

While political disorders receded from ... day, they were still at high level of three preceding months (some 75 rioters killed by police and about 50 Rightists killed by Communists -- figures for June not yet complete). On other hand number of policemen killed was negligible, indicating more effective defensive and preventive measures. Communist Party documents captured 6th revealed determined program for post-election disorders. Rebellion in Cheju Island continued, but toward end of month Commander of National Constabulary declared pacification was in sight and slowness of campaign had been due to reluctance of Constabulary to end it solely by means of slaughter. Capture of rebels continued, more than 2,000 having been caught in Constabulary dragnet strung across island May 28. High Korean judicial officer sent to island to investigate situation upon returning to Seoul 15th stated troubles were due to islanders' clannishness and to venality of officials and would be protracted. Deputy Commanding General Coulter personally conducted on-spot inquiry and likewise found police brutality and unbridled official corruption contributing factors to discontent, which Communist agents had fanned into rebellion. Because of unlikelihood of early pacification or political conciliation, elections for two North Cheju seats in National Assembly which had already been postponed from May 10 to June 23, were on 10th put off indefinitely. Reflecting perhaps bitterness of revolt was assassination on 17th during his sleep of Commanding Officer of Constabulary operations in island, regarded as one of best Korean soldiers.

▪ 5·10선거 실시에 관한 군정청 보고서(1948. 7. 22)





United States Political Adviser,
Hq. XXIV Corps, APO 235 c/o PM,
San Francisco, California

Seoul, Korea, July 22, 1948

AUG - 9 1948

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUBJECT: Report on United States Military Government's Activities in Connection with the Korean Election

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

AUG 3

With reference to Seoul POLAD despatch No. 185, June 25, 1948, transmitting three sets of a secret report prepared by the Command's Liaison Officer on the activities of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, I have the honor to enclose four copies of the "restricted" report prepared by the United States Military Government in Korea on its activities in connection with the holding of the Korean election on May 10, 1948.

There are also enclosed four copies of the Military Governor's memorandum of July 10, 1948 to the Commanding General transmitting this report.

As suggested in connection with the Liaison Officer's report, the information contained in the report transmitted herewith may be of assistance to the Department's officers who handle the Korean problem during the meeting of the General Assembly at Paris. In addition, both reports will be of interest for historical purposes.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph E. Jacobs
United States Political Adviser

Enclosures:

1. 4 sets of report by USAMGIK
2. 4 copies of memorandum July 10, 1948 from Military Governor to Commanding General

<첨부문서> 5·10선거와 주한미군정청 활동에 관한 보고서(1948. 7. 10)

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch No. 225, July 12, 1948, Seoul, Korea, "Report on United States Military Government Activities in Connection with the Korean Election of May 10, 1948"

COPY

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
Office of the Military Governor
APO 235 UNIT 2

10 July 1948

SUBJECT: Report of the Holding of Elections in South Korea

TO : Commanding General
United States Army Forces in Korea
APO 235

1. Attached are seventeen (17) copies of a report entitled: "Report of the Military Governor of the holding of elections in South Korea on 10 May 1948, leading to the establishment of a Korean National Assembly and Government under the observation of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK)." (See attached inclosure for recommended distribution).

2. The Korean people have demonstrated beyond doubt that they are capable of holding, under normal conditions, fair, honest, and efficient elections in the best democratic traditions. The administrative and organizing abilities of officials of the South Korean Interim Government and the National Election and subordinate Committees during the 10 May elections were of a uniformly high order. The efforts of Communist and dissident elements to stop the elections and to confuse the people were generally speaking ineffective.

3. The attached report shows that the leadership, drive, energy and technical direction of United States advisers in SKIG and the Chief Civil Affairs Officers in the Provinces, were responsible to a considerable extent for the success of the election of the executive and policy level. This statement does not, of course, detract in the least from the magnificent work of the Koreans in the organization and administration of the election machinery itself.

4. Largely because of the important role of the U. S. officials in this election the attached report is classified as "Restricted." For international reasons, it is inadvisable to stress overly U.S. participation publicly at this time.

