Congress of the CHAWN PYAWNG at which MG was ridiculed and the government likened to that of the Japanese, opposition was voiced against the Interim Legislative Assembly and capitalists in general were vilified.

Considered as secondary reasons for the strike are: 1) - grist for the Communist propaganda mill for use during the current Four Ministers Conference in MOSCOW; 2) - a protest against the President's speech and recent indications that the UNITED STATES will materially aid Korean economics.

Typical of the Communist pattern was the sudden strike following a period of asserted cooperation. The specious declaration of HU, Hun on 20 February 47 is worthy of note (par 4b (2) (a), W/S # 76) as was his denial on the same date of Left Wing responsibility for the school strikes. (See par 4b (3) W/S # 76). A further manifestation of cooperation was seen in the sudden display of Left Wing interest in the proposed general election as evidenced by the Democratic People's Front at their grand meeting of 29 -30 January 47. (See par 6b, W/S #73). Since sustained cooperation with MG has never been a part of the overall Communist plan, Left Wing expressions in this direction must be viewed with asstance. Considering the Left Wing potential for violence and deception, there is a strong possibility that the apparent termination of this and the CHEJU<sup>1</sup> strike (par 4b (2), W/S #79) may be cleverly planned feints; therefore, continued caution is believed necessary.

5. SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE IN ADJACENT AREAS

(1) Soviet Military Personnel Killed by South KOREA Police

On 181630/I March 47, at SAN JIK TONG<sup>2</sup> four South Korean policemen engaged a Soviet junior lieutenant and a Soviet enlisted man of unknown rank in a discussion which developed into a scuffle and the reported death by shooting of the two Soviet army men. The Russians, who had been engaged in the illegal collection of rice from Koreans South of the parallel were shot by three of the four policemen after one of the pair had fired first.

Upon the receipt of the initial report, the Commanding General dispatched a General Officer to investigate the incident; the following is based upon the investigator's subsequent report.

Four South Korean policemen were dispatched from NUL MONG-NI<sup>3</sup> to investigate a report that a Soviet officer and enlisted man were seizing rice from the villagers of OK SIM DONG<sup>4</sup>. The policemen arrived in time to see a kamani (8mal) of rice being carried North of the parallel and encountered the Russians near the southeast corner of SAN JIK TONG. The Russians inquired as to why the policemen were present and were told that they were there to investigate the report that rice was being taken from South of the 38th parallel. The Russians insisted that they were North of the boundary. The conversation is reported to have proceeded on a friendly basis until one of the policemen asked for the return of his carbine which had been taken by one of the Russians for inspection. The request was refused. The policeman tried to wrest the weapon from the Russian who threw it to the ground behind him.

After further friendly negotiation for the return of his carbine, the policeman started to retrieve his carbine which was still on the ground, at which action the Russian officer reportedly fired his sub-machine gun at the feet of the Korean policeman, CHUNG, Dai Wun. Police-men LEE, (PNU) seized the Russian from the rear and both fell to the ground, whereupon CHUNG retrieved his carbine and the Russian's sub-machine gun. After the Soviet officer's weapon had been taken, he and policeman LEE regained their feet.

- 1-CHEJU (950-1150)(33°30'N-126°32'E)
- 2-SAN JIK TONG (960-1697)(37°59'N-126°34'E)
- 3-NUL MONG NI (970-1690)(38°00'N-126°42'E)
- 4-OK SIM DONG (969-1695)(37°58'N-126°40'E)

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As LEE attempted to mollify the Russians and continue the discussion on a gentlemanly basis, the Russian enlisted man attempted to grab him from behind. As a result, policemen LEE and MIN, Young engaged in a melee on the ground with the Russian enlisted man. The officer retrieved his weapon from policeman CHUNG (fnu) and began firing at the two Koreans on the ground engaged in the scuffle with the Soviet enlisted man.

At this point, policeman CHUNG fired one round into the Soviet officer's chest and the Koreans on the ground urged him to shoot the enlisted man while he had the chance. CHUNG is reported to have then fired two rounds at the Russian soldier. LEE stated that he shot the officer twice subsequent to CHUNG's firing at him, because the officer was not dead and apparently wanted to continue the fight.

Leaving the two Russians where they lay, the policemen returned to their station carrying the Soviet weapons with them.

A chance meeting with three Soviet enlisted men and seven North Korean Constabularymen during the investigator's reconnaissance of the area South of the 38th parallel where the incident reportedly occurred, brought out a significant question propounded by a Soviet sergeant: "Why were the two Russian soldiers ambushed?" The investigator replied that to the best of his knowledge they had not been ambushed.

