

· 제주도 소요(1948. 7. 2)

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Ex. 149

SECRET

FOR STATE DEPT USE ONLY

SUBJECT: Disturbances on Cheju Island

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

In connection with the disturbances on Cheju Island, which we attribute in a general way to Communist activities, I have the honor to enclose a copy of a secret memorandum dated June 16, 1948, prepared for the Commanding General by his Deputy who visited the Island. Perusal of this memorandum will give a more accurate view of the situation there and the various disturbing factors which enable the Communist elements to take advantage of the situation for furtherance of their aims.

This despatch should not be distributed outside of a limited circle within the Department itself because it is a copy of an Army document which should be treated strictly as its classification ~~secret~~ indicates.

Respectfully yours,



Joseph E. Jacobs
United States Political Adviser

~~Enclosure~~
Copy of report on Cheju Island disturbances.

United States Political Adviser
Office, Hq. XXIV Corps, APO 235,
40 PM, San Francisco, California.

Seoul, Korea, July 2, 1948

OFFICE OF
NORTH EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

<첨부문서> 제주도 소요관련 보고서 사본(1948. 6. 16)

Enclosure to despatch No. 199 July 2, 1948
"Disturbances on Cheju Island"

Seoul, Korea

CCF

SECRET

COPY

1948. 6. 16

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Commanding General

SUBJECT: Visit to Cheju Do, 15 June 1948

1. Operations. Colonel Brown is conducting operations as follows:

a. Four Constabulary battalions have been stationed on the north, east, west and south sides of the island respectively, with about two companies in each battalion on substations in the battalion area. The police are charged with the responsibility of security in the coastal area and the Constabulary all areas exclusive of the coastal area.

b. Searching of Constabulary areas simultaneously by all battalions working inland toward the high point of the mountain as the common objective is scheduled to be completed and troops back at their base camps today (16 June).

c. About three thousand persons have been apprehended and screened during this operation. At present there are 575 persons, including two women, in the stockade at Cheju now being screened again by four interrogation teams. In this search, several sub-leaders were apprehended and through them, caches in caves in the mountains have been located. 500,000 yen, arms, food and equipment have been captured. At the time of my visit, headquarters in Cheju was out of communication with battalions other than by runner, so results of the operations on the 15th had not been received.

d. The operation has scattered the raiders into small bands who are on the run and in hiding. A second operation is contemplated in a few days to search the island from north and south in reverse order by adjoining battalions to surprise the raiders and with the hope of apprehending more.

2. Conditions.

a. The conditions are much improved but will be lost unless a well organized information and reorientation program is rigorously executed.

b. Communist trained agents are highly organized on the Island and Colonel Brown estimates that about 80% of the population are connected or adhere to the Communist set up through fear. Each village has a Communist cell and unless the inhabitants do as directed, they are shot, or beaten.

or their homes are burned. Colonel Brown is of the opinion that the organization of the Island has been effected by the South Korean Labor Party. Except for few agents sent in from China, or Manchuria, or North Korea, most of the raiders were trained natives. Few arms and a very little equipment have been found that could not have been obtained on the Island from old Japanese, American sources, or locally made.

c. The population live in constant fear and cooperation with the Communist propaganda because of that fear. Grade schools in a number of villages have been reopened but middle school students are on strike and so far have refused to return. Leftist tendencies have found fertile growth in these students and they are acting in accordance with instructions.

d. The police brutality, and economic conditions on the Island have contributed immeasurably to the work of the Communists and will require long and thorough treatment. The police activities are well known in this headquarters.

e. The economic situation is intolerable and corrective action must be taken soon or little headway can be made.

f. The Island, unlike the mainland, does not derive its major income from rice. Other grains are produced. The major crop of the Island has been the sweet potato for conversion into alcohol. The Japanese operated a large alcohol plant at Cheju, buying the potatoes from the farmers. The 1946 and 1947 crops were purchased and alcohol made.

g. Colonel Brown states that the operators of the plant sold the last year's production of alcohol and, through theft or other disposition, have no funds to purchase present existing crop on the Island the plant is closed. The value of the crop is about 40,000,000 yen. The farmers are approaching planting season now and with their last crop on their hands are confused and do not know what to plant.

h. Unless this situation is corrected without delay, serious trouble there can be expected both economically and politically.