5. The National Election Committee has prepared a report of the part that was played by that and subordinate committees and officials in the election. An English copy will be forwarded seperately as soon as translated. That report should be suitable for publicity purposes in South Korea.

/s/ W. F. Dean
W. F. DEAN
Major General, United States Army
Military Governor

<첨부문서> 선거결과 보고

S E L E C T E D

I N D E X

Subject

Preamble

I - PREPARATORY PHASES

1. Technical and Administrative Arrangements

2. Budget for Election Expenses

3. Measures Taken for Attainment of "Free Atmosphere" For Elections

4. Adoption of Election Date, Election Law and Regulations

5. Information Program

II - REGISTRATION AND ELECTIONS

6. Registration and Elections in Seoul City and the Provinces

7. Communist Efforts to Disrupt and Prevent Elections

8. UN Observation of Elections

9. Official Results of the Election

III - NATIONAL ELECTION COMMITTEE AND ELECTION REVIEW BOARD

10. National Election Committee

11. Election Review Board

IV - ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

12. Convocation of National Assembly

Summary

I - PREPARATORY PHASES

2. Budget for Election Expenses

Subsequent requests for funds were received from the National Election Committee to cover expenses for rent of polling places, local publication of notices, transportation, etc., for allocation to the provinces, totalling W122,760,000. Several conferences with the Military Governor and the National Election Committee resulted in reducing this amount to W28,000,000 which was approved. This amount was broken down for allocation to the provinces, and a directive covering the allocation of these

funds was prepared and issued on 15 April. Included in this directive was a strong statement to the effect that no further funds would be allocated, and that every available government resource would be used in order to keep expenditures down. The final budget amounted to W851,798,000.

ALLOCATIONS BY PROVINCES AND OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION

	Funds Allocated
City of Seoul	W27,656,000.00
Kyonggi-Do	63,818,600.00
Kang Won-Do	30,409,600.00
Kyong Sang Pukto	92,570,600.00
Kyong Sang Namdo	69,439,700.00
Cholla Pukto	63,422,500.00
Cholla Namdo	71,385,500.00
Chung Chong Pukto	30,083,200.00
Chung Chong Namdo	58,138,600.00
Cheju Do	8,542,700.00
Office of Administration	336,331,000.00
	W 851,798,000.00

4. Adoption of Election Date, Election Law and Regulations.

a. Decision of Election Date.

(1) Paragraph 2, Part II of the United Nations Resolution of 14 November 1947, recommended "... that the elections be held not later than 31 March 1948 ..." It was recognized by UNTCOK before its arrival in Seoul that holding the elections by this date would be impossible and there never was any discussion with the U.S. authorities proposing that this deadline be met.

(2) Influence of Planting Season: On the 19th of January, the U.S. Liaison Officer sent a "Spring Agricultural

Calendar" prepared in the Department of Agriculture (Major C. M. Tatum, Adviser) to UNTCOK and in an accompanying note said: "It is suggested from the viewpoint of agriculture that the first week in May is the very latest period during which elections should be held." The planting season was recognized by both the U.S. authorities and UNTCOK as being the greatest influence in the establishment of an election date. Mr. Petrus J. Schmidt, the Principal Secretary, on 20 February remarked to the U.S. Liaison Officer: "We were exceedingly glad to get, when we first arrived here, a calendar giving the planting schedule. This more than anything else helped to push the work along. It was the thing I needed to convince the delegates that they must reach some decision by the first of March."

(3) An earlier election date would have interrupted spring plantings in Kyonggi and Kangwon Do; a later one would have affected seeding farther south and transplanting in the north. Inasmuch as initial plantings and the subsequent transplanting of rice are dates that must be closely adhered to, the proper timing of the election undoubtedly contributed to its success. Due to the timeliness and because the election itself was carried through with a minimum of unrest there was only slight interference in the regular agricultural routine. Fisheries in Cheju Do were most affected, with production only 30 to 40% of normal.