During the course of the conversation, the Russian sergeant appeared evasive but stated the following:

- (a) That he knew the location of the parallel, but refused to reveal his conception of its location.
- (b) Both of his comrades were dead.
- (c) That the Russian officer had made a statement previous to his death in which he claimed an ambush.

Exact location of the thirty-eighth parallel in relation to the site of the incident could not be determined following a careful map and ground study; however, it is the investigating officer's belief that the shooting took place South of the thirty-eighth parallel.

On 22 March 47, the American Commander notified the Commanding General of the 25th Army, Soviet Forces in KOREA, of the unfortunate incident. In the letter, the American Commander expressed the deep regret at the necessity of informing the Soviet Commander of a situation which had resulted in the death of one of his officers and an enlisted man. The General stated that he considered the matter grave enough to send a General Officer to investigate the incident. The American Commander then stated that there is no doubt that the two members of the Soviet Command disobeyed Russian orders by violating the parallel and taking rice from the citizens of South KOREA. The letter stated further that there were no American soldiers present or otherwise involved in the matter.

The letter then narrated the facts of the incident, requested information as to where and when the Russian weapons were to be returned and closed with a repetition of the American Commander's regret that the Russian soldiers had violated Russian orders bringing tragedy to the Soviet command and to their friends.

COMMENT: The report of investigation which was concluded on 19 March 47, indicates that Russian border-soldiers may have already fabricated a "dying statement" attributed to the deceased officer in which ambush is alleged. There is no doubt that the border violation and rice stealing incident occurred South of the 38th parallel. Subsequent details are furnished by South Korean witnesses whose stories remain unshaken under detailed questioning. It is hoped that repetition of similar incidents will be obviated following the proposed joint survey of the border. (See par 7, ISNK#32).

For late information see Incl. #3.

(2) North Korean Terrorist Groups

A report of B-2 evaluation which is based upon information gained through the interrogation of a North Korean, indicates that three Koreans from the Soviet zone recently tested the security of the South Korean border guard to determine whether a group of persons could enter the southern zone unnoticed. One of the three persons informed; the other two are reported to have returned to PYONGYANG<sup>1</sup>. It is reported that this pair will join sixteen others and proceed to YANGYANG<sup>2</sup>. From there, the group will proceed by boat to CHUMUNJIN<sup>3</sup>, thence to KANGNUNG where they had planned to join the informant between the 25th and 30th of March.

The group, reported to consist of both men and women, is expected to be armed with a pistol for each person and twenty rounds of ammunition per member. Some may carry hand grenades. CHANG, Chang Ho, allegedly the leader, will issue orders in KANGNUNG dispersing the "agents" to various districts throughout South KOREA. The mission: to assassinate high officials in the National Police Force of South KOREA and prominent Right Wing political leaders.

Detectives have been sent to apprehend the group upon their arrival at CHUMUNJIN.

COMMENT: This report is considered as further substantiation of previous reports to the effect that terrorist groups have infiltrated into South KOREA for the purpose of sabotage, espionage, and terrorism. (Pw1, 47).

6. COMMENTS ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION

a. Summary

The paragraph opens with a review of the activities of the Interim Legislative Assembly and a discussion of the pro-Japanese bill and its implications. Political briefs include a discussion of Right and Left Wing relationships, and an intercepted radiogram which states that RHEE, Syng Man expects an independent South Korean government within thirty to sixty days.

b. Interim Legislative Assembly

Four sessions were held during the period in which the proposal to define and punish pro-Japanese collaborators, national traitors, profiteers and war criminals had its first reading; amendments were made to article #7 of Ordinance 102 which are designed to better the administration of SEUL National University; action appeared in the offing toward the proposal of an election law.

17 March 47 In the 32nd session, the drastic bill to define and punish pro-Japanese collaborators, national traitors, profiteers and war criminals received its first reading with SAW, Sang Il, HANKOOK Democratic Party member, explaining that it is not intended to stamp all members of Japanese organizations as pro-Japanese, only those who had harmed KOREA or Koreans. He said, however, that it is unnecessary to distinguish pro-Japanese from others at this time.

18 March 47 In the 33rd session, an amendment to Article # 7 of Ordinance 102 was passed which provides that the Board of Regents of SEUL National University will be chosen by a conference of the Korean Department of MG; the Head of the Department of Education will be ineligible for appointment to the Board.

1. PYONGYANG (880-1820) (39°01'N-125°44'E)
2. YANGYANG (1150-1700) (38°04'N-128°38'E)
3. CHUMUNJIN (1170-1680) (37°54'N-128°50'E)
4. KANGNUNG (1180-1660) (37°44'N-128°54'E)

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13 March 47 The 34th session brought a proposal to limit the term of the Board of Regents, SEOUL National University, to a period of two years; the proposal was adopted. Prior to adjournment, the draft of a proposed election law was distributed to the members. This draft, formulated by the Committee for Drafting Election Laws, is in the process of translation.