3. Miscellaneous Items.

a. There are three Japanese fishing boats tied up in a Cheju basin that were seized for being in local waters, and have been there for six months without action taken as to their disposition. The Japanese crews live in the boats and are fed from provincial sources. These boats should be released, or employed in local fishing to assist local economy.

b. An FS boat, aground in the harbor, is beyond further use. There is machinery aboard, such as lathes, etc., that could be used locally if salvage would be permitted.

c. The retaining wall on the quay at Cheju is badly undermined from high seas of past seasons. It can be saved now by chucking stone into washed out areas. If this work is not done soon the entire port will be subject to destruction and the only suitable port on the Island made inoperable.

4. Recommendations:

The above information is based upon statements of Colonel Brown and by personal observation. No doubt Military Government is cognizant of the above conditions, but I feel that conditions there are of such nature that prompt action should be taken. Therefore, the following recommendations are made:

a. A comprehensive reorientation of the inhabitants of Cheju be made by OGI, mainly through Korean personnel, be effected without delay. Communist hold on the Island must be eliminated or serious effect on the island will result.

b. An efficient and reliable police force be stationed on the Island.

c. A mobile, efficient Constabulary force should be stationed on the Island until the police can take over security responsibility.

d. Action be taken to remedy the present intolerable situation relative to the potato crop and operation of alcohol plant.

e. Action taken to dispose of the three Japanese fishing boats in the harbor.

f. Salvage of the FS boat be effected.

g. Repair of retaining wall on quay be accomplished at earliest practicable time.

• 제주도 소요(1948. 7. 12)

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. E. A. Tamm	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Carson	
Mr. Egan	
Mr. Gurnea	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Hendon	
Mr. Jones	
Mr. Mumford	
Mr. Quinn	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Gandy	

SECTION OF
NORTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
JUL 15 1948
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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SECTION OF
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While political disorders receded from the scene after June 1st, they were still at high level of three preceding months (some 75 rioters killed by police and about 50 Rightists killed by Communists -- figures for June not yet complete). On other hand number of policemen killed was negligible, indicating more effective defensive and preventive measures. Communist Party documents captured 6th revealed determined program for post-election disorders. Rebellion in Cheju Island continued, but toward end of month Commander of National Constabulary declared pacification was in sight and slowness of campaign had been due to reluctance of Constabulary to end it solely by means of slaughter. Capture of rebels continued, more than 3,000 having been caught in Constabulary dragnet strong across island May 28. High Korean judicial officer sent to island to investigate situation upon returning to Seoul 15th stated troubles were due to islanders' clamorishness and to venality of officials and would be protracted. Deputy Commanding General Coulter personally conducted on-spot inquiry and likewise found police brutality and unbridled official corruption contributing factors to discontent, which Communist agents had fanned into rebellion. Because of unlikelihood of early pacification or political conciliation, elections for two North Cheju seats in National Assembly which had already been postponed from May 10 to June 23, were on 10th put off indefinitely. Reflecting perhaps bitterness of revolt was assassination on 17th during his sleep of Commanding Officer of Constabulary operations in island, regarded as one of best Korean soldiers.

• 5.10선거 실시에 관한 군정청 보고서(1948. 7. 22)

NO. 225
100-100000

United States Political Adviser,
Bq. XXIV Corps, APO 235 c/o FM,
San Francisco, California

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~
Seoul, Korea, July 22, 1948

AUG - 9 1948

SUBJECT: Report on United States Military Government's
Activities in Connection with the Korean Election

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

AUG

WASHINGTON

Handwritten:
2/8/75
for 1st Lt. Edward EA
F000 1000
100-100000-73

· 제주도 소요(1948. 7. 2)

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
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• 제주도 소요(1948. 7. 12)

1. Subject

2. Reference

3. Summary

4. Remarks

5. Disposition

6. Indexing

7. Classification

8. Approval

9. Signature

10. Date

DEPARTMENT OF
NORTH ASIAN AFFAIRS

1948 7 12

DEPARTMENT OF STATE