(4) The selection of the actual date on which elections were to be held was carefully coordinated between UNTCOK and the U.S. Command. The agreement to hold elections not later than 10 May 1948, with the understanding that the U.S. authorities would select 9 May as the specific date, was reached on 29 February. At the same time, however, the U.S. Liaison officer carefully warned Mr. Schmidt, the Principal Secretary

of UNTCOK, that the selection of this date was conditional upon the U.S. authorities receiving promptly UNTCOK comments on the Election Law and Regulations, without which it was impossible to proceed with essential election preparations.

II - REGISTRATION AND ELECTIONS

6. Registration and Elections in Seoul and the Provinces.

(10) Cheju Island

On the island of Cheju, long the scene of bitter family vendettas, the Communists apparently made their greatest effort to disrupt the elections. Trained agitators and possibly armed groups were sent to Cheju from other provinces to interfere and halt, if possible, the registration and balloting.

Casualties on Cheju Island were considerable. For the entire period of the Communist subversive effort beginning 7 February [redacted] to 14 May (Communist subversive activities still continue on a diminishing scale on Cheju) the figures were:

Election officials	- Killed 4 (More than any other province)
Police	- Killed 12 Wounded 25 (Second highest total among provinces)
Families of Police	- Killed 6 Wounded 3 (Highest total among provinces)

Additionally 42 persons were killed and 60 wounded by Communists in indiscriminate attacks on Cheju Island. The Communists were well armed, principally with Japanese weapons, and the mountainous areas of the island, afforded excellent concealment [redacted] for launching raids on villages. There was considerable intimidation of both election officials and voters and in some [redacted] complete destruction of balloting places, particularly in [redacted]. In some cases almost the entire village population [redacted] voluntarily or by force on Election Day.

[redacted] a vigorous campaign by the Communists, excellent [redacted] results were obtained. In the three electoral dis-

[redacted] in Cheju (2 in North and 1 in South Cheju) a total of 69.8% [redacted] registered and 86.6 of actual registrants voted. (Inclosure [redacted] 55) In North Cheju tha voting was ligher, however, than in [redacted] other area in South Korea:

North Cheju	No. of Registered Voters	No. of Actual Voting Voters	Districts	Districts Where Votes Could Not Be Counted
[redacted] Electoral District "A"	27,560	11,912	73	42
[redacted] Electoral District "B"	20,917	9,724	61	29

(Inclosure No. 54)

In view of the situation prevailing on Cheju, the Military Governor, on recommendation of the National Election Committee, invalidated the voting in the two electoral districts of North Cheju. Elections in these areas were postponed indefinitely. (See Inclosure No. 46 for detailed report of U.S. observers).

(11) Report of Chief Adviser and USAMGIK Liaison Officer (Colonel Wm. F. Center, Acting Chief Adviser, and Lt. Colonel Charles G. Duffy, Liaison Officer)

Attached as Inclosure No. 47 is a report of the Office of Chief Adviser, South Korean Interim Government, which coordinated the various overall steps within the responsibility of the United States Army Military Government in Korea and the South Korean Interim Government. This office, through Colonel Duffy, also acted as liaison link between the U.S. Liaison Officer with the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea and the United States Army Military Government in Korea and also between the latter and the National Election Committee. (For photographs of Election Day balloting and other election activity, see Inclosures Nos. 47A to 470.)

7. Communist Efforts to Disrupt and Prevent Elections.

a. Beginning on 7 February 1948, the Communists began an

intensive, comprehensive effort to disrupt and prevent the 10 May elections in South Korea and to force the UNTCOK to leave Korea. That effort included murder, arson, violence, strikes, demonstrations, bribery, incitement to riot and revolution, intimidation, and propaganda. There was no doubt that the entire campaign was planned in Pyongyang and directed from Voroshilov (Eastern Siberian Military Headquarters) and Moscow.

b. The attempted 7 February general strike and the consequent disturbances and rioting were a prelude to the overall plan. This effort generally failed although it represented almost a maximum Communist effort.

c. The PYONGYANG Radio in North Korea trumpeted the major official themes of the campaign:

"The armies of both U.S. and U.S.S.R. should withdraw at once."

"The 10 May election means the permanent division of Korea."

"The United States intends to colonize Korea as part of an imperialistic plan."

"Pro-Japs and national traitors should be destroyed."