21 March 47 In the 35th session, KIM, Chang Kun, an electee from CHUNGCHONG NAMDO, resigned. The pro-Japanese collaborator, national traitor, profiteer and war criminal proposal was brought out for questions, although it normally would have automatically been referred to the Law and Judicial Committee following its first reading in the 32nd session. A move was immediately made and passed to stop discussion; nevertheless, LEE, Nam Kyoo, a Rightist electee from CHOLLA NAMDO, protested. In his protest, LEE defended the action of LEE, Wan Yong, an infamous Korean national traitor, stating that when LEE, Wan Yong, as premier, turned KOREA over to JAPAN, he did so under Japanese duress. This brought a storm of protest from moderates, Rightists and from the entire Left Wing. Acting chairman, YOON, Ki Sup, a moderate Leftist, twice demanded that LEE, Nam Kyoo apologize. The apology was twice refused. The session was adjourned shortly thereafter because the members were too emotionally disturbed to continue.

COMMENT: The most notable legislative event of the week was the initiation of the bill to define and punish pro-Japanese collaborators, national traitors, profiteers and war criminals. This resolution is considered potentially explosive because, if passed without considerable modification, many powerful members of the extreme Right Wing could suffer deprivation of citizenship and disenfranchisement for from three to five years. The beginning of Right Wing opposition to the bill was indicated in LEE, Nam Kyoo's defence of pro-Japanese and the subsequent storm of disapproval which it engendered. It is believed that modification of the bill might result in its adoption, with Rightist support coming from those who are anxious to obtain the protection which might accrue to any who vote for the measure. Since the bill states that the IIA shall establish enforcement agencies for its provisions, the Right Wing would be safe as long as they maintain legislative control.

c. Political Briefs

(1) A lull in political activity was broken with the advent of the general strike (par 4b) as the period closed. The arrest for strike agitation of KIM, Won Bong and twenty-eight other high level leaders of the Democratic People's Front, Council of All Korean Labor Unions, South KOREA Labor Party and CHOGUN Democratic Youth Alliance has reportedly caused mounting resentment in the Left Wing. With Leftist leaders in jail or in hiding, Rightist youths moved into Leftist headquarters on 23 March. They are reported to have confiscated documents, taken small, useful articles, and to have left the offices in a state of dishevelment on their departure by police order on 25 March.

(2) The following intercepted radiograms concern RHEE, Syng Man:

- (a) A request that RHEE and Louise YIM be authorized by the Legislature to represent that body at the United Nations. (Dated 17 March 47; withheld from delivery).
- (b) A radiogram from the Korean American Press Service, NEW YORK CITY, to Central News Services, SEOUL, states that RHEE, Syng Man expects an independent government to be established in South KOREA within thirty to sixty days. This government will provide a basis for Korean-American cooperation until the Russians withdraw from the North, making unification and complete independence possible. The interim government is to have complete control of internal affairs except enemy property administration. South KOREA's application for membership in United Nations (is)

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supported by the UNITED STATES, (KOREA) will have diplomatic representation in WASHINGTON and other capitols. Civilian high commissioner will be appointed to represent US in South KOREA. His authority will supersede that of the military commander in KOREA. Troops will remain as security force until Soviet withdrawal and until general elections set stable government in a united KOREA. US Congress asked for substantial loan to Korean government to assist in rehabilitation. American civilian personnel will be utilized as advisers to departments of the interim independent Korean government. (Dated 17 March 47; withheld from delivery).

Two sources reported similar news releases on this same date; SHANGHAI radip reportedly carried a message of the same substance, and a United Press statement datelined WASHINGTON was reported to have read: "A separate government will be set up in South KOREA under the leadership of RHEE, Syng Man." UP is said to have carried a later announcement attributed to the State Department to the effect that RHEE's statement was a figment of his imagination.

On 24 March 47, SEOUL Times and SEOUL Daily News carried an Associated Press release from WASHINGTON stating that plans for the abolition of Military Government in South KOREA and its replacement by a Korean independent interim government are being formulated.

RHEE is scheduled to depart the UNITED STATES for SEOUL via TOKYO, and NANKING on or about 01 April 47.

COMMENT: Widespread Korean distribution of such information may provide RHEE with the face-saving factor which he has needed in order to return to KOREA as the symbol of independence. If he returns according to plan, he will have arrived well within the sixty day maximum period set forth in the message. If independence does not come through, he may blame it on American duplicity. His proposed visit to NANKING makes the broadcast from nearby SHANGHAI noteworthy. (See par 6d, W/S # 79).