Subsidiary propaganda was to be spread by Communist agents as follows:

(1) A Korean People's Republic was already established in North Korea.

(2) An army of thousands of trained soldiers has been set up in North Korea while South Korea has very feeble national defense power.

(3) KIM, Il Sung (North Korea Communist leader) will conquer South Korea by force within a short time.

(4) The practical action to be taken was: "Grasp the chance now that the people are restless, and assail the police stations, killing policemen and rightist leaders. Tell the

people that if they do not oppose the general election, they will be punished as traitors."

d. Riots and disturbances were to be fomented at meetings (1) denouncing the U.N. Commission, (2) insisting that both occupation forces withdraw and (3) urging transfer of the political power to the people. Women would be sent to the administrative authorities to demand food. Food would be stolen and distributed to the people. When the Police and Dai Dong Youth Party interrupted meetings, the Communists were to crush them completely. When the people were ready to assault government and public offices the leaders were to disappear to evade responsibility but the assault would not be stopped. Fighting was to be continued so that it would paralyze peace and order.

e. Special instructions were issued in connection with the above efforts:

(1) For propagandizing, assaulting and destructive purposes, strangers from other districts were to be used.

(2) Leaders were to be either poor farmers or people who [illegible] the "revolutionary spirit" in the fight of February 7th. [illegible]

(3) The Constabulary was to be bribed and induced to clash with the police.

f. Although the Communist efforts were well planned and vigorously executed, the elections were carried out in most of Southern Korea quietly and efficiently. (On Cheju Island and in the Southern provinces the Communists made major efforts to stop the election and create chaos and revolution, particularly on Cheju). During the election week-end of 8-10 May there were 57 attacks on voting booths, 7 policemen killed, 1 candidate wounded and 5 election officials killed besides numerous other killings and incidents involving sabotage of industry and communications,

strikes, etc. But the entire campaign of the Communists from 7 February through 14 May totalled many more:

		Killed	Wounded
Election offices attacked	134		
Election officials and candidates		17	65
Police and their families		56 (49 policemen)	142 (128 policemen)
Communists and rioters		261	123

(See Inclosure No. 48 for complete details).

The Communists aided by family vendettas and isolation of Cheju Island, succeeded in disrupting the elections there sufficiently to cause the Military Governor to order new elections. The Communists made a powerful effort on Cheju Island and apparently brought in numbers of trained agitators and quantities of arms and ammunition from other areas and from North Korea itself. The effort continues and may be played up on Communist radio broadcasts as the "Greece of the Orient."

g. One of the most quieting influences on the election was the organization of the "Community Protective Corps (Hyang Boh Dan) with the approval of the South Korean Interim Government shortly before the election solely to guard against the anticipated Communist disruptive attempts and interference with the elections. This vigilante-type body of men was organized from citizens and members of youth groups not armed with clubs. It was dissolved on 22 May 1948 by Mr. [illegible], Vice Minister of SKIG, with the approval of the Military Governor. The body served a good purpose although (inevitably) there were a few reports of excesses committed by some members of the Corps.

h. Korean Constabulary (Brig. Gen. W. L. Roberts, Adviser)

(1) The entire Constabulary was alerted for possible action and immediate movement.

(2) Every American Adviser was directed to be physically present with the unit to which he was assigned, from 081800 May 1948 to 121800 May 1948. Other instructions directed the safe-

guarding of weapons and ammunition. An American duty officer was present at this Headquarters night and day from 080800 May to 121800 May. American advisers in the field established liaison with Civil Affairs Officer of each province, who called out Korean Constabulary for special guards in many provinces.

(3) Twenty-two (22) platoons were alerted to guard as many prisons; in some cases where unit was not close to prison earmarked for guard, the unit did not move out to a closer area near the prison, but still remained on an alert status.

(4) The Korean Constabulary also assumed the responsibility of guarding four (4) Hydro plants and four (4) Thermal plants.

(5) Four (4) Platoons from 4th Regiment were sent to isolated places for security reasons.

(6) On Cheju Do Island, the Korean Constabulary assisted in guarding the voting boxes.