*John N. Robinson*  
JOHN N. ROBINSON  
Colonel, GSC  
AC of S, G-2

Inclosures:

- 1- Illegal Activities
- 2- Chronology of Events
- 3- Unconfirmed Report of Death of Two Soviet Military Personnel.

NOTE: This report is prepared not only for higher headquarters but also for the purpose of disseminating to interested subordinate agencies such intelligence as will be of assistance in performing their missions. Although this is for use of authorized personnel only, it must of necessity be classified as "secret" and the provisions of AR 380-5 will be observed in regard to both the document and contents. If proper facilities are not available for safe-guarding this document, it should be burned upon completion of necessary study and circulation.


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

27 March 1947

ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES

A summary of civil disturbances, attacks on US troops, cases of illegal bearing of arms, and of unauthorized shipping reported during the period of 16 March to 23 March is given below:



CHEJU-DO " LEGEND

- CIVIL DISTURBANCES SHOWN THUS . . . . . 
- ATTACKS ON US TROOPS SHOWN THUS . . . . . 
- ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF ARMS SHOWN THUS . . . . . 
- UNAUTHORIZED SHIPPING SHOWN THUS . . . . . 

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1. Civil Disturbances

CHEJU-DO (980-1130)(33°24'N-126°34'E)

19 March 47 - A CIC report dated 21 March states that information has been received from the National Police that 1,000 people approached CHUNG MUN jail on the Northeast coast of CHEJU Island and demanded the release of a prisoner. The people were armed with clubs and rocks. When the crowd began throwing rocks and attempted to rush the jail the police fired, wounding four people. The crowd dispersed.

CHULPO (960-1400)(35°36'N-126°40'E)

221100 March 47 - 2,000 Koreans moved into CHULPO, three policemen at DOAM police box retreated to the main police station. The mob followed and attacked the main station. The police fired into the mob killing four people. On 23 March bodies of three policemen were found in CHULPO reservoir, their hands and feet tied.

KUNSAN (1040-1460)(36°06'N-127°30'E)

220900 March 47 - 120 people gathered at SANOKA-RI four miles south of KUNSAN cut telephone wires and blocked a road. People resisted arrest. Three were seriously wounded, seventy arrests.

230400 March 47 - A mob of 500 people, reported to be Leftists, attacked the police box ten miles South of KUNSAN. The police fired into the mob, dispersing it and killing one person.

SEOUL (1000-1640)(37°34'N-127°00'E)

221135 March 47 - About 50 Council of All Korean Labor Union members stationed themselves at the gate of the Chosen Leather factory barring workers from entering the grounds. At about 0900 these 50 men beat various workers. The crowd involved about 200 persons. Approximately 20 persons were injured. Police arrested 19 of the Leftists. Interrogation of both the attackers and the injured is being conducted.

TAEGO (KUMSAN GUN ) (Not on Map)

A mob of 1,000 moved into the town of TAEGO, KUMSAN GUN, and attacked police. Police retaliated with gun fire, killing three. The crowd was dispersed.

YONGDONGP'Ō (990-1630)(37°31'N-126°54'E)

22 March 47 - At approximately 1300 a member of a Left Wing labor union was killed accidentally by a fellow member during a fight between the Right and Left Wing labor unions at a local factory.

241045 March 47 - Detective of the YONGDONGP'Ō Police station, LEE, Kwang Ha, was killed by PARK, Chung Hyun, member of the South KOREA Labor Party. A group of police were proceeding to the headquarters of the South KOREA Labor Party and the Council of All Korean Labor Unions to raid same. As the police approached, PARK shot the detective, and attempted to flee. As he ran, PARK disposed of his pistol which has not been located. PARK was finally apprehended and is being held in the YONGDONGP'Ō jail.

2. Attacks on US Troops

SEOUL

171530 March 47 - One round was fired at a US Army range officer from a hill north of the Seventh Division small arms range.

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3. Illegal Possession of Arms

SEOUL                    A delayed report.

02 March 47 - Police searched a truck which was found to contain explosives. During the search, one Korean escaped. Upon subsequent search of the man's home, 178 small bags of gun powder were recovered and turned over to Military Government.

WOLCHONG (990-1330)(35°02'N-127°00'E) A delayed report.

04 March 47 - Six Rightist youths arrested at a temple were found to have in their possession two pistols, seven rounds of ammunition, one seven inch knife and one, eighteen inch knife.

4. Unauthorized Shipping - None reported.

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